XEROX

Xerox University Microfilms
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

WESTERN AMERICANA

Reproduced from the original in the collection of
THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARIES

VIOLATIONS OF FREE SPEECH AND RIGHTS OF LABOR

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR UNITED STATES SENATE

SEVENTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

THIRD SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Res. 266

(74th Congress)

THE LIBRARY OF THE
JUL 1 1940
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

A RESOLUTION TO INVESTIGATE VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY AND INTERFERENCE WITH THE RIGHT OF LABOR TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

PART 54

AGRICULTURAL LABOR IN CALIFORNIA

SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY COTTON STRIKE, 1933

LABOR CONDITIONS IN IMPERIAL VALLEY

WHEATLAND HOP-FIELD RIOT OF 1913

EXHIBITS ENTERED IN
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
JANUARY 13, 1940

Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and Labor

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89662 WASHINGTON : 1940

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR

ELBERT D. THOMAS, Utah, *Chairman*

DAVID I. WALSH, Massachusetts	WILLIAM E. BORAH, Idaho
JAMES E. MURRAY, Montana	ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, Jr., Wisconsin
VIC DONAHEY, Ohio	JAMES J. DAVIS, Pennsylvania
RUSH D. HOLT, West Virginia	ROBERT A. TAFT, Ohio
CLAUDE PEPPER, Florida	
ALLEN J. ELLENDER, Louisiana	
JOSH LEE, Oklahoma	
LISTER HILL, Alabama	

EARL B. WIXCEY, *Clerk*
W. ALAN THODY, *Assistant Clerk*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SENATE RESOLUTION 266

ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, Jr., Wisconsin, *Chairman*
ELBERT D. THOMAS, Utah
DAVID I. WALSH, Massachusetts

HENRY H. FOWLER, *Chief Counsel*
DAVID D. LLOYD, *Assistant Chief Counsel*
JAMES P. HART, Jr., *Associate Counsel*
DANIEL F. MARGOLIES, *Associate Counsel*
JAMES E. HEATH, *Associate Counsel*
ELWOOD W. HOLSTEIN, *Secretary*

NANCY A. HAYCOCK, *Editor*
DELLA C. KESSLER, *Assistant Editor*
MARION F. ROACH, *Assistant Editor*

CONTENTS

Statements and reports: Page

- **The Supply of Agricultural Labor as a Factor in the Evolution of Farm Organization in California, by Varden Fuller (exhibit 8762–A)** 19777
  - **Table of contents** 19777
- **Report of State Labor Commissioner Frank C. MacDonald to Governor James Rolph, Jr., on San Joaquin Valley Cotton Strike, September–October, 1933 (exhibit 8762–B)** 19899
- **Hearings on the Cotton Strike in San Joaquin Valley by the Fact Finding Commission Appointed by James Rolph, Jr., Governor of the State of California, Held in Visalia, California, October 19 and 20, 1933 (exhibit 8763)** 19913
- **Documentary History of the Strike of Cotton Pickers in California, 1933, by Paul S. Taylor and Clark Kerr (exhibit 8764)** 19945
  - **Introduction** 19947
  - **The strike interrupts the harvest** 19948
  - **The union attack** 19953
  - **The growers' resistance** 19962
    - **Growers' wage offer of 60 cents** 19963
    - **Eviction of strikers from camps** 19963
    - **Endeavor to "rid" valley of "radicals" and "communists"** 19965
    - **Resistance to picketing** 19967
    - **Efforts to increase number of pickers at work** 19968
    - **Suggestion to import strikebreakers** 19970
    - **Efforts to undermine confidence of strikers in leaders** 19972
    - **Efforts to influence other elements in community** 19974
  - **Corcoran Camp** 19975
  - **Mexican Consul** 19979
  - **Law enforcement** 19982
  - **Relief** 19993
  - **Settlement** 19996
  - **Aftermath** 20010
  - **Attitudes** 20014
  - **Appendix** 20022
    - **Some points of view** 20022
    - **Tactics** 20028
    - **Strike strategy in the agricultural fields** 20033
    - **Statistics of strikers receiving relief** 20036
- **Campbell McCullough's report on labor conditions in Imperial Valley (exhibit 8765)** 20037
- **Report to the National Labor Board by Special Commission, consisting of J. L. Leonard, Will J. French, and Simon J. Lubin (exhibit 8766)** 20043
  - **Introductory** 20043
  - **Chronology of events** 20043
  - **Imperial County** 20044
  - **Land economics** 20045
  - **The labor situation** 20046
  - **Violation of Constitutional rights** 20049
  - **Commercial aspects** 20050
  - **Immediacy of situation** 20051
- **Report of a special investigating committee, consisting of C. B. Hutchison, W. C. Jacobsen, and John Phillips, on the Imperial Valley farm labor situation (exhibit 8767–A)** 20053
- **Supplement to the Report Entitled "The Imperial Valley Farm Labor Situation," published and distributed by Associated Farmers of California, Inc. (exhibit 8767–B)** 20065

Statements and reports—Continued.

	Page
Report on the Wheatland, California, hop-field riot of August 3, 1913, submitted by the State Commission of Immigration and Housing of California to the Governor of California (exhibit 8768)	**20069**
The hop-pickers	**20069**
Wage conditions	**20069**
Sanitary condition of the camp	**20070**
The employer	**20071**
The I. W. W	**20071**
Problem	**20072**
The remedy	**20072**

EXHIBIT 8762-A[1]

THE SUPPLY OF AGRICULTURAL LABOR AS A FACTOR IN THE EVOLUTION OF FARM ORGANIZATION IN CALIFORNIA

By Varden Fuller, associate agricultural economist, United States Bureau of Agricultural Economics

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Chapter I. Introduction to the Problem:

1. The background 19778
2. The problem 19782

Chapter II. Spanish and Mexican Colonial Agriculture and Impressed Indian Labor:

1. The mission as a colonizing agency on the Pacific Coast 19784
2. Pueblos and presidios as agencies of minor significance in economic life during the mission regime 19786
3. The development of agriculture before the secularization of the missions 19788
4. Indian labor in civil life after secularization 19789
5. Decline of agriculture during the short period of civil life between secularization and the beginning of American control 19790
6. The question of slavery in California as a state in the Union 19793
7. Summary statement: Influence of Spanish and Mexican colonial institutions on subsequent economic organization in agriculture 19794
8. Bibliography 19795

Chapter III. American Agricultural Beginnings with a Scarce Labor Supply:

1. Characteristics of the population of 1850 19796
2. Availability of land 19798
3. Production opportunities 19798
4. "Where shall the laborers be found?" 19799
5. Encouragement to immigration and population changes, 1850 to 1870 19799
6. The Chinese in agriculture before 1870 19801
7. Enterprise organization, 1850 to 1870 19803
8. Significance of labor supply to farm organization, 1850 to 1870 19806
9. Bibliography 19808

Chapter IV. Chinese Labor: Intensive Cultivation in an Area of Sparse Population:

1. Changes in farm labor supply after 1869 19809
2. New enterprises 19810
3. Increasing dependence of agriculture upon Chinese labor 19810
4. Attitude of farm employers towards exclusion of Chinese immigration 19811
5. The labor supply immediately following Chinese exclusion 19813
6. Concerted action by farm employers to protect the resident Chinese labor supply 19814
7. Reorganize agriculture or import new labor supplies? 19815
8. Labor abundance without significant importation or immigration, 1889–1902 19818
9. Recrudescence of demand for additional Chinese labor, 1902–1907 19819
10. Quantitative importance of Chinese labor, 1870–1900 19820
11. Influence of Chinese labor on agricultural wage rates 19822
12. Changes in agriculture, 1870–1900 19823
13. Bibliography 19826

Chapter V. Farm Organization Based on Chinese Labor Perpetuated Through a Period of Labor Scarcity by Japanese:

1. Japanese immigration to California 19827
2. The Japanese as successors to the Chinese as laborers in California agriculture 19829
3. Japanese wage rates and their influence on the general level of wages 19833
4. Attitude of employers towards Japanese 19834
5. Efforts to encourage migration of farm population from eastern states, 1900–1910 19837
6. Hindustanis as a minor oriental labor group during the Japanese period 19838
7. The significance of Japanese labor to California farm organization 19839
8. Bibliography 19841

Chapter VI. Labor Supply for the War Decade, 1910–1920:

1. Reaction against orientals, revival of interest in domestic supply, and expectation of European immigration 19842
2. Agricultural labor supply kept abundant throughout the pre-war period by economic depression 19843
3. Concerted action by employers in opposition to the eight-hour day proposal 19845
4. Development of interest in altering the rural economic structure through state control of land settlement 19846
5. The war emergency and agricultural labor supply 19847
6. Bibliography 19849

Chapter VII. The Mexicans and Filipinos in California Agriculture:

Part I: Immigration and Population:

1. Mexican immigration to the United States and to California 19850
2. Mexican immigration not included in the quota restriction law 19853
3. Groups supporting quota restriction of Mexicans 19854
4. Social problems associated with the Mexicans 19854
5. Filipino migration to California 19857
6. Proportion of Mexican and Filipino immigrants occupied as farm laborers 19860

---

[1] See pt. 53, p. 19494.

Chapter VII. The Mexicans and Filipinos in California Agriculture—Continued. Page
Part 2: Economic Relationship:
1. Labor supply during the first half of the twenties 19860
2. The genesis of "dependence" on Mexican labor 19861
3. The economics of employer demand for convenient access to the Mexican labor supply 19863
4. The proportional importance of Mexican and Filipino employment 19871
5. Wage rates for Mexican and Filipino labor 19873
6. Significance of Mexican and Filipino labor to California farm organization 19873
7. Bibliography 19875
Chapter VIII. Summary and Conclusions 19876
Appendix A. 1. Tables 24-43 19883
Appendix B. 2. Exhibits I-VI 19894

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

The Background.—The majority of American farms are of such size that a large proportion of the work can be performed by the operator and the members of his family. On the basis of 1930 census data, only one out of every four gainfully employed in agriculture was a hired laborer. For most of American agriculture the hired laborer is the "farm hand." If he is single, he often lives with the farm family. If he is married, he lives either in a house furnished on the farm or in a house provided by himself in the immediate neighborhood. In any case he receives relatively steady work, either on one particular farm or on several farms located within the neighborhood. And moreover, he is able to enjoy a stabilized relationship with the community. The additional casual and seasonal labor required above that which is furnished by the operator, his family members and the regularly employed laborers is supplied principally by individuals who are stable within the community. They may be young people on school vacation, workers temporarily or seasonally unemployed from nonagricultural industries, and others who for one reason or another are available for temporary agricultural employment.

Certain agricultural areas in the United States are distinct exceptions to this typical pattern. Farm operations in these areas are conducted with a high proportion of wage laborers, many of whom must be drawn from outside the community for temporary employment. Among such areas, and one of the most extreme instances is California. Many localities within this state are dependent for their farm operations on a mobile labor supply which has neither stability in employment nor in domicile. There are other areas within the state which more nearly correspond to the pattern which is typical for the nation. Therefore when data for the state as a whole are being considered, there is a tendency for the more typical areas to offset the exceptional areas.

Census data for 1930 indicate the relative proportions of those engaged in agriculture in California, compared with Minnesota, Ohio, and the United States to be as follows:[1]

	California	Minnesota	Ohio	United States
Paid workers [1]	59.8	25.9	29.6	26.7
Farm operators [2]	38.1	60.5	64.5	57.4
Unpaid family workers	2.1	13.6	5.9	15.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[1] Laborers, managers, and foremen.
[2] Owners and tenants.

Some of those classifying themselves in the census of occupations as farm operators actually operate very small units and receive a large proportion of their income from employment off the farm. If the number of farm operators is adjusted by eliminating those receiving 150 days or more employment off the farm (in 1929), the proportion of operator as against wage labor is changed. In the following figures this adjustment has been made and at the same time the proportion of unpaid family labor has been grouped with that for the operators.[2]

---

[1] Percentages calculated from U. S. Dept. Commerce. Bureau of the Census. *Fifteenth Census of the United States (1930).* Occupations Vol. IV, pp. 25, 174, 828, 1240.

[2] Numbers gainfully occupied as above. The number of operators employed off the farm in 1929 is from U. S. Dept. Commerce. Bureau of the Census. *Part-time Farming in the United States.* (Special Study). (Gov't. Print. Off.: Washington, D. C., 1937), p. 33.

	California	Minnesota	Ohio	United States
Self-employed	36.0	73.3	67.9	71.8
Hired [1]	64.0	26.7	32.1	28.2

[1] Including managers and foremen.

Some of the operators who worked off the farm were employed in agriculture. If the number of farm operators who worked as farm laborers could be added to the "hired" group above, the proportions of self-employed would be reduced still further. But an accurate adjustment for this is impossible because of inadequate data.[3]

The number in California reporting themselves as hired laborers (not including managers and foremen) in 1930 was 190,022. Professor Adams' survey of seasonal labor demand [4] (labor needed in addition to that supplied by the operator, his family, and regularly employed hired labor) indicates that approximately 145,000 temporary workers are needed at the point of maximum demand in September. None of these workers can be given permanent employment on any particular farm or in any particular restricted locality. A portion of them could obtain relatively full employment by moving about between the specialized areas where the seasonal labor demand does not come simultaneously. But the variation in demand is so great in the aggregate that the whole group cannot receive anywhere near full employment. Excluding any in- and out-of-state movement during the year, this group or 145,000 could not obtain employment in agriculture for more than 60 per cent of the time. (Table 32 Appendix A.)

If the 145,000 seasonally employed workers [5] be subtracted from the total of 190,000 hired farm laborers, this leaves the number of regularly employed at 45,000. The total number of farm operators (owners and tenants) plus the managers and foremen in 1930 was 135,000. Eliminating the 22,000 operators who were employed 150 days or more off the farm reduces the regularly employed operators to 113,000. Adding the 45,000 regularly employed hired laborers to this number gives a total regularly employed of 158,000. Addition of the 22,000 temporarily employed operators to the 145,000 temporarily employed laborers brings the total number of temporarily employed to 167,000.

	Number	Percent
Regularly employed	158,000	48.6
Temporarily employed	167,000	51.4
Total [1]	325,000	100.0

[1] Excluding unpaid family workers who for the most part also are probably only temporarily employed.

Thus less than half of those gainfully employed in California agriculture receive regular work. This does not take into account the additional individuals who do not classify themselves as being engaged in agriculture but who do receive temporary employment at seasonal rushes. Also it does not take account of the technically necessary idle time of farm operators who do not obtain outside employment during slack periods on the farm.

The institutional foundation on which this economic structure, conducted with a high ratio of hired to operator labor and offering only temporary employment to such a large number of individuals, rests is one of large proportions of specialized, commercialized, intensified, and large scale farming.

---

[3] Farm operators working off the farm are classified according to whether their employment was principally "agricultural" or "non-agricultural" only in 1934. (*Part-time Farming in the United States*, op. cit., p. 33). These categories represent individuals and are not classified by quantities of employment. Hence it is hardly possible to develop ratios from the 1934 classification which could be applied to the 1929 data, in order to make such an adjustment as is mentioned above.

[4] R. L. Adams, "Seasonal Labor Requirements for California Crops," University of California Agricultural Experiment Station *Bul.* 623 (Berkeley, 1938), 28 pp.

[5] Actually the number is usually greater, for with the aggregate demand at 145,000, a perfect distribution of labor would be required in order to meet the demand with a supply of 145,000.

A special monograph study by the Census Bureau on the returns of the 1930 census [6] discovered that 37 per cent of all the large scale farms [7] in the nation were located in California. Of the truck and fruit types California had 60 per cent of the national total. (Table 27 Appendix A.) Within California, large scale farms of all types controlled 25 per cent of the farm acreage, hired 35 per cent of the labor and produced 29 per cent of the total output of agricultural commodities. By type of farm, the proportions of large scale farming within California were greatest in truck farming, stock ranching, and in cotton production. Large scale truck farms hired more than 50 per cent of the labor hired by all truck farms and produced more than 50 per cent of the total output. (Table 26 Appendix A.)

The value of output per farm in California for those types of farm in which the largest proportions of large scale farming occur is in sharp contrast to the output per farm of similar types for the remainder of the United States, as the following figures indicate: [8]

	California	United States (excluding California)
Cotton farms	$7,114	$1,024
Fruit farms	4,192	2,866
Truck farms	8,040	2,380

A further analysis of farm sizes of all types within California indicates that the largest ten per cent, as measured in farm acreage, controls some eighty per cent of the total farm land of California. The largest ten per cent in value of products produces more than fifty per cent of the total value of output.[9] (Fig. 1.)

The relatively greater intensity of California agriculture in the aggregate is indicated by the fact that, as of 1929, the value per acre of all products in California was $95 as compared with less than $31 for the nation as a whole.[10] This is only an approximate indication of real output per acre because value figures are affected by local variations in the price level. Another approximate indication of relative intensity is that, as of 1929, California agriculture used an average of 5.6 days of hired labor per acre of crop land harvested as compared with a national average of 1.1 days. (Table 35 Appendix A.)

In the aggregate, California farm production is highly diversified. But on individual farms and within particular areas specialization is relatively great. An unusual aspect of specialization occurs in California in the following form: In such areas as the Imperial Valley and the Santa Maria Valley where truck crops are grown in rotation with alfalfa and other soil-building crops, the specialized truck crop operator will move his operations from one piece of land to another. After a certain piece of land has produced truck crops for say three years, it will be rented to a dairyman for three or four years, and then returned to truck crop production. This results in specialized mobile operators, whose rate of mobility is dictated by the requirements of soil preservation. The units of land meanwhile go through a cycle of specialized uses. This is in contrast to the more usual pattern of diversification in the United States where each operator, remaining on the same land, will devote various portions of it to different lines of production. Thus in the more usual form, each operator and each farm are diversified at every point in time.

The few available quantitative indications of the relatively greater specialization in California farming are as follows: [11] For the United States as a whole, 17 per cent of the farms are "general" farms whereas in California 3 per cent of all farms

---

[6] R. D. Jennings, *Large Scale Farming in the United States*, 1929. U. S. Dept. Commerce. Bureau of the Census. (Govt. Print. Off. Washington, D. C., 1933), 106 pp.

[7] Farms which produced, or normally would have produced, $30,000 or more in value of product in 1929.

[8] Calculated from U. S. Dept. Commerce. Bur. of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States, (1930). *Agriculture* Vol. III, Part 3, pp. 24, 33.

[9] These two sets of ten per cent do not necessarily include identical farms because the analysis is based on independent arrays rather than on a cross-classification.

[10] Varden Fuller, Wage Rates and Expenditures for Labor, California, 1909–1935 (unpublished manuscript in Giannini Foundation Library, University of California), Table 7.

[11] An adequate quantitative measurement of the relative specialization of California agriculture, either on individual farms or within areas is difficult to make. Prior to the "type of farm" classifications of the 1930 census of agriculture, crop acreages and livestock numbers by counties are the only data available for the state as a whole. Even the "type of farm" data are of limited significance in measuring specialization, for they indicate mainly the *predominating* form.



Source of data: Table 26, Appendix A.

fall in this category. Whereas 8 per cent of all the farms in the nation are "self-sufficing," the proportion is only 1.5 per cent in California. (See table 29 Appendix A, which also includes a definition of these types of farm.) The proportion of all farm products consumed on the farm is relatively low for California, being only 2.5 per cent as compared with 13 per cent for all the farms in the nation. (Table 30 Appendix A.)

It is possible to get a rough measure of the extent of specialization in the aggregate, as between crops and livestock. The percentage of the total value of products which is contributed by livestock and livestock products on the crop-type farms is as follows, the data as of 1929:[13]

	California	United States
Cash-grain	10.0	21.6
Cotton	4.9	7.0
Crop-specialty	5.6	11.5
Fruit	3.0	5.6
Truck	1.4	5.6

---

[13] Data for this and the following classification are based on Table 31 Appendix A, which gives greater details.

The percentages of total value of products on the livestock-type farms which is contributed by crops is as follows:

	California	United States
Dairy farms	6.0	8.6
Animal-specialty	14.1	10.5
Stock ranches	5.9	4.9
Poultry farms	4.7	7.0

These data do not give any indication of the diversification as among types of crops and among types of livestock and livestock products. As they stand they indicate that as between crops and livestock, California crop-type farms are relatively more specialized by that California livestock-type farms are as diversified as those of the nation.

The Problem.—The objective of this investigation is to examine the evolution of California large scale and specialized farming, in particular relation to the economic characteristics of the population which has been engaged in agriculture. Emphasis will be placed upon the *additions* to the population and upon the economic circumstances under which they have entered agricultural employment. The deductive analysis which has served as a point of orientation in this investigation may be sketched briefly as follows:

Economic forces which operate to produce a given structure of size and specialization of farms may be divided into two not wholly exclusive categories: (1) Those residing principally in the "natural" conditions of man's economic environment and which are largely outside the control of man. (2) Those residing within the abilities and the economic characteristics of the population (some of which might perhaps be classified as "natural"). These two sets of forces will operate on the whole structure of economic organization.

The economic forces influencing the size of farms [13] are those which produce internal economies.[14] Internal economies corresponding to a particular scale of production may arise in two types of ways: (a) In the technique of production. (b) In the process of business transactions involved in the the purchase of productive agents and the sale of output. The former type of internal economics is experienced in the gains from division of labor and in the efficient utilization of some unit of equipment or agent of production which is costly and indivisible (such for instance as a combined harvester or a fumigating plant). The latter type of internal economics applies to the opportunities to make gains through buying or selling in large enough quantities to obtain discounts, favorable transportation rates, etc., or more favorable interest rates on capital loans.

Another factor influencing the size of farms which lies mainly outside the field of active economic forces is the public land policy under which the domain is apportioned for private use. Where the land policy has been to allot the domain in arbitrarily fixed size units, it may take considerable time for economic forces to produce subdivision or amalgamation of the legal units towards an "economic unit." In some instances, as with the *Erbhof* of Germany, size in land area is legislatively fixed and economic forces are not permitted to introduce any alterations.

The principal force tending towards specialization is the relative advantage of soil, climate, and distance from markets of a unit of land for the production of a given commodity. In some instances in California the advantage of one line of production greatly exceeds all others but the more usual situation is one of a series of more or less equal alternatives, depending on the turn of the market. Operating against the force of relative advantage towards specialization are a number of forces tending towards diversification. One of these is the necessity of rotating crops and keeping livestock in order to maintain soil fertility. Another is the opportunity to increase income by developing complementary and supplementary enterprises, either to utilize the by-products of one enterprise in another or in order more fully to utilize the agents of production.

---

[13] A suitable definition of "size" which at the same time corresponds to the possibility of measurement with available data is hard to make. Size defined in units of land is not a good measure for comparison between areas where the type of farming differs. Size measured in the gross value of products is also subject to great limitations. Value figures are subject to variations as the local price level varies, and also for different types of production the ratio of net value to gross is subject to wide variation. Perhaps the best measure of size is "value added" in the sense used by the Census of Manufactures. For present purposes, it is sufficient to think of size as being the ratio of hired labor to operator labor.

[14] I am going to assume that all farms are in pure competition. This rules out the possibility of an equilibrium size being determined by either rising marginal cost from monopsonistic purchase of factors or of declining marginal revenue from selling in an imperfect market.

The influence of the characteristics of the population on size and specialization of farms can perhaps be isolated from the influences in the "natural" environment and from the influences of technical methods by the analysis of a hypothetical situation.

Assume (a): that a new area is being organized for agricultural production with a population which is thoroughly homogeneous with respect to skill and entrepreneurial ability. (Entrepreneurial ability will be taken to include both the ability to organize an enterprise and the ability to command capital). Assume further that all internal economies of scale are negligible and that political intervention through land policy or taxation, etc., is absent. Under these circumstances, the tendency will be for all units to be of one-man size, except in so far as partnerships are formed for other than economic reasons. So long as no alterations in relative entrepreneurial ability appear (through differential ability to accumulate capital or experience), this size structure would be stable.

Assume, on the other hand, that (b): the same area is being organized for agricultural production, again with political intervention being absent and internal economics being negligible, with the exception of the economies of division of labor. Assume this time that the population is non-homogeneous with respect to entrepreneurial ability, i. e., some of the individuals are possessed of greater organizing ability and ability to command capital than others. In this case, through division of labor, those with relatively less ability will be able to produce more by working under the supervision of those with greater ability than they can by working under their own direction. Those with lesser ability will be forced into wage labor even against their will because those with greater ability will be able to pay more for land and to offer more as wages than those of lesser ability will be able to earn from land and labor employed under their own supervision. The tendency will be for larger units to be formed than would occur with a homogeneous population. The size of the units would vary according to the degree of concentration or entrepreneurial ability. The situation would remain stable, *ceteris paribus*, so long as the relative distribution of entrepreneurial ability did not change.

The influence of the characteristics of the population on the extent of specialization of output on individual farms can be shown in the same hypothetical situation. Assume that there is no necessity for diversification of crops or of maintaining livestock in order to preserve soil fertility, and that there is no opportunity to utilize by-products and the only force tending towards diversification is the desire more fully to utilize labor time.

In case (a) above, all of the population will be self-employed or at least will have equal employment opportunities. The pressure to develop supplementary enterprises wherever possible in order more fully to utilize labor time will be great. Diversification will proceed as far as the relative alternatives of production and the extent of complementary timing of labor need for each of these alternatives will permit.

In case (b) the population may be so non-homogeneous as to leave a considerable proportion of it with such limited alternatives for employment that some members will be available for employment on a temporary basis. In this case, labor time will not be an overhead cost as in the case (a). Thus labor will not be a factor tending to encourage greater specialization on individual farms and within areas. Operators will find it advantageous to specialize along the lines of maximum alternatives of the land and to employ labor only at the time when the line of specialization demands it.

Without overlooking the forces which in the above hypothetical situation have been held absent or negligible, this investigation will endeavor to trace the part which the characteristics of the population have played in the evolution of California farm organization.

When the term "cheap labor" is used in this discussion, its connotation is not intended to be derogatory in any respect; it is used only to denote individuals with restricted opportunities for employment. The term "white" to designate individuals who are not Negro, Chinese, Japanese, East Indian, Filipino, Porto Rican, or Mexican is only in line with customary usage and is not necessarily approved by the author.

Chapter II. Spanish and Mexican Colonial Agriculture and Impressed Indian Labor

> The southwest represents the connection of a great closed circuit of the world's civilization, whose first foundations were laid in the early institutions of Roman and Teuton. Here the two great streams of civilization have met; the one Romance, the other Teutonic. The former, moving first and more rapidly, having passed from Rome to old Spain, and thence to Mexico and the lands of the north, awaited the coming of the latter, moving from the northwest through Old England and New, and thence across the continent. As the latter has ever been characterised by thorough conquest and complete reduction of the resources of nature, and the former by loose and extended occupation of territory, the result of this meeting is easily determined by the general judgements of history.[15]

The Mission as a Colonizing Agency on the Pacific Coast.—Three agencies were employed by the Spanish in the colonization of the Pacific southwest: the mission, the pueblo, and the presidio. These agencies were intended to correspond to a foundation of religious, civil, and military forces, respectively. The mission was intended to convert the Indians to Christianity and to prepare them for civil life on a higher plane; the pueblo or civil colony was intended not only to strengthen the hold of the empire upon the frontier, but to serve as examples of colonization for the Indians and to produce food and military supplies for the army, navy, or other governmental agencies. The presidios were to protect both the missionaries and the civil colonists during the processes of conversion and settlement from external invasion and domestic disturbances. Of the three, only the civil colony was intended as a permanent agency. As the Indians became Christianized, the missions were to be converted into pueblos, with all religious functions being turned over to the lay clergy. The presidios were to be similarly disbanded.

This colonization theory had, however, been built up largely on the basis of the experience in Mexico, Central America, and Peru. When its application was attempted on the northern frontier among the more barbarian tribes, considerable modification was found to be required.[16] In the first place, the Indians of California had no sufficiently large and stabilized communities to permit the bringing of the faith to them; before ministration of the gospel could begin, it was necessary to assemble them. Secondly, there was even less economic organization.[17] Subsistence and other necessities of life were gained almost entirely from the spontaneous products of nature; the standard of living, compared with Old World standards, was essentially brutish. Such a mode of life was a wholly inadequate foundation upon which to lay the structure of a strange religion and a higher culture. The Indians must be taught the rudimentary arts of civilization; no better alternative was available for accomplishing this than to have it done by the missions; therefore, the task was delegated to them and their sphere of influence was broadened to include the temporal as well as the spiritual affairs of the Indians. To facilitate the process of teaching both religion and arts, the missionaries were permitted to bring the Indians to live within the missions.

When a new mission was being founded, the method of inducing the Indians to come to them was to attract their attention and interest by gifts of food, articles of clothing, colored beads, bits of bright cloth, and other trinketry of the advanced culture. Through such rewards, the Indians were persuaded to perform labor in the constructing of the mission buildings. His continued attachment to the mission was assured by the provision of clothing and food, the latter particularly having been a hazardous proposition in his old way of life. Instruction in the Catholic faith was begun at once and was usually conducted in Spanish or Latin. Since understanding was out of the question, no more was expected of the prospective convert than that he pay attention, learning only to pronounce some of the names and phrases and to perform the manual gestures. The missionaries, being zealous men of the general opinion that even a forced conversion was genuine and therefore immeasurably better than none, probably did not dally overlong with the conversion process. Paintings of the delights of paradise and the contrasting horrors of hell which adorned the walls of the chapels were an efficient supplementary technique to oral explanation. Contemporary foreign observers noted that harsher methods of persuasion were eventually employed on the refractory, the inattentive, and those showing outright repugnance to the manual dexterities and accoutrements of the imposed faith.[18]

---

[15] Frank W. Blackmar, "Spanish Institutions of the Southwest," Johns Hopkins University *Studies in Historical and Political Science* X (1891), 5-6.

[16] H. E. Bolton, "The Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish-American Colonies," *American Historical Review*, XXIII (October, 1917), 42-61. In the southern countries the mission system was preceded by, and in part evolved out of, two forms of civil system. The Laws of Burgos (1512) provided for compulsory civil congregation and the practice of the *encomienda*. This system was later replaced by the less harsh *repartimiento*, approximately a debt peonage. The mission system was intended, finally, to check the evils of exploitation while at the same time permitting realization of conversion, protection, and civilization. (See *ibid*, 42-61 and Lesley Byrd Simpson, "Studies in the Administration of the Indians in New Spain," *Ibero-Americana:* 7 (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1934), 129 pp. and *Ibero-Americana:* 13 University of California Press: Berkeley, 1938), 161 pp.

[17] A. L. Kroeber, "Handbook of the Indians of California," Bureau of American Ethnology *Bul.* 78 (Govt. Print. Off.: Washington, D. C., 1925), pp. 830-850.

Once an Indian had been baptized and become a neophyte, he was no longer permitted to leave the mission at his own decision. "Such neophytes were on a level with the soldiers who had taken oath to stand by the flag of their country which they could not be permitted to desert." These are the words with which Father Engelhardt explained the situation.[19] At each mission a small detail of soldiers, usually not more than four or five, were stationed with their principal function being to restore fugitive neophytes and to discourage running away. The presidios, too, were engaged in this task to a much greater extent than any other.[20] Life within the mission was not such as to impress observers or historians of its beneficence; the general impression, in fact, is to the contrary. Admittedly the system induced Indians to perform labor which was repulsive to them; the question must therefore rest in terms of whether the Indians experienced salutary advancement out of their mission training. The answer of historians here is generally in the negative. Blackmar maintains that the products of Indian labor were devoted less to their temporal welfare than to building up hoards within the missions and embellishing the churches.[21] Bancroft thought that the course of instruction given the neophytes was designed more specifically to make them useful to the mission than to prepare them for subsequent civil life.[22] Hittell gives an even less favorable account: "The condition of the Indians was so miserable and the discipline so severe that many attempted to escape; but they were almost always pursued and generally taken, when they were flogged and an iron clog fastened to their legs."[23]

If the situation for the Indians within the missions was so bad, by what methods were they induced to come into the system in the first place? First of all was the assurance of food, and this is admitted by both critics and sympathisers of the mission system to have been of principal importance.[24] Another was the very great curiosity of the Indians in the color and ceremonies of the missions and in the padres themselves. For the greater part it appears that the decision of whether to come within the mission system or not was left to the Indian. Although Hastings accuses the missionaries of having sent out and dragged them in for conversion,[25] it is quite improbable that the mission fathers ever engaged in this practice personally or directly. However, Forbes and other observers of the late mission period were of the impression that certain indirect methods of inducement were employed when the rate of conversion became too slow. The older neophytes of the missions realized that one of the best ways of improving their own prestige and of ingratiating themselves with the fathers was to bring in new applicants for conversion. Therefore it was their custom when allowed to go among their pagan fellows to represent mission life in its most favorable light. Moreover, some of the more trusted neophytes were permited to pay regular visits to their old homes and associates as well as to distant tribes, during the seasons of the year when their help was not needed at the missions. The boats in which the trip was taken were sometimes fitted out with musketry and cannons, in apparent excess of the probable requirements for self-protection and the procurement of game and evidently with the intention of supplementary persuasion.[26] That the rate of growth in the convert population was slow during the latter years of the mission regime is indicated by the fact that the total Indian population of eighteen missions in 1802 was 15,562 while that for twenty-one missions in 1831 had increased to only 18,683. The non-Indian population of all Alta California for the corresponding dates is given as not greater than 1,300, and as 4,342, respectively.[27]

---

[18] Alexander Forbes, *California: A History of Upper and Lower California*, (Russell edition, San Francisco, 1919), 215-216.

[19] Fr. Zephyrin Engelhardt, *The Missions and Missionaries of California* II (San Francisco, 1912), 204.

[20] Forbes, *op. cit.*, 205.

[21] Frank W. Blackmar, "Spanish Colonization of the Southwest," Johns Hopkins University *Studies in Historical and Political Science* VIII (1890), 37-38.

[22] H. H. Bancroft, *California Pastoral* (San Francisco, 1888), 229. "It is quite possible that the founders at first purposed not merely to convert the natives to christianity (sic), but to teach them also the arts of civilized life. Be it as it may, they were taught barely enough to utilize their labor. Neither the government nor the missionaries took any pains to make them in any way capable of relying on themselves after the secularization of the missions, which had to be pursuant to the royal orders under which the system of missions was established."

[23] T. H. Hittell, *History of California* II (San Francisco, 1885), 518-519.

[24] Engelhardt, *op. cit.* 204.

[25] L. W. Hastings, *The Emigrant's Guide to Oregon and California.* (Cincinnati, 1845), 105-106.

Pueblos and Presidios as Agencies of Minor Significance in Economic Life During the Mission Regime.—In contrast to the missions which as an agency were given only permissive powers, settlement in the civil colonies was under all manner of encouragements. Inducements were extremely liberal, including varying allowances of cash wages, advancement of subsistence, implements and stock, and as assurance of a market for their products at the presidios and other military outposts. After all the conditions of settlement had been met, clear titles to the land were supposed to be conferred upon all the colonists. In spite of all these liberal encouragements, the civil colony program of the Spanish was an almost complete failure. Only three pueblos had been founded in all Alta California by 1831;[28] the largest at this time was *Nuestra Senora de los Angeles* (Los Angeles), next was *San Jose de Guadalupe,* (San Jose), and last the almost insignificant village *Branciforte* (Santa Cruz).[29] The settlement of Los Angeles was undertaken with forty-six persons of mixed Indian and Negro blood, only slightly strained with Spanish; the original colonists of the other two pueblos were of approximately the same order. Subsequently, a large proportion of the colonists came to be made up of people of more marked Castilian descent, most of them being retired soldiers who had been pensioned off with land grants and who gained their subsistence from cultivation.

The failure of the colonies to expand and become more prosperous is to be ascribed, according to Blackmar, principally to the character of the colonists themselves. Spain had only a limited number of thrifty pioneers seeking to establish homes. What was available for the colonization project, including the criminals who were sent, were not of the aggressive or ambitious type. Moreover, the paternalistic practices of the government were extended so far as to encourage laziness and a life of ease rather than accomplishment. Close proximity to the domesticated Indians, who could be hired or forced to work, tended to degrade all labor. "Nearly all of the work was done by the neophytes, who were given a certain percentage of the crops for tilling the soil, or were hired from the padres at the missions."[30] Other reasons for lack of development of the civil colonies were the questionable security of the land titles, the lack of adequate markets, and the constant subordination of the fundamental interests of the colonists in behalf of the home government.

Presidios were established at San Diego, Santa Barbara, Monterey, and San Francisco. Theoretically, as has been seen, the presidios were to protect the country fron foreign invasion as well as from domestic disorder. In fact, the presidial fortifications and equipment were never kept in an adequate form to repel any respectable form of foreign invasion; actually, they were overwhelmed from time to time by lonely pirates, mainly for the amusement of the latter. The principal function, as it turned out, which the presidios served was to capture and return straying Indian neophytes.

Each presidio was provided with a tract of land for *el rancho del Rey,* which was to serve principally as a place for pasturing the presidio livestock, and to keep the taxes paid in kind. Although the soldiers were expected to do the work in connection with the king's farm, they soon learned to utilize the labor of the neophytes for all the tasks save those which could be conveniently done from horseback. The presidios kept fewer livestock and cultivated less land than the three civil colonies; their part in the economic life of the frontier was negligible.[31]

The Development of Agriculture Before the Secularization of the Missions.—Out of this combination of circumstances, the least permanent agency, the mission, proved to be the most aggressive. The missionaries were found to be good frontier agents and observers as well as managers of temporal affairs. Extensions of political and civil power were granted them, and they enlarged in independence, both conferred and assumed. They came to dominate the economic affairs of the territory, and when their interests came into conflict with those of private parties, civil colonists, or presidios, the issue was usually resolved in the padres, favor. Either because the Indians were slow to learn the arts of civilized life, or because the padres were less zealous in this matter than in the offices of the church, and probably because of both, it was generally recognized that the Indian was incapable of independent community life on the level of the imposed standards. Therefore the life of the missions had to be extended. Whereas the original intention had been to convert each into a civil community at the end of ten years, the earliest built were actually more than fifty years old before secularization was undertaken.[22]

---

[26] Forbes, op. cit. 214-216.

[27] Ibid., 200-201. These figures on the numbers of Indians probably represent the current enrollment. A common estimate for 1834, made by Duflot de Mofras, and accepted by Hittell and Bolton, was that of approximately 30,000. This is probably the total number who had been through and those currently within the mission. The California State Census of 1852 enumerated 33,539 "domesticated" Indians.

[28] Mexico became independent of Spain in 1822. But Mexican colonial policy in California was continued substantially as laid down by the Spanish until 1833.

[29] Forbes, op. cit., 206. Blackmar, "Spanish Institutions of the Southwest," op. cit., 166-186.

[30] Blackmar, op. cit., 187. Pages 153-191 of this work contain a complete account of the Spanish colonial municipalities.

[31] See Blackmar, op. cit., 192-216, for a concise account of the presidios and presidial towns.

The two foremost problems of the missions were subsistence and discipline, and the range and management of their economic activities were considerably conditioned by these two factors. On the one hand, great isolation, with slow and infrequent water connections and almost impossible land transportation, made it necessary that each mission provide the major portion of its food. On the other hand, disbelief in an abundance of worldly goods, and the opportunities for discipline in connection with physical toil made it unnecessary to adopt labor-saving methods of production. Harsh critics of the backward ways of the mission system apparently do not appreciate the patent facts that large volume or efficient production were not objectives, and that to have produced abundantly and efficiently would have been detrimental to the process of spiritual advancement in subjects whose first thought after subsistence was idleness. The neophytes were never fed a delectable variety of foods, but they were fed regularly.

Every mission was given the temporary use, without title, of some fifteen square miles of land, and if it were considered necessary, the missionaries found methods of expanding their allotment.[23] Part of the land was used for the cultivation of cereals and small amounts near the mission site for vines, fruits, and vegetables, but the great enterprise was cattle and, for the missions only, sheep. Most of the land was therefore used for grazing. In addition to cattle and sheep, the missions kept horses and mules, goats, and swine. (Table 1) Some curious animal husbandry practices were followed: Neither bulls nor rams were castrated before sexual maturity—the bulls not until they were three or four years old. Every herd was therefore attended with considerable bellowing and goreing, steers and wethers were unknown. Most of the beef was "bully beef." Mutton was but little eaten as the quality was poor, due partly to this practice and partly to the fact that the breed of sheep was not a good mutton producer. There was little dairying; butter, milk or cheese were not generally used.[24] The Spanish-Americans were under the impression that the flow of milk from the cow could not be induced without the presence and active participation of the calf. The technique was to let the calf suck for awhile, and, as he was occupying himself at one of the teats, to procure a little milk by stealth from the others. Such a practice necessitated the keeping of a large number of cows in order to get a small quantity of milk, and of keeping the calves with them. Their hogs were of Chinese extraction and of a better quality than either the cattle or the sheep. They were kept only for lard, and the husbandry practice was directed towards this goal. While the pig was growing up he was not permitted to become muscular and was fed so as to prevent the building up of much flesh. Later on, he would be penned up and fed corn as rapidly as he could absorb it until slaughtering time, whereupon he would be almost all fat and would produce the maximum of lard.[24a] Other than this feeding of hogs, there apparently was no attempt whatever to develop supplementary feeding for animals so that the whole livestock economy depended upon grazing.

Of the cereals, wheat was the most important and maize (Indian corn) was a widely used staple. Beans and *frijoles* were also important articles of the diet. Potatoes were known but not much used, vegetables other than peppers and onions were of little importance. Nearly all the missions had vineyards; horticulture and gardening, so far as they were practiced at all, were confined almost entirely to the missions.[35] Hemp had been produced for shipment to San Blas during 1792 and 1793 when the Spanish had stationed a squadron there.

---

[22] The missions of Alta California (including San Diego and northward) were administered by the Franciscan order while those of Baja California (Mexico) were administered by the Dominican. The Dominican Missions were even less economically and socially successful. Each went through a life cycle of approximately 50 years and then was disbanded because of loss of population through introduction of foreign diseases. (See Peveril Meigs, "The Dominican Mission Frontier of Lower California," University of California *Publications in Geography*, Vol. 7 (Berkeley, 1935), 153-156.

[23] Blackmar, *op. cit.*, 197-198. Forbes, *op. cit.*, 210.

[24] Forbes, *op. cit.*, 271-279.

[24a] Forbes, *op. cit.*, 271-279.

Field cultivation was rude, the plow was sometimes no more than a forked limb, with one end hitched to the horns of oxen. Even the best built plows had no metal in them and no share, they did not turn the soil but only made a rut of equal depth on both sides. In order adequately to loosen the soil and to kill the weeds, several cross plowings were required. The harrow was unknown; to cover the seed which was broadcast by hand, a limb or heavy log was dragged over the field. The crop was harvested and threshed entirely by hand, except that sometimes the trampling of horses was employed in the place of flailing.

Throughout the Spanish period, 1769–1822, there was but little foreign commerce. Provisions had been shipped to the Spanish squadron while it had been stationed at San Blas during 1792 and 1793. Spanish ships had been provisioned at their miscellaneous calls at California ports. The Russians had been anxious to open up trading relations with California, but with little success. Shortly after Mexican independence, foreign trade began to develop, particularly with hides and tallow as the exports to Peru, Chile, and Mexico, and a few years later a considerable trade was built up in live cattle to the Sandwich Islands. A small volume of trade with Boston merchants was built up between 1825 and 1834. Hides were exchanged for manufactured articles, but this trade did not achieve significant proportions until after the secularization of the missions. Domestic trade was of no importance during either the Spanish or the Mexican regime; there was no division of labor or specialization by areas—everybody did the same things and produced the same commodities. Furthermore, there were no means of inland transportation except along the waterways to permit any volume of domestic trade. The missions were apparently in the habit of giving or trading various products to private colonists and to the presidios from time to time, but these exchanges were not of such proportions and regularity as to be considered commercial trade.[36]

Within the mission there was some specialization of labor. Artisans were sent up from Mexico to teach various skills, and workers in agriculture were specialized along certain lines. The tasks assigned to the neophytes were never very arduous. Ordinarily they would have time every day for their beloved pastime, idleness, or for simple games. When it is considered that the number of people in relation to the domesticated Indians was very small, that they for the most part lived in unpretentious style, and that no foreign commerce of any extent was built up until the last few years of the mission regime, the charges by the harsher critics of "slavery" and "exploitation" can be seen to possess very little justice. The charges against the system must be placed not in terms of exploitation but of inefficacy in preparing the Indian neophytes for an adequate life on a higher social level. The conclusion of Forbes in this regard seems to be a fair summary of the situation:

> Notwithstanding this dark picture of the general mode of life of the converted Indians, it must not be imagined that it is one of real hardship, or that it is generally thought so by the parties themselves. On the contrary, it accords too well with the native indolence of their character and total defect of all independent spirit. It is true that the system tends most powerfully to keep up and to aggravate the natural defects in their character, and to frustrate all prospect of true civilization and all natural improvement. Still it can't be said that they are discontented. If they lead the life of groveling animals, they have at least their negative happiness. If they are cribbed like the stalled ox, they are fed like him, and they have hardly more care for fear about the future than he has.[37]

Mission-building as the predominating form of colonizing activity extended through a fifty-four year period, beginning at San Diego in 1769 and ending with the foundation of San Francisco de Solano on the north of San Francisco Bay in 1823. The twenty-one missions are fairly evenly distributed in a chain along the coast between these two points. Only five are located at any considerable distance inland, and none as far as the great interior valley. Despite their intended impermanence, no steps were taken by the Spanish government to convert any of the missions into civil communities before 1813. At this time, a decree was passed that all the missions which had been in existence ten years should be turned over to the bishop, the mission lands to be granted to private ownership, and the neophytes to be governed by town councils. Apparently no action was ever taken under this decree. After Mexican independence in 1822, the question of secularization again was discussed and further decrees issued, but no action was taken until 1833 when a further law declared that secularization should proceed according to the principles already laid down. By 1846, when California was occupied by the Americans, mission life had become negligible.

---

[35] Hittell, *op. cit.*, 474. E. J. Wickson, "California Mission Fruits," *Overland Monthly* XI, 2d. ser. (May, 1888), 501–505. This article contains a statement by John Bidwell to the effect that when he arrived in California in 1841, all the fruits with a few exceptions were grown at the missions or at places which had been improved by them.

[36] Forbes, op. cit., 281–285. Titus Fey Cronise *The Natural Wealth of California* (San Francisco, 1868). 35–54. The Russians had, after lengthy negotiations, been able in 1806 to obtain a shipload of provisions such as flour, peas, beans, and maize from the padres which they shipped from Yerba Buena (San Francisco) to Sitka. I. B. Richman, *California Under Spain and Mexico* (New York, 1911), 198–199.

[37] Forbes, *op. cit.*, 221–222.

Indian Labor in Civil Life After Secularization.—The transformation from mission to civil life brought with it considerable alteration in the status of Indian labor. One of the arguments for the carrying through of secularisation was that the Indian neophytes should be released from mission servitude and permitted to engage in individual economic activity. There was, however, considerable indication that the neophytes had not advanced far enough to carry on for themselves. Father Engelhardt frankly charges that the real reason for removing the missionaries from charge was the desire of powerful private interests to gain control of the Indians and their property.[38] The course of affairs subsequent to the secularization of the missions gives considerable support to this view. A large proportion of the supposedly domesticated Indians simply drifted back to their old haunts and ways of life and thus failed to become a source of labor supply to private interests. The Indians who attempted to take up the property offered them did not remain long in possession of it; those who remained at the missions under the supervision of hired administrators fared rather badly and those who went to work on private ranchos received approximately the same pay (subsistence) which they had received at the missions but usually under far less benevolent conditions. The whole transformation process was accompanied with much misery, drunkenness, pilfering, stealing of horses and cattle, and murder.[39]

Although the Indian was readily despoiled of his property control over his labor power was not so easy to secure. However, with retaliation against vandalism as a more or less real excuse, Indians were seized by many of the larger rancheros and forced to labor. And this action provided the opening wedge for a rather general resort to the age-old device of impressed labor. Mexican law had formally abolished slavery in 1829, but great distances and inadequate transportation facilities made enforcement impossible, and various forms of abuse continued to exist. Moreover, a system of debt peonage was officially sanctioned. Before the Indian could move about, he was required to have a properly signed discharge showing that he was not in debt to his employer. It appears that this technique was utilized by many a ranchero as a method of keeping his labor force assembled.[40] In some instances the Indians were encouraged to work by the promise of a given rate of wages, only to be turned away at the end of the season with no more remuneration than subsistence during the working period.[41] Thus a range of devices of varying degrees of harshness was used to assemble the Indian labor supply; and in conjunction with those of a milder nature it appears that outright seizure and force were not unimportant, and there is also evidence that a traffic in Indians existed.[42]

Out of these several methods of impressment it was possible for most of the larger rancheros to maintain a convenient labor supply. Indeed, it is said that "some of the ranchos were like old feudal estates. The ranchero lived like a lord. He had his retainers and servants, his flocks and herds, as well as great landed estates."[43] General Vallejo kept numerous Indians about his rancho as house and field servants, who were not accustomed to ask for money or to receive any fixed rate of wages.[44] Foreign settlers in the territory, such as Sutter and John Marsh, enjoyed the privilege of feudalistic (or even more extreme) relations with the Indians.[45] When Bryant visited Sutter's fort in 1846, he noted that:

---

[38] Engelhardt, *op. cit.*, IV, 137. Rev. G. J. Geary, "The Secularization of the California Missions," Catholic University of America *Studies in American Church History* XVII (Washington, D. C., 1934), 166. "There is every indication that one of the purposes of the Californians in overthrowing Mexican rule had been to secure free rein in looting the missions."

[39] Engelhardt, *op. cit.*, IV, 140, 306–324. Blackmar, "Spanish Institutions of the Southwest," *op. cit.*, 138. Hittell, *op. cit.*, 207–208. E. Duflot de Mofras, *Exploration du territoire de l'Oregon, des Californies, et de la mer Vermeille*, etc. (Paris, 1844). (Tome premier, 320–321). The number of Indians in the missions is estimated to have been 30,650 in 1834 and to have declined to 4,450 in 1842.

[40] J. D. Francis, *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California*, Berkeley, 1936), 505–506. Bancroft, *op. cit.*, 438. Ira B. Cross, "A History of the Labor Movement in California," University of California *Publications in Economics* 14 (Berkeley, 1935), 8.

[41] Engelhardt, *op. cit.*, IV, 650.

[42] Bancroft, *op. cit.*, 437. E. G. Gudde, *Sutter's Own Story* (New York, 1936), 55–58, 67–68. Francis, *op. cit.*, 506.

[43] Blackmar, *op. cit.*, 321. Also, Bancroft, *op. cit.*, 347.

> The laboring or field Indians about the fort are fed upon the offal of slaughtered animals, and upon the bran sifted from the ground wheat. This is boiled in large iron kettles. It is then placed in wooden troughs standing in the court, around which the several masses seat themselves and scoop out with their hand this poor fodder. Bad as it is, they eat it with an apparent high relish; and no doubt it is more palatable and more healthy that the acorn mush, or atole, which constitutes the principal food of these Indians in their wild state.[46]

The structure of society in these days was not wholly dichotomous, however. Not all the *gente de razon* were able to live in lordship over Indian serfs. At the top of society were the relatively few great rancheros and the families of official station, and at the bottom, the Indians. In between and covering a wide range of variation were the mestizoes, the mulattoes, the Sandwich Islanders, and all who in fact were not Indians. Some of them had small grants of land, some had settled in the civil colonies, and a large proportion had been retired from military service. Hittell ascribes their general indolence and lack of enterprise to their military experience which had made them believe that war was the only honorable occupation for a man.[47] In his travels about California in 1846–1847, Bryant noted many small ranches and people living in parts of the deserted missions, whose lot was far from being luxurious, even in frontier terms.[48]

With the rapid influx of gold-rush population after 1848, the limited stability of the old regime was upset, and the Indian population scattered about. Some of them became laborers in the mines; many were reduced to begging, loitering and doing odd jobs about the rapidly growing towns. Some of the larger and more remote ranchos were able to continue employing Indians exclusively far into the American regime. The visiting committee for the State Agricultural Society reported that as late as 1856 most of the labor on Major Bidwell's ranch (Chico) was performed by Indians, of whom he had a large number in his employ.[49] At Sutter's Hock Farm a small tribe of Indians in 1858 was furnishing all the labor other than that done by Sutter and his two sons.[50] But with all their cheapness, the numbers and efficiency of the Indians were not great enough to make possible their general employment in a more aggressive and enterprising regime. Scattered employment of Indians continued into the American period, particularly in hop picking in Sacramento Valley, and in grape picking at Fresno. Even now they constitute a minor element in the agricultural labor supply.

Decline of Agriculture During the Short Period of Civil Life Between Secularization and the Beginning of American Control.—The administrators appointed to succeed the padres soon indicated that they considered their appointments as opportunities to enrich themselves rather than as positions of trust to the neophytes and the community.[51] When the padres of the missions which had not yet been turned over to the administrators observed what was going on, they began liquidating mission properties and possessions in behalf of their neophytes. Cattle were slaughtered at a much more rapid rate than was usual and their hides and tallow sold. At San Luis Obispo, for instance, all available cattle and properties were sold and the proceeds taken in cotton, silk, and woolen goods were turned over to the Indians.[52] The only aggregate quantitative measure of the extent in decline of mission agriculture are the figures of Duflot de Mofras for the years 1834 and 1842.[53]

---

[44] Engelhardt, *op. cit.*, 136. Commenting on this situation, Fr. Engelhardt, says: "So here we find Vallejo actually continuing the method which he and his confederates had denounced as an injustice to the Indian when in charge of the Fathers, on the ground that the neophytes labored for food and clothing only, but received no money: The difference, however, was material. In the missions, the Indian earning went into the common fund for the benefit of the neophytes, whereas, in the case of Vallejo and other California landlords, the profits went into the pockets of said philanthropic landlords." (*Ibid.*, 137.)

[45] Gudde, *op. cit.*, George D. Lyman, *John Marsh, Pioneer* (New York, 1930), 220–221.

[46] Edwin Bryant, *What I saw in California* (Calafia ed., Santa Ana, California, 1936), 245–246.

[47] *Op. cit.*, II, 471.

[48] Bryant, *op. cit.*, 290–296, 406–412.

[49] California State Agricultural Society, *Official Report of the Third Annual Fair* (1856), 6.

[50] California State Agricultural Society, *Transactions for 1858*, 167.

[51] ". . . the great mass of the commissioners and other officials, whose duty it became to administer the properties of the missions and especially their great numbers of horses, cattle, sheep and animals, thought of little else and accomplished little else than enriching themselves." Hittell, *op. cit.*, 206.

[52] *Ibid.*, 207.

[53] E. Duflot de Mofras, *op. cit.*, 320–321.

	1834	1842
Cattle	424,000	28,220
Horses, mules, asses	62,500	3,800
Sheep, goats, swine	321,500	31,600
Cereals harvested (hectares)	70,000	4,000

These figures cannot be taken as indicating the full decline for the entire area. Some of the livestock, by various methods, had come into the possession of private interests and had not been slain for their hides. Likewise, some of the cultivated land had been privately granted and removed from the jurisdiction of the missions. Also, the figures of de Mofras for numbers of livestock are high as compared with those of Forbes for 1831, and the difference is in excess of any probable rate of increase in the three-year period. Forbes probably had the better opportunity to get accurate data since his were obtained before the demolition of the missions took place. The census of 1850 counted 262,659 cattle, but only 17,574 sheep so that it appears that the sheep industry almost disappeared while the cattle were transferred in part to the private ranches.[54] Although de Mofras' figures show a precipitous decline in mission production of cereals, the decline could not have been nearly so great for the whole territory. In cereals, the territory had been on a nearly even self-sufficient basis for many years. and imports did not commence on any scale until after 1846.[55]

In the course of his tour of the missions during 1846–1847, Bryant noted that San Jose, San Miguel, and Dolores were all deserted and crumbling; at Santa Ynez thickly strewn bones bore grim witness to the post-secularization slaughter of cattle for hides and tallow; Santa Clara and San Luis Obispo were in good repair although practically deserted; San Fernando and San Luis Rey were still being cultivated.[56]

The methods of cultivation did not improve during the few years of private enterprise. Indian labor was so cheap it did not pay to build fences to protect the crops or to retain the livestock for they could be guarded at less expense than the fences could be built.[57] The following description of grain harvesting at Sutter's farm is most graphic:

> Harvesting, with rude implements, was a scene. Imagine three or four hundred wild Indians in the grain field, armed, some with sickles, some with butcher knives, some with pieces of hoop iron roughly fashioned into shapes like sickles, but many having only their hands with which to gather up by small handfuls the dry and brittle grain; and as their hands would soon become sore, they resorted to dry willow sticks, which were split to afford a sharper edge with which to sever the straw. But the wildest part was threshing. The harvest of weeks, sometimes of a month, was piled up in the straw in the form of a huge mound in the middle of a high, strong, round corral; three or four hundred wild horses were turned in to thresh it, the Indians whooping to make them run faster. Suddenly they would dash in before the band at full speed, when the motion became reversed, with the effect of plowing up the trampled straw to the very bottom. In an hour the grain would be thoroughly thrashed and the straw broken almost into chaff. In this manner I have seen 2000 bushels of wheat threshed in a single hour. Next came the winnowing, which would often take another month.[58]

Bryant reported the methods of agriculture in 1846–1847 with respect to field cultivation to be substantially the same as Forbes had found them in 1831. The plow had not been improved and there were still no cultivating implements in addition to the rude plow other than the branch of a tree being used to harrow in the broadcast seed.[59]

The Spanish, particularly during the latter part of their regime, had attempted to stimulate private enterprise and civil colonization by making private land grants under very easy terms. Titles to such grants were indefinite, however, and were usually considered to be in usufructure only, although of differing grades.[60] Lack of clear title is probably one of the important reasons for so little land being taken for private use during the Spanish period, as well as for the fact that very little improvement was made in that which was taken. Only twenty-five grants were made by the Spanish, and at the end of their regime in 1822, only eighteen private ranches (outside of the government established pueblos) were in existence.[61] The Mexicans early indicated an intention to offer more encouragement to private enterprise. Although their land laws were based on the Spanish system, they were made more liberal, with particular inducements to foreigners. Even then, only thirteen new grants were made between 1822 and 1833.[62] It is not until the secularization program got under way that grantees were encouraged to believe that they would hold title in fee simple. During the fourteen years from 1833 to 1846, granting of private titles proceed at a feverish rate and a large proportion of the best land in California passed from the missions and the public domain into private hands. The number of original grants by the Mexicans was some 428, which with the 25 Spanish grants makes a total of 453. The Spanish grants had ranged from 4,000 acres to 300,000; most of the Mexican grants were between 5,000 and 25,000 acres.[63] Some of the original grants had been subdivided before the claims had been patented by the United States, so that the number of patents issued exceeded the number of original grants. To February, 1886, a total of 626 grouped claims had been patented, averaging almost 16,000 acres each.[64] The grants were distributed along the coast with clusters at San Diego, Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, Monterey, and around the San Francisco Bay. There was a sprinkling in the southern Sacramento and northern San Joaquin valleys, very few in the southern San Joaquin and Tulare areas, and none in the Humboldt Bay or Imperial areas, these being opened by the Americans.[65]

---

[54] U. S. Department of the Interior. Census Office. *Report on the Productions of Agriculture*, (1880), 1046.
[55] Horace Davis, "California Breadstuffs," *Journal of Political Economy* 2 (September, 1894), 517–535.
[56] Bryant, *op. cit.*, 298, 297, 552, 357, 373, 395, 409.
[57] Hastings, *op. cit.*, 87, 110.
[58] John Bidwell, *Echoes of the Past*, 43–44.
[59] Bryant, *op. cit.*, 435–436. The American plow was just being introduced in 1847.

The Question of Slavery in California as a State in the Union.—American control of California was only three months old when the attention of the people was drawn to the fact that labor service was being rendered by Indians against their will and without legal contract. The occasion was a proclamation by the commander in chief of the military district against this practice.[66] What effect this may have had in discouraging the impressment of Indian labor is not known, but in such a period of disorganized public administration, it is highly probable that it had none. During the following year it was observed that the women of the ranchos had the assistance of Indian men and women "legally reduced to servitude" to assist them in the cultivation of *frijoles*, potatoes, onions, and chiles.[67]

Within the two following years the population structure was materially altered by migration from the East, from both slave and free territory. It was generally recognized that the question of whether California should become slave or free would become an issue in Congress whenever the matter of statehood were considered. The newly-arrived were not hesitant about discussing their views on the matter. On March 15, 1848 the *Californian* in considering the possibility of slavery being introduced into California declared that "not a single instance of precedence exists in the shape of physical bondage of our fellowmen." [68] This article not only declared itself opposed to the establishment of any form or degree of slavery, but against the importation of free blacks as well. The *California Star* joined in the discussion a few days later to protest "on the part of ninety-nine hundredths of the population of this country" against the possible blight of slavery in the home of their adoption.[69] An alternative by which the benefits of slavery might be enjoyed without some of the external appearances of the system was proposed by a correspondent of the *Californian* (November 4, 1848) who wrote: "If white labor is too high for agriculture, laborers on contract may be brought from China, or elsewhere, who if well treated will work faithfully for low wages." [70]

Meanwhile, paying quantities of alluvial gold had been discovered, and this was to change the whole complexion of California life. The non-Indian population of the spring of 1846 had been composed of between 8,000 and 12,000 Hispanic-Californians, and of some 2,000 foreigners, chiefly from the United States. By the spring of 1847 the "foreign" population had increased to 5,000 and by 1848 to something less than 13,000 of which 8,000 were Americans, making the total non-Indian population for the spring of 1848 equal to approximately 20,000.[71] The population committee of the constitutional convention placed the population for the end of 1849 at 106,000, or an increase of five times in less than two years. The approximate accuracy of the latter figure is supported by the returns of the United States Census taken in the following spring which enumerated 92,597, which, when adjusted for the returns of three counties which were lost, brings an estimated total of 112,097.[72] Against such an onslaught of foreign element, local institutional heritages of any nature had little chance of self-preservation. The gold-seekers, at least the American constituent, were mainly from northern territory and hence vigorously anti-slave.

---

[60] Bancroft, *op. cit.*, 256. M. M. Livingston, "The Earliest Spanish Land Grants in California," Historical Society of Southern California *Annual Publications* IX (Part III), 195–199.

[61] R. H. Avina, *Spanish and Mexican Land Grants in California*, (Berkeley, 1934), 44–45.

[62] *Ibid.*, 62–94.

[63] *Ibid.*, 62–114.

[64] California State Surveyor-General, *Corrected Report of Spanish and Mexican Land Grants in California, Complete to February 25, 1886.*

[65] I. P. Bethany, U. S. General Land Office. *Map Showing Location of Spanish and Mexican Land Grants* (Washington, D. C., 1907).

[66] D. L. Beasley, "Slavery in California," *Journal of Negro History* III, (January, 1918), 35–36.

[67] Bryant, *op. cit.*, 435.

[68] Lucile Eaves, "A History of California Labor Legislation," University of California *Publication in Economics* 2 (August, 1910), 82.

[69] *Ibid.*, 83.

[70] H. H. Bancroft, *History of California* VI (San Francisco, 1888), 290.

When the delegates from the constitutional convention met at Monterey in September of 1849, the older elements of the population were in decided minority; of the 48 delegates, only six had been born in California, and the number of foreign-born who had been in California any length of time was not greater.[73] A resolution excluding slavery from the territory was adopted without debate or dissenting vote. Pro-slavery sympathizers were in the convention and had been expected to assert themselves, but they were entangled in office-seeking and could not afford to be trouble-some.[74] The assemblage went even so far as to support a measure providing that the first session of the legislature should pass such laws as would prevent the immigration of free Negroes into California, and the owners of slaves from bringing them into the state to set them free. Supporting argument for this provision related that race inferiority would make equal assimilation impossible, that labor would be degraded and desirable immigration be discouraged, that monopolies and social inequalities would result from their exploitation, that they would constitute a vicious and disorderly element in the community, and that they would be a costly social burden. Despite these arguments the proposal was finally defeated, but its defeat can be attributed to the fear of the delegates that such a provision might delay admission into the Union.[75] Popular support for adopting the measure was particularly strong in the mines.[76]

The question of slavery had not been settled, however. Its sympathisers had for the moment acquiesced, but they were not downed. When the question of boundary came up, they stood in favor of making the territory sufficiently large that it could be subdivided at some future time. Antislave delegates, who previously had been in favor of an equally large territory, recognised this possibility and proceeded to reverse their positions. When finally the constitution was presented to Congress, there was debate and delay, and "the long delays in admission, occasioned by the discussions of the slavery question, seem to have given the subject a different significance in California. Her lawmakers became a little more cautious about legislation on this topic, and those who had secretly desired slavery began to hope that, with this evidence of strong support from other sections of the country, the matter was not an entirely closed issue in California."[77]

In the meantime, the legislature undertook to perpetuate the system of Indian impressment, and enacted a law during 1849–1850 which permitted Indians arrested for vagrancy to be sold to the highest bidder within twenty-four hours after arrest. The buyer was entitled to the services of the Indian for a period not to exceed four months. An Indian arrested for violation of the law could demand jury trial, but could not testify in his own behalf against a white person.[78]

A considerable number of slave owners and their chattels had arrived in California during 1849–1850, and continued to come through 1851 and 1852 after the territory had entered the Union as a free state. Their continued arrival,[79] together with the circumstances discussed above, served to encourage the pro-slavery partisans to come out into the open. The only feasible course of action open to them now, however, was to attempt a division of the state, the southern part of which, under the terms of the compromise of 1850, was open to slavery as a territory. Efforts towards such action were begun in the summer of 1851, the immediate excuse being the disproportionate amount of taxation borne by the southern counties, and neglect in the distribution of political patronage. Bills calling for a constitutional convention were introduced at every session of the legislature for six years beginning with 1852, but the underlying purpose for calling the convention was recognised and the measures were defeated. All hopes for securing an opening for slavery in California were put to an end in 1857 when the proposal for calling a constitutional convention was placed before the people and failed to obtain the necessary majority.[50]

---

[71] Bryant, *op. cit.*, 263, 433. Bancroft, VI, *op. cit.*, 158–159.

[72] Bancroft, *ibid.*, 158–159.

[73] *Ibid.*, 287–290.

[74] *Ibid.*, 290–291.

[75] Eaves, *op. cit.*, 84–88.

[76] G. E. Tower, *Sentiment in California for American Government and Admission into the Union* (Los Angeles, 1927), 57, 63.

[77] Eaves, *op. cit.*, 89

[78] California Laws, 1849–1850, p. 408.

[79] The Census of 1850 enumerated nearly one thousand Negroes. The California State Census of 1852 enumerated 2,642 Negroes and mulattoes. Part of the number at each period were freemen. See also C. A. Duniway, "Slavery in California after 1848," American Historical Association, *Annual Report* for 1905 I, p. 244, and Eaves, *op. cit.*, 90–91.

Another legislative-judicial concession to slavery was experienced in the state fugitive slave law of 1852, and its administration by the courts. This statute was patterned after the federal fugitive slave law which empowered an owner or his agent to seize a fugitive slave in free territory. Most of the California law had no significance for it was quite improbable that a newly escaped slave would ever be able to make so lengthy and difficult a trip. The purpose of the California law was not to permit the return of fugitives. Rather, its real motive was contained in a provision not in the federal law. This provision allowed an owner to retain control over a slave brought from a territory where labor service was legally due. Slaves who refused to return could be seized, and the terms of the original statute could be interpreted in such a manner as to allow slavery indefinitely. Subsequently the the law was amended to permit recovery only for purposes of removal from the state and within one year from the passage of the law. The time allowed for recovery was extended by the legislatures of 1853 and 1854.[51] Court administration of the law further broadened its significance by rendering decisions in exceptional consistency with the interest of the masters.[52] It is improbable that the effect of this statute was to enable the exaction of any significant amount of involuntary servitude, but it did permit holding Negroes in bondage, and even the buying and selling of them within a constitutionally free state.

The slave issue in California was not unattended with novel arguments and occurrences. One southerner maintained that it would be impossible to develop agriculture in California with white labor because of the presence of poison oak.[53] The *Jackson Mississippian* of April 1, 1850 carried an advertisement inviting the citizens of the slave states to come to a slave colony in southern California. It was proposed that the friends of the enterprise settle in the richest mining and agricultural district of California "to secure the uninterrupted enjoyment of slave property."[54] In 1852 as assemblyman from San Joaquin County introduced a measure to permit the settlement of fifty southern families and their slaves, despite the fact that the state had for two years been under an anti-slave constitution.[55] In the same year, a memorial from twelve hundred and eighteen citizens of South Carolina and Florida, asking permission to colonise a rural district of California with not less than two thousand slaves, was received by the legislature and accorded the dignity of being referred to the Committee on Federal Relations.[56] As late as 1855, "two men, named Chase and Day, were ridden on a rail, ducked, and otherwise maltreated in Alameda County for being abolitionists."[57]

Summary Statement: Influence of Spanish and Mexican Colonial Institutions on Subsequent Economic Organization in Agriculture.—The first half century of agriculture in California was conducted principally under the Spanish missions. The ostensible purpose of the Spanish on the western frontier was to convert the Indians to the Catholic faith. In addition, however, they had to utilise the native population for colonial purposes, for Spain, itself a small nation, was unable to provide a sufficient number of her own people as colonists to hold the frontier. Moreover, the Indian population was in such an undeveloped state, economically, socially, and politically, that it was necessary to give them considerable instruction before either the religious or civil objectives could be accomplished. The tasks of doing this fell to the missions and they were temporarily given economic and political as well as religious powers. Because of the zeal of the padres and the lack of vigor of the civil colonist program which the Spanish sought to advance simultaneously, the mission became the only important colonial institution. Even though the missions were intended to be only temporary, the lack of progress of the Indian neophytes in becoming prepared for independent civil life made necessary the extension of the system over a longer period.

---

[50] Eaves, *op. cit.*, 92-94.
[51] *Ibid.*, 94-96.
[52] Duniway, *op. cit.*, 244-246. Beasley, *op. cit.*, 40.
[53] Eaves, *op. cit.*, 91.
[54] Bancroft, VI, *op. cit.*, 313n.
[55] *Ibid.*, 715.
[56] Eaves, *op. cit.*, 92.
[57] Bancroft, *op. cit.*, 715-716.

Economic activity during the mission period was not directed towards an abundant life. The mission padres were schooled in the faith of virtue through poverty, and their Indian subjects preferred leisure to an abundance in goods. However, great isolation and poor transportation made it necessary to provide self-subsistence and this was their foremost economic problem. Next in importance was that of discipline. Since this problem was made easier by keeping the Indians at work, there was no reason to utilize labor-saving devices or strive for efficient production. Furthermore the missions were not required to furnish raw materials to the mother country. Thus the economic objective was neither maximum nor efficient production. The principal economic inducement offered the Indians to encourage them to come into mission life was the assurance of regular subsistence. Once the Indians had been baptized into the Catholic faith, they were no longer permitted to leave the missions of their own accord. In this sense they may be said to have been impressed laborers. However, their product redounded principally to their own welfare. Even though the Indians may have rendered service against their will, this service was towards the objective of imposed ideals and not for purposes of exploitation or slavery in behalf of others.

The land used for mission agriculture was granted under temporary terms and without title. Therefore the mission system had no direct influence upon the structure of land ownership.

The transition from mission to civil life brought a new status to economic objectives and to the utilization of land and labor. The amount of private enterprise during the mission regime had been relatively insignificant. During the early post-mission years, a large proportion of the best land which had been used by the missions or had been part of the unused public domain, was apportioned in very large units for private use. The new owners were neither accustomed not inclined to do their own work. The Indians who had been domesticated by the mission system could be easily impressed, and the result was that they were utilized, virtually as slaves, for the menial tasks of agriculture during the short period of private enterprise between 1833 and 1846. Their liberties were fully as circumscribed as they had been in mission life. The products of their labor inured less to their own benefit and their treatment was less kindly. This was true even of the period between 1846 and 1850, when California was a territory, and to a limited extent for several years after California was admitted as a state.

The period of private enterprise before the gold rush was too short to achieve stability. The direction in which it was tending was definitely towards latifundia cultivation. This was true for both the Hispanic and the foreign rancheros, including the Americans who had come to California before 1848. Had not the establishment of this system and the process of gradual settlement on this basis been rudely interrupted by the sudden gold-rush migration, it appears unquestionable that the influence of Spanish-founded institutions on the subsequent agriculture of California would have been much greater. As it was, the impressed labor system was overthrown. The downfall eventually proceeded beyond the Mexican statutory prohibition of slavery to a *de facto* as well as to a *de jure* prohibition. Land titles were the only institution of the old regime which were specifically guaranteed by the Americans. But this guarantee, as we shall see, experienced only limited fulfillment.

BIBLIOGRAPHY TO CHAPTER II

Allen, R. H. *The Influence of Spanish and Mexican Land Grants in the Agricultural History of California* (Unpublished manuscripts in the library of the Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics, University of California, unpaged).

Alvina, R. H. *Spanish and Mexican Land Grants in California* (Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of California, 1934). 137 numbered leaves.

Baker, C. C. "Mexican Land Grants in California," Southern California Historical Society *Annual Publications*, 9 (Part 3, 1914), pp. 236-243.

Bancroft, H. H. *California Pastoral* (San Francisco, 1888), pp. 247-248, 438.

Beasley, D. L. "Slavery in California," *The Journal of Negro History*, III (January, 1918), pp. 33-44.

Bethany, I. P. *Map Showing Location of Spanish and Mexican Land Grants*, United States General Land Office (Washington, D. C., 1907).

Bidwell, John. *Echoes of the Past* (Chico, California, undated), 91 pp.

Blackmar, F. W. "Spanish Colonization in the Southwest," Johns Hopkins University *Studies in Historical and Political Science*, VIII (Baltimore, 1890), 79 pp.

Blackmar, F. W. "Spanish Institutions of the Southwest," Johns Hopkins University *Studies in Historical and Political Science*, X (Baltimore, 1891), 353 pp.

Bolton, H. E. "The Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish-American Colonies," *American Historical Review*, XXIII (October, 1917), pp. 42–61.

Bryant, Edwin. *What I Saw in California* (Calafia edition, Santa Ana, California, 1936), 506 pp.

California, State Surveyor General, *Corrected Report of the Spanish and Mexican Grants in California, Complete to February 25, 1886.* (Sacramento, 1886).

Coman, Katherine. *Economic Beginnings of the Far West*, II (New York, 1912), pp. 207–319.

Cronise, Titus Fey. *The Natural Wealth of California* (San Francisco, 1868), pp. 1–70.

Cross, I. B. "A History of the Labor Movement in California," University of California *Publications in Economics*, 14 (Berkeley, 1935), pp. 1–18.

Dana, R. H. *Two Years Before the Mast* (New York, 1857), 483 pp.

de Mofras, E. Duflot. *Exploration du territoire de l'oregon, des Californies, et de la mer Vermeille, etc.*, I (Paris, 1844), pp. 320–321.

Duniway, C. A. "Slavery in California after 1848," American Historical Association *Annual Report*, I (1905), pp. 243–248.

Engelhardt, Fr. Zephyrin. *The Missions and the Missionaries of California* (4 Vols. San Francisco, 1912).

Forbes, Alexander. *California, A History of Upper and Lower California* (London, 1839 and Russell edition, San Francisco, 1919), 372 pp.

Francis, J. D. *An Economic and Social History of Mexican California* (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of California, 1935), 905 numbered leaves.

Geary, Rev. G. J. "The Secularization of the California Missions," Catholic University of America *Studies in American Church History* XVII, 204 pp.

Gudde, E. G. *Sutter's Own Story*, (Putnam: New York, 1936), pp. 56, 58, 67–68.

Hastings, L. W. *The Emigrant's Guide to Oregon and California* (Cincinnati, 1845), 152 pp.

Hittell, T. H. *History of California*, II (San Francisco, 1885), pp. 453–543.

Hughes, J. T. *California: Its History, Population, Climate, Soils, Productions, and Harbors* (Cincinnati, 1848), 120 pp.

Kroeber, A. L. "Handbook of the Indians of California," Bureau of Ethnology *Bul.* 78 (Govt. Print. Off.: Washington, D. C., 1925), 995 pp.

Livingston, M. M. "The Earliest Spanish Land Grants in California," Southern California Historical Society *Annual Publications* 9 (Part 3, 1914), pp. 195–199.

Lyman, G. D. *John Marsh, Pioneer* (New York, 1930), pp. 220–221.

Meigs, Peveril, 3d. "The Dominican Mission Frontier of Lower California," University of California *Publications in Geography*, Vol. 7 (Berkeley, 1935), 231 pp.

Pfeiffer, Gottfried. *Die räumliche Gliederung der Landwirtschaft im nördlichen Kalifornien* (Leipzig, 1936), pp. 27–30.

Richman, I. B. *California Under Spain and Mexico* (Boston and New York, 1911), 559 pp.

Ross, I. B. *The Confirmation of Spanish and Mexican Land Grants in California* (Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of California, 1928), 100 numbered leaves.

Simpson, Lesley Byrd. "Studies in the Administration of the Indians of New Spain," *Ibero-Americana:* 7 (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1934), 129 pp.

Simpson, Lesley Byrd. "Studies in the Administration of the Indians of New Spain," *Ibero-Americana:* 13 (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1938), 161 pp.

Speth, F. A. *A History of Agricultural Labor in Sonoma County, California* (Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of California, 1938), 117 numbered leaves.

Tower, G. E. *Sentiment in California for American Government and Admission into the Union* (Los Angeles, 1927), 83 pp.

U. S. Department of the Interior. Census Office. *Report on the Productions of Agriculture.* Tenth Census of the United States (1880), pp. 1028–1046.

Wickson, E. J. "California Mission Fruits," *Overland Monthly* XI (New Series, May, 1888), pp. 501–505

CHAPTER III. AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL BEGINNINGS WITH A SCARCE LABOR SUPPLY

> We find ourselves threatened by hordes of Yankee immigrants, who have already begun to flock into our country, and whose progress we cannot arrest. Already have the wagons of that perfidious people scaled the almost inaccessible summits of the Sierra Nevada, crossed the entire continent, and penetrated the fruitful valley of the Sacramento. What that astonishing people will next undertake, I cannot say, but in whatever enterprise they embark, they will be sure to be successful. Already, these adventurous voyagers, spreading themselves far and wide over a country which seems to suit their tastes, are cultivating farms, establishing vineyards, erecting mills, sawing up lumber, and doing a thousand other things which seem natural to them.[illegible]

Characteristics of the Population of 1850.—Immigrants from the United States and other foreign countries first had begun to settle in California after Mexican independence in 1822. The earliest settlers had originally come as trappers or traders and had subsequently decided to stay, or were deserters from ships which had called at California ports. After 1832, American immigrants had become so numerous that the Mexican government became alarmed and began to place impediments in their way, such as refusing to make them grants of land outside of the pueblos. Between 1835 and 1840 emigrant aid societies had been

---

[illegible] Governor Pio Pico, May, 1846, in a speech before the Departmental Assembly, favoring the annexation of California to England. Quoted from Titus Fey Cronise, *The Natural Wealth of California* (San Francisco, 1868), 51.

active on the Atlantic Coast in encouraging and aiding the settlement of Americans in California.[89] We have already seen that approximately two thousand Americans were in California by 1846, that the number increased rapidly during the two years of American occupation before the gold-rush, and that between 1848 and 1850 the growth was tremendous.

An indication of the proportional constituents of the population of 1850 is afforded by the federal census figures of that year. This census was not taken under conditions conducive to accuracy, and in fact, the returns from three counties were lost entirely. However, the results are useful for analysis of the relative proportions if not of the total population. Table 2 indicates that more than ninety percent of the total population in 1850 had been born outside of the state; approximately seventy-five percent of the total had been born in the United States, outside of California. Less than ten per cent of the total were females, and almost one-half of the female population had been born in the state. Thus, the population of California was predominately of newly-arrived males. Table 3 indicates further outstanding characteristics of this predominately male population. There were very few who were very young or very old; they were all in the early prime of life. Almost eighty per cent of the total male population was between twenty and forty years old, and more than one-half of the total was between twenty and thirty. Comparable statistics for the two middlewestern frontier states, Ohio and Illinois, and two Atlantic seaboard states, New York and New Jersey, are also given in Table 3. It is to be noted that for the two middlewestern states the proportion of all males between the ages of twenty and forty is less than for the Atlantic states, and all are extremely lower than California.

TABLE 2.—*Population of California 1850* [1]

Place of birth	Whites			Free colored			Total population
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
Born in California	4,532	3,164	7,696	60	9	69	7,765
Born outside of California (in the United States)	59,471	2,395	61,866	641	68	709	62,575
Born in foreign countries	20,278	1,351	21,629	161	12	173	21,802
Unknown	427	17	444	10	1	11	455
Total	84,708	6,927	91,635	872	90	962	92,597

[1] This enumeration lacks returns from Santa Clara, San Francisco, and Contra Costa Counties.

Source: Seventh Census of the United States, 1850, p. 972.

TABLE 3.—*Ages of Male Population in California Compared with Four Other States 1850*

[In percentages of the total males]

Age in years	California	Ohio	New York	New Jersey	Illinois
10 to 20	6.7	23.5	21.2	22.5	23.6
20 to 30	52.9	17.8	20.0	18.1	17.8
30 to 40	25.3	12.0	14.0	12.9	12.8
40 to 60	11.3	12.6	14.9	14.4	12.0
All others	3.8	34.1	29.9	32.1	33.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Calculated from Seventh Census of the United States, 1850, pp. 88–91, 134–135, 675–702, 811–818.

---

[89] Cronise, *ibid.*, 35, 39–56.

TABLE 4.—*Laborers as a Percentage of the Total Gainfully Employed, 1850 California Compared with Four Other States*

State	Total Males Gainfully Employed	Laborers	Percentage, Laborers of Gainfully Employed
California	77,631	2,150	2.8
Ohio	530,792	86,909	16.4
New Jersey	128,540	36,361	28.3
New York	888,690	174,867	19.7
Illinois	215,350	27,910	13.0

Source: Seventh Census of the United States, 1850, pp. 119-120, 146-147, 727-728, 661-662, 978.

Of the 77,631 males gainfully employed, more than half of them gave their occupation as miners. It is a significant fact that almost none of them considered themselves to be laborers. In the category of laborers, farm and other industries included, less than three per cent were classified, as compared with a percentage of five or more times that large in the other four states selected for comparison. "As for the men," said Hittell, "we were the flower of the West: nearly all young, active, healthy, many well educated, all full of hope and enthusiasm."[30] The country was full of potential entrepreneurs, but except for the Indians and the few Negroes which had been imported from the South, was devoid of a laboring class available for wage work.

In the census of 1850, the number of farmers was enumerated as 1,486. In addition, 210 were listed as rancheros, and some 50 others in miscellaneous jobs connected with farm work. Since there were but 872 farms, about half of this total must in fact have been farm laborers.

With a population of young, vigorous, and enterprising men already selected through the process of having made their way from their homes in the East, it is not surprising that few should consider themselves as being in the laboring class, even when the returns from surface mining began to diminish as they did after 1852. Great schemes and opportunities electrified the atmosphere, and it was hard even for those down on their luck and broke to think of themselves as fit only to become the laborers of some other entrepreneur.

Availability of land.—In contrast to the shortage in manpower, land was available on exceedingly favorable terms. The original grantees of the Spanish and Mexican claims had never supposed their land to be worth more than the equivalent of about one dollar per acre, and usually much less. Moreover, their inertia against changing to any form of cultivation other than simple grazing was so great that they neither were able nor cared to make the effort necessary to produce an income large enough to support valuations as high as the prices which the Americans were willing to offer. Not all of the grantees were so fortunate as to dispose of their property through sale. Many of the immigrants were under the impression that all the land ceded by Mexico to the United States was public domain, and they proceeded to settle down wherever the conditions appeared favorable. Even those otherwise informed followed the same practice and were not dislodged. Ambiguity in the titles to the land and in the boundaries, and in addition, the administration of justice in so remote a territory, all contributed to both temporary and permanent use of land under no more difficult terms than simply squatting on it. Most of the land in the northern grants passed out of the hands of the original grantees within the first few years of the American period, some to squatters, some to bona fide settlers, but a very large proportion simply to speculators who were interested in both agricultural and petroleum possibilities.

In addition to the available land within the grants, there was considerable ungranted public domain, particularly in the interior valleys, available for settlement. Everywhere, land was available in large or small size units as the settler chose. As compared with the timbered, sodded, or uneven land of much of the rest of the United States, the land in California could be converted into agricultural use without appreciable expenditure. The principal item of cost for the farmer who wanted to raise crops was to build fences. This was made difficult and expensive because of lack of suitable timber in the vicinity. In some cases, the fences cost more than the land.[31]

---

[30] John S. Hittell, *Resources of California* (San Francisco, 1874), XIII.

[31] Hittell, *op. cit.*, 219-221.

Production opportunities.—It is commonly said that the people who came to California seeking gold were not impressed with the agricultural possibilities of the country, particularly of the dry and barren San Joaquin Valley. However, we have already seen that there was a considerable immigration prior to the gold rush. These people had come to California because of favorable accounts of the agricultural possibilities. Even before the yield of gold had begun to decline, many gold-seekers, including new-comers as well as those who had deserted their California farms to go to the gold fields, began to realize that the best way to "skim the cream off the diggings" was to go into the raising of produce to sell to the miners. Much of the agriculture of the period immediately following the gold-rush was conducted on this basis and was not intended to be permanent because it was not expected that the market would last long. After the yield of gold had begun to decline and the new-comers had witnessed the productive response of the California soil and climate, the realization began to spread that the permanent wealth of the area lay not in mining but in agriculture.

The mission padres had demonstrated the adaptability of the country to the production of a wide range of fruits, including temperate and subtropical varieties. It was commonly believed that tropical fruits, silk, sugar, tobacco, tea, and coffee could also be produced. Claims of wheat yields as large as one hundred and one hundred and twenty bushels to the acre had been accepted by travelers and had been circulated in the East even before gold-rush time.[32]

Another factor favorable to the expansion of agriculture was the opening up of external markets as well as the rapid expansion of the internal markets due to the sudden influx of population. Western penetration into Asia was just beginning. European countries were just beginning to launch themselves upon policies of free trade. Industrialization on the Atlantic Coast was expanding rapidly. All of these were factors favorable to production for an external market.

"Where Shall the Laborers be Found?"—The economic environment was thus one in which highly productive land and entrepreneurship were abundant and markets were favorable. As soon as all other conditions were right, capital was available for investment, for many of the early immigrants to California were neither devoid of capital themselves nor of connections with the Eastern capital markets. The apparent limiting factor then was labor. Not only was the limited potential working population being kept away from agriculture by better opportunities elsewhere, but most of them had not had the experience required of the type of cultivation to which it was thought California was best fitted. Some of the most promising production opportunities, it was thought, were in tropical and semi-tropical products, which, the world over, were produced mainly with slave or peasant labor. Such lines of production as coffee, tea, sugar, tobacco, and silk required a great deal of hand labor, to be performed under uninviting conditions. The early population of California had neither the experience nor the temperament for such tasks. It is quite natural, therefore, that, denied the use of slaves, such sources of labor as China should be immediately thought of, particularly when this country had only recently been opened up to western commerce. It appears, however, that no attempts were made to import the Chinese for agricultural labor, or even to encourage their immigration for that purpose. Efforts to increase the population were directed mainly towards encouraging emigrants from Europe and from the eastern and middlewestern states to come to California.

Encouragement to Immigration and Population Changes, 1850 to 1870.—Industrial employers as early as 1853 began working individually and through associations to encourage the migration of laborers from the eastern states.[33] The *California Farmer* of January 2, 1857 mentions that a group of Californians were in New York attempting to encourage emigration to California. They were engaged in giving out information, in securing traveling accommodations and in encouraging the passage of the Pacific railroad and wagon-road bills. The *Farmer* further adds that the eastern newspapers and journals were accustomed to suppress glowing accounts of conditions in California which would tend to encourage emigration.[34]

The necessity for encouraging immigration was one of the principal subjects discussed by the California State Agricultural Society for many years, beginning in 1865. "We know that we have within our borders the elements of greatness and prosperity equal, if not superior, to those of any other State in the Union. Then what do we lack? The answer most emphatically is *labor*, and capital * * * and capital for investment in our material resources will not, for obvious reasons, precede labor—it will follow."[55] And in the following year: "For the past ten years it has been evident to all who have given the subject a careful thought, that nothing would contribute so much to the advancement of our prosperity as a common wealth, as the influx of a large immigration of industrious citizens. Every class of the community experiences the want of labor."[56] At this time, the idea was expressed that if some of the surplus female population of the Atlantic Coast could be brought West, some 30,000 Chinamen would be transferred from household work to farm work and to construction of the transcontinental railroad.

---

[32] L. W. Hastings, *The Emigrant's Guide to Oregon and California* (Cincinnati, 1845), 99. Edwin Bryant, *What I Saw in California*, *op. cit.*, 246. John T. Hughes, *California; Its History, Population, Climate, Soils, Productions, and Harbors* (Cincinnati, 1848), 79.

[33] Ira B. Cross, "A History of the Labor Movement in California," University of California *Publications in Economics*, 14 (1935), 28.

[34] *California Farmer*, VI (Jan. 2, 1857), 177.

Nothing much beyond discussions and proposals was accomplished before the completion of the railroad in 1869. It was suggested that the State Board of Agriculture be given such powers as were lodged in the bureaus of immigration in other states, that books and information circulars to describe economic resources be prepared and that an immigrant aid society be incorporated.[57] Tentatively, all such proposals were given but limited support because the high cost of transportation was recognized as a barrier which would be at least partially removed by the completion of the railroad. Upon the completion of this railroad it was anticipated that California would share in the immigration from Europe as well as receive migrants from the Atlantic shores.

The early propaganda endeavors of the employer interests to influence a migration of laborers to the Pacific Coast met the counteraction of literature from the San Francisco labor unions of the opposite purpose. Circulars warning laborers that California was no place for a poor man were sent throughout the eastern states.[58]

A formal organization was incorporated in 1869 as the *California Immigrant Union* with its object "to encourage emigration from Europe and the eastern part of the United States to California."[59] The *Union* apparently intended to serve the whole community rather than any particular group interest. One of its first publications was a summary of press opinions in which the conclusion was reached that white immigration should be encouraged not only for its own sake but because it would be the best way to discourage, or at least counteract, Chinese immigration.[1] An apparent spokesman for the *Union* said that it felt under no obligation to encourage Chinese immigration. The Chinese had been serviceable makeshifts, had performed valuable labor under peonage conditions without the privileges of equality or citizenship, and if they could always be kept as a political and social minority and in isolation, their presence would not be objectionable except that it might discourage the emigration of Europeans and Americans.[2] By 1870 and 1871 the Immigrant Union was distributing its pamphlet, *All About California*, throughout the eastern states. The emphasis of this pamphlet was upon the great opportunities in agriculture. It is particularly worthy of note that persuasive endeavor was directed towards stimulating the migration of a small farm operator rather than a laborer group. California was said to be greatly in need of a farming population which would do away with current evils by building up small farms and diversifying agriculture. That the intention of the Immigrant Union was to encourage the migration of a small entrepreneurial rather than a laboring class is further indicated in a statement made in 1870 by its manager to Edward Young, Chief of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, who was making a complete survey of immigration possibilities within the United States:

> * * * California at the present time does not present any brilliant inducements to the immigration of men having no capital but their labor, and who are content to remain mere laborers. Industrious, enterprising men, who understand farming, or almost any other useful occupation or mechanical trade, usually find employment without much difficulty at higher

---

[55] California State Agricultural Society, *Transactions* (1865), p. 61.

[56] *Transactions* (1866–67), p. 7.

[57] California State Agricultural Society, *Transactions* (1865), p. 61: (1866-1867), p. 7: (1868-1869), p. 8.

[58] John S. Hittell, "Benefits of Chinese Immigration," *Overland Monthly* VII Sec. Ser. (1886), 121.

[59] California Immigrant Union (San Francisco, 1870) in *California Pamphlets* V (Collection of Bancroft Library, University of California).

[1] California Immigrant Union, *Opinions of the Press, etc.* (San Francisco, 1870), 9, 11, 17, 19. (In *California Pamphlets* V)

[2] C. T. Hopkins, *Common Sense Applied to the Immigration Question, etc.* (San Francisco, 1869), 21–22. (In *California Pamphlets* XX).

rates than prevail elsewhere, and in a few years lay up sufficient capital to commence business upon a small scale on their own account.[3]

The total white population in California approximately tripled between 1850 and 1860, although most of the growth occurred in the earlier years of the decade. It is significant that much of the population growth was due to the very great increase in the number of women. (Table 5) The growth during the decade 1860–1870 was very much slower, with an increase of less than fifty per cent, a large proportion of which again was made up by the increase in the number of women. Growth of Chinese population through apparently unencouraged immigration continued throughout the years 1850–1870. Their ratio to the total population was relatively small, but since they were predominately males, young and able-bodied, they comprised upwards of one-fifth of the total gainfully employed in both 1860 and 1870.

The Chinese in Agriculture before 1870.—As was seen in the last chapter, employing interests who had been sympathetic towards slavery had consoled themselves on the possibility that, if white labor turned out to be too high for agriculture, it might be possible to import Chinese contract labor. This was in 1848 before any except a few Chinese stragglers had made their way to California. Beginning in 1849, their immigration commenced on a fairly significant scale. Their coming, however, was not because of importation or through employer encouragement, but of their own accord.[4]

TABLE 5.—*Population of California 1850, 1860, and 1870*

	Male	Female	Total
1850			
Whites	84,708	6,927	[1] 91,635
Colored	872	90	[1] 962
Asiatics			([2])
Indians			([3])
Total	85,580	7,017	92,597
1860			
Whites	226,774	96,403	323,177
Colored	2,827	1,259	4,086
1860—Continued			
Asiatics	33,149	1,784	34,933
Indians	10,587	7,211	17,798
Total	273,337	106,657	379,994
1870			
Whites	297,646	201,778	499,424
Colored	2,514	1,758	4,272
Asiatics	45,429	3,881	49,310
Indians	3,888	3,353	7,241
Total	349,479	210,768	560,247

[1] The census of 1850 is not adjusted for loss of returns for three counties. An adjustment for this brings the total white and colored population to approximately 113,000. (See Bancroft, *History of California* VI, 159 n.)

[2] The State Census of 1852 estimated 25,000 Chinese. (*Governor's Message and Report of the Secretary of the Census of 1852*, Senate Session of 1853, pp. 6-7). Data for 1860 and 1870 include a few Japanese.

[3] The State Census, 1852, *Ibid.*, lists 32,539 domesticated Indians.

Source of data: Seventh Census of the United States (1850), 972. Eighth Census of the United States (1860), 22-27. Ninth Census of the United States (1870), 606-609.

TABLE 6.—*Chinese Immigration to the Pacific Coast 1850–1870.*

Year	At San Francisco Customs House		Net Gain (+) or Loss (−)	Estimated Number on Pacific Coast [1]	Year	At San Francisco Customs House		Net Gain (+) or Loss (−)	Estimated Number on Pacific Coast [1]
	Arrivals	Departures				Arrivals	Departures		
1850	450				1861	8,434	3,594	+4,840	50,703
1851	2,716			7,370	1862	8,188	2,795	+5,393	54,973
1852	20,026	1,768	+18,258	25,116	1863	6,435	2,947	+3,488	57,384
1853	4,270	4,421	−151	24,488	1864	2,696	3,911	−1,215	54,968
1854	16,084	2,339	+13,745	37,447	1865	3,097	2,298	+799	54,663
1855	3,329	3,473	+144	36,557	1866	2,242	3,113	−871	52,696
1856	4,807	3,028	+1,779	37,999	1867	4,794	4,999	−205	51,432
1857	5,924	1,932	+3,992	40,730	1868	11,085	4,209	+6,876	57,142
1858	5,427	2,542	+2,885	42,743	1869	14,994	4,896	+10,098	65,996
1859	3,175	2,450	+725	42,599	1870	10,869	4,232	+6,637	71,093
1860	7,343	2,088	+5,255	46,897					

[1] Customs house figures minus deaths at 2 per cent per year, and estimate which stands between the death-rate of male colored and male whites of the same age, i. e., 28.34 and 18.62.

Source of data: M. R. Coolidge, *Chinese Immigration*, (New York, 1909), 498–498.

---

[3] Edward Young, *Special Report on Immigration* (Washington, D. C., 1872), 188.

[4] The immigration of Chinese to California has its modern parallels. Actually, their reasons for leaving home lay less in the enticement of California as in the poverty and ruin brought about by the great Taiping rebellion beginning in the summer of 1850. See M. R. Coolidge, *Chinese Immigration* (New York, 1909), 17.

In the beginning, their arrival was given cordial welcome.[5] The cordiality was not to last long however, for it was soon apparent that the Chinese, like everyone else, were attracted to the gold mines, and hence did not become available as a source of labor to agriculture or any other industry.

Their presence at the mines soon provoked outbursts of ill-will and before long they became the most harried of the harassed group of "foreigners" which also included the Mexicans, Chileans, the Negroes, and others. They became the objects of discriminating taxation as well as of miscellaneous types of molestation perpetrated with the intent of driving them from the mines.[6] By 1855, a series of bills had been proposed in the legislature which would have excluded all aliens not eligible for citizenship from the mines. The legislative committee to whom those bills were referred, reported on them in part as follows:

> * * * The American laborer claims the *exclusive privilege* and right of occupying and working the immense placers of our State. They look upon the mines as being the just inheritance of the laboring poor of America, and the only class of laborers they are willing to admit to any participation of this rich inheritance with them, are those of kindred land, whom they can receive as brothers.
>
> Your committee believe (sic) that the only place in our State where the Chinese can be of permanent advantage to the country, would be in the reclamation of the Tule lands, but does any one for a moment suppose that they will ever settle in the Tules and work in the mud among the mosquitoes and frogs, so long as they are allowed the privilege of working our mines and breathing pure mountain air? [7]

That certain agricultural interests were thinking along approximately the same lines at this time is indicated by an editorial on the Chinese in the *California Farmer* of May 25, 1854, in which the following statement appears:

> California is destined to become a large grower of Cotton, Rice, Tobacco, Sugar, Tea, and Coffee (sic) and where shall the laborers be found? Americans will not become the working men of our tule land, in our Rice fields and our Cotton plantations and other departments of the same kind of labor. At the South, this is the work of the slave, but slavery cannot exist here. California is a Free State—her citizens have spoken it—human progress has uttered it—God has said it. Then where shall the laborers be found? The Chinese! And everything tends to this—those great walls of China are to be broken down and that population, educated, schooled and drilled in the cultivation of these products, are (sic) to be to California what the African has been to the South. This is the decree of the Almighty, and man cannot stop it.[8]

With more restraint, the *Farmer* the following year in commenting on a legislative report respecting the Chinese said:

> The Chinese should not be driven away from California, rather, their labor power should be utilized in preparing the tule, swamp, and alluvial lands for cultivation. Their labor could be utilized in producing sugar and other commodities which we now import.[9] [10]

Dislike for the Chinese was not limited to the miners even in the early years; organized labor particularly did not like them and charged that they were an impressed coolie labor who were brought by fellow Chinese to California under conditions not far removed from salvery. A special committee was appointed by the legislature to investigate the social and economic status of the Chinese population of California. Their report of 1862 indicated that the Chinese was a free laborer in all respects. This report went on further to admonish against driving the Chinese away; rather than drive them, it would be a good idea to give them bounties to cultivate rice, tea, tobacco, and other such commodities. In these fields, their labor would be of great productive value, without coming into competition with white labor. Sheep raising and wine production were other industries in which, it was said, the shortage and high price of white labor had not permitted development. These therefore, were other fields in which the Chinese could work without hurting the economic position of the whites.[11]

---

[5] Lucile Eaves, "A History of California Labor Legislation," University of California *Publications in Economics* 2 (1910), 105-107.

[6] Good accounts of the development of anti-Chinese feeling in the mines and of legislation against them after 1850 are to be found in Coolidge, *op. cit.*, 35-43, and in Eaves, *op. cit.*, 107-142.

[7] Assembly Doc. 19, Session of 1855, p. 7.

[8] *California Farmer* I (May 25, 1854), 164.

[9] *California Farmer*, III (April 26, 1855), 131.

[10] The Rev. William Speer, in *An Humble Plea Addressed to the Legislature of California in Behalf of the Immigrants from the Empire of China* (San Francisco, 1856), 40 pp., argued for the employment of the Chinese in agriculture. Cotton raising was a particularly good prospect for their employment. Intelligent and liberal legislation would prevent debasing the Chinese into a position of peonage or slavery. "Chinese immigration, indeed, extends a hope of the emancipation of the Negro." (p. 13). (Compare footnote 40 Chap. IV). The latter idea has an interesting parallel. Early in the sixteenth century, Las Casas proposed that each Spanish settler in the West Indies be permitted to import a dozen Negro slaves. Las Casas' thought was that this would provide a means for the emancipation of the Indians (See Sir Arthur Helps, *The Life of Las Casas* (London, 1896), pp. 69-72, 291-292).

Although farmers extended a welcome hand to them while the miners and other organized labor groups sought to drive them out, the Chinese did not go immediately into agriculture, for there were other competitors for his labor service. For one thing, the predominately male population gave rise to a great demand for household service, laundry work, cooking, and other tasks which in a more normal population are usually performed by women. The versatile Chinaman could fill these requirements with some aptitude; consequently these types of service absorbed a large number of those ousted from the mines. There were also other menial tasks such as shoe repairing and cigar making into which the Chinese shifted as they came from the mines. The other and principal competitor for the Chinese was the Central Pacific Railroad which not only took all the resident Chinese they could get during the last few years of construction of the transcontinental line, but actually were active in soliciting and encouraging the immigration of more of them.[12] Upwards of 10,000 Chinese laborers were employed on this project, and upon its completion in 1869 such a large number were released from work as temporarily to flood the labor market. Thereafter, the employment of Chinese in agriculture increased in both absolute and relative terms until after their exclusion in 1882.

A few Chinese had entered agriculture before 1870. The census for that year indicates that of a total of 33,768 gainfully employed Chinese, only 2,694 of them were engaged in agriculture.[13] Of the 2,694 Chinese engaged in agriculture, 1,637 were laborers. Since the total number of all farm laborers was 16,231, it is evident that in 1870, Chinese constituted approximately one tenth of the farm labor group.[14] The other 1,057 Chinese engaged in agriculture were small operators producing vegetables, fruits, peanuts, etc., on their own account.[15]

As laborers, they were engaged in the orchards, in the hops, and in the wheat; a few of them were hired for general ranch work, including the managing of teams. In the wheat fields they were employed to follow the reapers and bind up the grain stocks into sheaves. As early as 1868 they were said to be employed to such an extent as to "soon become indispensable to our wheatgrowers * * *. We must have labor from some source, and if China can give us the men, the fields will never lie idle. * * * poor John spreads a dirty tent in some corner of the field near water, sleeps on the ground, works by star-light, lives on rice of his own cooking * * *."[16] Another observer of 1868 described them as calm and quiet workers in a bustling environment and noted instances in which the harvesting crews were made up in the ratio of two Chinese to one other worker.[17] In the hop fields, the Chinese worked in gangs of from fifty to seventy, and it was generally conceded that the hop industry would not have been able to exist had not the Chinese been available to do this work. They were also employed as cooks and for other domestic work about the ranches.

Enterprise Organization, 1850 to 1870.—Economic life south of the Tehachapis, other than in the trading town of Los Angeles, was little changed before 1870 by the penetration of Americans. The immediate effect upon the southern area of the great northern influx of population was greatly to increase the prosperity of the cattle raiser. For many decades the price of cattle had been from $2 to $4 per head, when their value had been based upon production of hide and tallow. Without incurring additional cost, the price of the same animal rose to from $20 to $50 as beef in the northern mining camps. Buyers drove them over the Tehachapis or brought them up the coast by steamer.[18] The increased income was devoted by the rancheros simply to enhance their scale of living; no attempts were made to improve the breeds of stock, to develop supplementary feeding, or to diversify the enterprises.[19]

---

[11] California, Joint Select Committee Relative to the Chinese Population of the State of California, *Report*, 1862, pp. 1–12.

[12] Oscar Lewis, *The Big Four* (New York, 1938), 70–72. M. R. Coolidge, *op. cit.*, [illegible].

[13] Ninth Census of the United States, 1870, Vol. III, pp. [illegible].

[14] Ninth Census of the United States, 1870, Vol. I, p. 722.

[15] *Overland Monthly*, "How Our Chinamen are Employed," II (March, 1869), [illegible].

[16] Horace Davis, "Wheat in California," *Overland Monthly*, I (November 1868), [illegible].

[17] C. L. Brace, *The New West* (New York, 1869), [illegible].

[18] J. M. Guinn, "The Passing of the Cattle Barons of California," Historical Society of Southern California *Annual Publication*, VIII, (1909–1911), [illegible].

Such good fortune was not to last long however. Immigrants from the East had brought cattle with them as early as 1850–1851, and the importation had continued to a maximum between 1855 and 1857.[20] The new cattle were placed on the ranges further to the north, in the Salinas and San Joaquin Valleys, which had the advantage of being nearer the market as well as being less heavily stocked. The beef of the American cattle was apparently preferred over that of the Spanish cattle as it consistently brought a premium in the San Francisco market.[21] Southern producers distinctly felt the competition of the new cattle production by 1856.[22] Failing to comprehend their economic situation, the rancheros regarded the market as being only temporarily depressed, and in the face of declining incomes, mortgaged their ranchos for the money with which to maintain their living standards. So vulnerable was their economic position that the prolonged drought of 1862–1864 forced the downfall of their regime. With no supplementary feed and with their grazing land well run down, there was no preparation against long and severe drought. Many rancheros lost substantially all of their cattle; the total number which perished through the drought period is estimated as 1,000,000 out of a total of 3,000,000.[23] Being already under mortgage, they were in no position to restock their ranges; mortgages were foreclosed, and "within five years after the famine nearly all the great ranchos had changed hands".[24] The day of the gay and romantic ranchero was done. His estates passed into the hands of real estate investors who surveyed and subdivided them into smaller units for farming. Much of the land had been foreclosed with a mortgage encumbrance of but ten to twenty-five cents per acre, and was resold on terms of from $2 to $10 per acre.[25] The process of surveying, subdividing, and advertising the lands took several years so that it was not until after 1870 that new settlers began to come into the territory and to commence its future in more intensive agriculture.

A small beginning had already been made. The value of orchard products in Los Angeles for 1869 was $74,000, but this was greatly exceeded by Sacramento, Sonoma, Yuba, Solano, and Alameda Counties in the north. The value of orchard products in San Bernardino and Santa Barbara Counties was trifling, and for Dan Siego County, nothing. Wheat production in these southern counties was also insignificant.[26]

The penetration of Americans into northern California before the gold-rush had set examples of enterprise development in agriculture. The efforts of Sutter to establish agriculture and other industries served as an encouragement to all those who came in contact with him. In fact, some of the grain raised by other farmers in Sutter's neighborhood was under his direction and taken up by him to help fill his contract with the Russians incurred in connection with the purchase of Fort Ross.[27] Previous to the gold-rush, farms producing mainly livestock, but also considerably more grain and fruit than had the Spanish and Mexicans, had been established on Honcut Creek, the Feather, the Yuba, the Bear, the American, the Cosumnes, the Mokelumne, and other tributaries of the great bay.[28] Even with the imperfect methods of cultivation the yields of grain were very great, and the volunteer crops almost as good as the planted ones. The rainless ripening and harvesting season was a favorable condition unknown in other parts of the United States. Fruit trees yielded earlier and in greater quantity, and with some exceptions—principally the apple—with relatively finer flavors.

---

[19] *Ibid.*, 53–54. R. H. Allen, *Economic History of Agriculture of Monterey County* (Berkeley, 1934), 14–17. The lands of the San Fernando Valley remained in large ranches through the early sixties. "On these ranches, as there are no fences, the cattle are half wild, and require many horses to keep them and tend them. A ranch with a thousand head of cattle will have a hundred horses. The natives are lazy enough, but are slowly giving way before the Americans, with whom they do not assimilate." W. H. Brewer (Journal of) ed. by F. P. Farquhar, *Up and Down California in 1860–1864* (Yale University Press, 1930), 44. The lands of San Bernardino and Riverside Counties were not subdivided until the seventies. See Robert Hornbeck, *Roubidoux's Ranch in the Seventies* (Riverside, 1913), 87–134. The Mexican grants in Santa Barbara County were for sale at from $2 to $10 per acre as late as 1870, and were said when subdivided and settled to rise in value to from $25 to $100, and when planted to fruits or vines, to $1,000. Letter from O. L. Abbott to Edward Young, reprinted in his *Special Report on Immigration* (Washington, D. C., 1872), 185.

[20] Osgood Hardy, "Some Economic Aspects of the Gold Age in California," American Historical Association, Pacific Coast Branch, *Proceedings*, 1927, pp. 142–143. Allen, *op. cit.*, 18.

[21] Allen, *op. cit.*, 22.

[22] *Ibid.*, 15.

[23] Cattle numbers had increased from 262,000 in 1850 to 1,180,000 in 1860, and were estimated to be approximately 3,000,000 in 1862 just before the drought, although this is probably an extreme estimate. U. S. Dept. Interior, Census Office, *Report on the Productions of Agriculture*, Tenth Census (1880), 1046. See also Osgood Hardy, "Agricultural Changes in California," American Historical Association, Pacific Coast Branch, *Proceedings*, 1929, 216–217; Hardy, *op. cit.*, 142; Guinn, *op. cit.*, 58–60.

[24] Guinn, *op. cit.*, 59.

[25] Guinn, *op. cit.*, 59. J. M. Guinn, "The Passing of the Rancho", Historical Society of Southern California *Annual Publications* X, (1915–1916), 47.

[26] Ninth Census of the United States (1870), pp. 104–105.

[27] H. H. Bancroft, *History of California*, VI (San Francisco, 1888), 469.

[28] Bryant, *op. cit.*, 217, 246, 280, 282, 285–286. Bancroft, *op. cit.*, 463–512, gives incidental history of the development of agriculture in the northern bay area. See also Horace Davis, "Wheat in California," *op. cit.*, 442–452.

Gold discovery caused many farmers in the northern mining territory temporarily to leave their farms for the diggings. It was not long, however, before they realised that more money was to be made by returning to their farms and producing for the new mining population. In addition to the return of the already established farmers, others with the same realization created new farms. Small farms sprang up throughout the foothill country, many of them being irrigated out of the mining ditches.[*] Since cereals and fibers could be imported, and meat was relatively abundant, the great demand was for fresh vegetables and fruits and these were the line of production in which the earliest expansion took place. Potatoes were in particularly great demand. The profits from producing vegetables were so great during the first few years that a single year's crop would often more than pay for the farm land. Those who had earlier planted fruit trees now enjoyed a great market. From 1846 until 1854 California had regularly imported cereals which came mainly from Chile, Oregon, and the Atlantic Coast.[29] Wheat production after 1850 expanded first in the valleys contiguous to San Francisco Bay—Livermore, San Ramon, Santa Clara, etc.

Cattle raising remained the most important enterprise in the northern San Joaquin and Salinas valleys until after 1862, in spite of being adversely affected by declining incomes during the latter six years of that period. The cattlemen of the San Joaquin Valley fought desperately, both in the legislature and on the range, to prevent the encroachment of the "nester" and the "sandlapper". But the combined forces of low cattle prices, population pressure and finally drought were sufficient to commence the overthrow of the range system.[30] Cattlemen began to place all or part of their holdings on the market, and grain growing, with sheep or cattle as a side-line, began its ascendancy.[31] However, the livestock furnished their own transportation whereas grain did not, and so the extension of grain farming on down the valley from Stockton had to await the development of transportation. The railroad south from Stockton did not get under way until 1870, and by 1872 the San Joaquin Valley line from Lathrop to Goshen Junction had been completed.[32] Grain culture in the Salinas Valley was enabled to get started earlier because of better transportation facilities by water.[33]

Grain farms as they were established in the Great Valley during the sixties and seventies were on a scale hitherto unknown in the United States. Farms of two to five thousand acres were small, and many were as large as twenty to forty thousand.[34] Several factors contributed to the establishment of such units. One was the availability of land in large parcels, without the interruption of roads, canals, fences, etc. A second factor was the evenness of the topography, which, together with the previously named factor permitted the efficient application of large scale equipment. A third factor, and possibly the most important, was a climate in which the practical assurance of a long period of no rain permitted a harvesting season, which, in comparison with other parts of the United States, could be greatly prolonged. The importance of this factor lies in that, the harvest season being the most busy, total output is determined by the quantity which can be handled at harvest time.

In addition to being produced in large units, grain production was specialized and speculative. The attitude of the grain grower was to make a small fortune or nothing. As late as the early seventies a wheat grower of the San Joaquin Valley was quoted as having said, when being reproached for not planting trees: "We don't go a cent on anything but wheat in this county; we all want to get rich in two years." [35] Plowing was very shallow and the preparation of the seed-bed superficial; where the land was not successively planted to wheat, it was permitted to produce volunteer crops. Summer-fallowing was an uncommon practice, and fertilization of any kind was virtually unheard of.[36] After the harvest the straw and stubble were burned; it was claimed that the stubble could not be plowed under because the soil was too dry to rot it and the result would be that the soil would be made still more porous by the presence of the undecayed stubble. Although yields in the beginning were very great, they soon began to decline under such practices. In the periods between planting and harvesting, the wheat farmer typically did nothing to improve his farm or to supplement his income—it was to be all from wheat or nothing.[37]

---

[29] Horace Davis, "California Breadstuffs," *Journal of Political Economy* 2 (September, 1894), 604.

[30] C. B. Leonard, *History of the San Joaquin Valley* (Berkeley, 1922), 116–122. Allen, *op. cit.*, 26.

[31] Cattle numbers declined during the sixties and seventies but sheep continued to increase through 1880. (See Table 30, Appendix A)

[32] Stuart Daggett, *History of the Southern Pacific* (New York, 1922), 119.

[33] Allen, *op. cit.*, 40.

[34] Charles Nordhoff, *California* (New York, 1874), 182. C. B. Leonard, *op. cit.*, 127. San Francisco Call Company, *California As It Is* (San Francisco, 1882), 147.

[35] Nordhoff, *op. cit.*, 188. See also John Hayes, "Wants and Advantages of California," *Overland Monthly*, VIII (1872), 328. This situation was particularly true of the San Joaquin Valley. There were striking exceptions in other parts of the state. The *California Farmer*, I (1854), p. 34, describes two large farms in Santa Clara Valley on which wheat was the predominant crop, but oats, barley, potatoes, cabbage, and root crops for livestock were also grown. Both farms intended to set out fruits and vines in the following season. The visiting committees of the California State Agricultural Society found many examples of well-managed, diversified farms, even in the very early years. (See *Transactions* for 1856 and 1858).

Although the nature of the soil permitted gang plows to be used from the beginning, the two-bottom plow drawn by four to six-horses or mules remained the typical unit throughout the sixties and seventies. Eight-horse outfits with six to eight bottoms were used to some extent on the larger farms, and their use was becoming more common towards the end of the eighties, but was not typical until the nineties. Steam plowing was never more than in the experimental stage before the nineties.[38] Although the combine harvester was first adapted in California as early as 1854, it had to go through two decades of experimentation so that it was not until 1880 and after that its use became common. During the early regime of wheat production in California harvesting was done chiefly with the header, but also with reapers from which the grain was bound into sheaves. Thresher-separators were available for use at the beginning of the wheat period and later were improved by the addition of the winnowing device to become thresher-cleaners.[39]

The State Agricultural Society in 1869 commented on the situation of grain production in the following terms:

> It is a shameful and deplorable fact, that many of the naturally best grain-producing portions of our State have been cropped every year, for from ten to fifteen years in succession, with grain, and in many cases with an unvaried single crop—wheat * * * throughout the agricultural districts, there is a season of active labor for all and a season of idleness for all. As a result of this management of our great agricultural industry of the State, there is lost to these districts, and to the State at large, each year, the profits of nearly half the agricultural labor of the State. As another result, all that large class of persons who depend for their livelihood on daily labor upon our farms, are during this idle season, thrown out of employment, and are consequently deprived of the means of subsistence, and to compensate them for this idle season, they are compelled to demand of their employers proportionally high wages while they do labor. The employers, who from the exigency of their position in the busy season, are, in turn, compelled to comply with this demand. Thus it turns out, that for the year's operation the farmers themselves realize about half what they should realize, and the labor they employ, though receiving double price for the time actually engaged, is but poorly paid.[40]

If large-scale wheat farms were the most spectacular feature of California agriculture during the sixties and seventies, their number must have been more than exceeded by small farms, for the average size of all farms in 1860 and 1870 was 466 and 482 acres, respectively. The average size in terms of total acreage in both these years was but one-tenth the average size of 1850, but the average number of improved acres per farm continued to increase.[41] The smaller farms were located in the valleys tributary to the San Francisco Bay, in the Sierra Nevada foothills, and along the coast. They were the small orchards, the market gardens and dairies near the towns and the smaller diversified farms.

Significance of Labor Supply to Farm Organization, 1850–1870.—Agriculture between 1850 and 1870 was principally in a transitional stage. The great population influx of 1849–1853 drastically altered the domestic market. Meat supply was relatively abundant because cattle which had formerly been utilized only for hides and tallow could also be used for beef. Cereals and fibers could be imported but fresh vegetables and fruits could not, and therefore the great production opportunities of the early years were in fruits and vegetables. Subsequently, when the economy was being readjusted to fit the needs of a permanently enlarged population, it was anticipated that exotic commodities of the tropics, as well as the already partly adapted temperate and subtropical fruits and nuts would play a large part in the agricultural enterprise of the future. The first two decades of American life saw but little fulfillment of these high expectations. Lack of sufficient knowledge and experience, and of markets and transportation were all factors which, together with the easy exploitation of natural wealth through livestock and cereal production, made these two enterprises predominate the economic effort of the first two decades.

---

[36] Horace Davis, "Wheat in California," *Op. cit.*, 442–452.

[37] Hayes, *op. cit.*, Henry F. Blanchard, "The Improvement of the Wheat Crop of California," United States Department of Agriculture. Bureau of Plant Industry *Bulletin* 178 (Washington, D. C., 1910), pp. 8–9.

[38] Leo Rogin, "The Introduction of Farm Machinery," University of California Publications in Economics 9 (Berkeley, 1931), 43–44. *California As It is*, *op. cit.*, 147.

[39] Rogin, *op. cit.*, 103–110, 119–125, 169–173.

[40] California State Agricultural Society, *Transactions for 1868–1869*, pp. 11–12.

[41] Detailed data are to be found in Table 24, Appendix A.

While labor scarcity was commonly said to be the limiting factor of production, it cannot in retrospect be so regarded. Such products as coffee, tobacco, and silk, for which much labor would have been required, were found or subsequently decided to be inadaptable. Deciduous fruits, citrus fruits, and grapes required considerable experimentation as to selection of varieties, methods of production and control of pests before their commercial production was possible. Even then, the fresh fruit market before the building of the railroad and the development of the refrigerator car was very small. The processes of drying and canning which greatly enlarged the market for deciduous fruits were not developed until the seventies and eighties. Cotton production was said for many years to be impossible only because labor was so scarce and wages too high to permit competition with the South Later, during the seventies, cotton production was tried with Chinese who were admitted to be a cheaper form of labor than the Negroes, and yet was given up. Cotton in California had to wait both the development of irrigation and of a particular varietal form.

Expansion in livestock did not proceed far beyond the restoring of the deficit consumption of the post-secularisation and the early gold-rush periods. Cereals were the only commodity which achieved any importance in the export market before 1870. California wheat was particularly adapted to water shipment since it had low moisture content and so did not heat or sweat easily. Both barley and wheat commanded premiums in the English market because of their milling and malting properties. Since these cereals were produced without clearing the land and with only a superficial seed-bed, the amount of labor required was relatively small. The long rainless harvest season also relaxed the seasonal peak of labor demand for harvesting. Labor scarcity is often said to have been one of the important factors leading to the adoption of large-scale labor-saving machinery in California grain production far in advance of any other area. To other factors, however, such as the smoothness of the land and the dryness of the harvest season must be attributed the principal influence. The evidence of complaint of labor shortage by grain producers indicates that its volume was nothing to compare with the subsequent volume of complaint of the fruit growers. This is true even though the grain field laborers of the early years were principally disappointed gold-seekers.

Thus we must conclude that factors other than the nature of the labor supply were more closely related to the type of farm organization which came into existence before 1870. The isolated instances of slavery and of sympathy for the institution of slavery which were noted in the previous chapter, were of such small relative importance after 1850 as to have little significant influence. The significance of the guaranteed land grants was minimised in several ways. Both the titles and the boundaries were so indefinite that the process of patenting was fraught with difficulty. The remoteness of the territory and the rapidity of settlement made the administration of justice very difficult. Furthermore, most of the original grantees were unable to adapt to the new régime and even where their land was not wrested from them it was sold at very low prices. To the extent that the land passed in large lots to speculators rather than to actual settlers, the influence of the pre-American land institution is still present.

Evidently, the only place where labor could have been a factor of importance was in grain production. If the only available labor supply had been composed of individuals anxious and able to establish themselves as independent operators, as has been more generally true in most of American frontier settlement, rather than disappointed gold-seekers, the land would undoubtedly have been further subdivided before being planted to grain. This would have influenced size perhaps more than specialisation or intensity, although it might be expected that the smaller units would have tended towards earlier diversification.

BIBLIOGRAPHY TO CHAPTER III

Allen, R. H. *Economic History of Agriculture of Monterey County* (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of California, 1934). 178 numbered leaves.

Bancroft, H. H. *History of California*, VI (San Francisco, 1888), 787 pp.

Bancroft, H. H. *History of California*, VII (San Francisco, 1890), 826 pp.

Bannister, Alfred. "California and her Wheat Culture," *Overland Monthly*, n. s. XII (July, 1888), 65–70.

Bepler, Doris West. *Descriptive Catalog of Western Historical Materials* (Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of California, 1920). 280 numbered leaves.

Blanchard, Henry F. "Improvement of the Wheat Crop of California," U. S. Department of Agriculture. Bureau of Plant Industry *Bul.* No. 178 (Washington, D. C., 1910), 37 pp.

Boyd, Jessie Edna. *Historical Import of the Orange Industry in Southern California* (Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of California, 1922). 135 numbered sheets.

Brace, C. L. *The New West* (New York, 1869), 373 pp.

Brewer, Wm. H. (Journal of, edited by Francis P. Farquar) *Up and Down California in 1860-1864* (Yale University Press, 1930), 601 pp.

Browne, J. Ross. "Agricultural Capacity of California," *Overland Monthly*, X (April, 1873), 297–314.

Bryant, Edwin, *What I Saw in California* (Calafia edition Santa Ana, California, 1936), 481 pp.

Burns, J. (ps) "A Pioneer Fruit Region," *Overland Monthly*, VXII (July, 1888), 1–12.

California As It Is, San Francisco Call Company (San Francisco, 1882), 196 pp.

California Farmer. Vol. 1 (1854) through Vol. 13 (1860).

California Immigrant Union. All About California and the Inducements to Settle Here, (San Francisco, 1870), 74 pp.

California Immigrant Union. *Arguments in Favor of Immigration* (San Francisco, 1870), 27 pp.

California Immigrant Union. *Opinions of the Press of San Francisco and Sacramento on the Value and Importance of Immigration, etc.* (San Francisco, 1870), 26 pp.

California Legislature, Assembly Document No. 19, Session of 1855.

California Legislature. Report of the Joint Select Committee Relative to the Chinese Population of the State of California (1862), 18 pp.

California Senate. *Governor's Message and Report of the Secretary of the Census of 1852 of the State of California.* (Senate Session of 1853), 40 pp.

California State Agricultural Society. *Transactions*, 1858 through 1900.

Cone, Victor. "Irrigation in the San Joaquin Valley, California," U. S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Experiment Stations *Bul.* 239 (Washington, D. C., 1911), 621 pp.

Coolidge, Mrs. Mary R. *Chinese Immigration* (New York, 1909), 531 pp.

Cronise, Titus Fey. *The Agricultural and Other Resources of California* (San Francisco, 1870), 80 pp.

Cronise, Titus Fey. *The Natural Wealth of California*, (San Francisco, 1868), 696 pp.

Cross, Ira B. "A History of the Labor Movement in California," University of California *Publications in Economics*, 14 (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1935), 354 pp.

Daggett, Stuart. *History of the Southern Pacific* (Ronald Press: New York, 1922), 470 pp.

Davis, Horace. "California Breadstuffs," *Journal of Political Economy*, 2 (September, 1894), 517–535.

Eaves, Lucile. "A History of California Labor Legislation," University of California *Publications in Economics*, 2 (Berkeley, 1910), 461 pp.

Guinn, J. M. "From Cattle Ranch to Orange Grove," Southern Historical Society *Annual Publications*, 8 (Pt. 3, 1912), 145–157.

Guinn, J. M. "The Great Real Estate Boom of 1887," Southern California Historical *Annual Publications*, 1 (Pt. 5, 1890), 13–21.

Guinn, J. M. "The Passing of the Cattle Barons of California," Southern California Historical Society *Annual Publications*, 8 (Pts. 1–2, 1911), 51–60.

Guinn, J. M. "The Passing of the Rancho," Southern California Historical Society *Annual Publications*, 10 (Pts. 1–2, 1915–1916), 46–53.

Guinn, J. M. "The Romance of Rancho Realty," Southern California Society *Annual Publications*, 8 (Pt. 3, 1917), 234–242.

Hall, Charles Victor. *California, The Ideal Italy of the World* (Philadelphia, 1875), 88 pp.

Hardy, Osgood. "Agricultural Changes in California, 1860-1900," American Historical Society, Pacific Coast Branch *Proceedings* (1929), 216–230.

Hardy, Osgood. "Some Economic Aspects of the Gold Age in California," American Historical Association, Pacific Coast Branch *Proceedings* (1926), 141–150.

Hastings, L. W. *The Emigrant's Guide to Oregon and California* (Cincinnati, 1845), 152 pp.

Hayes, John. "Wants and Advantages of California," *Overland Monthly*, VIII (April 1872), 338–347.

Hilgard, E. W. "The Agriculture and Soils of California," U. S. Department of Agriculture *Report*, 1878 (Washington, D. C., 1879), 476–507.

Hittell, John S. *Resources of California*, (San Francisco, 1874), 463 pp.

Hopkins, C. T. *Common Sense Applied to the Immigrant Question, etc.* (San Francisco, 1869), 64 pp.

Hornbeck, Robert. *Roubidoux's Ranch in the 70's* (Riverside, California, 1913), 290 pp.

"How Our Chinamen Are Employed," *Overland Monthly*, II (March, 1869), 231–240.

Hughes, John T. *California; Its History, Population, Climate, Soils, Productions, and Harbors* (Cincinnati, 1848), 144 pp.

Leonard, Charles Berdan. *History of the San Joaquin Valley* (Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of California, 1922), 151 numbered leaves.

Lewis, Oscar. *The Big Four*, (A. A. Knopf: New York, 1938), 418 pp.

Marten, Effie ElFreda. *The Development of Wheat Culture in the San Joaquin Valley.* (Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of California, 1924), 144 numbered sheets.

Nordhoff, Charles, *California* (New York, 1874), 255 pp.

Pressley, Eva S. "California's Grain Industry, Its Interesting History Since 1848," *Grizzley Bear*, 22 (February, 1918), 6–7.

Rogin, Leo. "The Introduction of Farm Machinery," University of California *Publications in Economics*, 9 (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1931), 260 pp.

Silver, J. S. "Farming Facts for California Immigrants," *Overland Monthly*, I (August, 1868), 176–183.

Speer, Rev. William. *An Humble Plea Addressed to the Legislature of California in Behalf of the Immigrants from the Empire of China* (San Francisco, 1856), 40 pp.

Speth, Frank Anthony. *A History of Agricultural Labor in Sonoma County, California.* (Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of California, 1938), 100 numbered leaves.

Street, C. H., and Company. *California* (San Francisco, 1887), 72 pp.

Wildman, E. T. *Settlement and Resources of the Sacramento Valley* (Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of California, 1921), 118 numbered leaves.

Young, Edward. *Special Report on Immigration.* U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Washington, D. C., 1872), 232 pp.

CHAPTER IV. CHINESE LABOR: INTENSIVE CULTIVATION IN AN AREA OF SPARSE POPULATION

> What we want, above all things, to give us universal prosperity and constant and remunerative employment for all classes, is a diversified agriculture so varied in its products and so constant in its operations that it will require about an equal amount of labor every month of the year. * * * That nature designed California for an agriculture as diversified in its character as are the soils and the climate of her thousands of valleys and innumerable mountain and hill sides, and as valuable as the world has ever known, cannot be doubted.[42]

Changes in Farm Labor Supply After 1869.—The widespread attitude before 1869 that economic progress was being retarded because of lack of labor was sharply re-cast by developments following the completion of the transcontinental railroad. For one thing, the number of laborers released from its construction was so large as to make difficult their immediate absorption into other lines of work. For another, its completion made possible the migration of a different class of people from the East. Heretofore, the people who had been able to make their way by the relatively expensive means then available, usually had some means at their command and were not forced to seek manual labor upon arrival. But a large proportion of the arrivals of 1869 and the years immediately following came pennyless and were dependent upon employment in the local industries.[43] To aggravate the situation still further, many local industries were thrown into depression because of being brought into competition with the better established industries of the East.[44] In January of 1870 it was estimated that upward of one-fifth of the working population was unemployed.[45] This was the economic environment out of which arose the ant-Chinese agitation, which, within a few years, was to accumulate such strength as to become the leading political question of the state.

Heretofore, the lament of the agricultural interests had been the shortage in the labor supply; for several years after 1869 its terms shifted to deficiencies in quality rather than quantity. It was said that the only laborers available were fortune-minded and had neither the temperament nor the experience required of good farm workers, or as expressed by the *Pacific Rural Press:*

> It is a notorious fact that numbers of white men who claim to be competent farm hands, and hire themselves out for labor in the harvest fields and in the plowing season, are positively not as intelligent as regards the prosecution of ordinary farm labor as are the darker colored "heathen Chinese".[46]

California had long been considered adapted for cotton production, but it had never been attempted on any significant scale before 1870 because labor was thought to be too scarce and high-priced to compete against southern slave labor. The full extent of the change in the labor supply may be indicated by the fact that production was significantly undertaken during 1870 and 1871.[47] "Labor is abundant," wrote John W. Strong, who had experimented with cotton on a large scale near Anaheim in 1871; "White labor can be hired for one dollar per day, with board; Chinamen in any quantity, at twenty-five dollars per month, they boarding themselves."[48] Col. Strong added a further interesting commentary on Chinese labor: "I regard the latter after testing it thoroughly, as more efficient, notwithstanding the want of experience, than negro labor of the South. *It is only employed when actually needed, and is, therefore, less expensive.* [italics mine.] It is controlled with less difficulty, and is universally conceded to be industrious and painstaking."[49]

---

[42] California State Agricultural Society *Transactions*, 1868–1869, pp. 12–13.

[43] Ira B. Cross, "A History of the Labor Movement in California," University of California *Publications in Economics*, 14 (Berkeley, 1935), 61–63.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] *Ibid.*, 62.

[46] Vol. IV (July, 27, 1872), 57. Cf. John Hayes, "A New View of the Labor Question," *Overland Monthly* 6 (February, 1871), 140–141; Frank H. Norton, "Our Labor-System and the Chinese," *Scribners Monthly* 2 (1871), 61–62.

[47] Thirty-four bales had been produced in 1869.

[48] Letter by Col. John W. Strong, reproduced in California State Agricultural Society *Transactions* for 1872, p. 307.

[49] *Ibid.* The opinion that employment of Chinese was cheaper than the employment of Negroes and would have broken up slavery if the Chinese had been introduced into the South before the Civil War is advanced by John H. Durst "The Exclusion of Chinese," *The North American Review*, CXXXIX (1884), 256–263. (Compare footnote 10, Chap. III).

The labor supply was sufficient in 1871 to permit cotton to be grown on the Merced River, in Tulare County, and in the vicinity of Los Angeles. Throughout the early seventies, the labor supply for agriculture was augmented not only by immigration and unemployment due to the stagnation of the city industries, but also by anti-Chinese campaigns in the cities which drove the Chinese out into the rural areas and prevented the city employment of the newly arriving Chinese. In addition, the increase in the number of women in the population released many Chinese from domestic service. Chinese immigration continued in spite of the anti-Chinese activities, so that the number of their race available for employment in agriculture continuously increased.

New Enterprises.—Cotton production in the early seventies was mentioned in the above discussion to show the extent to which the labor supply was changed at this time. Experimentation with it continued through the seventies, but it apparently had been given up before 1879 as the census for that year reports no cotton produced, and in fact, it was not until after 1910 with the introduction of irrigated cotton that commercial production in California became significant. Other new lines of production had been experimented with during the sixties, including tobacco, silk, flax, hops, and sugar. Of these, hops had indicated a natural adaptation and its production was rapidly expanded. Better qualities of grapes than the mission grape and different methods of making wine were being experimented with and with considerable encouragement, but grapes and grape products did not become important until the late seventies and early eighties. Development of the fruit drying process was beginning to give some value to the surplus products of the deciduous orchards by extending their market. Set over against these favorable intensive production opportunities was the fact that the production of wheat had already advanced to such a point during the seventies as to arouse anxiety over market outlets—by 1874, it was already beginning to be regarded as a "lifeless commodity".[50]

On the production side, too, wheat was losing its advantage. Continuous cropping with no attemps at restoring the soil had resulted in rapidly declining yields. Moreover, the variability in rainfall made dry-farming a highly speculative type of enterprise. To increase their yields and as a protection against drought, wheat farmers began to develop irrigation. But once under irrigation, the more intensive production alternatives for former wheat land became relatively so favorable that the land could no longer be used for wheat production. Where, before irrigation, land was valued at $2.50 per acre, its value now rose to $25.00 and $30.00. With the market already being rapidly broadened by the perfecting of the fruit drying process and of wine making, it was highly profitable to set out trees and vines on the former wheat land as fast as it was brought under irrigation.[51]

Another undertaking of the period following 1869 was the commencement of reclamation. The tidal and flood-water overflow lands of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys, commonly called the "tule lands", had long been recognised as being of great fertility. The problem was principally one of building dikes to prevent their periodic inundation, either from the tides, or of greater importance, from the spring flood waters. Since dredging machinery was not yet available, the job required a great deal of hand work, which, as we have heretofore seen, had long been considered as work fit for the Chinese. And to the Chinese it fell. Two of the witnesses appearing before the Congressional committee which was investigating Chinese immigration in 1876 were connected with a reclamation project which had been undertaken in the immediately preceding years.[52] Their testimony was to the effect that the Chinese were the only laborers available for that employment since the whites would not risk their health to attempt it. The Chinese were employed on a contract basis, three to four thousand at a time, and thirty to forty thousand acres of a 120,000 acre project had been completed. It was declared that had the Chinese not been available, the work could not have proceeded at that time.[53]

Increasing Dependence of Agriculture upon Chinese Labor.—The period of the seventies and early eighties was strategic for the economic structure of California agricultural organization. As land was successively placed under irrigation and prepared for more intensive farming, some of it was subdivided and apportioned out for small farms. But a not insignificant proportion of the large farms were held intact or only slightly subdivided, and then converted from grain and livestock farms into fruit farms of vast acreages. The fruit industry as it was being established did not make use of large scale equipment or of any extensive division of labor, either or both of which would have given large units an economic advantage over small. The failure to subdivide the land and the consequent establishment of large units must be attributed principally to the fact that purchasers to buy and establish small farms at the land prices asked by the large holders were absent and that in their stead cheap and convenient labor, principally Chinese, was available for intensive cultivation.[54] In the absence of a labor supply conveniently available for seasonal employment and at relatively low real wages, it seems reasonably clear that the process of transition from wheat and livestock farming to fruit, hops, vines, etc., would have taken place more slowly and only as small farmers to do the work themselves and with their families settled on the land. As it was, the Chinese labor supply was perfectly adapted to the seasonal work in operating the large-scale intensive units. They were skillful in handling the fruit. They were readily available—the employer had only to contact the "Chinese boss" or "head boy", tell him how many laborers were wanted, where and when, and the rest would be done. He was not even under the necessity of paying the laborers individually or of firing them if they did unsatisfactory work—all negotiations were carried on through the Chinese boss. The gang would stay until the work was finished, would provide their own board, and were not particular about housing. In sharp contrast, white laborers had to be solicited and bargained with individually, and, it was said, once found and hired (at a higher wage rate than the Chinese) they were given to grumbling, to independence, probably would leave within a few days, and moreover, had to be fed. When the Chinese had finished the work they would disappear, and when the season in the agricultural districts had ended, they usually flocked to the cities. Being frugal and without dependents, they could subsist through the slack period on their season's earnings. Except for the handling of machinery and teams, the Chinese were said usually to be as good laborers as the whites, and for dexterity in picking and handling fruit, to be superior.

---

[50] California State Agriculture Society, *Transactions*, 1874, pp. 242-254.

[51] Victor M. Cone, "Irrigation in the San Joaquin Valley, California," U. S. D. A. Office of Experiment Stations *Bul.* 239 (Washington, D. C., 1911), p. 17.

[52] George D. Roberts and Solomon Heydenfeldt of The Tide-land Reclamation Company.

[53] Report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration, 44th Cong. 2d. Sess. S. Rept. No. 689 (Washington, D. C., 1877), 436-443, 504-509.

The extent to which farm operators had become dependent upon Chinese by 1876 may be judged from the testimony of farm employers before the congressional committee mentioned above.[55] Briefly, their testimony indicated in general as follows: Chinese were widely employed in general and wheat farming, and almost exclusively in the hand work of harvesting fruits, vegetables, and hops. Many of the employers would have preferred whites but were forced to take Chinese because whites were scarce and untrustworthy. The seasonal availability as well as the cheapness of the Chinese were factors which enabled California agriculture to compete with the eastern states where wages for white labor were much lower. Chinese labor was said not to be in competition with white; on the contrary, more and better jobs were opened up for the whites by having the Chinese to perform lower grade elementary tasks which the whites would have been loath to accept. The Chinese had permitted a material advance in California wealth and income which would never have been possible without them.[56]

Attitude of Farm Employers Towards Exclusion of Chinese Immigration.—While farm employers admitted their dependence upon Chinese labor and maintained that production would be interrupted if such labor were not available, they were not in 1876 generally in favor of continued unlimited immigration of the Chinese.[57] This attitude can probably be accounted for partly by the acceptance of farm employers of the anti-Chinese argument that the presence of these Orientals prevented or hindered the migration of a more desirable farming class from the eastern states. Partly, too, farm employers doubtless questioned as did others whether the Chinese would ever be able to become satisfactory members of the community.

The two outstanding objections upon which the anti-Chinese campaigns were based were his vice and his labor competition. And it was principally in the cities that both became apparent. Congregated into Chinatowns, his idle time was spent in gambling, smoking opium, in houses of prostitution, and other such forms of recreation. Moreover, the demoralizing influence of such activities were not confined to the Chinese community alone; they attracted and influenced others. So said his antagonists. Labor competition, too, was most apparent in the cities. Here congregated the seasonally unemployed workers from all over the state to spend the winter. It is not wholly unnatural that, jobless and penniless, these men should regard the busy Chinaman as a competitor and usurper even though he was performing a job which any one of them would promptly have deserted when spring came. Whether Chinese labor stood predominately in a competitive or a complementary relation with respect to all other labor has never been clearly established;[58] moreover, the question is not of any great contemporary importance. The laboring population rightly or wrongly designated it as competitive, and so strong were their waves of objection that the politicians joined in and rode them out to exclusion.[59]

---

[54] "The division of our land into these vast estates, derives additional significance from the threatening wave of Asiatic immigration whose first ripples are already breaking upon our shores. What the barbarians enslaved by foreign wars were to the great land lords of ancient Italy, what the blacks of the African coast were to the great land lords of the Southern States, the Chinese coolies may be, in fact are already beginning to be, to the great land lords of our Pacific slope." Henry George, *Our Land and Land Policy* (San Francisco, 1871), p. 26 (In Pamphlets by California Authors. Economics, Vol. 5, University of California Library).

[55] Mrs. M. R. Coolidge devotes a chapter to a discussion of this investigation. See her *Chinese Immigration* (New York, 1909), 96–107.

[56] Report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration, *op. cit.*, particularly pages 436–443, 569–585, 620–621, 624, 706–796, 799–801, 1033–1034, 1075, 1091.

[57] Report of the Special Joint Committee, *Ibid.*

The results of a popular vote taken in 1879 on the question of Chinese immigration have been widely used to show that opposition to the Chinese was not confined to the labor unions and the other outspoken opponents. In this poll 154,638 votes were cast against and 883 for Chinese immigration. But Mrs. Coolidge has pointed out that this vote was taken under such circumstances as to rob it of its apparent significance. The primary purpose of the election was the adoption of a new constitution; the names of forty-five candidates for office also appeared on the ticket, and at the bottom in much smaller type than that in which all the rest of the ballot was printed, were the words "Against Chinese Immigration". To vote *for* Chinese immigration, it was necessary to cross out "against" and write in "for". Failure to do this or to take any notice of the proposition resulted in a vote *against* Chinese immigration.[60]

During the most feverish part of the anti-Chinese campaign, 1876–1882, farm employers reiterated the dependent position of agriculture upon Chinese labor.[61] Beyond this, there is no evidence that a position was taken either way with respect to the Chinese exclusion movement. Congressman-elect Rosencrans was reported to have said upon departure for Washington in December, 1881 that he had been visited by quite a number of fruit raisers who protested against the exclusion of the Chinese.[62] The same letter to the editor of the *Pacific Rural Press* in which this information is conveyed also claims that members of the State Horticultural Society had been recently discussing the possibility of passing a resolution in favor of Chinese labor and immigration. Another letter to the editor two weeks later makes a particularly emphatic statement of the dependence of the fruit grower upon Chinese labor:

> Our orchards and vineyards are the product of Chinese labor. Had not such labor been at command, there would not now be one fruit tree or grapevine in the State where there are now ten.[63]

In the beginning, Chinese laborers had been available without individual or associated attempts by farm employers to import them. Even though they had now come to depend upon the Chinese, no vigorous or aggressive efforts were made to assure their continued coming. Two of the reasons which may explain this have previously been suggested, namely, that the Chinese were not considered good citizen possibilities, and that their presence discouraged the coming of people from the eastern states and from Europe. There may have been additional reasons such as those suggested by the *Overland Monthly*, that there was a certain amount of pooling of issues. Farmers were willing to take sides with labor against the Chinese, if organized labor in turn would help the farmers in their fight against the railroads and the creditor class.[64]

Farm operators had, however, utilized Chinese labor to build up an economic structure differing from that in which labor from Europe or the eastern United

---

[58] Mrs. M. R. Coolidge, "Chinese Labor Competition on the Pacific Coast." *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XXXIV (September, 1909), 341–350, concluded that Chinese labor was principally non-competitive and therefore could not have depressed wages. Carl C. Plehn, "Labor in California," *Yale Review*, 4 (February, 1896), 409–425, concluded that the presence of Chinese labor intensified and aggravated the forces already at work which were forcing a decline in wage rates, particularly in the unskilled ranks.

[59] "The feeling on the Chinese question has long been so strong in California as to give certain victory to any party that could fully utilize it. But the difficulty in the way of making political capital of this feeling has been to get resistance, since all parties are willing to take the strongest anti-Chinese ground." Henry George, "The Kearney Agitation in California," *Popular Science Monthly*, XVII (August, 1880), 443. For a good discussion of labor participation in Chinese exclusion see Cross, *op. cit.*, pp. 73–129.

[60] Coolidge, *op. cit.*, 123–124.

[61] *Pacific Rural Press*, XIII (June 30, 1877), 408. XX (September 11, 1880), 168. XXII (July 30, 1881), 65. XXII (December 10, 1881), 386, XXII (December 24, 1881), 418.

[62] *Pacific Rural Press*, XXII (December 10, 1881), 386.

[63] *Ibid.* (December 24, 1881), 418.

[64] Vol. III, 2d. Ser. (March, 1884), 332–333.

States was willing to work. After legislative exclusion [65] (1882) had been established, farm employers shortly began to feel the pressure of a restricted labor supply and this forced them into a less passive attitude. Although no aggressive or concerted action had been taken to insure the continuous arrival of new Chinese labor supply, they were soon to take aggressive action to prevent the supply already here from being expelled.

The Labor Supply Immediately Following Chinese Exclusion.—

> The (fruit) crop of the present year (1883), although deemed a short one, taxed the labor capacity of the State to the utmost to fit and prepare it for shipment to the world's market. If such was the situation this year, what will it be when the numerous young orchards now just coming into bearing will be producing full crops? The labor is not now in the country to handle such an increase in production. Will the demand for labor to meet and handle this increase of production be responded to when made? If so, where from? Not from China, for the Chinese are debarred from coming here. From the older States of the Union? The laborers of those older States are as well or better paid than similar laborers are paid here.
>
> * * * The only avenue for an unlimited supply of labor to the people of California, Congress *at their instance* [italics mine] has closed. Hence they must look to the natural increase of population for their labor supply. The orchardist and farmer cannot send to Europe or the East for laborers, with the hope of obtaining them at a reasonable hire, for the reason that he cannot employ them profitably to himself more than three or four months in the year—a condition of things entirely unsuited to the demands of the European laborer.[66]

The above statement gives an indication of how quickly the absence of the first annual addition to the Chinese labor supply was missed. More discussion of the problem of labor was to appear in the fall of 1883 than at any time to that date. It was one of the most important subjects for discussion at the September meeting of the State Horticultural Society. The fruit growers realized that they were planting in excess of the available labor supply and advised each other to go slower. Suggestions were made that arrangements with the school authorities might make it possible for them to obtain city boys to help them in the fruit harvest. The city boys would be satisfactory workers, it was maintained, particularly if it were determined to give them comfortable quarters and "treat them as fellow creatures who are capable of being our own equals—capable of some day filling the positions we now occupy—not as slaves but as freemen".[67] Several members responded that their experience with boys as harvest help had been unsatisfactory, and that nothing was to be expected from this source of labor.

Other suggestions of the meeting were that a sufficient supply could be had if the employers would endeavor to improve labor relations by making their workers more comfortable and less servile. One member thought that cottages and a few acres of ground ought to be allotted to a few laborers for each ranch—to insure a minimum labor nucleus. Still another thought was that the only solution to the problem was to reduce the sizes of farms and increase diversification.[68]

Again in the October meeting of the State Horticultural Society, the question of labor supply dominated the discussion. "The apparent lack of suitable help has given me more uneasiness in relation to the solution of the fruit problem than any or all other obstacles combined," said the opening speaker.[69] Possible sources of labor supply were again discussed, and among them was the State of Sonora, Mexico. Several members expressed the opinion that no adequate solution of the labor problem could be found short of a reorganization of agriculture which would offer a more constant labor demand. "But once assure the outsiders that they can get steady employment, and they will come as fast as we need them." [70] The more general opinion appeared to be that this would require relaxation of monopolistic control of land as well as the introduction of more diversified enterprise. Land should be distributed so that homes could be built up and the fruit industry be supported by family labor, it was said.

---

[65] The political and legislative events leading to the temporary exclusion law in 1882 and its subsequent renewals cannot be discussed here. The following discussions are referred to: Chester Lloyd Jones, "The Legislative History of Exclusion Legislation," *Annals* of the American Academy of Political Science, XXXIV (September 1909), 351–359; Mildred Wellborn, "The Events Leading to the Chinese Exclusion Acts," Historical Society of Southern California, *Annual Publications*, 9 (1912-1914), 49–58.

[66] From an editorial in the *Pacific Rural Press*, XXVI (September 8 1883), 192.

[67] *Ibid.*, (October 6, 1883), 290.

[68] *Ibid.*, 281, 290, 294.

[69] *Ibid.* (November 3, 1883), 378–379

[70] *Ibid.*, 379.

The Santa Clara County Viticultural Society at the same time was also greatly interested in the matter of labor supply. Their organization reported labor scarcity; Chinese, particularly, were hard to obtain. A proposition to import Portuguese laborers was discussed. Another proposition was that Italian family immigration should be encouraged; since the Italians were too poor to become operators, they would remain as laborers. If no other source opened up, within ten years the people would be only too glad to removed the restrictions upon the Chinese.[71]

Scarcity of agricultural labor during the early eighties was partly the function of industrial recovery from the depressed conditions of the seventies, as well as of expansion in intensive crop production, and the cutting off of additional Chinese labor supplies. Beginning in 1883 and extending through 1886 industrial depression again prevailed with considerable unemployment, especially in the East.[72] It appears that the agricultural labor supply was thus augmented to some extent during these years, for the excited anticipations of labor shortage of the fall of 1883 appear not to have materialized. References to the labor supply during 1884–1886 would indicate that the supply was not as scarce as expected.[73] But the situation for these years was complicated by occurrences which shifted the attention of farm employers from the question of future sources to an active program of protection of their present supply of Chinese.

Concerted Action by Farm Employers to Protect the Resident Chinese Labor Supply.—The anti-Chinese elements in the California population were not satisfied by the preventing of further immigration of Chinese, but were determined as well to be rid of those already here. Proposals to drive them away by excluding them from employment had played a prominent part in the Constitutional convention of 1878. A measure to exclude Chinese from *all* employment was seriously considered,[74] and measures to exclude them from employment by corporations and on state, county, and municipal or other public work, except in the punishment of crime, were carried.[75] In 1880, the unemployed of San Francisco, knowing that the clause prohibiting Chinese employment by corporations was not being enforced, undertook action in their own behalf towards its enforcement. Threats of physical destruction became more effective than the long-standing use of the boycott had ever been, and the pressure succeeded in the displacement of many Chinese. Outside of San Francisco, as early as 1877 farmers were reported to have received anonymous notices that they must not employ Chinese labor.[76] But it appears that no concerted action against Chinese employment in agriculture occurred until nearly ten years later.

Sporadic instances of violences against the Chinese had occurred in the rural areas during the whole anti-Chinese period. But the spring of 1886 such activities had become of sufficient importance as to draw the attention of growers' associations. The Vacaville Fruit Growers at their meeting in February, 1886 reported that an organization to harangue the people against the Chinese was trying to get started and that it was feared that continued acts of violence against the Chinese would result in their leaving. The meeting was concluded with a call upon "brother fruit-growers, the directors of the Fruit Union, San Francisco newspapers and every good citizen of California to help prevent the Chinese from being driven away."[77] Five days later, the trustees of the California Fruit Union passed a resolution cordially endorsing and sympathizing with the stand of the Vacaville growers. Hasty and violent expulsion of the Chinese would inflict great injury upon the fruit industry, as the Vacaville growers had so truthfully said.[78]

A series of resolutions by various growers' organizations followed the lead of the Vacaville fruit growers. The State Horticultural Society resolved in addition that "each member of this association will at all times give preference to white men as laborers, when he can do so without material injury to our interests."[79]

---

[71] *Ibid.*, 281.

[72] Cross, *op. cit.*, 181.

[73] *Pacific Rural Press*, XXVIII (July 26, 1884), 65, XXIX (April 11, 1885), 355, XXXI (February 13, 1886) 152. One prominent grower, Wm. C. Blackwood, maintained that labor was not abundant, however; "Chinese wages have advanced from eighty cents to one dollar and twenty-five cents per day, and they cannot be had by sufficient numbers at any price." (May, 1884). "A Consideration of the Labor Problem." *Overland Monthly*, III (2d. Ser.), 449–450.

[74] Eaves, *op. cit.*, 153–155.

[75] Constitution of California, Article XIX, Sections 2 and 3. Section 3 prohibiting the employment of Chinese by corporations was subsequently held to be in conflict with the United States Constitution, and therefore void. (*In re* Parrott, I Fed. 481).

[76] *Pacific Rural Press*, XIII (June 30, 1877), 408.

[77] *Ibid.*, XXXI (February 27, 1886), 197, 209.

[78] *Ibid.* (March 6, 1886), 232.

[79] *Ibid.*

The Mendocino Hop-Growers Association, the fruit growers of Newcastle and vicinity, the strawberry growers of Santa Clara, and the fruit growers of Santa Cruz each expressed collectively its position with respect to the driving out of the Chinese.[80]

During March, 1886, a convention was held at Sacramento by the Chinese antagonists at which the "State Non-Partisan Anti-Chinese Organization" was formed, with a resolution to promote the absolute prohibition of Chinese immigration and their early removal.[81] After this, growers' resistance strengthened. At an immediately following meeting, the Santa Clara Horticultural Association declared that "organization must meet organization" and that growers would have to prepare for self-protection; a committee to devise ways and means for the latter was appointed. A month later the "Fruit Growers' and Citizens' Defensive Association of Santa Clara County" had been organized by this committee, with the purpose of preventing interference and resisting boycott.[82] The Mendocino Hop Growers Association immediately stepped into a more aggressive position, unanimously resolving: "That what is here we own and we have a perfect right to use it as we think best, and while we deplore the presence of Chinese in our midst and that they have come into competition with white labor, still our necessities, owing to losses in the hop business in previous years, compel us to use any and all honorable means to retrieve these losses." [83]

Meanwhile the basis of the Chinese eradication campaign had shifted from the use of threats and violence upon the Chinese to the use of the boycott against growers who employed them.[84] It is reported that Eastern visitors to California during the summer of 1886 found a state of social eruption and rebellion because of the boycott.[85] The excitement did not continue beyond 1886. In the latter part of the year, industry began to revive and many erstwhile anti-Chinese campaigners were able to go back to their former employments. Once restored into more attractive and better paid jobs, they lost interest in agriculture and in the asserted dreadful consequences of Chinese employment in that industry. The expulsion campaigns had not been without their effect, however. Departures of Chinese from San Francisco in 1885 and 1886 were almost 50 per cent greater than in the Chinese emigration history.[86]

The harvest season of 1887 apparently was without particular event, although the labor supply appears not to have been over-abundant. "Last year Chinese, school children, tramps, and all were unable to prevent hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of fruit from wasting", was the way in which one writer described the situation in the following year.[87]

Reorganize Agriculture or Import New Labor Supplies?—Commissioner John S. Enos of the State Bureau of Labor Statistics in the first biennial report of that bureau (1883-1884) capably expressed the alternatives which lay before California agriculture after the exclusion of the Chinese, as follows:

> Hitherto the one great objection to an increase of the unskilled white labor population in California has been, that necessary as it was to have more help during the summer and harvest, the manner of husbandry in this state was such as to assure those who labor for others, work only for three, or at the highest, five or six months during the year. It was admitted to be an unnatural condition of affairs, and one which should be remedied, but which, under prevailing circumstances, could not be changed, especially as long as Chinamen in sufficient numbers could be hired during the busiest seasons of the year. * * * The coming of Chinamen was tolerated and encouraged for many years. As a natural consequence they made for themselves a place in the industrial economy of the State, preventing thereby the natural increase and provision for a white laboring population. Employers could not expect white laborers to spring out of the ground when the Chinese influx ceased; nor can they now expect to remedy the evil, which a short-sighted policy, preferred a homeless wandering heathen to a settled American with a family brought upon them, without suffering the consequences. But the great danger is that they are unwilling to suffer these consequences and rather than undergo the annoyance of a settlement which would, once for all, put the questions of labor upon a right basis, they will look to the immediate

---

[80] *Ibid.* (March 13, 1886), 244; (March 20, 1886), 278.
[81] *Ibid.* (March 20, 1886), 278.
[82] *Ibid.* (March 27, 1886), 292; (April 24, 1886), 412.
[83] *Ibid.* (April 10, 1886), 358.
[84] *Ibid.* (March 27, 1886), 289; (April 24, 1886), 412; (May 15, 1886), 486.
[85] California State Agricultural Society *Transactions* for 1886, pp. 200-201.
[86] Table 8.
[87] Letter to the editor, *Pacific Rural Press*, XXXV (April 21, 1888), 304.

> future and continue to encourage or begin again to encourage Chinese immigration. * * * If the size of their landed estates and the mode of cultivating them preclude the employment of civilized labor under civilized conditions, it is better that such estates lay waste, than that they be made the means of perpetuating the coolie system.[88]

And again after the Chinese eradication campaign of 1884–1886 it was anticipated that:—"The departure of these people (Chinese) will imply a new domestic policy for many of the farmers and fruit-raisers of this State. They have depended mainly on the Chinese, who readily move, like armies, come when called for, and depart when their mission is accomplished.[89] Farmers must now look to a normal population, for the age of the single male laborer will gradually slide away. * * * "Diversified industry that will give some employment all the year round is the solution. The married man cannot be a mover. He must have his cottage and garden, and a reasonable employment within a few miles. * * * This is the normal condition of American life. The Chinaman has denied it to California, but the boom and the exodus will bring it to us in spite of ourselves. The change should not be viewed as a calamity. It may be inconvenient at first, but after a few years no doubt the places now held by the Chinese will be filled by a more desirable laboring population." [90]

Such were undoubtedly the hopes or expectations of many people in the period of 1883–1888. Community-conscious people had been dissatisfied with the period of wheat specialization because it produced wheat but not rural homes or communities. They had been equally or even more greatly disappointed with the early beginning in fruit specialization. Since the availability of Chinese labor had been commonly regarded as a reason for excessive specialization and for the perpetuation of large units, it was thought that their exclusion and repatriation would bring a change. Farm operators would be forced to adjust their operations into conformity with the domestic labor supply, and the domestic labor supply would not submit to the conditions tolerated by the Chinese.

Farm employers, as was expected, were not to find the process of adjustment to a non-Chinese labor supply so easy. Their production had been based upon the use of labor which was available for short period employment, and the value of their land was capitalized on the basis of returns from this specialized type of production and from the low wage rates of the Chinese. It was declared that land valued at from $200 to $500 per acre would be worth but from $25 to $50 if it had to be used for anything but fruit production.[91] [92] Consequently, farm operators were greatly concerned with the possibility that the exclusion of the Chinese would mean a drastic curtailment of the supply of labor such as would force an alteration in their established system of cultivation. The imminent possibility of such an occurrence was well recognized for it was admitted that "as a class of laborers, the Chinese in California have theretofore occupied precisely the same position in the body politic that the peasantry of Europe do at home." [93] If this was the limit of economic opportunity awaiting the successors of the Chinese, it was useless to suppose that Europeans would stand the cost of immigration to attain, in the end, nothing better than they had at home. The economic environment of America was still in 1888 such that domestic labor was neither of the temperament nor of the necessity of occupying employment of the same level as the European peasant. Hence, to perpetuate the system, laborers of the same characteristics as the Chinese, or the Chinese themselves, were required. Since the latter were still the most feasible alternative, the removal of the exclusion law upon them began to be openly advocated by the spokesmen of the farm employers.[94]

Certain alternatives to the renewed immigration of the Chinese were also proposed, other than that of encouraging the immigration of the Sonoran Mexicans, which has already been mentioned. The Santa Clara County Viticultural Society was early in 1888 discussing the possibility of bringing in Negroes from the South to relieve the pressure of labor shortage. And plans were already being laid to try out Negroes in the grapes at Fresno during the approaching harvest season.[95] [96] With two railroads as principals, a regular agency was established to bring Negroes to California as successors to the excluded and departing Chinamen.[97] A little later in the season the Southern Pacific announced that it would bring any number of Negroes to California employers who would advance the fare (not to exceed $60). Contracts would be made by the railroad with the Negro whereby one-third of this wages would be withheld until the employer had been repaid his advance of fare; and the employer was to take all the responsibility for the advance.[98]

---

[88] California State Bureau of Labor Statistics *First Biennial Report* (1883–1884) ,10–11.

[89] From an editorial, *Pacific Rural Press* (February 11, 1888), 116.

[90] *Ibid.*

[91] W. C. Blackwood, "A Consideration of the Labor Problem," *op. cit.*, 455. The *California Fruit Grower*, I (June 2, 1888), 9 made a particularly graphic statement of the strategic position of labor supply: "Whatever abounding fertility of land inviting to plant, whatever perfect condition of tree and vine proceeding from years of intelligent study, experimentation, expenditure and toil, whatever wants of a vast market for fruit fresh, canned and dried, and whatever certainty of profit if those wants be can supplied; all these elements of success and prosperity are now, more than ever in the history of the business in this State, depending upon a supply of labor to pick and prepare the fruit for market."

[92] The anomolous situation wherein it was considered that the grain and hay producer could pay $2 and $3 per day for laborers whereas the fruit producer could pay only $1 to $1.25 developed during the seventies and eighties. *California Fruit Grower*, IV (July 6, 1889), 3, and Report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration, *op. cit.*, 83. The less advantaged industry could pay higher wages than the more advantaged. The significance of the situation lies in the fact that Chinese labor was employed principally in the fruit and hardly at all in grain and hay.

[93] Blackwood, *op. cit.*, 455.

[94] *Ibid.*, *California Fruit Grower*, I (June 2, 1888), 7.

The experiment with Negroes appears not to have been remarkably successful, although some of the growers who imported them were at times enthusiastic. One grower employed 100 of them in his vineyard and claimed them to be more satisfactory than the Chinese.[99] The total importation of Negroes probably did not exceed a few hundred. Some of the enthusiasm of employers may be accounted for in the fact that the Negroes were hired for $15 per month with board when the common rate of wages was approximately twice that; the same fact undoubtedly accounts for some of the Negroes having taken "French leaves" from their employers without having repaid their advanced fare.[1]

The season of 1888 was one of relatively extreme labor shortage. Chinese exclusion, expansion in fruit production,[2] and industrial prosperity were all contributing causes. To get through the season, several things were done other than to export Negroes. Indians were employed on a greater scale than was customary. The school vacation was started earlier at San Jose.[3] The State Board of Trade worked out a plan with the Southern Pacific to transport boys and girls for agricultural employment at half fare, and upon presentation of a certificate from their employer at the end of the season they were returned at no cost.[4] At Vacaville, growers had early advertised their need of help, and families from as far away as three hundred miles came in their wagons and with camping equipment to help in the fruit harvest; many of them were potential fruit growers whose trees had not yet come into bearing.[5] In the vicinity of Winters, Japanese had appeared and had been employed by several growers and had been found to be satisfactory. When the State Horticultural Society met in May the possibility of obtaining a considerable number of Japanese was one of the principal topics for discussion.[6]

The measures taken to secure juvenile workers for the fruit harvest succeeded in recruiting quite a number.[7] Employers were not fully satisfied with this type of labor, however. For one thing, they did not like to undertake the disciplinary problems involved in employing boys; for another, the boys required attention as to food and housing which employers, on the basis of their experience with Chinese labor, were unaccustomed to giving and unprepared to offer.[8]

---

[95] *Pacific Rural Press*, XXXV (April 28, 1888), 376.

[96] An earlier society for encouraging Negro migration had been organized by Negroes at Stockton in 1882. *Pacific Rural Press*, XXV (May 19, 1883), 440.

[97] *Pacific Rural Press*, XXXV (April 28, 1888), 376. Evidently the editor of the *Rural* had but little strength of conviction in the opinion quoted earlier in this section that the departure of the Chinese would not mean a calamity but a much desired alteration in California, for his comment on the plan to bring out Negroes was as follows: "As we have said, there is much of an experimental nature in this undertaking, but it is worth attention, because *most certainly we need a good supply of reasonably priced labor in this State to make our great fruit industry profitable*." (Italics mine).

[98] *California Fruit Grower*, I (July 21, 1888), 7.

[99] *Ibid.*, I (June 30, 1888), 6 and (July 7, 1888), 7. *Pacific Rural Press*, XXXV (May 19, 1888), 446 and (May 26, 1888), 468.

[1] *California Fruit Grower*, I (June 23, 1888), 7.

[2] Canning had been experimented with during the late seventies and had become commercially practical and was being expanded to a significant scale during the eighties. California State Agricultural Society *Transactions*, 1891, p. 198.

[3] *Pacific Rural Press*, XXXV (Apr. 28, 1888), 376.

[4] *Ibid.*, XXXVI (July 21, 1888), 48. *California Fruit Grower*, I (August 11, 1888), 3.

[5] *Pacific Rural Press*, XXXV (June 9, 1888), 506 and XXXVI (August 4, 1888), 92.

[6] *Ibid.*, XXXV (May 19, 1888). 446 and (June 2, 1888), 492. The Japanese consul at San Francisco offered the opinion that he was certain that his government would sanction the immigration of some of the redundant Japanese population to California. *California Fruit Grower*, I (June 9, 1888), 6.

[7] *Pacific Rural Press* (August 11, 1888), 118. *California Fruit Grower*, I (August 17, 1888), 9.

[8] *Pacific Rural Press*, XXXVI (August 25, 1888), 165. *California Fruit Grower*, IX (July 11, 1891), 17. The latter journal was outspoken about certain employers' attitudes about employing boys; "One of the objections to white boys, and to girls also, was that they required too much attention. They want quarters in which they can preserve the decencies of life, want meals cooked for them and want opportunity to pass their resting hours as become civilized people. This does not suit some fruit growers, who consider only the fruit and the immediate profit. The moral condition of their employees is nothing to them. The degrading influence of reducing white laborers to the level of barbarians is not considered. If all were like a few who spoke at the State Horticultural Society's meeting on Saturday, the boys of California would have no opportunity to become anything but hoodlums."

Labor Abundance Without Significant Importation or Immigration, 1889–1902.—The 1888 anxiety over labor shortage was not to be experienced again for more than a decade. During 1889, the labor unions of San Francisco commenced a program of strikes and boycotts to enforce demands for higher wages, shorter hours, closed shop, etc. Unfortunately, this program was undertaken just as economic activity was beginning to decline. Employers fought back, and by the time the crisis of 1893 hit California, unemployment had already been general for several years. Recovery was delayed until the turn of the century, when it was assisted by the Spanish-American War, and by discovery of gold in Alaska.[9]

This long period of labor strife and depression was to be the principal factor in providing agriculture with an abundant labor supply, with the result that specialization and intensity of cultivation were not only enabled to be perpetuated but also to be expanded.[10] With the commencement of labor troubles in 1889, the farm labor situation of the previous season was immediately relaxed. The editor of the *Pacific Rural Press* in February declared that the current press discussion of labor supply reflected not an economic problem but only an effort to stir up daily sensations.[11] Shortly thereafter, the State Board of Trade announced that there was a sufficient labor supply for the following season.[12] During 1889 and the following seasons there were scattered reports concerning the labor supply, indicating a few instances of local shortage, but on the whole an abundance or super-abundance of labor. The first survey of labor supply in California by the United States Department of Agriculture in 1892 indicated no instance of real shortage, and in most localities supply exceeded demand.[13] The subsequent industrial depression increased the labor supply to a point of continued superabundance, and farm employers did not again experience the pressure of an underabundant labor supply until after 1900.[14] Further augmentation of the farm labor supply during this period resulted from Japanese immigration. As will be found in the following chapter, the immigration of Japanese to California began in the late eighties and continued throughout the nineties on a small but steady scale. Even though economic recovery commenced in 1900, its influence in depleting the farm labor supply was not generally felt until 1902. This was partly the result of greatly increased Japanese immigration in 1900 and 1901.[15]

Certain occurrences of minor significance during this period, 1889–1902, are perhaps of general interest. During the summer of 1889, the State Board of Trade took a strong position in regard to the employment of Chinese. In an open letter "To the Vineyardist, the Fruit-Grower and Labor-Employer", their attention was called to the fact that in the recent struggle for protection against commodities of cheap and degraded labor in foreign countries, the labor of the country had stood behind them. Was it now to be the fate of labor in this country to sit on the fence and watch this same degraded foreign labor busily engaged in producing the excluded commodities within the walls of protection? And further:

> There is a principle lying beneath the question of deeper and more important significance than the idea of cheapness. And, gentlemen, that is the only reason why you ever think of taking a Chinaman in preference to a white man to work for you, because of money cheapness, feeling that for a smaller amount you get the same work, the same results. * * * And yet you wish to build up your State, wish to see it prosper, wish to see family after family come here and locate. And you invite him for what? To seek labor among his own by the side of his own fellow white laborer? Oh, No! By the side of John the Coolie. And yet the cry continually goes out from California, that we would do anything to get rid of our yellow countrymen, And we hold him tightly with the one hand while pushing him desperately away with the other. * * * We will probe this subject until we find whether the manufacturer, the fruit-grower and the labor-employer loves to talk a certain way to the white laborer when he wants his vote and a different way when he wants his labor.[16]

---

[9] Cross, *op. cit.*, 209–228.

[10] The changes in demand for labor during the three decades 1870–1900 are discussed in a later section of this chapter titled "Changes in Agriculture, 1870–1900".

[11] Vol., XXXVI (January 19, 1889), 57 *Cf.* *California Fruit Grower*, III (February 2, 1889), 3.

[12] *Pacific Rural Press*, XXXVII (February 23, 1889), 185.

[13] United States Department of Agriculture. Division of Statistics. *Miscellaneous Series Report*, No. 4 (Washington, 1892), 53–54.

[14] They did, however, experience certain inconvenience through Anti-Chinese activities and other labor conflicts occasioned by scarcity of work. The anti-Chinese activities were not on a scale comparable with the previous decade, however.

[15] Table 10, Chap. V.

[16] *California Fruit Grower*, IV (May 25, 1889), 9.

Farm operators began to complain in the early nineties that wages were too high. During the process of agitation for reductions, the following interesting comment appeared: "We cannot meet and discuss the question of wage rates," was the complaint expressed in the Oroville Register, "for all the newspapers in San Francisco would howl against us." [17] Nevertheless, drastic wage reductions were put into effect the following year (1894) and it was reported easier to get men at 50 or 75 cents per day than it formerly had been at $1.00.[18] In the season of 1894, a gang of Chinese were brought into Anaheim to pick oranges, but were driven out, and subsequently another gang was brought in under police guard.[19]

Recrudescence of Demand for Additional Chinese Labor, 1902–1907.—From a situation of superabundance during the nineties, labor supply and demand began to approach equality during 1900 and 1901, with isolated cases of declared labor shortage in each of these years. A committee on labor was appointed at the 1900 convention of the California Fruit Growers and this committee reported at the close of 1901 that they had been active during the past season as follows: They had held conference with the Southern Pacific to get the railroad to put a colony rate into effect. This was said to have resulted in bringing several thousand people into the state. In addition the labor committee had formed the California Colony Association, which pledged the sum of over $600 per month for one year to be devoted to the purpose of bringing bona fide colonists to the state. Over eight hundred families, it was said, were located in different parts of the state by this action.[20]

The California Colony Association continued its labors in 1902 and the railroad maintained its colony rate in effect. Continued pressure of a scarce labor supply throughout 1902 brought more vigorous action by the fruit growers at their next annual convention. One of the first papers presented at the convention was by H. P. Stabler of Yuba City. It was indicated that an unprecedented scarcity of help had been felt in every fruit district of the state. Even at an advance of twenty-five to fifty and even one hundred per cent in the wage rates, the necessary help had not been obtained to harvest the crops. Grain, hay, hop and dairy producers had been affected as well as the fruit producers: dairymen had even been forced to turn some of their cows out to pasture for want of milkers. As new fruit districts were to come into bearing and canning and drying establishments were rapidly expanding, the demand for the following season would be still greater than it had been in the past. Fruit-growers had therefore to look forward and plan to meet the approach of another crop.

The Chinese, said Mr. Stabler, had been instrumental in helping to found the industry and were in all respects satisfactory workers but they were now excluded and out of the question. The Japanese had already shown themselves to be unreliable, and therefore their immigration should not be encouraged. California never having received much immigration from Europe, this left finally only the eastern states as the both feasible and desirable source of labor for California. "While I am aware that there is no surplus of farm labor in the East, the great advertising California has received during the past few years has placed our advantages and greater possibilities before the Eastern people generally, and I am persuaded that a united effort on our part would result in a large immigration of a desirable class of settlers." [21] The convention was then asked to appoint a committee of fifteen to work in conjunction with the transportation companies, the State Board of Trade, the California Promotion Committee, the Sacramento Valley Development Association, and others, to take such measures as would encourage migration from the East to relieve the threat of labor shortage for the following season.

Another member of the convention, A. N. Judd of Watsonville, was more inclined to demand the removal of restriction upon the Chinese and had come to the convention with a memorial to Congress from the Pajaro Valley Fruit-Growers' Association expressing this demand.[22] This memorial the fruit growers as a whole were asked to adopt. In the subsequent discussion, most of the members were in favor of Mr. Stabler's proposal of stimulating migration from the eastern states, although Mr. Judd continued to favor demanding removal of Chinese exclusion, saying: "We have degraded a certain class of labor, and there is not a man who lives in any agricultural locality who wants to get in and do this work."[23] The convention did not adopt the Pajaro memorial but did appoint the suggested committee. This committee functioned for a number of years. Its activities and results can more conveniently be discussed in the following chapter, and it is sufficient here to indicate that no solution was found through the efforts along this line. Although the Japanese continued to pour into the country during the next few years, farm employers were not satisfied. By 1906 the fruit growers were ready to adopt a resolution in favor of removal of the exclusion law upon the Chinese, and in the following year to express their resolution more formally as a memorial to Congress. But the period 1908–1916 was a parallel of 1889–1902; the pressure of labor scarcity was again relieved by industrial depression. Nothing more was heard about Chinese labor until 1917–1919, when wartime emergency again caused agricultural producers to favor immigration of Chinese labor.

---

[17] Pacific Rural Press, XLVI (November 4, 1893), 315.

[18] *Ibid.* (April 7, 1894), 264–265. This information was conveyed at a meeting of the State Horticultural Society, at which incidentally, several growers testified as to the high returns they had experienced from a little kindness and extra consideration. Efforts to domesticate and stabilize help on various ranches were said to have succeeded handsomely.

[19] *Ibid.* (March 3, 1894), 174. The citrus industry and other intensive cultivation in the southern part of the state was developed principally with white labor and a small number of Mexicans. Not until after 1900 did the employment of Orientals in the south become of any significance.

[20] Twenty-Sixth Fruit-Growers' Convention (1901) *Official Report* (Sacramento, 1902), 76.

[21] Twenty-Seventh State Fruit-Growers' Convention (1902) *Transactions*, 268–272.

[22] *Ibid.*, 272–275. This memorial is reproduced in Appendix B.

Quantitative Importance of Chinese Labor, 1870–1900.—Tables 7 and 8 indicate the immigration and emigration of the Chinese through the years 1870–1890. From approximately 50,000 in California in 1870 (Table 9), the Chinese population grew by an average net immigration of some six to eight thousand through 1876. Thereafter, due to the vigorous anti-Chinese campaigning, net immigration dropped to relative insignificance until 1882. With exclusion imminent, upwards of thirty thousand rushed in during the last year of free immigration, bringing the total on the Pacific Coast to approximately 130,000, of which probably well towards 100,000 were in California. The exclusion law applied only to laborers, and the statistics are such as to make it impossible to segregate the arrivals and departures by occupation. But the fact that the net departures correspond to the period of vigorous anti-Chinese labor agitation through 1886 would make it appear that labor population was lost through net emigration in these years. After 1886, laborers continued to be gradually lost through emigration, but to a greater extent through death, since the Chinese were principally males and hence did not perpetuate themselves. As for agriculture, additional losses of laborers came through their transferring to other industries as the attitude toward them became less hostile and eventually even friendly.

TABLE 7.—*Chinese Immigration to the Pacific Coast 1870–1882*

Year	Arrived in United States [1]	Departed from San Francisco Custom House	Net Gain or Loss [2]	Estimated Number on Pacific Coast [3]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1870	15,740	4,232	+6,687	71,083
1871	7,125	3,264	+2,278	71,894
1872	7,788	4,887	+4,886	75,245
1873	20,291	6,805	+10,270	83,805
1874	13,776	7,710	+8,375	90,337
1875	16,437	6,305	+11,716	100,003
1876	22,781	8,525	+14,256	111,971
1877	10,594	8,161	+2,433	112,116
1878	8,992	8,186	+806	110,664
1879	9,604	9,220	+384	108,827
1880	5,802	7,496	−1,694	104,991
1881	11,890	8,926	+2,964	105,796
1882	39,579	10,366	+29,213	132,309

[1] From the report of the Commissioner-General of Immigration, 1905.
[2] Computed 1870-1875 from arrivals at San Francisco rather than column (1).
[3] Net arrivals minus deaths at 2 per year, an estimate which stands between the death-rate of male colored and male whites of the same age, i. e., 28.24 and 15.63.

SOURCE: M. R. Coolidge, *Chinese Immigration* (New York, 1909), 498–499.

---

[23] *Ibid.*, 276.

TABLE 8.—*Arrivals and Departures of Chinese from San Francisco 1883–1890*

Year	Arrived	Departed	Gain or loss
1883	9,269	10,894	[1] −1,625
1884	7,985	12,273	[1] −4,288
1885	11,330	15,185	−3,855
1886	11,110	16,915	−5,805
1887	13,718	11,339	+2,379
1888	14,173	11,786	+2,387
1889	10,935	10,169	+766
1890	832	5,652	−4,820

[1] Figures not as in Source but corrected from arrivals and departures.

SOURCE: M. R. Coolidge, *Chinese Immigration* (New York, 1909), 500.

Chinese immigration and settlement, particularly in the years prior to 1900, has been a peculiarly Californian experience. Between 1860 and 1900, the percentage of all Chinese in the continental United States who were located in California declined each census period from 100 per cent to 50 per cent. (Table 9.) The neighboring states of Oregon, Washington, Nevada, and Montana were the only others to share significantly in Chinese immigration and settlement.

TABLE 9.—*Geographic Distribution of Chinese Population in United States Census Periods, 1860–1900*

Geographic Division	1860	1870	1880	1890	1900
	Number				
Montana		1,949	1,765	2,532	1,739
Nevada		3,152	5,416	2,833	1,352
Oregon		3,330	9,510	9,540	10,397
Washington		234	3,186	3,260	3,629
California	34,933	49,277	75,132	72,472	45,753
All other states		5,257	10,456	16,951	26,993
U. S. (Continental)	34,933	63,199	105,465	107,488	89,863
	Per cent of Total				
Montana		3.1	1.7	2.4	1.9
Nevada		5.0	5.1	2.6	1.5
Oregon		5.3	9.0	8.9	11.6
Washington		0.4	3.0	3.0	4.0
California	100.0	78.0	71.2	67.4	50.9
All other states		8.2	9.9	15.8	30.1
U. S. (Continental)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: Ninth Census of the United States (1870), Vol. I, p. 8. Tenth Census of the United States (1880), Vol. I, p. 3. Twelfth Census of the United States (1900), Vol. II, p. xxii.

There are no adequate data to indicate the relative importance of Chinese agricultural labor throughout the three decades. The census of 1870 classified Chinese and Japanese into a single category, and at this time they accounted for 1,637 out of a total of 16,231 farm laborers.[24] Since there were practically no Japanese laborers in the United States at this date, this group must have been almost entirely composed of Chinese. In the following censuses, 1880 and 1890, the Chinese are not classified separately as to occupation, but are combined into the residual category of "all other countries." They must have constituted the major proportion of this category, for all of the other important groups are classified individually. In 1880 the total of this group within the agricultural labor category accounted for approximately one-fourth, and in 1890 for approximately one-fifth.

---

[24] Ninth Census of the United States, (1870), Vol. I, p. 722.

It is quite possible that the Chinese were never completely enumerated. (Compare Tables 7 and 8.)[25] Also there is a great possibility that considerable labor service in agriculture was performed by Chinese casual laborers who did not report their occupation as being farm laborers. Of the individual estimates of the proportional importance of the Chinese, many are too high. The State Labor Commissioner, for instance, estimated that in 1886, seven out of eight agricultural laborers were Chinese.[26] Mears has estimated that in the late seventies, three-fourths of the agricultural laborers were Chinese.[27] Both of these estimates are evidently too high. In 1881 a correspondent to the *Pacific Rural Press* estimated that between one-third and one-fourth of all the Chinese in California found employment during the summer months in the vineyards and orchards.[28] On the basis of the Chinese population in California in 1880, this would have meant some 20,000 and the total number of agricultural laborers reported in the census for this year was 23,856. A survey made by the State Bureau of Labor Statistics in the spring of 1884 indicated that in fifteen rural counties where both the number of Chinese and the number of white laborers were reported, they were in approximately equal proportion.[29] Probably the maximum proportion, between 1882 and 1884, did not exceed one-half. Before this time the absolute number and the proportion of Chinese had been increasing; subsequently they both declined. By 1910, the Chinese had declined to a position of relative insignificance in the aggregate farm labor supply; a few have remained to the present day, however. As early as 1900 they were exceeded in number in the beet fields by the Japanese and the Mexicans, although they were still the most important foreign group in fruit work.[30]

Even though the Chinese probably never constituted a large majority, and were in fact throughout the period 1870 to 1900 much of the time a small proportion of the total agricultural labor supply, it is significant that they did supply a large proportion of the demand for casual and seasonal labor. There are no data to permit a quantitative measurement of this; it is, however, the consensus of innumerable comments by employers, the agricultural press, and contemporary observers. Moreover, Chinese employment was restricted principally to the northern part of the state and to intensive crops—fruits, truck crops, hops, and later, sugar beets.

Influence of Chinese Labor on Agricultural Wage Rates.—Wage rates for agricultural labor fell rapidly during the decade 1850–1860. Thereafter, although they continued generally to decline until the middle nineties, the rate of decline was on the whole much more gradual. Throughout the period 1870 to 1882 wage rates for Chinese remained relatively constant, being everywhere $1 per day or $25 a month, without board. Field hands of other races were at the same time getting $1.75 and $2 per day with board, and ranch hands hired by the month received from $30 to $45 per month with board. Since the work performed by Chinese was generally of a different nature than that performed by others, these differences in wage rates cannot be accounted for on a purely racial basis. Chinese usually were engaged in routine hand tasks, and very little in general ranch work around dairies, livestock, or machinery. The non-Chinese fruit harvest help were usually paid about the same money wage rates as the Chinese, but with board generally included, or if board was not included, they were paid 25 to 50 cents more per day.[31] This amount of difference, where it occurred for the same type of work can be considered to be a racial concession, for the productivity of the Chinese was generally considered to be as great as the whites.

The report of a state investigation of Chinese immigration made in 1878 claimed that Chinese farm hands worked for 20 to 30 percent lower wages than whites.[32] Although this report is thoroughly anti-Chinese in its prejudice, this estimate, to the extent that the rates are at all comparable, is probably not excessive, when perquisites and cash are both considered. In 1901, Chinese fruit pickers were being paid $1.25 per day without board, while whites were similarly paid $1.50 to $1.75.[33] The California State Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1905 made a survey of 147 farms in 29 counties in which it was found that Chinese were receiving $1.25 per day without board as against $1.50 for whites. On a monthly basis, the Chinese were receiving $35 per month without board against $45 for the whites. Similar differences were found in 1909 by the United States Immigration Commission. Their results are as follows:[34]

---

[25] Also Mrs. Coolidge, *op. cit.*, 501n.

[26] United States Immigration Commission, *Summary Report on Immigrants in the Pacific Coast and Rocky Mountain States* (Washington, D. C., 1911), 40.

[27] E. G. Mears, *Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast* (Chicago, 1928), 238.

[28] *Pacific Rural Press*, XXII (December 24, 1881), 418.

[29] *Ibid.*, XXVII (April 19, 1884), 382.

[30] California State Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Ninth Biennial Report* (1899–1900), 29.

[31] Detailed data on wage rates will be found in Tables 36–38, Appendix A.

[32] *Chinese Immigration, its Social, Moral and Political Effect*, California State Senate Report (Sacramento, 1878), 295.

[33] United States Industrial Commission *Reports*, X (1901), 955.

	Dollars per day	
	Chinese	Whites
Regularly employed, with board	$1.41	$1.31
Regularly employed, without board	1.56	1.89
Temporarily employed, with board	1.45	1.29
Temporarily employed, without board	1.74	1.86

An interesting fact regarding the value of board is indicated in the above figures. Where both groups were given board, whites were paid less in cash than the Chinese, but without board, whites were paid more. Evidently Chinese board was valued at 15 to 30 cents per day, while white board was valued at approximately 60 cents.

While it is reasonably certain that Chinese were commonly paid less than whites, it does not follow that the result of this was to depress wages for all workers. The effect of Chinese employment on the general level of wages would depend upon whether the Chinese stood in a competitive or a complementary relation to other constituents of the labor supply. The nature of this relationship is not easily determined. Other laborers considered them to be competitors, and loathsome competitors at that, because of their supposed competitive advantage in being able to live on a much cheaper standard. Employers, on the other hand maintained that the work of the Chinese was essentially complementary. White men could not be obtained for the work which the Chinese did, said employers, and once the Chinese had performed the primary tasks, all ambitious white workers were elevated to more advantageous positions.

For agriculture during the seventies and eighties, the position of the employers is probably the more correct; the Chinese by performing some of the less desirable primary tasks not only made the work more pleasant but raised their level of productivity and income. This conclusion can be true only if it be supposed that the non-Chinese population would have been the same regardless of the presence of the Chinese. If it was true, as was commonly claimed, that the presence of the Chinese retarded the immigration of Europeans and Americans to California, the above conclusion is unwarranted, in part at least. A wholly non-Chinese population might not have developed the resources as rapidly as was done, but the production organization founded with such a population would not have been less efficient and would have been constructed so as to give greater equality in the distribution of income, both as between individuals, and for all individuals over time.

During the nineties, when labor in general was redundant with respect to the curtailed level of economic activity, the relation of the Chinese was probably more competitive than complementary, and hence wage-depressing.

Changes in Agriculture, 1870–1900.—These three decades experienced an approximate tripling of the total acreage in farms and in the number of farms.[35] Total acreage of improved land approximately doubled. By 1900 both total acreage and improved acreage were at a level from which they have subsequently changed but little. Irrigation was hardly significant in 1870, the aggregate acreage being less than 60,000 in 1869, but during the following three decades it had increased to 1,446,000 arces. Average improved acreage per farm was greatest in 1880 at 297 acres, and within the next two decades had declined by almost one-half, to 165 acres. The aggregate value of farms (land and improvements, including buildings) by 1890 had risen to approximately five times the value of 1870; the average value per farm had more than doubled and the average value per acre had almost tripled. On account of the depression and low prices, farm values were lower in 1900 than in 1890 on a per acre and per farm basis. The proportion of farms with an acreage of five hundred or more increased between 1870 and 1880 by approximately one hundred per cent and remained relatively constant through the next two decades. Apparently there had been some farms of less than ten acres established before 1870 which were not economically sound, for the number of farms of less than ten acres declined both absolutely and relatively between 1870 and 1880.

---

[34] United States Immigration Commission *Reports*, 24 (Washington, D. C., 1911), 35, 37.

[35] The data on which the following discussion is based are to be found in Tables 24–25 and 30–42, Appendix A.

Although a large proportion of the land which was put under irrigation was taken out of grain production, the production of cereals did not decline immediately. Wheat production continued to increase to around 1890, oats through 1900, and barley through 1910. This was the result of bringing into cultivation of additional dry-farm acreage. The significant expansion of these years, however, was in the intensive crops, particularly fruit. The data on the production of fruit are not complete and fully comparable for the census periods between 1870 and 1900; it appears, however, that in the aggregate, fruit and other intensive crops were yet relatively insignificant in 1880. Thereafter, the expansion in intensive crops was so rapid that by 1900 their value was almost equal to that of extensive crops.[56]

This rapid transition was accelerated by the use of a labor supply which in many respects was cheaper than Negro slaves. No capital outlay, such as was needed to purchase slaves, was required. Likewise, the cost of maintaining the family unit necessary to the propogation and rearing of slaves was not involved. Chinese workers came as mature individuals, without dependents, who demanded no more in exchange for their services than a moderate cash wage. When his work was done, the Chinese moved on, relieving his employer of any burden or responsibility for his welfare during the slack season. And he was always available again upon short notice when needed. Efficient slave labor would have demanded greater concern, and the cost of acquiring and maintaining a slave would undoubtedly have exceeded the annual average wage payment per worker by the typical fruit grower or hop producer. Moreover, the Chinese was commonly considered to be a more efficient worker than the Negro.

It has already been seen that certain members of the community in the early years of the American period in California had been interested in some form of cheap labor, either Negro slaves or contract labor. This sympathy was of minor relative importance and subsequently died away without influencing the community. It is not apparent that the later development of an economic structure requiring an abundance of cheap, casual labor was the designed or concerted intention of any significant proportion of the community. "* * * when the growing of fruits, both deciduous and citrus, began to occupy the attention of Californians, there were present among us many Chinese. Orchardists freely availed themselves of the services of the Chinese until the operation of the exclusion law prevented his immigration into the United States. * * * By boarding and lodging himself, the Chinese relieved the fruit grower of the responsibility of maintaining a boarding house on his premises, and many growers advocated his employment."[57]

"Before the enactment of the exclusion law there were enough Chinese in California to meet any exigency in the labor situation. They proved themselves well adapted to that particular form of labor to which so many white men object. They were patient, plodding and uncomplaining in the performance of the most menial service. They were content to live apart and board themselves. The bosses regulated the prices. These bosses furnished the number of men required, and when the harvest or other work was completed in one locality they were content to move to another."[58]

These are statements of prominent fruit growers to fellow growers of the circumstances under which Chinese came to be employed, and are, so far as the writer has been able to ascertain, simple and direct statements of the truth.[59] That the profitable opportunity to expand the production of fruit and the availability of Chinese labor should be concurrent appears to have been no more than an historical accident. The immediate conditions back of the profitability of fruit lay in the recently completed railroad, in the possibilities of development of irrigation, in the perfecting of the canning and drying processes, and in the natural adaptation of California soil and climate. The more immediate antecedents of the availability of Chinese labor lay in the Taiping rebellion and the discovery of gold in California.

---

[56] The decade 1880-1890 was one of extreme optimism among fruit growers. They were continually urging each other to expand, declaring that the market for California fruit was unlimited. Many of the fruit growers conventions heard speakers detail the greater profits of fruit as against wheat. Moreover, the area supposed to be suitable for fruit was very great. In 1889 there were still 11,265,493 acres recommended as being suitable for planting various semitropical fruits and nuts, available at prices ranging between $5 and $290 and averaging approximately $100. Department of the Interior. Census Office. *Report on the Statistics of Agriculture*, Eleventh Census (1890), 589-590.

[57] H. P. Stabler, "The California Fruit-Grower and the Labor Supply," *op. cit.*, 269.

[58] G. H. Hecke, "The Pacific Coast Labor Question from the Standpoint of a Horticulturist," Thirty-Third Fruit-Growers Convention (December, 1907) *Proceedings*, 68-69.

[59] Except that Mr. Stabler did not make allowance for citrus fruit in the southern part of the state being produced for the most part without Chinese labor.

Since the antagonistic attitude of a large proportion of the community towards the Chinese had in no wise been concealed during the years when their farm employment was expanding, it cannot be supposed that employers thought that the Chinese would always be available. Sometime the industry would have to employ individuals with family dependents to be maintained on a standard corresponding to the general community level. What the significance to the future of employing the Chinese would be may not have been appreciated by farm employers. More realistically, we must look upon it as one of the aspects of social accounting of which individual interest cannot be expected to take cognizance. Those who controlled extensive land acreages had certain alternatives. They could continue to use their land for producing grain or livestock or hold it idle, subdividing and selling it only as small operator-settlers arrived. Or, with sufficient labor available, as it was through the Chinese, it was feasible to convert large acreages into intensively cultivated fruit farms. This was the most profitable alternative and the one which self-interest dictated should be followed. A land-owner stood only to gain out of such a transition, if assured the presence of a convenient labor supply long enough to bring his fruit into bearing. After land was capitalized on the basis of actual or anticipated profits of fruit specialization, its sale was rendered more difficult. If a prospective purchaser intended to operate a large acreage with hired labor, it was necessary for him to anticipate the future availability of Chinese labor or other labor of similar characteristics. The prospective purchaser of a small acreage, to be operated as a "family farm" principally with the labor of himself and his family, found that the capitalized value of the land was too high to permit a labor return equal to his other wage alternatives. An established farmer of the eastern states stood a good chance to lose if he attempted to migrate to California. He must sell less highly capitalized land to purchase the more highly capitalized land of California and must pay the cost of migration in addition.

"Why is it then that the permanent population of the State has not increased more rapidly? Why did so many of the early immigrants leave her shores, never to return, by their departure depriving her of the greatest element of wealth?"[40] So asked Hittell in 1874, and answered by saying that the greatest cause was the mismanagement of the land titles by the Federal Government. Other factors, he said, were the great expense of transporting families from the eastern states, the uncertainty of crops in the dryer valleys, the scarcity of irrigation and reclamation developments. Another factor which Hittell might have added is the great variability of soils and climate, even within very short distances. This made it difficult for the farmer accustomed to the more homogeneous conditions of the eastern states to evaluate the productive value, and easy, moreover, for the unscrupulous seller to misrepresent. These factors applied to the seventies and to the later decades as well. And the additional factor developed above, which applied less to the early seventies, but more to the later years, was the capitalization of the land values on the basis of actual or prospective profits from the employment of cheap Chinese labor. The price of the land was placed so high as to enable a labor return to an owner-operator only approximately equal to Chinese wages.

The volume of propaganda encouraging migration to California was probably greater during the eighties than at any other time in the history of California. The early work of the California Immigrant Union was now supplemented in various ways. The California Immigration Society was organized at San Francisco in 1881 and the Southern California Immigration Association at Los Angeles in 1885. The agricultural trade papers, particularly the *Pacific Rural Press*, *Semi-Tropic California*, the *Rural Californian*, and the *California Fruit Grower*, all strove to publish and circulate information encouraging settlement. The state and county boards of trade were very active in disseminating colorful literature throughout the eighties. And in addition, there was considerable literature published by private land-owners, real estate developers, and sponsors of private colonies.[41]

---

[40] John S. Hittell, *op. cit.*, 442.

[41] A large collection of these pamphlets and advertisements is brought together in the Bancroft Library collection, University of California. (*California Pamphlets*, Vols. 4, 5, 20, and 23.)

The agricultural trade papers unanimously and consistently supported small farming as against large. The *Rural Californian* and *Semi-Tropic California* repeatedly maintained that ten to twenty acres was the proper size for fruit farms in the vicinity of Los Angeles. In the north, the *Pacific Rural Press* and the *California Fruit Grower* capitalized on every opportunity (such as the subdivision of large estates) to assert the economic superiority and to glorify the social ideal of family farm units.

Nevertheless, the transition to family units was discouragingly slow.[42] "We are fast becoming one grand community of fruit growers," said the *California Fruit Grower* in 1889, "but unfortunately, for our future prosperity, individual holdings are too large. The fact that our lands, cultivated and uncultivated, planted or unplanted, are owned by a few individuals in exceedingly large tracts, is today and will be in the future, one of our greatest drawbacks."[43] The failure to establish desirable rural homes, bad treatment of white and Chinese labor, economic dependence upon an undesirable alien element, and failure of the population to increase as rapidly as it should were characteristics of the rural structure which it was supposed would be eliminated if only small farms were established. "Land monopolies" were generally blamed for the bad state of affairs. As has been indicated, however, the significance of the large land holdings would have been greatly reduced had not an abundant supply of cheap, docile labor been available to cultivate them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY TO CHAPTER IV

Bancroft, H. H. *Essays and Miscellany* (San Francisco, 1890), 309–418.

Bancroft Library, University of California. (*Bancroft Scraps*) *Clippings on Chinese Immigration*, 4 vols.

Bancroft Library, University of California. *Extracts on Chinese Immigration*, 2 vols.

Bancroft Library, University of California. *Pamphlets on Chinese Immigration*, 4 vols.

Barrett, John. "The Plain Truth About Asiatic Labor," *North American Review*, 163 (November, 1896), 620–632.

Bee, Fred A. *The Other Side of the Chinese Question.* (San Francisco, 1886), 76 pp.

Bennett, H. C. *Chinese Labor: A Lecture in Reply to Hon. F. M. Pixley* (San Francisco, 1870), 41 pp.

Blackwood, Wm. C. "A Consideration of the Labor Problem," *Overland Monthly*, n. s. III (May, 1884), 449–460.

Bonner, John. "A Chinese Protest Against Exclusion," *California Illustrated Magazine*, V (April 1894), 603–610.

Bonner, John. "TheLabor Question on the Pacific Coast," *Californian Illustrated Magazine*, I (April, 1892), 410–419.

Brace, C. L. *The New West: or California in 1867–1868*, (New York, 1869), 373 pp.

Brooks, B. S. *Brief on the Legislation and Adjudication Touching the Chinese Question* (San Francisco, 1877), 160 pp.

Bryce, Viscount James. *The American Commonwealth* (New York, 1888), III, 223–254.

Burlingame, E. L. "An Asiatic Invasion," *Scribner's Monthly* 13 (November, 1877), 687–694.

California Fruit Grower, I (June 2, 1888) through IX (September 12, 1891).

California. Legislature. Report of the joint select committee relative to the Chinese population of the State of California. (Sacramento, 1862), 12 pp.

California. Legislature. Report of the Select Committee to Whom was Referred Assembly Bills No. 206, No. 207, and No. 208 with Reference to Foreign Miners. Assembly Document No. 19. Session of 1855.

California State Agricultural Society, *Transactions*, 1868 through 1900.

California, State Board of Control. *California and the Oriental.* A report on Oriental immigration, population, and land ownership. (Sacramento, 1920), 231 pp.

California State Bureau of Labor Statistics. *Biennial Reports* 1883–1884 through 1899–1900.

California State Senate. *Report on Chinese Immigration, Its Moral and Political Effect.* (Sacramento, 1878), 302 pp.

"The Chinese in America," *Littell's Living Age*, XXXIV (July, 1852), 32–34.

"Chinese Labor, a Cure for Strikes," *Overland Monthly*, n. s. XXXVIII (September, 1901), 231–233.

Chipman, N. P. "Wheat vs. Fruit," Tenth Fruit-Grower's Convention. *Official Report* (1888), 94–107.

Cone, Victor M. "Irrigation in the San Joaquin Valley, California," U. S. Department of Agriculture. Office of Experiment Stations *Bul.* 239 (Washington D. C., 1911), 62 pp.

Coolidge, Mrs. Mary R. *Chinese Immigration* (New York, 1909), 531 pp.

Coolidge, Mrs. Mary R. "Chinese Labor Competition on the Pacific Coast," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXXIV (September, 1909), 340–350.

Cross, Ira B. "A History of the Labor Movement in California," University of California *Publications in Economics*, 14 (Berkeley, 1935), 354 pp.

de Varigny, C. "L'invasion chinoise et le Socialisme aux Etats-Unis," *Revue des deux Mondes* 3e serie, t. 29 (October, 1878), 586–613.

Durst, John H. "The Exclusion of the Chinese," *North America Review*, CXXXIX (September, 1884), 256–273.

Eaves, Lucile. "A History of California Labor Legislation," University of California *Publications in Economics*, Vol. 2 (Berkeley, 1910), 461 pp.

Freud, J. R. Lecture on Chinese Labor. Printed in *Daily Morning Call* (San Francisco), January 21, 1878.

George, Henry. *Our Land and Land Policy* (San Francisco, 1871), 48 pp. (Bound in *Pamphlets by California Authors*, Economics V, University of California Library).

---

[42] Actually there may have been no general tendency towards smaller units. The average size of farm in total acreage and in improved acreage did decline it is true, but whether increased intensity was sufficient to offset this, so that the size in terms of "value of output" or "value added", did not decline cannot be definitely answered. The evidence of Table 33, Appendix A indicates that size in terms of the amount of hired labor has remained approximately constant, and in fact, may have slightly increased.

[43] Vol. III (March 2, 1889), 5. And later (V, November 9, 1889), "We are going to assert that it is better for the country to have one hundred acres planted in orchard or vineyard, owned by five men, each with a family, than five hundred owned by a corporation, with no family and no home."

George, Henry. "The Kearney Agitation in California," *Popular Science Monthly*, XVII (August, 1880), 433–453.
Gibson, Rev. Otis. *The Chinese in America* (Cincinnati, 1877), 403 pp.
Gompers, Samuel, and Gutstadt, Herman. *Meat vs. Rice* (San Francisco, 1908), 34 pp.
Hayes, John. "A New View of the Labor Question," *Overland Monthly*, o. s. VI (February, 1871), 140–147.
Hittell, John S. "Benefits of Chinese Immigration," *Overland Monthly*, n. s. VII (February, 1886), 120–124.
Hittell, John S. *The Commerce and Industries of the Pacific Coast* (San Francisco, 1882), 819 pp.
"How Our Chinamen are Employed," *Overland Monthly*, o. s. II (March, 1869), 231–240.
Hutcheson, Robert. "Why the Chinese Should be Admitted," *Forum*, 33 (March, 1902), 59–67.
Jones, Chester Lloyd. "The Legislative History of Exclusion Legislation," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXXIV (September, 1909), 351–359.
Kennedy, Joseph C. G. "Argument Adverse to Bills 407 and 409 to Restrict and Regulate Chinese Immigration." 45th Cong. 2d Sess. *Miscell. Senate Doc.* No. 36, pp. 1–36.
Lee, Yan Phou. "The Chinese Must Stay," *North American Review*, 148 (March, 1889), 476–483.
Loomis, Rev. A. W. "The Chinese as Agriculturists," *Overland Monthly*, o. s. IV (June, 1870), 526–532.
Macarthur, Walter. "Opposition to Oriental Immigration," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXXIV (September, 1909), 239–246.
Mears, E. G. *Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1928), 545 pp.
Norton, Frank H. "Our Labor System and the Chinese," *Scribner's Monthly*, II (May, 1871), 61–70.
Overland Monthly, Editorial on the Chinese. n. s. III (March, 1884), 332–333.
Pacific Rural Press, IV (July 27, 1872) through LX (September 15, 1900).
Perkins, George C. "Reasons for Continued Chinese Exclusion," *North American Review*, 163 (July, 1906), 15–23.
Plehn, Carl C. "Labor in California," *Yale Review*, 4 (February, 1896), 409–425.
Renner, George T. "Chinese Influence in the Development of the Western United States," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 152 (November, 1930), 356–369.
Rowell, Chester H. "Chinese and Japanese Immigrants—A Comparison," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXXIV (September, 1909), 223–230.
Schrieke, B. *Alien Americans: A Study of Race Relations* (The Viking Press: New York, 1936), 206 pp.
Seward, G. F. *Chinese Immigration in its Social and Economical Aspects* (New York, 1881), 420 pp.
Seward, George F. "Mongolian Immigration," *North American Review* 134 (June, 1882), 562–577.
Shewin, H. "Observations on the Chinese Laborer," *Overland Monthly*, n. s. VII (January, 1886), 91–99.
Silver, J. S. "The Chinese in California," *Lippincott's Magazine*, II (July, 1868), 36–41.
Speer, Rev. William. *An Humble Plea Addressed to the Legislature of California in Behalf of the Immigrants of China* (San Francisco, 1856), 40 pp.
Starr, M. B. *The Coming Struggle, or What the People of the Pacific Coast Think of the Coolie Invasion* (San Francisco, 1873), 115 pp.
Stone, W. W. "The Knights of Labor on the Chinese Situation," *Overland Monthly*, n. s. VII (March, 1886), 225–230.
Strong, John L. "Labor in Cotton Culture," *Overland Monthly*, o. s. XIII (July, 1874), 18–25.
U. S. Congress. House. *Chinese Immigration*. 46th Cong., 2d. Sess. House Report No. 572 (Washington, D. C., March, 1880), 39 pp.
U. S. Congress. Report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration. 44th Cong. 2d. Sess. S. Rept. No. 689 (Washington, D. C., 1877), 1281 pp.
U. S. Congress. Senate. "Views of the late Oliver P. Morton on the Character, extent, and effect of Chinese immigration to the United States." 45th Cong. 3d. Sess. *Senate Miscell. Doc.* No. 20, 14 pp.
U. S. Department of Agriculture. Division of Statistics. *Abundance or Scarcity of Farm Labor*, Miscell. Series Report No. 4 (Washington, D. C., 1892), pp. 53–54.
U. S. Immigration Commission. *Immigrants in Industries*. *Reports*, 24 (Govt. Print. Off.: Washington, D. C., 1911), 1045 pp.
U. S. Industrial Commission, *Reports*, X (Washington, D. C., 1901), 1149 pp.
Wellborn, Mildred. "The Events Leading to the Chinese Exclusion Acts," Historical Society of Southern California *Annual Publications*, 9 (1912–1914), 49–58.
Wheeler, Rev. O. C. *The Chinese in America* (Oakland, 1880), 27 pp.
Whitney, James A. *The Chinese and the Chinese Question* (New York, 1880) 67 pp.
Yen, Yung Kiung. "A Chinaman on Our Treatment of China," *The Forum*, 14 (September, 1892), 85–90.
Young, John P. "The Support of the Anti-Oriental Movement," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* XXXIV (September, 1909), 231–238.
Young, John Russell. "The Chinese Question Again," *North American Review*, 154 (May, 1892), 596–602.

CHAPTER V. FARM ORGANIZATION BASED ON CHINESE LABOR PERPETUATED THROUGH A PERIOD OF LABOR SCARCITY BY JAPANESE

> Under present agricultural conditions we seem to need a certain number of Japanese, as we apparently cannot get an equal number of Chinese, which would be vastly preferred. We seem to need enough Japanese to keep some lines of our agriculture going; it is hard to see how a ruinous slump could be avoided without them. But we do not wish too many, nor do we wish them to buy up and lease up all the good things of the State and paint the future for Americans on this coast dark brown. We need those who will work for fair wages and fly away with them. * * * [44]

Japanese immigration to California.—The emigration of Japanese laborers was not legalized by their government until 1885. Three years later Japanese were being employed as agricultural laborers in California.[45] Farm employers made them welcome and they would probably have come to California in large numbers during the years immediately following had not depression created a labor surplus and reduced employment opportunities. Even so, throughout the depressed nineties their immigration continued on a small scale. With recovery after the turn of the century, conditions were favorable to an increase in their immigration. This opportunity was availed of by Japanese located both in their home country and in the Hawaiian Islands, and through the years 1900–1908 they arrived in relatively large numbers. (Tables 10 and 11.)

---

[44] *Pacific Rural Press*, LXXVII (February 13, 1909), 122.
[45] *Ibid.*, XXXV (May 19, 1888), 446.

Before 1902 most of the Japanese came directly from their home shores, thereafter a large proportion re-migrated from Hawaii. The earlier arrivals from Hawaii had been employed on the sugar plantations and came to the United States to improve their economic position.[46] Later, when the Japanese government discouraged emigration to the United States, many Japanese emigrated to Hawaii as a stepping-stone to the Pacific Coast. The number of Japanese coming to the mainland by way of Hawaii during the seven years 1902–1908 is estimated as being more than 37,000, as against 46,779 who immigrated from Japan or other countries during the seven years, July 1, 1901 to June 30, 1908.[47]

Three-fourths of the Japanese who migrated to the United States were under thirty years of age. Up to 1909, nine-tenths of the population were males.[48] Of those who arrived between 1901–1909, approximately two-thirds were laborers and farmers, and within this group more than half were farm laborers. (Table 11.)

Like the Chinese before them, the Japanese population remained principally in California. (Table 12.) The proportion of all Japanese in continental United States which was in California increased from 42 per cent in 1900 to 57 per cent in 1910 and to 65 per cent in 1920. This is an interesting contrast to the Chinese, who in the beginning were exclusively in California and later scattered through other parts of the United States.[49]

TABLE 10.—*Japanese Admitted to Continental United States,*[1] *Exclusive of those coming from Hawaiian Islands*

Year ending June 30—	Number [2]	Year ending June 30—	Number [2]
1893	1,380	1902	5,325
1894	1,931	1903	6,990
1895	1,150	1904	7,771
1896	1,110	1905	4,319
1897	1,526	1906	5,178
1898	2,230	1907	9,948
1899	3,395	1908	7,250
1900	12,626	1909	1,593
1901	4,908	1910	1,552

[1] Not including Alaska.

[2] From 1893 through 1899 includes alien passengers as well as immigrants of the Japanese race. Beginning with 1900 the figures include only immigrants.

Source of data: United States Immigration *Reports*, Vol. 23, p. 5.

TABLE 11.—*Occupations of Japanese Aliens Arrived at the Ports of United States and Canada 1901–1909*

Year	Total number	Farmers	Farm laborers	Skilled laborers	Laborers	Others
1901	5,249	897	1,153	603	830	1,766
1902	14,455	5,212	451	1,047	1,558	6,187
1903	20,041	5,010	5,816	922	572	7,721
1904	14,382	121	6,775	641	1,474	5,371
1905	11,021	380	5,883	358	743	3,657
1906	14,243	822	8,435	329	835	4,122
1907	30,824	817	20,696	546	1,334	7,491
1908	16,418	378	6,766	457	1,144	8,745
1909	3,275	15	628	85	200	2,347
Total	129,908	13,352	56,843	4,988	8,690	46,335

Source: United States Immigration Commission *Reports*, Vol. 23, p. 8.

---

[46] The number of Japanese laborers in the Hawaiian sugar plantations was 15 in 1882, 13,019 in 1892, 31,029 in 1902, 26,462 in 1912, 17,883 in 1922, and 9,395 in 1932. See W. H. Taylor, *The Hawaiian Sugar Industry* (Berkeley, 1935), 92.

[47] United States Immigration Commission, *Reports* 23, p. 6.

[48] *Ibid.*, 7, 21.

[49] As indicated by Table 9, Chap. IV.

TABLE 12.—*Location of Japanese Population in United States 1900, 1910 and 1920*

Geographic Division	1900		1910		1920	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
California	10,151	41.7	41,356	57.3	71,952	64.8
Washington	5,617	23.1	12,929	17.9	17,387	15.7
Oregon	2,501	10.3	3,418	4.7	4,151	3.7
Total Pacific States	18,269	75.1	57,703	79.9	93,490	84.2
All other States	6,057	24.9	14,454	20.1	17,520	15.8
Total	24,326	100.0	72,157	100.0	111,010	100.0

Source of data: U. S. Census Office. Twelfth Census of the United States (1900), *Census Reports* Vol. I, CXIII. U. S. Dept. Commerce Bur. of the Census. Thirteenth Census of the United States (1910), Vol. I, p. 141. Fourteenth Census of the United States (1920), Vol. II, p. 31.

The same charges were made against the Japanese as had been earlier made against the Chinese, that they were coolie labor brought into the United States for exploitation under contract conditions. The State bureau of labor statistics in 1896 made an investigation of the conditions under which the Japanese were immigrating. Although the inclination of the investigators was to find the situation against the Japanese as unfavorable as possible, they discovered no evidence that these laborers were being imported under specific contract.[30] Their movement was quite apparently being assisted by fellow countrymen, particularly those established in hotels and boarding houses, who dispensed information concerning employment, and possibly also worked with the Japanese "bosses" in providing financial assistance for the cost of migration. The United States Immigration Commission in 1909 found substantially the same results. Cooperative arrangements among Japanese countrymen made the process of emigration easy and assured immediate employment on arrival in the United States, but again there was no evidence that any had come under specific contract.[31]

When the arrival of Japanese immigrants began to stir up reaction in the cities of California, the Japanese government was responsive to the feeling and attempted to discourage emigration of their subjects to the continental United States. They were, however, permitted to emigrate to the Islands, to Canada, and to Mexico, and after their arrival at these places, the Japanese government no longer had control over them. Thereupon they remigrated to the United States. It was not until February, 1907 that the immigration laws of the United States were amended so as to permit control over this class of immigrant. This amendment gave the President of the United States the right to refuse entry to aliens bearing passports to other countries or insular possessions of this country if he were satisfied that the bearers of these passports were attempting to enter continental territory to the detriment of labor conditions. On March 14, 1907, President Roosevelt took action under this law and refused admission to skilled and unskilled Japanese and Korean laborers attempting to enter United States after having received passports to Mexico, Canada, and Hawaii. After the promulgation of this order, the Japanese government agreed not to issue passports to their laborer subjects for emigration to either continental United States or Hawaii.[32] This agreement remained in effect until superseded by the immigration law of 1924, which absolutely excludes Orientals.

The Japanese as Successors to the Chinese as Laborers in California Agriculture.—It is commonly said that the exclusion of the Chinese left a labor vacuum into which the Japanese were drawn. Mr. John P. Irish declared before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization in 1920 that in the years immediately following the exclusion of Chinese laborers, 568,943 acres of farm land in California were put out of cultivation; from Bakersfield to Redding banks held mortgages on farm lands which could not be made productive because Chinese labor had been driven out. This, claimed Mr. Irish, was the situation which created the demand for the Japanese.[33]

The vacuum, such as it was, did not develop immediately however. As was indicated in the previous chapter, there was fear of labor shortage in the years immediately following Chinese exclusion, 1883–1888, and farm employers acted to prevent resident Chinese from being driven out of the country. There were also plans to import Mexicans and attempts to import Negroes. But beginning with 1889 and extending throughout the nineties, stagnation in non-agricultural industries was instrumental in releasing such a large number of workers that agricultural employers experienced general abundance. In fact, the labor supply during the nineties was such that the newly-arriving Japanese were forced to resort to wage cutting in order to obtain employment. Not until 1902, two decades after Chinese exclusion, did anything like a vacuum draw upon the Japanese. For the intervening years Mr. Irish's claim of agricultural stagnation is the exact opposite of the truth.[54]

---

[30] California State Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Seventh Biennial Report* (1895-1896), 109-110.

[31] *Op. cit.*, 11-15.

[32] Ibid., 16.

[33] U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. Hearings of Japanese Immigration. 66th Cong. 2d. Sess. (Washington, 1921), 43-44.

The Japanese, like the Chinese before them, followed the practice of organizing themselves into gangs or associations under the direction of a "boss." They also were willing to provide their own food and housing, and to live apart from the employer and his society. In all respects they were as convenient to the employer as their Chinese predecessors had been. They were at first employed principally in the production of grapes and sugar beets. These two branches of agriculture were rapidly expanding at the same time that the Chinese labor supply was diminishing. Competition and displacement were thus minimised. When recovery had removed the general labor superabundance of the nineties, Japanese employment could be expanded into deciduous fruits and hops without disadvantage to the Chinese.[55]

An investigation by the California State Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1899 indicated that before 1900 the number of Japanese in sugar beet work exceeded the Chinese.[56]

	Number	Percent
Whites	1,500	38.2
Chinese	575	14.6
Japanese	1,000	25.7
Mexicans	850	21.6
Total	3,925	100.0

Only two of the eight sugar factories in California in 1897 were operating without employing Asiatic labor in the fields, and these were at Chino and Anaheim where white labor continued to be employed exclusively for several years.[57] The Bureau of Labor Statistics survey also included employment in fruit, but the results are obscured by throwing together employment in the field, packing houses, drying yards and canneries. Much of the inside work was performed by women, and the report does not segregate the sexes. This makes it impossible to determine the proportion of different labor groups in fruit work. Already, however, 8,000 Japanese as against 12,000 Chinese were employed here.[58]

On the whole, the relation of the Japanese to the Chinese was one of replacement rather than displacement. With regard to other labor groups, the relationship was more competitive. This was especially true in the southern citrus area where Chinese had not penetrated and where employment of Mexicans had not yet become common.[59] Here both whites and Mexicans resented the encroachment of the Japanese, and there were outbursts of labor conflict.[60]

The employment of Japanese increased after 1900 rapidly enough to raise the relative importance of Oriental labor back to approximately the proportion at which it had been Chinese in 1882–1884. A survey of 147 farms in 29 counties during 1905 by the State Bureau of Labor Statistics, indicated proportions of hired laborers as follows:[61]

---

[54] Actually, according to census data, between 1880 and 1890 total acreage in farms increased by six million acres, improved acreage by two million, and the value of land per acre more than doubled. The decade 1890–1900 experienced further increase in the total acreage in farms although not in improved acreage. Value of land declined, but because of a generally declining price level.

[55] Compare H. A. Millis, "Some Economic Aspects of Japanese Immigration," *American Economic Review* (December 1915), 790–791.

[56] California State Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Ninth Biennial Report* (1899–1900), 29.

[57] Pacific Rural Press (April 10, 1897), 228. United States Industrial Commission, *Reports*, X (1901), 890.

[58] *Op. cit.*, 29.

[59] United States Immigration Commission, *Reports*, 24, p. 25.

[60] California Fruit Grower, XXVIII (March 28, 1903), 14 and XXXIII (March 3, 1906), 4. In the spring of 1906 a letter was written by one H. Shera of Uplands to the Chicago Federation of Labor suggesting that lemons and oranges picked and packed by Japanese should be boycotted by organized labor.

[61] California State Bureau of Labor Statistics. *Twelfth Biennial Report* (1905–1906), 73.

	Whites	Orientals	Total
	Percent	Percent	Percent
Permanent	42	19	61
Temporary	18	21	39
Total	60	40	100

These farms were not representative in size, because the average number of workers was more than thirty-three. Since Oriental employment has always been greater on the larger farms, it is doubtful that the proportion would be as large for the state as a whole. It is interesting to note that this survey, which was not particularly concerned with Oriental labor and hence the farms were not selected to include a large number of them, indicated that the ratio of whites to Orientals for all jobs was 1½:1 while for temporary jobs the ratio was less than 1:1. This finding is in agreement with that of the United States Immigration Commission where it was indicated that the Japanese came to dominate the seasonal labor supply about 1905.[62]

The most complete data on Japanese employment in agriculture apply to 1909 when surveys were made by both the United States Immigration Commission and the State Bureau of Labor Statistics. On 2,369 farms the State Bureau of Labor Statistics found the proportions of labor by races to be as follows: [63]

	Number	Percent		Number	Percent
Whites	25,826	47.4	Indians	1,038	1.9
Japanese	22,811	41.9	All others	82	0.2
Chinese	2,091	3.8			
Mexicans	1,847	3.4	Total	54,468	100.0
Hindus	773	1.4			

The counties in which the Japanese constituted fifty per cent or more of the total were Alameda, Fresno, Kings, Monterey, Orange, San Berito, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, Santa Cruz, and Tulare.[64]

In the census of 1910 (taken April 15) Japanese, Chinese, and Indian farm laborers are all thrown into one category, and the census total is less than for the above sample of 2,369 farms. The proportional importance of Oriental labor of all farm laborers, as indicated by the census, is less than one quarter. Almost none were dairy farm laborers; approximately one-fourth of the general farm labor group were Orientals, while the groups including garden laborers and orchard and nursery laborers the proportions were greater than one-third.[65]

The relative importance of the Japanese as between different types of crops is indicated by the classification in Table 13 which shows the percentage of total farms of each type which hired Japanese labor and the percentage which Japanese labor constituted of the total employed. Berry producers employed Japanese almost exclusively; more than half of the laborers in sugar beets, nursery products and grapes were Japanese. Their employment was relatively small on hay and grain farms and in the hops.

TABLE 13.—*Proportional Employment of Japanese by White Farm Operators, California, 1909*

Type of farm	Percentage of farms employing Japanese labor	Japanese as a percentage of all laborers	Type of farm	Percentage of farms employing Japanese labor	Japanese as a percentage of all laborers
Berries	100.0	85.5	Hops	30.0	11.9
Citrus Fruit	64.1	41.3	Nursery Products	100.0	87.4
Deciduous Fruit	58.5	45.6	Sugar Beets	95.2	66.3
Grapes	45.0	52.7	Vegetables	50.1	47.8
Hay and Grain	6.4	6.8	Miscellaneous	38.5	22.1

Source of data: Calculated from California State Bureau of Labor Statistics. *Fourteenth Biennial Report* (1909-1910), 265, 270.

---

[62] Reports op. cit., p. 27.

[63] California State Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Fourteenth Biennial Report* (1909-1910), 268. These farms are again larger than the average for the average number of workers was more than twenty.

[64] *Ibid.* The only counties where Mexicans were yet proportionally significant were Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Tulare and Ventura.

[65] U. S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Thirteenth Census of the United States (1910), Vol. IV, p. 438.

An indication of the relative duration of employment of whites and Japanese is given in Table 14. A larger proportion of the Japanese were hired for periods less than one week, and a smaller proportion were permanent. For periods of employment from two weeks to two months the proportion of whites greatly exceeded the Japanese. Thus the whites predominated in the shortest and in the longest periods of employment.

TABLE 14.—*Duration of Employment of White and Japanese Laborers on Farms Operated by Whites, California, 1909*

Length of employment	Whites (Percent of Total)	Japanese (Percent of Total)
Less than 1 week	1.15	4.57
1 week to 2 weeks	6.97	5.81
2 weeks to 3 weeks	11.03	6.11
3 weeks to 1 month	11.70	4.60
1 month to 2 months	18.92	17.96
2 months to 3 months	11.63	22.53
3 months to 4 months	6.18	11.33
4 months to 5 months	5.13	10.21
5 months to 6 months	2.90	1.96
6 months to 1 year	3.26	4.23
Permanent	21.13	10.69
Total	100.00	100.00

Source of data: California State Bureau of Labor Statistics *Fourteenth Biennial Report* (1909-1910), 273.

The data for seasonal variation in employment for whites and Japanese (Table 15) indicate that the employment of the former was more heavily concentrated in the harvest period.[96]

TABLE 15.—*Seasonal Distribution of Temporary Employment for White and Japanese Laborers On Farms Operated by Whites, California, 1909*

Month	Whites (1)	Japanese (2)	Total (3)
January	3.23	4.24	3.74
February	3.85	5.45	4.65
March	4.30	5.74	5.02
April	4.32	5.34	4.83
May	6.73	7.71	7.22
June	8.04	7.73	7.88
July	10.56	8.11	9.33
August	15.60	11.02	13.31
September	28.10	22.21	25.15
October	8.49	12.87	10.68
November	4.11	6.01	5.06
December	2.65	3.57	3.11
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source of Data: Cols. (1) and (2) from California State Bureau of Labor Statistics *Fourteenth Biennial Report* (1909-1910), 273. Col. (3) is computed by giving equal weight to Whites and Japanese.

---

[96] An interesting comparison may be made of these results with those of Prof. R. L. Adams from his investigation of seasonal labor demand for 1935:

	1909	1935		1909	1935
Jan.	3.7	5.2	July	9.4	9.3
Feb.	4.7	4.8	Aug.	13.3	12.8
Mar.	5.0	4.4	Sept.	25.2	13.2
Apr.	4.8	6.5	Oct.	10.7	12.6
May	7.2	10.2	Nov.	5.1	6.4
June	7.9	9.7	Dec.	3.1	4.9

The percentage distribution is calculated from pp. 12-13 of California Agricultural Experiment Station Bul. 623. Although there are many attenuating factors in such a comparison, it appears that the harvest peak may have become less abrupt and the spring peak more abrupt between 1909 and 1935.

The investigation of the United States Immigration Commission in 1909 emphasized wage data more than the numbers and proportions of laborers. These wage data will be presented in the following section. It was found, however, that the Japanese were the most important labor group in many intensive types of cultivation. In the southern citrus area they constituted one-half to three-fourths of all the seasonally employed; they accounted for some two-thirds of the seasonal sugar beet workers. They were also important in the melons, celery, hops and other intensive crops requiring considerable quantities of hand labor. On the Japanese-operated farms Japanese laborers were hired almost exclusively.[67] This year was probably the highest point in Japanese employment. The stopping of Japanese immigration after 1908 prevented further outside additions to the Japanese population and the development of a strong anti-Japanese agitation in the rural areas after 1909 tended to scatter those already here. In succeeding years, the remaining Japanese laborers transferred from white-operated farms to the rapidly expanding Japanese-operated farms. When the California State Board of Control made an extensive investigation into the occupational status of Orientals in 1920, it was found that they were of no appreciable importance as laborers to the American farmer. The Oriental laboring class was valuable principally to land speculators who developed lands for lease to Orientals. "As a matter of fact there are probably more white laborers working for Oriental farmers" than there are Oriental laborers working for American farmers.[68]

Japanese Wage Rates and Their Influence on the General Level of Wages.—The few Japanese in California before 1890 probably received about the same wages as the Chinese. When jobs became scarce during the nineties, they took the initiative in competition by reducing wage rates. In 1894 a gang of Japanese were working in Santa Clara County for 50 cents per day and boarding themselves,[69] the common rate at the same time for Chinese being around $1 and the rate for whites $1.25 to $1.75. During 1896, the Japanese entered into competition with the Chinese for sugar beet work in Pajaro Valley, reducing the contract price from $1.20 to 70 cents per ton. Having established themselves, their price for the following year rose to $1 per ton.[70] Fruit growers of Monte Rio agreed for the season of 1897 to pay Chinese 90 cents and Japanese 75 cents per day, both without board.[71]

Throughout the latter half of the decade following 1900, the Chinese were preferred over the Japanese and where both were employed on the time basis, the Chinese often received a slight premium. The Japanese preferred to work on the contract or piece rate basis, and their attitude was such that it was much less expensive to hire them this way. Therefore they were not paid time rates whenever it could be avoided. By 1909 their wage rates had become approximately equal to the Chinese. The Immigration Commission in 1909 found average time wage rates for whites, Chinese, and Japanese to compare as follows:[72]

	Chinese	Japanese	White
Regularly employed:			
Without board	$1.56	$1.62	$1.89
With board	1.41	1.40	1.31
Temporarily employed:			
Without board	1.74	1.67	1.86
With board	1.45	1.42	1.29

Japanese and Chinese were receiving approximately equal wages; where no board was furnished, regularly employed Orientals received approximately 30 cents (15 percent) less than regularly employed whites, temporarily employed Orientals approximately 20 cents (10 percent) less than temporarily employed whites. Judging from the difference in wage rates with and without board, it appears that the costs of Chinese and Japanese board were approximately equal, both being less than 30 cents, and less than half the cost of board for whites.

Where Japanese worked on a piece rate basis, their earnings frequently exceeded those of other nationality groups. This was found to be true during the 1909 season of sugar beets, hops, citrus, and raisin grapes.[73]

---

[67] U. S. Immigration Commission. *Reports* 24, pp. 20-22.
[68] California State Board of Control, *California and the Oriental* (Sacramento, 1920), 101.
[69] *Pacific Rural Press*, XLVII (April 7, 1894), 264-265.
[70] *Ibid.*, LIII (April 10, 1897), 228; (May 1, 1897), 275. See also U. S. Immig. Comm. *Reports* 24, p. 27, and California State Bureau of Labor Statistics *Seventh Biennial Report* (1895-1896), 124-125.
[71] *Ibid.* (May 22, 1896), 324.
[72] U. S. Immigration Commission *Reports* 24, pp. 35-38.
[73] U. S. Immigration Comm., *op. cit.*, 40-41, 161, 219, 102.

The differential between wages of whites and Orientals gradually disappeared in the years following 1910. As Japanese farm operators absorbed the Japanese labor, they may have paid them lower wages than the white operators paid whites. However, in 1919 it was reported that where Japanese farm operators employed both whites and Japanese, the latter were paid slightly higher average wages.[74] In 1929, a sample of sixty-six white farm operators employing both whites and Japanese were paying averages of $3.70 and $3.76, respectively, without board; thirteen farms employing both whites and Chinese were paying $3.56 and $3.43 respectively, and twelve farms hiring both Chinese and Japanese were paying $3.44 and $3.50 respectively, per day.[75]

It thus becomes apparent that the Japanese at first worked for lower wages than either whites or Chinese, that during the decade 1900–1910 Japanese rates rose until approximately equal to the Chinese, and that after 1910 both Chinese and Japanese rates were approximately the same as whites. Hence through the two decades, 1890–1910, the Japanese were a cheap labor supplement and successor to the Chinese. To what extent can we therefore conclude that their employment was wage-depressing in general?

For the nineties, their proportion of the total labor supply was so small that even though this was a decade of general labor redundance, their depressing effect could hardly have been significant. Between 1900 and 1910 Japanese employment was in many respects parallel to the Chinese employment of the eighties. General prosperity and expansion in agricultural production removed most aspects of competition. At the most, Japanese employment between 1900 and 1910 may have retarded the rise from the low levels of the nineties.[76] However, Japanese employment, 1900–1910, was not parallel with Chinese employment, 1880–1890, in this respect: Availability of the Chinese in the earlier decade contributed materially to the establishment of the intensive agricultural industries as well as to their peculiar economic structure. If the Japanese had not later been available, it is highly improbable that the intensive industries would have been curtailed, although they might have expanded less rapidly. Nonavailability of Japanese (or other labor of characteristics resembling the Chinese) would probably have forced the reorganization of the intensive industries to a structural basis resulting in a more nearly equal distribution of income, instead of perpetuating and expanding the structure founded with the help of the Chinese.

Attitude of Employers Towards Japanese.—Employers welcomed the Japanese at first because they would be competitors and substitutes for the Chinese.[77] By 1900 the remaining Chinese were becoming old and less active, and in contrast, the young Japanese were much more vigorous. The earliest Japanese arrivals strove to be pleasant and accomodating, which, in addition to their willingness to accept low wages, made them very popular laborers. It was not long, however, until the Japanese indicated that they were not to be wholly satisfactory substitutes for the Chinese. They could hardly wait until becoming established in an area before they showed themselves to be less docile and accommodating and inclined to take advantage of every opportunity for their own gain. While the Chinese had not passed up all bargaining opportunities, they had been scrupulous about keeping contracts once made. The Japanese were less satisfactory in this respect; they were particularly given to choosing the times when trees were laden with rapidly ripening fruit as their idea of a strategic bargaining opportunity, even when agreements had been previously entered into.

As early as 1891 the Japanese began to employ strike strategy,[78] but labor abundance through the nineties prevented much bargaining on this basis. The season of 1903 put the Japanese in a strategic position because of the lessening of other competition and the increase in their own numbers. They struck in Sutter County for increases from $1.25 per day to $1.40. Since they had the growers in a corner, their demands were promptly met.[79] Also in the vineyards at Fresno they had now come into a dominating position and were demanding pay increases.[80] The Japanese also became more particular about working conditions, and before the end of the 1903 season, employers were very dissatisfied with the "saucy, debonair Jap, who would like to do all his work in a white, starched shirt with cuffs and collar accompaniments."[61]

---

[74] U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization Hearings on Japanese Immigration, 66th Cong., 2d. Sess. (Washington D. C., 1921), 693–694.

[75] California State Department of Industrial Relations, Department of Social Welfare, and Department of Agriculture. *Mexicans in California.* Report of Governor C. C. Young's Fact-Finding Committee (San Francisco, 1930), 169.

[76] Compare Millis "Some Economic Aspects of Japanese Immigration," op. cit., 790–791.

[77] Employers resented the bargaining attempts of Chinese after their numbers had been limited by exclusion, and they were frequently charged with having a "monopoly" of certain types of labor.

[78] *California Fruit Grower*, VIII (June 13, 1891), 372.

[79] *Pacific Rural Press*, LXVI (August 15, 1903), 103.

[80] *California Fruit Grower*, XXVIII (April 18, 1903), 4.

The strike was not the only bargaining tactic of the Japanese. Once established by working very rapidly on a low time wage, their pace began soon to slow up. In order to get any quantity of work done, employers had to put them on piece rates, whereupon their activity was said to have undergone an astounding transformation. They would now work much more rapidly, and in addition, their gang bosses would undertake contracts for more work than they could perform, in both ways giving little satisfaction by way of quality.[62] After being put on piece rates, the next step frequently was for the Japanese to attempt to contract with the grower to attend the whole detail of harvesting his crop on a share basis. As a bargaining argument the Japanese were able to assure the producer that he would get none of their countrymen to work for him the following season if he did not meet their demands.

The seasons of 1904 and 1905 were less eventful. Lower crop yields and continued migration of Japanese relaxed the labor scarcity of the two previous seasons. The early popularity of the Japanese had lost ground and the Chinese had moved into place of first preference. The idea was beginning to spread that if California was to have Orientals, they had as well be the Chinese who would be better liked.

If the Japanese had proved better laborers than they have, the California farmers would be more interested in having plenty of them. At present the general agricultural view is that, if we are to have plenty of Asiatics here, the Chinamen would be better for farm hands—and some are quite strongly urging that a turn about would be fair play, and that to put the Exclusion Act upon the Japanese and the free entry upon the Chinamen for a while would be a good move.[63]

The program to encourage migration of farming population from the eastern states, which had been initiated by the fruit growers in 1902, had not been abundantly successful. With a slower rate of Japanese immigration in the preceding two years, and a normal crop yield, the season of 1906 again brought forward the problem of labor supply. Several instances of shortage were noted,[64] and the apprehension was increased by unionization activities among the farm workers.[65] At the fruit growers' convention it was maintained that growers were sincere in preferring Caucasian laborers, but it had been demonstrated that such laborers were not to be had, hence further addition of Asiatics was the only solution. Accordingly the following resolution was adopted:

> Whereas, farm labor is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain, and in California especially the great fruit and wine industries are threatened with disaster unless some remedy be found to get more labor; therefore be it
>
> Resolved, that the fruit growers of California, in convention assembled, favor such modification of the Chinese exclusion act as will permit the enactment of laws making possible restricted immigration of laborers irrespective of nationality.[66]

Anti-Japanese agitation in San Francisco[67] became so vigorous in the latter part of 1906 and the early part of 1907 as to threaten the continuance of free Japanese immigration. The relative attitude of rural and urban areas towards continued Japanese immigration is indicated by the following comment from an editorial in the *Pacific Rural Press:*

> If the Japanese had only had sense enough to go quietly into farming, for which they are now manifesting a great passion and had not collected in cities and gone into city activities so sweepingly and aggressively the present issue would not have arisen for a decade, possibly for a generation. But, as the situation now is, it seems to be a menace to our agricultural production which it will be very difficult to avert.[68]

---

[61] *Ibid.* (August 15, 1903), 2.

[62] *Ibid.*, (April 18, 1903), 4.

[63] *Pacific Rural Press*, LXIX (June 3, 1905), 338.

[64] *Pacific Rural Press*, LXXII (August 4, 1906), 66; (October 6, 1906), 220.

[65] Ibid., (July 21, 1906), 34; (December 22, 1906), 388.

[66] *Ibid.*, (December 15, 1906), 370.

[67] Anti-Japanese agitation was largely of labor union genesis. See John P. Young, "The Support of the Anti-Oriental Movement," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXXIV (1909), 231-238. Paul Scharrenberg, "The Attitude of Organized Labor Towards the Japanese," *Ibid.*, XCIII (January, 1921), 34-38. Raymond Leslie Buell, "Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly*, 37 (December, 1922).

[68] Vol., LXXIII (February 23, 1907), 114.

During the spring of 1907 it was reported that leading fruit growers and cannery men of Southern California were quietly organizing to combat the total exclusion of the Japanese. These interests did not favor an unlimited immigration but suggested that a state immigration bureau ascertain the exact shortage and regulate immigration to correspond to the needs of the employers.[89] Later in the year, a Grand Island farm operator was in Washington, D. C. as the representative of the "International Equality League of California." He was endeavoring to present President Roosevelt and the immigration officials with a petition demanding the admission of Asiatic labor to California "under no other restrictions than are imposed upon the admission of European labor and enterprise to the Atlantic seaboard." The petition concluded with the statement that: "to save California from the decadence of her industries with reference to the soil, we demand the admission to our state of Japanese labor."[90]

The harvest season of 1907 was again one of great anxiety over labor supply.[91] Japanese grape pickers took advantage of the situation in the northern San Joaquin Valley and demanded to have their pay increased from $1.75 per day to $2.50. Growers resisted and held a mass meeting but were forced to meet the demands of the Japanese. The excitements of the season, together with the discouraging results of the program to encourage migration from the East, were sufficient to put fruit growers in a more aggressive mood at their annual convention in December. Papers on the labor question were read by John P. Irish[92] and G. H. Hecke.[93] Both emphasized the great dependence of fruit growers upon Asiatic laborers to perform the primary tasks which white labor refused to do. Mr. Irish (long a pro-Oriental sympathiser) in a whirlwind of oratory asked why should fruit growers be dictated to "by people who live in these cities which your enterprise has created?" Why should farming interests not stand up independently and say, "We require, in the primary processes of our production, which lie at the foundation of California's prosperity, this form of labor, and, by the Eternal, that form of labor we will have!" Mr. Irish was received with much enthusiasm, and at the end of his speech he read a memorial to Congress, which he prepared, asking that a limited but liberal number of Chinese and equal number of Japanese immigrants be admitted under the same conditions as Europeans were.[94] A member of the convention then proposed that the memorial be endorsed by the convention and the motion was carried, with only one dissenting vote. The memorial was forwarded to Washington but no action was ever taken on it.[95]

For the following season, a slowing down of industrial activity and the large Japanese immigration of the preceding year were sufficient to relieve the labor problem.[96] In 1909 the California State Legislature appropriated $10,000 for an investigation of the Japanese in relation to agriculture, to be made under the direction of the State Labor Commissioner. Apparently the intention of the legislature was that the report should be anti-Japanese, for when a pro-Japanese report was submitted in May, 1910, the Senate disapproved it with unanimous support for the following resolution:

> Whereas, The State Labor Commissioner has in his report concerning Japanese laborers, expressed his opinion of the necessity for such laborers in this state, and thus without authority misrepresented the wishes of the people of this commonwealth, therefore, be it *Resolved*, that the opinion of such Labor Commissioner is hereby disapproved by this Senate.[97]

Part of the results of this investigation was published in the 1909–1910 biennial report of the State Bureau of Labor Statistics[98] and the summary was released to the press, but the full text of the report is not now available.[99]

It is surprising that legislative disapproval of an official report supporting recent demands of farm employers should not provoke a reaction from them.

---

[89] *California Fruit Grower*, XXXV (May 4, 1907), 1.

[90] *California Fruit Grower*, XXXVI (August 10, 1907), 1.

[91] *Ibid.*, XXXV (May 25, 1907), 2; XXXVI (August 24, 1907), 4; (August 31, 1907), 1.

[92] "Labor in the Rural Industries of California," Thirty-Third Fruit-Growers' Convention (December, 1907) *Official Report* 54-66.

[93] "The Pacific Coast Labor Question from the Standpoint of a Horticulturist," *ibid.*, 67-72.

[94] A copy of this memorial appears in Appendix B.

[95] United States Immigration Commission, *Reports Abstracts*, Vol. 1, p. 692.

[96] Or as more graphically stated by the editor of the *Pacific Rural Press*: "There is one piece of good luck which often comes to California farmers, and that is that whenever they become much concerned lest their labor supply be short for some coming crop, time brings a solution of the difficulty; either the crop is so short that few men are needed, or some other line of business slacks up and sends a lot of labor afloat and it blows itself into the rural districts." (Vol. LXXVI, July 4, 1908, p. 2).

[97] California Senate Journal, 1910, p. 39.

[98] *Fourteenth Biennial Report*, pp. 205–274.

[99] The summary is reproduced in Appendix B.

Evidently it did not, however. Chester H. Rowell, as editor of the Fresno *Republican* (in one of the concentrated centers of Japanese employment) released a blasting editorial, denouncing both the report and the Labor Commissioner who prepared it.[1] When several instances of successful employment of white family labor during the harvest of 1910 was reported, the *Pacific Rural Press* observed that this proved the fallacy of the State Labor Commissioner's Report.[2]

The absence of a reaction of the farm employing interests against the disapproval of the Labor Commissioner's report is not to be accounted for alone in the current abundance of labor. There was another factor. As has been true of the Chinese, the opponents of the Japanese were not content with excluding future immigration. Anti-Japanese activities against those already here continued through 1907–1909. The result of these activities was to drive more Japanese out of city industries into agriculture. Those driven out, however, represented greater proportions of capital and enterprise than had the Japanese previously employed in agriculture. They were therefore not content to be laborers but established themselves as operators, in the meantime absorbing the Japanese labor supply for their own operations. These activities were already beginning to attract the attention and disapproval of rural people by 1909 and 1910, and undoubtedly account for the coolness in attitude towards the Japanese at this time. Subsequently Japanese farming expanded and so did the reaction against them. The Alien Land Law of 1913[3] was the result of this provocation. General anti-Japanese feeling in the rural districts dates from the years subsequent to 1910, and not before as some writers have supposed. This almost unanimous attitude against the Japanese has been maintained to date. When farm employers were agitating for importation of labor during the war, the Japanese were not suggested although their exclusion was legislatively less formal than that of the Chinese. At a Congressional investigation of Japanese immigration held in California in 1920, there were few enthusiastic supporters of Japanese. A few witnesses were agreeable to their immigration if it could be assured that they would remain as laborers rather than become operators;[4] owners of delta lands claimed that they were the only people who could be gotten to operate that land.[5] The San Joaquin County Farm Bureau reported that in a referendum which they had held, only 25 out of 250 favored the use of Orientals as laborers, and only one was in favor of Japanese immigration.[6] The Los Angeles County Farm Bureau, after investigation, had decided that they favored Oriental laborers only under the condition that they were brought in under bond. Their resolution to this effect was also adopted by the State Farm Bureau Federation.[7]

Efforts to Encourage Migration of Farm Population from Eastern States, 1900–1910.—The proposal of Mr. Stabler to the fruit growers convention in December, 1902 (mentioned in the previous chapter), that a committee be appointed to encourage migration of farm laborers from the eastern states was acted upon immediately. An organization of fifteen members called the "California Employment Committee" was set up with Mr. Stabler as chairman and B. N. Rowley, editor of the *California Fruit Grower* as secretary.[8] This committee was very soon merged with the California Promotion Committee, an already established booster organization. Mr. Rowley, through the *California Fruit Grower*, attempted to make some local preparation before the committee should plunge actively into a program of encouraging migration from the East.

Prospective employers were asked by Mr. Rowley to send in answers to the following questions:

(1) How many single men or men with families will be given employment for three months at one dollar per day and board?

(2) When will employment begin?

(3) What accommodations will be provided?

(4) Would you not consider it good to provide better sleeping quarters in order to secure laborers from the East?

---

[1] E. G. Mears, *Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast* (Chicago, 1928), 446–448.

[2] Vol., LXXX (September 17, 1910), 235.

[3] This law and its subsequent alterations cannot be discussed here. An account is given by Raymond Leslie Buell, "Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly*, XXXVIII (March, 1923), 57–81.

[4] U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. Hearings on Japanese Immigration, 66th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D. C., 1921), 451, 466, 942.

[5] *Ibid.*, 43–44, 338, 455–456.

[6] *Ibid.*, 450.

[7] *Ibid.*, 940–942.

[8] *California Fruit Grower*, XXVII (December 27, 1902), 2; *Pacific Rural Press* (December 27, 1902), 405.

And added further: "If you do really intend to cooperate with the Committee, let us suggest that you put away for all time the old idea that any sort of a shakedown and that any sort of a 'feed' or grub will do for the man who in (the) future is expected to help you in the orchard, among the trees and about the trays."[9]

Evidently Mr. Rowley got no response whatever, at least he had not within less than one week of the departure of four representatives to the East, on February 4, 1903. These representatives were not armed with tabulated answers to Mr. Rowley's fundamental questions but with "the most approved, up-to-date lanterns" and hundreds of stereopticon views "comprising industrial as well as scenic views with which to interest their Eastern audiences the better to make known the extent of the varied resources and possibilities of this great state,"[10] and with an ample supply of the pamphlet "Grasp This, Your Opportunity."[11] The four representatives held lectures illustrated with their slides in Nebraska, Missouri, Illinois, and Michigan, and the meetings were reported to have been well attended. After thirty-five days in the field, the first representatives returned and were replaced by two new ones who spent forty-five days in the small towns of Ohio. In April two more representatives started for towns through the Atlantic seaboard and the southern states. To facilitate the program, low railroad fares were put into effect. The results of the program to May, 1903 as reported by the secretary of the committee are not specific: "Great numbers have arrived, are arriving, and will continue to arrive until the close of the low railroad fares which will be June 15th next."[12]

The chairman's report in December, 1903, indicates that during the summer two more representatives labored in New York, Ohio, and Michigan. Altogether, 100,000 copies of "Grasp This, Your Opportunity" had been "judiciously distributed," along with application blanks. The reports of the ten travelers had now shown conclusively that agricultural help was just as scarce in the eastern states as in California. The very limited success of the program is shown by the fact that only 917 people had been placed in orchards, vineyards, and fruit-canning factories, according to the committee records, but it was supposed that others had been induced to come to California and had gone to work without having gone through the committee office. Part of the 917 had already returned to their eastern homes.[13] [14]

In part, the failure of this program may have been due to counter propaganda sent out by labor organizations. A circular was broadcast throughout the East advising the working people not to be deceived by the propaganda of the committee, because the state was already overrun with people unable to find employment except at starvation wages.[15]

Farm employing interests were now generally convinced that something more must be offered if they expected to get a labor supply from the eastern states and the notion which had been frequently suggested during the eighties—that laborers be stabilized on small holdings—was again revived.[16] The initiative was taken by the California Promotion Committee. Circular letters were sent out to farmers suggesting the advisability of leasing or selling five, ten, or fifteen acre plots of land on easy terms to men with families who would agree to assist in the harvest. Replies to the circular letters were favorable and 26,614 acres had been offered for settlement by December.[17] The Sacramento Valley Development Association cooperated in the plan, and a few instances of settlement were made during 1904. But the seasons of 1904 and 1905, as we have seen, were not troublesome with respect to labor supply, and the projects to induce laborers from the East were abandoned. When demand for labor from external sources again revived, attention was again directed towards the Orient.

Hindustanis as a Minor Oriental Labor Group During the Japanese Period.—Another Oriental labor group whose arrival into Califorina was welcomed by farm employers was the Hindustanis. They began to appear in the seasons of 1905 and

---

[9] *California Fruit Grower*, XXVIII (January 17, 1903), 2; (January 31, 1903), 2.

[10] *Pacific Rural Press*, LXV (February 14, 1903), 100.

[11] Twenty-Eighth Fruit-Growers Convention (May, 1903) *Official Report*. 90.

[12] *Ibid.*, 92.

[13] Twenty-Ninth Fruit-Growers' Convention (December, 1903) *Official Report*, 217-221.

[14] Private fruit growing and canning concerns in the spring of 1903 worked out arrangements with eastern representatives to attend details of soliciting and transporting 1,500 boys and girls to work in the fruit for the season only. The success of this plan was not reported. See *California Fruit Grower*, XXVIII (February 28, 1903), 3, 8.

[15] *California Fruit Grower*, XXVIII (July 25, 1903), 2. This circular is reproduced in Appendix B.

[16] *Ibid.* (August 8, 1903), 2; (August 15, 1903), 2. *Pacific Rural Press*, LXVII (February 13, 1904), 103. Twenty-Ninth Fruit-Growers' Convention, *op. cit.*, 219-220.

[17] Twenty-Ninth Convention, *op. cit*,. 220.

1907[18] when the pressure of labor scarcity and imminent Japanese exclusion opened a favorable opportunity for them. The first arrivals had come first to British Columbia, then on down the coast.[19] Their first employment upon arrival was principally on the railroads, which they readily left as soon as opportunity of work in agriculture appeared.[20] When the first migrants from the north found the climate and employment conditions in California to be relatively congenial, the information was conveyed back to their countrymen and direct migration commenced. The first large number of arrivals to the United States, 1,072, came in 1907. The number of immigrants admitted and departed for the period 1908 to 1912 were as follows:[21]

	Admitted	Departed
1908	1,710	124
1909	337	48
1910	1,782	80
1911	517	75
1912	165	104

The Asiatic Exclusion League which had been so vigorous against the Japanese was still intact and ready to deal with the Hindustanis. Since the latter were a less physically perfect and educated group than the Chinese or Japanese, it was possible for the immigration officials to find administrative means of securing a satisfactory *de facto* exclusion.[22] This they did, on protest of the Asiatic Exclusion League, beginning in 1911 and the arrivals thereafter were no longer from the laboring classes and were more than offset by departures. The total Hindustani population of the United States in 1910 was 5,424 of whom 2,742 were in California Probably less than half of them were agricultural laborers.

Although some employers welcomed the Hindustanis as additions to the labor supply, they in general were not enthusiastic about them because of their less desirable appearance and habits, language inability, and low productivity.[23] Nevertheless, Hindustanis were substituted for the Japanese when the wage demands of the latter became too high,[24] and they were usually paid 25 to 50 cents less per day than the Japanese.[25] It is reported that immediately following exclusion of the Japanese, at the same time that Mexicans were being considered, a scheme was on foot to railroad hordes of Hindustanis into the United States. It was presumed that they would come as British subjects and hence escape the bars against the Asiatics.[26]

The editorial comment of the *Pacific Rural Press* upon the pro-Japanese report of the State Commissioner of Labor Statistics on his survey of 1909 (referred to above) concluded that the only alternative to the Japanese would appear to be the Hindustanis, but their employment had proved so unsatisfactory that: "viewed from the ground on which the employer stands, the preservation of specialized farming by the labor of the Hindu would be practically impossible."[27]

The Significance of Japanese Labor to California Farm Organization.—It is commonly supposed that the Japanese were the direct successors of the Chinese as laborers in California agriculture. But they were successors to depression-opportunity whites as well. The Chinese labor population had been declining since 1883. Meanwhile, agricultural production had been expanding. And yet, except for a few seasons in the eighties, farm employers had not been greatly concerned over the adequacy of the labor supply until after 1900. This is to be accounted for, as we have seen previously, by the increasing employment of whites whose services were no longer in demand in the non-agricultural industries. Professor Wickson believed the proportion of white labor to be greater in 1900 than at any time in the history of the state. His report to the United States Industrial Commission, after having made considerable inquiry through the *Pacific Rural Press* contains several observations on the labor outlook for the immediate future which are interesting when contrasted with what subsequently did take place.

---

[18] *Pacific Rural Press*, LXXII (December 8, 1906), 354, 356. *California Fruit Grower*, XXXV (May 25, 1907), 2.

[19] Rajani Kanta Das, *Hindustani Workers on the Pacific Coast* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1923), 15; Immigration Comm. *Reports*, 23, p. 28.

[20] Das, op. cit., 22.

[21] Das, op. cit., 10–11.

[22] *Ibid.*, 15–16.

[23] U. S. Immigration Commissions *Reports* 24, pp. 25–29.

[24] *Pacific Rural Press*, LXXVIII (July 3, 1909), p. 2.

[25] Immigration Commission, *op. cit.*, 29.

[26] *California Fruit Grower*, XXXVI (August 24, 1907), 4.

[27] *Pacific Rural Press*, LXXIX (June 11, 1910), 468.

> The proportion of white labor now employed in California agriculture is greater than ever before in the history of the State. The available supply of Chinese has been greatly reduced by the exclusion acts, and the numbers now employed in field labor is so small as to be inconspicuous. Meantime the numbers of Japanese have increased, and in some localities they have become a main reliance in some kinds of work, but their distribution has never attained anything like the breadth which the Chinese at one time commanded. At present, Asiatic help of both kinds serves a very good purpose for temporary uses, but it is too restricted in volume to menace the white population or to maintain the antagonisms which once existed. * * * Unquestionably our white labor is advancing in motive, in spirit, and in efficiency, and each year onward there will be less opportunity for competition by other races.
>
> As to the term during which farm laborers are employed, it is unquestionably lengthening. Though still the extra demands at harvesting all sorts of crops exist, and in the nature of things always will exist, probably there is a better opportunity than ever for long term employment. The increase of the dairy interest in regions formerly almost wholly given to grain has of itself opened the way for steady employment which formerly did not exist. The development of fruit areas has had a similar tendency. The disposition to provide better quarters for laborers on agricultural properties is very marked, and so far as we have heard and seen, such investments on the part of employers have been found profitable in the greater loyalty and efficiency of the laborers secured. * * * But it is one of the most pleasant facts of recent years that our great fruit products can be so largely handled by white labor from towns as it is now. Twenty years ago it was thought impracticable, and growers were in much anxiety as to whence their fruit-harvest help should come. Today there is no concern whatever about it, for, though there is now and then a little pinch, the demand as a whole seems to be provided for.[38]

Within the next seven years the proportional distribution of the Japanese had come to equal or possibly exceed the maximum earlier proportions of the Chinese. What now, in summary can be said of Japanese contribution to California farm organization? Evidently this: Their labor enabled the perpetuation of an organizational structure which had been founded with the Chinese. In the interval between plentiful Chinese and Japanese labor, the structure had been maintained by depression-opportunity whites. The Japanese came at a strategic moment of prosperity-opportunity for the local whites and carried the system through until recurring depression again gave it security. What might have happended had not the Japanese appeared at this strategic time? For one thing, employers would have had materially to improve the terms of employment, especially in regard to housing. We have seen that their attempts of 1903 to induce migration from the eastern states, without making any alteration in the employment terms obtaining, were a complete fiasco. The decision of the employers in 1904 to improve the terms of employment by providing small holdings and better living accommodations was unfortunately not under the necessity of being carried through, for the pressure of labor shortage was relaxed during the next two seasons. It is questionable that, in the absence of the Japanese during these years, any thorough-going alterations of the system with respect to size and specialization would have been accomplished for the period of general industrial prosperity was not very long. Moreover, the extent of change would depend upon how successful the modified plan to encourage migration had been, and thus on the economic alternatives in the eastern states as well as in California. It would have been interesting to see what might have been the outcome of the plan to settle a labor supply on small holdings.

In the recrudescence of interest in and demand for the Chinese in 1906 and 1907 we see the full extent of the non-fulfillment of Professor Wickson's anticipation at the beginning of the decade—that white people would soon, to the pleasure of the community, be the principal members of the farm labor supply for California agriculture. It is interesting that, despite the clear indications by the Japanese of their lack of a satisfactory degree of docility, the demand for Orientals as expressed in the Congressional memorial was for an equal number of Japanese and Chinese. Some show of resistance was made by farm employing interests against the excluding of the Japanese. Once more, however, there was no necessity of following through the demands for an Oriental labor supply, immediately. Economic inactivity again, from 1908 until 1917, brought relief from the pressure of an underabundant labor supply.

---

[38] United States Industrial Commission, *Reports* XI, (1901), 106-110.

BIBLIOGRAPHY TO CHAPTER V

Buell, Raymond Leslie, "Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly*, 37 (December, 1922), 605–638.

Burnett, Albert G. "Misunderstanding of Oriental Immigration," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XXXIV* (September, 1909), 257–261.

California Fruit Growers. *Official Report* of the Twenty-Sixth Convention (Sacramento, 1902), p. 76. *Transactions* of the Twenty-Seventh Convention (Sacramento, 1903), pp. 313, 292–298. *Official Report* of the Twenty-Eighth Convention (Sacramento, 1903), pp. 89–94. *Official Report* of the Twenty-Ninth Convention (Sacramento, 1904), 184–187, 217–221. *Official Report* of the Thirty-Third Convention (Sacramento, 1908), 54–72.

California Fruit Grower. Vol. I (June, 1888) through Vol. XXXVI (December, 1907).

California State Board of Control. *California and the Oriental* (Sacramento, 1920), 231 pp.

California State Bureau of Labor Statistics. *Biennial Reports*, 1895–1896 through 1910–1911.

California State Department of Industrial Relations, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Social Welfare. *Mexicans in California*. Report of Gov. C. C. Young's Fact-Finding Committee (San Francisco, 1930), 214 pp.

Chambers, T. S. "The Japanese Invasion," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 23–29.

Coryn, Sidney G. P. "The Japanese Problem in California," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXXIV (September, 1909), 262–268.

Cross, Ira B. "A History of the Labor Movement in California," University of California *Publications in Economics*, 14 (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1935), 354 pp.

Das, Rajani Kanta. *Hindustani Workers on the Pacific Coast* (W. de Gruyter & Co.: Berlin and Leipzig, 1923), 126 pp.

Eliot, Rev. Thos. L. "Moral and Social Interests Involved in Restricting Oriental Immigration," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXXIV (September, 1909), 300–305.

Foord, John. "Japanese in America," *Outlook*, 86 (May 18, 1907), 101–105.

Goto, Baron Shimpei. "The Anti-Japanese Question in California," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 104–110.

Gulick, Sidney L. "Japanese in California," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 55–69.

Hecke, G. H. "The Pacific Coast Labor Question from the Standpoint of a Horticulturist," Thirty-Third Fruit-Growers' Convention (December, 1907). *Official Report*, 67–72.

Ichihashi, Yamato. *Japanese Immigration* (San Francisco, 1915), 69 pp.

Inui, K. S. "California's Japanese Situation," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 97–104.

Inui, K. S. *The Unsolved Problem of the Pacific* (Kamakura, Japan, 1925), 618 pp.

Irish, J. P. "Labor in the Rural Industries of California," Thirty-Third Fruit-Growers' Convention (December, 1907). *Official Report*, 54–56.

Irish, J. P. "Reasons for Encouraging Japanese Immigration," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXXIV (September, 1909), 294–299.

Irish, J. P. "The Range of California Orientation," California Department of Agriculture *Monthly Bul.*, 8 (November-December, 1919), 718–724.

Irwin, Will. "The Japanese and the Pacific Coast," *Colliers*, 40 (October 19, 1907), 17–19; (October 26, 1907), 15–16.

Japanese and Korean Exclusion League. *Proceedings*, May, 1906 through December, 1911. (For December, 1907, proceedings are published under the name of the Asiatic Exclusion League.)

Kanzaki, Kiichi. "Is the Japanese Menace in America a Reality?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 88–97.

Kawakami, K. K. "The Japanese Question," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 81–88.

Lind, Andrew W. *An Island Community* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1938), 337 pp.

Lynch, Robert Newton. "The Development of the Anti-Japanese Movement," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 47–50.

Macarthur, Walter. "Opposition to Oriental Migration," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXXIV (September, 1909), 239–246.

Macarthur, Walter. "Review of Exclusion History," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 38–42.

Mead, Elwood. "The Japanese Land Problem of California," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 51–55.

Mears, E. G. *Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1928), 545 pp.

McClatchy, V. S. "Japanese in the Melting Pot: Can They Assimilate and Make Good Citizens?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 29–34.

McKenzie, R. D. *Oriental Exclusion* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1928), 200 pp.

McKenzie, R. D. "The Oriental Invasion," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 10 (November-December, 1925), 120–130.

Millis, H. A. "Some Economic Aspects of Japanese Immigration," *American Economic Review* (December, 1915), 787–804.

Millis, H. A. *The Japanese Problem in the United States* (New York, 1915), 334 pp.

Pacific Rural Press, Vol. XXXV (January, 1888) through Vol. LXXXV (June, 1913).

Phelan, James D. *Pamphlets on Japanese Exclusion*. 10 Vols. (Collection in the University of California Library).

Phelan, James D. "Why California Objects to the Japanese Invasion," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 16–17.

Philips, Rubert. "The Oriental on the Pacific Coast," *Nation*, 132 (January 9, 1931), pp. 12–14.

Rowell, Chester H. "Chinese and Japanese Immigrants—A Comparison," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXXIV (September, 1909), 223–230.

Scharrenberg, Paul. "The Attitude of Organized Labor Towards the Japanese," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 34–38.

Schrieke, B. *Alien Americans: A Study of Race Relations* (The Viking Press: New York, 1936), 208 pp.
Scudder, Doremus. "Hawaii's Experience with the Japanese," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 110-116.
Soyeda, J. and Kamiya, T. *A Survey of the Japanese Question in California* (San Francisco, 1913), 16 pp.
Steiner, Jesse Frederick. "Some Factors Involved in Minimizing Race Friction on the Pacific Coast," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 116-120.
Sttoddard, Lathrop. "The Japanese Question in California," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 42-47.
Taylor, Wm. H. *The Hawaiian Sugar Industry* (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, 1935), p. 92.
U. S. Congress. House. House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Hearings on Japanese Immigration*, 66th Cong., 2d sess. (Gov't. Print. Office: Washington, D. C., 1921), 1490 pp.
U. S. Congress. Senate. *Japanese Immigration and Colonization*. Senate Doc. No. 55, 67th Cong. 1st sess.
U. S. Congress. Senate. Senate Committee on Immigration. Hearings on S. 2576, 68th Cong., 1st sess., Print. Office, Washington, D. C., 1924), pp. 22-100.
U. S. Immigration Commission. *Immigrants in Industries*. *Reports* Vol. 24 (Washington, D. C., 1911), 1045 pp.
U. S. Immigration Commission. *Immigrants in Industries*. *Reports* Vol. 23 (Washington, D. C., 1911), 403 pp.
U. S. Immigration Commission. *Reports* Vol. 1 *Abstracts of Reports* (Govt'. Print. Office: Washington, D. C., 1911), 992 pp.
U. S. Industrial Commission. *Reports*. X (Washington, D. C., 1911), 1045 pp.
Wickson, E. J. "The Vacaville Early Fruit District," *California Illustrated*, No. 1 (San Francisco, 1888), 166 pp.
Yoell, A. E. "Oriental vs. American Labor," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXXIV (September, 1909), 247-256.
Young, John P. "The Support of the Anti-Oriental Movement," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXXIV (September, 1909), 231-238.

Chapter VI. Labor Supply for the War Decade, 1910-1920

Reaction Against Orientals, Revival of Interest in Domestic Supply, and Expectation of European Immigration.—Their unhappy experience with the ambitious, aggressive and opportunistic Japanese had temporarily dampened the enthusiasm of farm employing interests for cheap labor. "The trouble with the idea of importing any class of laborers into the United States as 'cheap labor' and keeping them here any length of time, working them under the conditions obtaining here where there is an atmosphere of freedom and independence of labor however menial it may be," said the editor of the *California Fruit Grower* in August 1907, "is that it is not conducive to servility, and it has been proven by experience that laboring men whether white, black or yellow are soon inoculated with this spirit of independence."[29] Whatever enthusiasm for Oriental labor was retained through the years until 1910 rapidly disappeared thereafter as the Japanese transferred from a convenient labor supply to independent producers and formidable competitors. It is not surprising that out of this experience there should arise a greater interest in utilizing local labor supplies, and also in the expected immigration from Europe through the Panama Canal.

In the 1910 harvest of prunes, Mr. H. A. Craig, President of the Farmers' Union in Union district (Santa Clara Valley) had employed local women and children in the place of Orientals and had found them generally more satisfactory. The supposed novelty of the experiment as well as the significance of it so impressed him that he decided that such labor ought to be utilized more generally. His ideas were advanced during the summer through the *Pacific Rural Press*.[30] Although Mr. Craig died before the fruit-growers' convention of December was held, a resolution which he had proposed was presented to and adopted by the convention. This resolution stated that the demand for "white help" on the part of horticulturists was constantly growing, but since the period of school vacations did not coincide with the period of harvest for fruit crops, it was advocated that the school authorities adjust the vacation period to a more perfect coincidence. This would permit the fruit growers to make a better utilization of the labor of their own children as well as those of urban areas.[31] However, for the immediately succeeding years labor was so abundant that no special effort need be made to secure workers and the plan was carried no further.

Many Californians in the early part of the decade 1910-1920 anticipated that the completion of the Panama Canal would bring relief to the half century-old complaint that this state did not share in immigration from Europe.[32] The question was whether the new immigrant influx which would come on to California for the $7.50 to $10 additional cost over the fare to New York would be principally of the poorer classes of Italy and Portugal. Such a population would become a labor supply to replace the Japanese and hence perpetuate the peculiar economic structure of California agriculture. The more optimistic of the community-conscious anticipated that at last European immigration would stand in the same relation to Pacific Coast agriculture as it had long done on the Atlantic Coast where the immigrant laborers had advanced to independent farm operators. The outcome of such a population influx into California, it was thought, would introduce a tendency toward thrifty cultivation of small diversified farms and away from large specialized ones. A member of the California Development Board expected to see "the San Joaquin Valley from Redding to Bakersfield and from the Sierra Nevadas to the Coast Range filled with a population of 5 and 10 acre farms, and there will be no need for the squat labor of the Orient." [33] Mr. John P. McLaughlin, Commissioner of the State Bureau of Labor Statistics, held a similar view: "The industrious immigrant once placed in the fields, the question would solve itself. The industrious immigrant could acquire a small farm in a few years under the proper schemes of colonization, which are now under way, dividing up the large land holdings of our State. These people would in turn develop an agricultural community, which in time would solve the farm labor problem, with the adoption of a scheme of varied crops within certain localities and the gradual doing away with high specialisation." [34] The United States Immigration Commission was also of the opinion that a large volume of European immigration would follow the completion of the Panama Canal and this would contribute to a solution of the Oriental labor question.[35] In anticipation of immigration, conferences of social agencies were held at Tacoma in 1912 and at San Francisco in 1913, to consider means of receiving, distributing and assimilating the immigrants.[36] Several of the members thought that the immigrants should be directed principally into agriculture; Dean Hunt of the University of California College of Agriculture went so far as to propose that they be received at Davis Farm rather than at San Francisco.[37]

---

[29] Vol. XXXVI (August 24, 1907), 4.
[30] Vol. LXXX (July 2, 1910), 30; (July 23, 1910), 62; (September 17, 1910), 233; (October 8, 1910), 282, 289; (October 29, 1910), 344.
[31] Fortieth Fruit Growers' Convention (December, 1910) *Proceedings*, 160-161. This resolution is reproduced in Appendix B.
[32] Commonwealth Club of California, "Immigration," *Transactions*, VIII (May, 1913), 155-179.

The expected great influx of European immigrants was never to materialize however. The number of all immigrants entering the port of San Francisco increased from approximately 8,500 per year during the six years preceding 1913 to approximately twice that annually for the years 1913–1918.[38] War in Europe and economic depression in the United States undoubtedly retarded the inflow before 1917. With our entry into the conflict and restrictions upon immigration during and after the war, expectation of European immigration was of course out of the question.

Agricultural Labor Supply Kept Abundant Throughout the Pre-War Period by Economic Depression.—An indication of the extent of industrial inactivity and abundance of labor in the early part of the decade is to be seen in the report in January, 1912 of the California Development Board (normally disposed to an abundant labor supply) that no shortage of labor existed. "This showing should bring disappointment to all because it indicates a condition of industrial quiescence * * *. California is less able than the East to absorb a sudden influx of laborers. * * *." [39]

During the 1913 harvest season there occurred the first really serious instance of friction on a large scale between employers and workers in California agricultural history. This was the riot which broke out among the hop pickers in Wheatland during August of that year. A large hop producer, evidently devoid of an adequate sense of social responsibility, had permitted and even encouraged the congregation of a heterogeneous mass of 2,800 laborers and their families on his ranch when the drying capacity of his kilns would permit the employment of not more than 1,500. The provision for housing, camping, and sanitation were wholly inadequate. The combination of misery and employer deception with a few trained members of the Industrial Workers of the World was sufficient to bring an explosion which resulted in death, injury and a large amount of court action.[40] "The problem of vagrancy; that of the unemployed and the unemployable; the vexing conflict between the right of free speech and the law relating to criminal conspiracy; the housing and wages of agricultural laborers; the efficiency and sense of responsibility found in a posse of country deputies; the temper of the country people faced with the confusion and rioting of a labor outbreak; all these problems have found a starting point for their new and vigorous analysis in the Wheatland Riot."[41] These were the issues of the affair as seen by Carleton H. Parker while investigating the occurrence as the official representative of the California Commission of Immigration and Housing. Mr. Parker's report particularly stressed the deplorable living conditions found and strongly recommended improvement in that particular respect. However, while bad living conditions may have been an immediate precipitating factor at this particular time, the fact is that these were substantially the same living conditions, except for unusual overcrowding in this case, which had existed for casual labor throughout California history. Living and working conditions had not suddenly become worse; neither had those normally employed as casual laborers suddenly become aware of their unsatisfactory state, but industrial unemployment was driving a class of people into casual labor who were unaccustomed to its traditional conditions. The economic environment was similar to that which had existed during the middle nineties and which was again to exist during the thirties.

---

[33] California Development Board, *Sixteenth Semi-Annual Counties Committee Meeting* (January, 1912), 40.

[34] California State Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Fifteenth Biennial Report* (1911–1912), 48–49.

[35] *Abstracts of Reports*, Vol. 1, p. 694.

[36] Chas. W. Blanpied, *A Humanitarian Study of the Coming Immigration Problem on the Pacific Coast* (San Francisco, 1913), 63 pp.

[37] *Ibid.* 13 See also pp. 44–47, 61–63.

[38] United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1918, p. 109.

[39] California Development Board, *op. cit.*, 26–28.

[40] Carleton H. Parker, *The Casual Laborer and Other Essays* (New York, 1920), 171–199. U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations. *The Seasonal Labor Problem in Agriculture*, 64th Cong., 1st sess. Senate Doc. 415 (Washington, D. C., 1916), 4911–5026.

In the fall of 1914 the United States Commission on Industrial Relations conducted an investigation of the seasonal employment problem in agriculture, principally of California.[42] The testimony gathered by this commission indicated that among other problems, general superabundance of labor was a serious one.[43] The "hobo" element, which came along with their blankets and applied for work, was the predominating constituent of the itinerant labor supply. Growers had formerly advertised for labor but found it no longer necessary to do so. For sentimental reasons the employers preferred to give work to whites, particularly as against Japanese, although the whites were less reliable.[44] The investigators were also told that some growers were attempting to make their labor demand more constant by diversifying not only individual crops but the varieties of particular types of crops. But there was no organized effort being made along that line, and to accomplish anything significant by that method would be economically disadvantageous to the growers. An American Federation of Labor organizer testified that they had begun four years previous (1910) to try to organize agricultural laborers into the United Laborers of America. Some 5,000 members had been enrolled and several locals had been formed, but the point of collective bargaining had not yet been reached. An Industrial Worker of the World organizer also testified as to the difficulties of organizing agricultural labor.

The same level of labor abundance continued through 1914 and 1915, and began to change under the war stimulation of prosperity during 1916. Governor Hiram W. Johnson in 1914 requested the Commission of Immigration and Housing to make an investigation of unemployment. Their report[45] does not offer quantitative measures of the extent of unemployment, but the problem was apparently serious, particularly during the winter months. Additional aggravation was being experienced through migration of the unemployed from other areas, for the by-word among the migratory workers of the country was said to be: "You cannot freeze to death in California; you cannot starve to death in California."[46] Of 22 casual workers from whom case histories were taken, almost one-fourth had had their last regular job somewhere outside of California.[47] Moreover, the report cautioned that relief authorities must be careful about the publicity given their temporary relief plans or else it "would bring hordes of applicants for charity from all the western states, eager to spend a winter in our mild climate, and many who are not in genuine need would be tempted to try their luck at enjoying our munificence."[48] The Commission of Immigration and Housing was later assigned to take charge of a relief campaign in behalf of the unemployed, and to prevent the burden being increased by the unemployed of the eastern and central states coming to California, a vigorous press campaign was resorted to. The migratory population of these areas was "determinedly informed" that California offered no special inducements for their coming either by way of relief or of employment. The Commission estimated that this action protected the state from additional relief burden.[49]

---

[41] Parker, *op. cit.*, 172.

[42] U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations, *op. cit.*

[43] *Ibid.*, 4924, 4930, 4931, 4955, 4961, 4966, G. H. Hecke attributed the surplus of labor to the Underwood tariff permitting large amounts of imports (pp. 4930–4931). One witness, Mr. James Mills testified as to scarcity with respect to the fruit industry south of the Tehachapi. Not in ten years had he enough men to do his work, and this experience was said to be general throughout the south. *Ibid.*, 4957, 4959.

[44] The witness on this particular point was G. H. Hecke. "* * * now, most of the thinking farmers of California have come to the conclusion that it must be absolutely necessary to keep California for the white men." (4955). This stand presents a rather interesting contrast to that taken by Mr. Hecke seven years before at the Fruit-Growers' Convention of 1907. ("The Pacific Coast Labor Question from the Standpoint of a Horticulturist," *Proceedings* of the Thirty-Third Fruit-Growers' Convention, (1907), pp. 67–72. In both instances Mr. Hecke indicated the undesirability of the aggressive Japanese. But in 1907, "it would be unreasonable to expect them (white men) to be satisfied to carry their blankets in the wake of the harvesting as it moves from one district to another with the ripening crop", whereas in 1914 this type of labor had already come to be considered an almost permanent part of the rural scene.

[45] Commission of Immigration and Housing of California, *Report on Unemployment* (Sacramento, December, 1914), 73 pp.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[47] *Ibid.*, 47, 49. This may not have been wholly an unusual circumstance but a function of a regional migratory pattern.

An interesting aspect of employment during the early part of this decade was the rate of labor turnover. The average period of employment in one railroad camp from January to May, 1914 was 14 days per man; in another from June to December, 10 days per man; and in another from March to July, 8½ days per man. The average duration for other types of employment in 1914 was estimated to be as follows:[50]

Lumber camps	15–30 days
Construction work	10 days
Harvesting	7 days
Mining	60 days
Canning	30 days
Orchard work	7–10 days

Carleton Parker pointed out that this phenomenon was commonly interpreted as "labor undependability" by employers and laymen but was actually an instinctive and unconscious exercise of the "strike in detail"—simply drifting off the job—as a protest against unattractive working conditions.[51]

Concerted Action by Employers in Opposition to the Eight-Hour Day Proposal.—During the early part of 1914 there originated an initiative proposal seeking to limit the working day in all industries to eight hours. This proposal immediately brought antagonistic reaction from farm employers. Most of them were certain that if the eight-hour proposition should become law it would mean catastrophe. At the convention of the California Fruit-Growers in June a committee was proposed to organize the Farmers' Protective League. It was decided that this organization would concentrate its efforts principally in the north and leave the campaign for the southern part of the state in the hands of the Citrus Protective League.[52] Subsequently, on July 16, 1914, the Farmers' and Fruit-Growers' Federation was organized at Los Angeles to work towards the defeat of the eight-hour initiative proposal.[53] The California Development Board also opposed the eight-hour proposition.[54]

Throughout the summer of 1914 a vigorous campaign against the proposal was carried on. The *Pacific Rural Press* published a large volume of the views that were being exchanged.

Most of the opposition of farm employers were based on the view that they would be forced to reduce their operations to what could be handled without hired labor, which would mean giving a great advantage to foreigners with large families.[55] The Farmers' Protective League offered ten reasons for the defeat of the eight-hour proposal, six of which related directly to agriculture:[56]

(1) It would result in increased cost of production of all foodstuffs because producers would be compelled to employ more persons.

(2) California producers would be put to comparative disadvantage with the states not having eight-hour laws.

(3) It would force an undesirable competition between white men and aliens. This being because the only extra labor available was claimed to be Japanese, Chinese, or Hindoos, "which races are unassimilable and therefore cannot be

---

[48] *Ibid.*, 68.

[49] Commission of Immigration and Housing of California, *Report on Relief of Destitute Unemployed* (Sacramento, June, 1915), 8.

[50] Parker, *op. cit.*, 74–79.

[51] *Ibid.*, 76.

[52] *Pacific Rural Press*, LXXXVII (June 13, 1914), 665.

[53] *California Fruit Grower*, L (July 25, 1914), 4.

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] "For the farmers it means operating only what each family can care for, discharging white labor and leasing to Oriental partnerships. The large families of the foreigners will also have the advantage in this way over Americans." (*Pacific Rural Press*), LXXXVII (June 13, 1914), 665.

[56] *California Fruit Grower*, L (July 25, 1914), 4.

considered and fostered as permanent factors in the development of agriculture and other industries, and in the social life of California."[57]

(4) The proposed law was inequitable since it would punish the employer but not the employee, if violation occurred.

(5) Nature cannot be regulated to an eight-hour day—there are no eight-hour fruits or eight-hour cows.

(6) Decreased production would adversely affect the earning power of the land. This would affect land values and hence rural credits. The financial system would be disarranged and disrupted; stringency and absolute loss would be felt—first by the banks and then by people who own deposits.

Some of the points of view were even more novel. One correspondent claimed that the eight-hour day would work a hardship on elderly workers who were not able to move rapidly during harvest rushes.[58] Another thought that renters who have to pay high rentals would work under great hardship because under the eight-hour law they would not be able to farm intensively.[59] Another correspondent said that it seemed to him that the eight-hour law would make little difference because the trusts would always squeeze any differential out of the farmer anyway.[60] One farmer favored the proposition because it would limit production, thus making possible higher prices and the additional cost would be passed off on to the consumer without his ever noticing it.[61] A letter from a laborer explained his stand in favor of it in this way: "At first I was much against the eight-hour law. I have studied the amendment and nothing has made me so much in favor of its passage as a lecture I had the opportunity of hearing, against its passage. The speaker was so selfish and inconsiderate in his views that I began to see the other side."[62]

An opinion of the State Attorney General that an eight-hour law would be unconstitutional was apparently sufficient to discourage its proponents. By the next year the issue had subsided; the Farmers' Protective League of California was now able to state its *raison d'etre* in broader terms; *viz.*, "to use every honorable endeavor to secure the election to the Legislature of men who are friendly to the agricultural interests of the State."[63]

Development of Interest in Altering the Rural Economic Structure Through State Control of Land Settlement.—In California, there have always been antagonists of the system of large land holdings and "land monopolies". The prolonged depression of the nineties brought forward a large volume of literature dealing with the evil effects upon employment and community welfare of concentrated land control, but its origins were mainly "socialistic" or "radical", and principally inspired by the long-standing arguments of Henry George.[64] During the period of 1910–1914 some additional factors other than general unemployment gave impetus and significance to interest in land control. One of these was the expectation of alteration when the European immigrants should commence to come to California by way of the Panama Canal. Another was the known abuses which prospective settlers had experienced in attempting to purchase land, varying all the way from misrepresentation to outright fraud. Yet another was the general fear that had arisen when the aggressive Japanese had begun to expand control over a good deal of land, and by various methods—the same excitement which had resulted in the Alien Land Law of 1913.

The combination of these circumstances created an economic environment which placed the 1910–1920 recrudescence of interest in land control on a less exclusively "radical" basis than that of the nineties had been. As a means of cautioning the less informed "back to the landers" the College of Agriculture of the University in October, 1914 had issued a circular, "Some Things the Prospective Settler Should Know".[65] This circular gave information on yields, values of lands, and other such requisite information for the settler. A few months later, in their *Report on Unemployment,*[66] the Commission of Immigration and Housing had carried the idea further, and, recognizing that regularization of employment and unemployment were problems closely related to the size of land holdings, recommended that a permanent land bureau be created. "To supply at cost to prospective purchasers the needed information regarding the best economic uses of land, its value, approaches to the market, and the like" was to be the function of such a bureau. In addition, a comprehensive land law to prevent fraud and misrepresentation in the sale of lands was suggested.

---

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] *Pacific Rural Press*, LXXXVII (July 25, 1914), 79.

[59] *Ibid.* (October 10, 1914), 353.

[60] *Ibid.* (July 18, 1914), 54–55.

[61] *Ibid.* (July 11, 1914), 31.

[62] *Ibid.* (September 12, 1914), 262.

[63] *Ibid.* XC (November 10, 1915), 515.

[64] Several of these writings have been assembled in *Pamphlets by California Authors* (Economics) Vol. 5, and are in the University of California Library.

[65] T. F. Hunt, University of California, College of Agriculture, Agr. Exp. Sta. *Circ.* 121 (Berkeley, 1914).

[66] *Op. cit.*, 20–22.

This line of interest led to the creation of the Commission on Land Colonization and Rural Credits by the legislature in 1915. The report of this commission in 1916 [67] was yet more vigorous and aggressive. California was said to be suffering from arrested rural development. High prices of land, high interest rates, short terms of payment for colonization contracts were the principal immediate causes. Four million acres of land suited to intensive cultivation and capable of supporting a dense population were under control of 310 landed proprietors. "The evils of such ownership are every year becoming more apparent. We have at one end of the social scale a few rich men who as a rule do not live on their estates, and at the other end either a body of shifting farm laborers or a farm tenantry made up largely of aliens, who take small interest in the progress of the community. Political stability, the best results in agriculture, and satisfactory social conditions require that this inheritance from a Mexican land system and former land laws of the United States be abolished." [68] Since it would be impractical for the state to attempt to control the entire area of settlement within the state, it was proposed that demonstration projects be undertaken "for the purpose of showing how superior carefully thought out development is to that where only local or immediate benefits are considered".[69] Subsequently this proposal was carried through and two demonstration colonies were attempted.[70] Among other objectives, the farm laborer was to be given a home, and his social and economic status improved.[71]

Still more vigorous proposals for breaking down large land holdings were offered by the Commission of Immigration and Housing in 1919.[72] After making a survey of the concentration of holdings in southern California, this agency arrived at the conclusion that a graduated tax on unimproved land value would be the most practical method by which a more desirable type of land occupancy could be obtained.[73] The particular time was considered unusually opportune because imperative obligation to returning soldiers gave new emphasis to the need for opening up the land.[74]

But vigorous interest in land reform was not long-lived. War prosperity gave employment to many erstwhile agricultural casuals. The immediate and discouraging problems met in the demonstration projects of the state soon brought pessimism for such undertakings, and participation in the war brought forward more immediately pressing problems.

The War Emergency and Agricultural Labor Supply.—With a boom which was associated with the war in Europe, the superabundance of agricultural labor supply disappeared, and subsequently, with the United States participating, shortage in labor supply emerged as a strategic problem. There was no complaint of scarcity during 1916, but for 1917 farm operators regarded their operations as being considerably hampered by lack of labor, even to the extent of losing some of the crops. Immediately upon the entrance of the United States into the war, Professor R. L. Adams was appointed to the office of State Farm Labor Agent, to represent the University of California College of Agriculture, the United States Department of Agriculture, and the State Council of Defense, this office being created solely to facilitate the use of labor in the production of food, feed, and fiber necessary to the conduct of the war.[75] Various attempts were made fully to utilize the potential domestic labor force for the harvest of 1917. Boys were taken from the Preston School of Industry at Ione to help in the berry harvest at Sebastopol.[76] At Turlock growers and merchants cooperated in improving the housing conditions for farm labor and in setting up an employment exchange. "With California farmers depending this year on city folks, high school students, and others accustomed to sleeping in beds, it behooves everyone to provide something as cheap and sanitary as possible."[77] Employers resorted also to considerable advertising for help during 1917.[78] In addition to recruiting all local supplies, the sugar beet growers imported 1,700 men and several hundred Texas and Oklahoma families were imported by private subscription into Imperial Valley.[79]

---

[67] Commission on Land Colonization and Rural Credits, *Report* (Sacramento, November, 1916), 120 pp. Cf. also "Land Settlement in California," Commonwealth Club of California *Transactions*, XI (December, 1916), 369–465.

[68] *Ibid.*, 7–8.

[69] *Ibid.*, 85.

[70] R. J. Smith, *An Economic Analysis of the California State Land Settlements at Durham and Delhi* (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of California, 1937), 424 numbered leaves.

[71] *Ibid.*, 9.

[72] California Commission of Immigration and Housing, *A Report on Large Landholdings in Southern California* (Sacramento, 1919), 43 pp.

[73] *Ibid.*, 36–43.

[74] *Ibid.*, 32.

[75] R. L. Adams and T. R. Kelley, "A Study of Farm Labor in California," University of California College of Agriculture, Agr. Exp. Sta. *Circular* No. 193 (Berkeley, 1918), 79 pp. Cf. also Commonwealth Club of California *Transactions*, XIII (May, 1918), 73–122.

[76] *Pacific Rural Press*, XCIII (June 9, 1917), 700.

Nevertheless, wage rates for 1917 rose to 40 per cent above 1916 and farm operators reported losses of crops because of the inability to procure labor to harvest them. Whatever degree of shortage existed affected large operators more greatly than small, and farmers' spokesmen estimated their losses as being greater then did the public agencies concerned with farm labor supply.[80] Exceptional weather conditions during spring plantings and fall harvests helped to minimize the losses by reducing the yields in sugar beets, cotton, citrus and walnuts, and labor needs in certain fruits were reduced by shortage of shook and shipping facilities.[81]

For the 1918 season the outlook was less hopeful. Farm operators began immediately to consider the possibilities of importing labor from outside the United States. Out of the six most frequently recommended solutions offered by farmers, this one stood first, with the remainder in the following order:[82]

Close saloons—a close second to importation of labor.
Practice more liberal exemptions of farm labor from military draft.
Develop the potential supplies of home labor, i. e., children, women, city dwellers.
Bring about better distribution and utilization of present labor supplies.
Promote anti-vagrancy laws.
Conscript labor.

In contrast to the recommendations of farmers, Prof. Adams as State Farm Labor Agent, listed first that every effort should be made to utilize all available home supplies to the best advantage, and that this would mean more attention by employers to wages, housing, food, hours, and supervision.[83]

Familiarity with the agricultural employer attitude throughout the Chinese post-exclusion period makes it easy to guess as to which foreign supply was thought of first. Moreover, it would appear that the Chinese would have been favorable, even to permitting their citizens to come to this country temporarily and under contract rather than as immigrants.[84] Realizing the legal complications which would be involved as well as the strength of union labor resistance, many farm leaders gave up the idea of Chinese as hopeless and turned their attention elsewhere. They did, however, find considerable difficulty in appreciating the attitude of organized labor and of rationalizing the governmental sympathy for it with the fact that farmers were being spurred on to greater efforts by the Hoover motto: "Food will win the war".[85] Alternative sources of labor considered were the Philippine Islands, Hawaiian Islands, Porto Rico and other islands of the Caribbean, as well as Mexico. The United States Department of Labor had in May, 1917 issued an order suspending the head tax, literacy test, and the provisions against contract labor for Mexicans, expressly authorizing farm operators to bring them into United States, where they were to engage exclusively in agricultural labor or be arrested and deported.[86] Even with this way made clear, California employers were not generally enthusiastic about the Mexicans. There appeared to be considerable favor for the Porto Ricans, even though there was some question about their being a sufficient supply and also about the chances of their becoming public charges, because of the impossibility of exportation, should demand for labor slacken up. The Caribbeans were favorably regarded because they could stand the hot climate of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys and because they would flock well together, as the Chinese had done.[87]

---

[77] *Ibid.* (June 2, 1917), 673, 681.

[78] Adams, *op. cit.*, 16.

[79] Adams, *op. cit.*, 4.

[80] D. O. Lively, "Agricultural Labor Problems During the Past Season," State Commission of Horticulture *Monthly Bulletin*, VII (January, 1918), 70–73 and M. F. Tarpey, "Some Possibilities of the Development of New Labor During the War," *Ibid.*, 74–79. In the course of the discussion, following the presentation of these papers (at the 50th Fruit Growers' Convention) one of the members said as follows: "I remember hearing in this very hall the statement from our State Board of Defense that all our crops had been garnered and that there was no appreciable lack of labor. I don't know where they got the information, they certainly didn't get if from any farmer, they didn't get it from anyone who is trying to win this war by making the State of California produce all that it is capable of producing." (*Ibid*, 87).

[81] Adams, *op. cit.*, 3.

[82] Adams, *op. cit.*, 10.

[83] Adams, *op. cit.*, 9–12.

[84] See Tarpey, *op. cit.*, 77 and U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Japanese Immigration*, 66th Cong., 2d sess. (July, 1920), 812–816.

[85] Lively, *op. cit.*, 70. Also, in discussion, *Ibid.*, 87. One grower explained his attitude towards bringing in Chinese as follows: "Twenty-five years ago at the end of a period of excitement and agitation, I, with fifty or a hundred other men carried shotguns all one night to protect those fellows from being driven out of town and out of the country by a band of hoodlums who were reported to be headed our way. I don't want to have to do it again." (*Ibid.*, 88).

[86] Details of Mexican importation and immigration will be found in the following chapter.

As things turned out, the season of 1918 was gotten through without serious loss or curtailment of production, and with only the more complete utilization of potential labor supplies and the importation of a relatively small number of Mexicans.[88] Scarcity of labor prevented the production of as large a volume of the intensive crops such as potatoes, sugar beets, etc., as otherwise might have taken place, but the investigation made by Prof. Adams through the Farm Bureau indicated that the losses of planted crops because of lack of labor was relatively insignificant. The labor supply was augmented, in addition to the importation of Mexicans by several things: Construction work was curtailed; cantonment building was completed in 1917; the closing of saloons in some communities, more stringent enforcement of anti-vagrancy ordinances, the use of labor-saving machinery, and curtailment of non-essential industries were all factors which contributed; but most important of all was the more effective utilization of all potential domestic labor supplies, including that of women through the Woman's Land Army. In concluding his report of the 1918 season, Prof. Adams said:

> A growing realization arising from various studies and investigations is that the state has a great potential labor power in women, school children, and city dwellers, many of whom are farm reared or farm trained, and a large majority of whom can be drawn upon to aid in any real emergency; but at the same time great reliance should, emphatically, not be placed upon such classes of labor to meet the constant demands of California's specialized agriculture for a kind of labor able to meet the requirements of hard, stoop, hand labor, and to work under the sometimes less advantageous conditions of heat, sun, dust, winds, and isolation. Either sufficient capable labor must soon be available to do the work or else the character and methods of many important California agricultural enterprises must undergo a substantial and far-reaching readjustment. The amount of labor available of this class has a very definite bearing upon the character and extent of farming operations in the sugar beet industries, in the industries of the Imperial Valley, and of the San Joaquin and Stockton deltas, and, to some extent, in the fruit industry.[89]

Although wage rates continued to rise through 1919 and 1920 it apparently was not because of labor shortage in these years, for the reports indicate an adequate supply.[90]

BIBLIOGRAPHY TO CHAPTER VI

Adams, R. L. and Kelley, T. R. "A Study of Farm Labor in California," University of California, College of Agriculture. Agricultural Experiment Station *Circular* 198 (Berkeley, 1918), 79 pp.

Adams, R. L. "The Farm Labor Problem," Reprint from the University of California *Chronicle*, XXII, No. 2 (1919), 19 pp.

Blanpied, Chas. W. *A Humanitarian Study of the Coming Immigration Problem on the Pacific Coast* (San Francisco, 1913), 63 pp.

California Development Board, *Sixteenth Semi-Annual Counties Committee Meeting* (January, 1912), pp. 21-28, 40.

California Fruit Growers. Fortieth Convention *Proceedings* (December, 1911), pp. 160-161.

California Fruit Grower. "Why the Eight-Hour Law Would be a Detriment to the State," Vol. L (July 25, 1914), p. 4.

California State Bureau of Labor Statistics. *Fifteenth Biennial Report*, 1911-1912 (Sacramento, 1912), pp. 47-50.

California State Commission of Horticulture *Monthly Bulletin*, VII (January, 1918), pp. 81-98.

California State Commission of Immigration and Housing. *A Report on Large Landholdings in Southern California* (Sacramento, 1919), 43 pp.

California State Commission of Immigration and Housing. *Report on Relief of Destitute Unemployed* (Sacramento, June, 1915), 24 pp.

California State Commission of Immigration and Housing. *Report on Unemployment* (Sacramento, December, 1914), 78 pp.

California State Commission of Land Colonization and Rural Credits. *Report* (Sacramento, 1916), 120 pp.

Commonwealth Club of California. "Farm Labor," *Transactions*, XIII (May, 1918), 73-122.

---

[87] Lively, *op. cit.*

[88] R. L. Adams, "The Farm Labor Problems" (Reprint from the University of California *Chronicle*, Vol. XXII, No. 2), 19 pp. Paul S. Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States Imperial Valley," University of California *Publications in Economics*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Berkeley, 1928), p. 17.

[89] *Ibid.*, 19.

[90] *Pacific Rural Press*, XCVIII (August 9, 1919), 161; (October 11, 1919), 478; C (July 31, 1920).

Commonwealth Club of California. "Immigration," *Transactions*, VIII (May, 1913), pp. 155-179.
Commonwealth Club of California. "Land Settlement in California," *Transactions*, XI (December, 1916), pp. 319-465.
Hodgkin, Geo. B. "Survey of the Labor Situation," *The California Citrograph*, V (August, 1920), pp. 314, 330.
Hunt, T. F. "Some Things the Prospective Settler Should Know," University of California. College of Agriculture. Agr. Exp. Sta. *Circ.* No. 121 (Berkeley, 1914), 39 pp.
Lively, D. O. "Agricultural Labor Problems During the Past Season," California State Commission of Horticulture *Monthly Bulletin*, VII (January, 1918), pp. 70-73.
Pacific Rural Press, Vols. LXXX through C (San Francisco, 1910-1920).
Parker, Carleton H. *The Casual Laborer and Other Essays* (New York, 1920), pp. 3-26, 69-89, 169-199.
Smith, R. J. *An Economic Analysis of the California Land Settlements at Durham and Delhi* (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of California, 1937), 424 numbered leaves.
Tarpey, M. F. "Some Possibilities of the Development of New Labor During the War," California State Commission of Horticulture *Monthly Bulletin*, VII (January, 1918), pp. 74-79.
Taylor, Paul S. "Mexican Labor in the United States Imperial Valley," University of California *Publications in Economics*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Berkeley, 1928), 94 pp.
U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Japanese Immigration*, 66th Cong., 2d sess., (July, 1920), pp. 812-816.
U. S. Congress. Senate. Commission on Industrial Relations. *The Seasonal Labor Problem in Agriculture*, 64th Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Doc. 415 (1914), 4911-5027.
U. S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Results of Admission of Mexican Laborers, Under Departmental Orders, for Employment in Agricultural Pursuits," *Monthly Labor Review*, 11 (1920), pp. 1095-1097.
Wicker, A. L. "How the Army Draft Affects the Farm Labor Situation," California State Commission of Horticulture *Monthly Bulletin*, VII (January, 1918), pp. 79-81.

CHAPTER VII. THE MEXICANS AND FILIPINOS IN CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE

PART 1. IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION

Mexican Immigration to the United States and to California.—The Mexicans, in contrast to the Chinese, Japanese, and Hindus, have not been concentrated in California. In 1900, less than 8 percent of the Mexican-born population in the United States was located in California. This proportion increased throughout the three decades 1900-1930 until it had reached approximately one quarter. Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico have been the three other states which principally have shared the experience of Mexican immigration. Although the proportion within these four states has tended to decline as Mexicans have become more widely scattered throughout the nation, they have had approximately 90 percent of the Mexican population of the United States at each census from 1900 through 1930.

Although Mexican laborers immigrated to the United States in significant numbers during the two decades preceding 1910, it was only after this date that their employment in agriculture achieved a position of importance. As irrigation and intensive cultivation expanded in the southwest, Mexican workers were drawn away from the mines and railroads. This expansion in employment opportunity in the southwest occurred in combination with the hardships of the Villa revolution, thus offering substantial encouragement to immigration. The rate of immigration increased after 1910 and continued steadily throughout the pre-war period.[81] On the basis of emergency during the year 1917-1920, special exemptions from the general immigration laws were made to permit Mexicans temporarily to come into the United States to engage in agricultural labor and certain other specified occupations. The movement into this country under these special conditions was not large, however. The great volume of Mexican immigration was during the decade 1920-1930. Beginning with 1930 the number of Mexicans returning to Mexico has been greater than the number entering the United States.

The Mexican immigration statistics, both of United States and Mexican governments, were wholly inadequate prior to 1930 to measure the movement of population across the border, as Professor Paul S. Taylor has shown.[82] The difficulties of properly recording the regular entries and departures are aggravated by the impossibility of recording the surreptitious entries and departures over a long land border. The Mexican and United States figures agree roughly on the north-bound movement, but disagree widely on the south-bound. United States data indicate that less than one-fourth of the Mexicans entering United States ever returned to Mexico. In contrast, the Mexican figures indicate that the number of Mexicans entering Mexico from the north exceeded the number leaving Mexico for the north.[90] Since the number of illegal entries is commonly estimated to have been very large, it is possible that the Mexican south-bound statistics are the relatively more accurate and that neither set of figures gives an adequate indication of the north-bound movement. In any case, the United States figures as they are shown in Table 16 indicates that the Mexican immigration to the United States took place principally in the decade 1920–1930.

---

[81] M. S. Handman, "Economic Reasons for the Coming of the Mexican Immigrant," *American Journal of Sociology*, 35 (January, 1930), 601-611. Victor S. Clark, "Mexican Labor in the United States," Bureau of Labor Statistics *Bul.* No. 78 (Washington, D. C., 1908), 466-522.

[82] "Mexican Labor in the United States: Migration Statistics," University of California *Publications in Economics* Vol. 6, No. 3 (Berkeley, 1929), 237-255.

TABLE 16.—*Mexican Immigration to the United States 1910–1936*

Year Ending June 30—	Arrivals			Departures			Difference
	Immigrants	Non-Immigrants	Total	Emigrants	Non-Emigrants	Total	
1910	17,760	3,237	20,997	210	973	1,183	+19,814
1911	18,784	3,581	22,365	119	1,485	1,604	+20,761
1912	22,001	3,701	25,702	325	1,820	2,145	+23,557
1913	10,954	4,541	15,495	910	1,883	2,793	+12,702
1914	13,089	3,990	17,079	1,670	2,497	4,167	+12,912
1915	10,993	7,649	18,642	573	2,096	2,669	+15,973
1916	17,198	7,963	25,161	559	2,317	2,876	+22,285
1917	16,438	9,442	25,880	759	1,938	2,697	+23,183
1918	17,602	14,147	31,749	25,084	3,618	28,702	+3,047
1919	28,844	15,932	44,776	17,793	8,764	26,557	+18,219
1920	51,042	17,350	68,392	6,412	4,742	11,154	+57,238
1921	29,603	17,191	46,794	5,519	2,383	7,902	+38,892
1922	18,246	12,049	30,295	5,770	1,730	7,500	+22,795
1923	62,709	13,279	75,988	2,479	1,422	3,901	+72,087
1924	87,648	18,139	105,787	1,878	1,694	3,572	+102,215
1925	32,378	17,351	49,729	2,875	1,836	4,711	+45,018
1926	42,638	17,147	59,785	3,167	2,170	5,337	+54,448
1927	66,766	13,873	80,639	2,774	8,180	10,954	+69,685
1928	57,765	3,857	61,622	3,873	9,198	13,071	+48,551
1929	38,980	3,405	42,385	7,172	3,328	10,500	+31,885
1930	11,915	4,971	16,886	6,296	5,200	11,496	+5,390
1931	2,627	3,237	5,694	14,406	3,327	17,733	−11,769
1932	1,674	2,022	3,696	36,992	2,234	39,226	−35,530
1933	1,514	(1)	----------	18,977	(1)	----------	−[2]17,463
1934	1,454	(1)	----------	6,384	(1)	----------	−[2]4,930
1935	1,232	(1)	----------	6,629	(1)	----------	−[2]5,397
1936	1,306	(1)	----------	5,097	(1)	----------	−[2]3,790

[1] Data no longer published.
[2] Not including non-immigrants and non-emigrants.

Source of Data: Years 1910–1932: United States Department of Labor. Bureau of Immigration, *Annual Reports of the Commissioner-General of Immigration*. Years 1933–1936: United States Department of Commerce. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1936), p. 101; (1937), p. 99.

The opinion was widespread throughout California and the southwest during the twenties that the Mexicans came across the border only during the harvest season for temporary work and then returned and thus did not become permanent immigrants. That this opinion was unfounded is shown by Tables 17 and 18 which indicate that the Mexican population of the United States increased geometrically each decade through 1900–1930. Before 1930 only persons born in Mexico were enumerated by the census but in 1930 an enumeration of Mexicans along "racial" lines was attempted. When the 1920 data on persons born in Mexico are adjusted, according to the proportions of Mexican-born and racial Mexicans in 1930, the total population for the former census year is increased from 486,000 to 700,500. Even on this basis, the Mexican population of the United States more than doubled in the decade 1920–1930. (Table 18.) The more rapid growth of the Mexican population in California, as indicated by the rising proportion of all the Mexicans of the United States which was located in California, is largely the result of filtration through from other states.[91]

---

[90] *Ibid.*, 240–241.
[91] Louis Bloch, "Facts About Mexican Immigration Before and Since the Quota Restriction Laws," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 24 (March, 1929), 57–58.

TABLE 17.—*Geographic Distribution of the Mexican-Born Population of the United States 1900, 1910, and 1920*

Geographic division	1900		1910		1920	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Texas	71,062	68.7	125,016	56.3	251,827	51.8
California	8,086	7.8	33,694	15.2	88,771	18.2
Arizona	14,172	13.7	29,987	13.5	61,580	12.7
New Mexico	6,649	6.4	11,918	5.4	20,272	4.2
Total: Four States	99,969	96.6	200,615	90.4	422,450	86.9
Total: United States	103,393	100.0	221,915	100.0	486,418	100.0

Source of data: United States Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States (1920) *Population* Vol. II, p. 727.

TABLE 18.—*Geographic Distribution of the Mexican Population*[1] *in the United States 1920 and 1930*

Geographic division	1920 [2]		1930	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Texas	388,365	55.4	683,681	48.1
California	121,176	17.1	368,013	25.8
Arizona	88,464	12.6	114,173	8.3
New Mexico	32,794	4.6	59,340	4.2
Total: Four States	630,790	89.7	1,225,207	86.4
Total: United States	700,541	100.0	1,422,533	100.0

[1] "All persons born in Mexico, or having parents born in Mexico, who are not definitely white, Negro, Indian, Chinese or Japanese."

[2] In 1920 only persons born in Mexico were enumerated. These estimates of the 1920 Mexican population were made from the 1930 proportion calculated upon the 1920 Mexican born. (See source reference p. 7)

Source of data: United States Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States (1930): *Population* Vol. II, Part I, 27.

Mexico has played an interesting part in the general immigration policy of the United States. Before 1917, immigration from all countries, except such as China and Japan where specific legislation applied, was not limited other than to exclude those with characteristics which would make them undesirable citizens. The 1917 general immigration law sought to achieve a generally restricted immigration by more strictly excluding the physically, the mentally, the morally, the politically, and the educationally defective as well as the economically dangerous and the racially undesirable. A further provision of the law stipulated, however, "that the Commissioner General of Immigration with the approval of the Secretary of Labor shall issue rules and prescribe conditions, including exaction of such bonds as may be necessary, to control and regulate the admission and return of otherwise inadmissable aliens applying for temporary admission". On May 23, 1917 the Secretary of Labor, on the basis that a labor emergency existed in agricultural pursuits, suspended certain provisions of the general immigration law, including the literacy test, the contract labor clause, and the payment of the head tax, under authority of this provision, in favor of Mexican agricultural laborers.[95] Mexican aliens so admitted were allowed to engage only in agricultural labor, or be promptly arrested and deported. Subsequently, on April 12, 1918, the Secretary of Labor extended the emergency exemptions to include agricultural laborers from Canada as well.[96]

On June 12, 1918 the provisions were extended to permit employment of Mexicans on maintenance of railroad way and lignite coal mining, and on July 10, further to include erection of certain government buildings.[97] All special exceptions were withdrawn December 15, 1918, only later to be modified on request of sugar beet producers, on January 2, 1919. This modification applied only to

---

[95] U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Immigration. *Emergency Immigration Legislation.* Hearings on H. R. 14461. 66th Cong. 3d sess. (Washington, D. C., January, 1921), 698-699.

[96] *Ibid.*, 699-700.

[97] *Ibid.*, 704-708.

Mexicans and they were to be engaged only in sugar beet labor but later modifications again liberalized the range of employment and extended the exceptions through June 30, 1920.[98]

A committee was appointed in 1920 by the Secretary of Labor to investigate the results of admissions under these departmental exceptions. This committee estimated that 50,800 Mexicans had come in under the emergency exemptions. On June 30, 1920, 22,637 were still employed; 17,186 had returned; 10,601 had deserted and 327 had died. Of the total importation, approximately 80 per cent had been agricultural laborers.[99] The representative for the majority of the sugar beet companies in the west and midwest testified they had obtained twenty per cent of their laborers by going across the border for them under the privileges of these exemptions.[1] The investigating committee, incidentally, reported that the Mexicans so imported had not come into competition with or displaced white labor. The protests that such importations had been permitted without emergency justification were reported to be unfounded. The investigators further added, however, that the United States should safeguard against undesirable developments through a continuation of such policy.[2] This not unfavorable report was submitted by two investigators said to have labor union affiliations, one of them reported to have been for years a walking delegate of the American Federation of Labor and the other the president of the Glass Blowers' Union.[3]

California farm employers were less enthusuastic about bringing in Mexicans under these provisions than were employers of the southwestern areas where Mexicans had already been used to a greater extent. The first California attempt to import Mexicans in 1917 was reported to have been a disappointment. Even though Mexico was quite obviously the more feasible source of labor importation, the agitation for Chinese as a war-time labor expedient continued through 1917 to 1918.[4] No data are available to show the total importation of Mexicans into California under the exemption provisions, but it appears not to have been very great.[5]

Mexican Immigration not Included in the Quota Restriction Law.—Because of the great influx of all immigrants to the United States from Europe immediately following the war, the idea of permanent restriction upon all immigration became popular. The first quota legislation was being prepared during 1921. While this legislation was in process, representatives of agricultural employers of the southwest were on hand to present their case for dependence upon Mexican labor.[6] California employers, however, were not represented. Evidently they were not yet much more enthusiastic about Mexican labor than they had been during the period of special emergency exemptions, although there is some evidence that Mexicans were coming to be considered as a feasible successor to the Japanese.[7] Again in 1924, when the immigration law of 1921 was being changed and given more permanent standing, California farm employers were still unrepresented. That Mexico and other countries of the western hemisphere eventually were exempted from quota restrictions was not so much a concession to the other employer interests of the southwest which were represented as it was to the expectation that potential immigration from these countries would be negligible, and because of diplomatic reasons.

The volume of immigration from Mexico during the years 1923–1926 was larger than expected, however. This large immigration of a quite apparently less desirable population than that which had already been restricted gave rise to a demand that quota restrictions be applied to Mexico as well. The first of a series of bills which would accomplish this were being prepared in 1926.[8] The effect of applying the quota would have been to reduce the volume of Mexican immigration to approximately two thousand per year. By this time the attitude of the California farm employers towards the Mexicans had changed to the extent that they were willing to take aggressive action in order to assure continued augmentation of the Mexican labor population. None of the bills of 1926 was ever passed. Meanwhile, immigration of Mexicans continued at a high level, and correspondingly, the pressure to restrict it. Similar legislation was proposed in 1928 and again in 1930. The resistance of the California farm employer interests also grew. In 1926 two representatives had been sent to Washington.[9] The delegation increased to five in 1928[10] and to seven in 1930.[11] The arguments which these individuals presented in opposition to quota restriction of Mexican immigration will be considered in the second part of this chapter.

---

[98] *Ibid.*, 64, 709–710; United States Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. *Monthly Labor Review* 11 (1920), 1095–1097.

[99] *Monthly Labor Review, Ibid.*; Hearings on H. R. 14461, *op. cit.*, 69–70.

[1] Hearings on H. R. 14461, *op. cit.*, 120.

[2] *Monthly Labor Review.*, *op cit.*, 1095–1097.

[3] Hearings on H. R. 14461, *op. cit.*, 87.

[4] D. O. Lively "Agricultural Labor Problems During the Past Season," California State Commission of Horticulture. *Monthly Bulletin* VII (January, 1918), 70–73.

[5] R. L. Adams, "The Farm Labor Problem," Reprint from the University of California *Chronicle* XXII No. 2, p. 7. Paul S. Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States Imperial Valley," "University of California" *Publications in Economics* Vol. 6, No. 1 (Berkeley, 1928), 16–17.

[6] Hearings on H. R. 14461, *op. cit.*; and U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Immigration. Hearings on S. 4304. 66th Cong. 4th Sess. (Washington, D. C., 1921.)

[7] California State Board of Control, *California and the Oriental* (Sacramento, June 1920), 121–122. U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Hearings on Japanese Immigration* (July, 1920), 201, 226.

[8] U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. Hearings on H. R. 6741, H. R. 7559, and H. R. 9036. 69th Cong. 1st Sess. (Washington, D. C. January and February, 1926.)

Within California, the State Grange, the State Farm Bureau Federation, the Farmers' Union, and numerous producers associations through the Agricultural Legislative Committee, the California Development Association and State and local Chambers of Commerce all vigorously opposed quota restriction of Mexicans. The California arguments and representations were quite similar to those of the other states of the southwest. Outside of agriculture, the principal opponents of quota restriction were the railroads and to a smaller extent, the mines. Nationally, these employer interests were backed up by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and the National Grange.[12]

Groups Supporting Quota Restriction of Mexicans.—Organized labor in California took a much less aggressive attitude towards the Mexicans than towards the Chinese and Japanese. The California State Federation of Labor at its 1927 convention held in September discussed the subjects of Mexican and Filipino immigration and propositions were presented that the former be restricted by quota and the latter be excluded on the basis of ineligibility for citizenship.[13] At the convention of the American Federation of Labor held the following month, the delegates of the California Federation attempted to obtain the adoption of resolutions supporting the proposed quota legislation on Mexicans. This the American Federation refused to do because of a prior agreement with the Mexican Federation of Labor. In August 1925, the American and Mexican Federations had agreed to utilize principles of self-restraint and mutual cooperation in dealing with immigration and emigration between United States and Mexico. The Mexican Federation agreed to petition the Mexican Government to adopt a restriction policy which would accomplish the same results as might be accomplished by legislative restriction within the United States. In addition, the Mexican Federation itself agreed to discourage Mexican workers from coming to the United States.[14] On account of this agreement the American Federation would not support the California delegates in demanding quota restriction legislation.[15]

This policy with respect to Mexican labor originated in the East and apparently at no time had the approval of the California Federation of Labor. At the state convention in September, 1928, it was declared that the immigration statistics proved conclusively that the agreement with the Mexican Federation was ineffective and that a stronger stand had to be taken in winning the support of the American Federation for legislative demand. This they were successful in doing at the November, 1928 convention of the American Federation.[16] This position was reaffirmed at the 1929 convention of the American Confederation.[17]

---

[9] Mr. S. P. Frisselle of Kearney Park, representing the California Farm Bureau Federation and the California Development Association and Mr. Charles P. Boyer, field secretary of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. See Hearings on H. R. 6741, etc., *op. cit.*, 4-23, 128-137.

[10] Mr. A. C. Hardison, representing the California State Grange and the California Farmers' Union; Mr. Ralph H. Taylor, representing the Agricultural Legislative Committee of California which in turn represented some forty growers' organizations: Mr. Fred H. Bixby, representing the California Cattle Raisers' Association; Mr. C. B. Moore, representing the Vegetable Growers of Imperial Valley; Mr. A. Ahlf, representing the California Farm Bureau Federation. See U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Immigration from Countries of the Western Hemisphere.* Hearings on H. R. 6465, H. R. 7358, H. R. 10955, H. R. 11687. 70th Cong. 1st Sess. (Washington, D. C., February to April, 1928), 153-176, 225-264, 295-329. Senate Committee on Immigration. *Restriction of Western Hemisphere Immigration.* Hearings on S. 1296, S. 1437, S. 3019. 70th Cong. 1st Sess. (Washington, D. C., February and March, 1928), 26-63.

[11] Harry Chandler, publisher of the Los Angeles *Times*: Arthur S. Bent, Contractor of Los Angeles; Fred J. Hart, Managing editor of the California Farm Bureau *Monthlies*; Ralph H. Taylor, representing the Agricultural Legislative Committee of California: Chester B. Moore, manager of the Western Growers' Protective Association; Frank J. Palomares, manager of the Agricultural Labor Bureau of the San Joaquin Valley. See U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Western Hemisphere Immigration.* Hearings on H. R. 8523, H. R. 8530, H. R. 8702. 71st Cong. 2d. Sess. (Washington, D. C., January, 1930), 59-74, 75-83, 139-145, 147-154, 263-264.

[12] Hearings on H. R. 6465, etc., *op. cit.*, 153-160. Hearings on S. 1296, etc , *op. cit.*, 40. National Grange, Patrons of Husbandry, *Journal of Proceedings*, Sixty-first Annual Sessions (1927), p. 144.

[13] California State Federation of Labor *Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention* (September, 1927), 26, 61, 63, 79-80.

[14] American Federation of Labor, Forty-Seventh Annual Convention (Los Angeles,) 1927. *Report of Proceedings*, pp. 95-98.

[15] *Ibid.*, 321-325.

The California Federation did not rest its case with adopting resolutions and with persuading the American Federation to adopt them. A delegate was sent to the 1928 hearings on quota legislation to testify that California was burdened with unemployment of unskilled labor and that the problem was further aggravated by Mexican Immigration.[18] Direct pressure upon members of Congress was decided upon in the convention of 1929. When in the spring of 1930 it became apparent that the opposition of the State Department at Washington was the principal deterrent to the passing of restrictive legislation, the California Federation believed that if sufficient pressure were brought to bear upon the members of Congress, legislation would result in the next session.[19] By 1931 the issue had subsided to the extent that only a resolution requesting that a resolution be presented to the American Federation was adopted.[20] In 1932 Mexican Immigration was not discussed.

Groups other than organized labor who were interested in restricting Mexican immigration were the American Legion,[21] the racialists,[22] and the public health, social workers, and school teachers, as well as patriotic organizations.[23]

None of these bills to extend the provisions of the general quota immigration law of 1924 to Mexico and the other countries of the western hemisphere ever became law. The opposition of the employer interests of California and the southwest is only one, and possibly the less important reason. To have applied the quota to Mexico and not to the other countries of the western hemisphere would have involved a discrimination which it was not in the best interest of the United States to make. For diplomatic reasons, also, it was considered undesirable to set up quota restrictions against all the countries of the western hemisphere in order to restrict the immigration of Mexicans. Consequently, the policy of administrative restriction was adopted in March, 1929 and this helped to reduce the volume of immigration very materially.[24] The Mexican government had no objection to this method since it involved no discrimination and since that country wanted to keep her nationals at home anyway.

The depression beginning in the fall of 1929 greatly reduced the employment opportunities for Mexicans in the United States and discouraged further immigration northward. When the burden of unemployed Mexicans in the United States began to be very heavy, the social agencies brought pressure upon Mexicans to return to their home country. To a limited extent, actual financial assistance was provided to help them back over the border.[25] Mexico itself contributed to the creation of a relatively more favorable economic environment in that country by undertaking a program of land reforms which included opportunities for the *repatriados.* Repatriation commenced in 1930 and quickly reached a peak in 1931 and 1932. The United States immigration data are less adequate than the Mexican to indicate the extent of repatriation. Whereas the Mexican data indicate the net south-bound movement for the years 1931–1933 to have been more than 200,000,[26] the American figures indicate it to have been some 65,000 (Table 16). The net south-bound movement for the years 1930–1933, as measured by the Mexican figures, represented less than one-fifth of the 1930 Mexican population of the United States. Actually, the rate of the large south-bound movement through 1930–1933 was hardly 50 percent greater than the rate of departures throughout the latter twenties.[27] The significant feature is that since 1930 the north-bound movement had virtually ceased. The repatriation movement has been very much slower during the years following 1933. This still leaves the United States with a substantial Mexican population. Unless a very great and sudden change should take place in the population movement, the census of 1940 will probably discover a Mexican population in the United States which, allowing for some offset against repatriation by births, is not greatly reduced from that of 1930.

---

[16] *Report of Proceedings*, Forty-Eighth Annual Convention (November, 1928), 258–263.

[17] *Report of Proceedings*, Forty-Ninth Annual Convention (October, 1929), 306.

[18] Edward H. Dowell at Hearings on S. 1296, etc., *op. cit.*, 6–14.

[19] *Proceedings* (September, 1929), 30, 62, 77–78, 87; (September, 1930), 30, 79–80.

[20] *Proceedings* (September, 1931), 63–64, 72.

[21] California State Federation of Labor *Proceedings* (September, 1929), 30.

[22] Samuel J. Holmes, "An Argument Against Mexican Immigration," Commonwealth Club of California *Transactions*, XXI (March 23, 1926), 21–27. Hearings on H. R. 6465, etc., *op. cit.*, 14–18.

[23] Emory S. Bogardus, *The Mexican in the United States* (Los Angeles, 1934), 82–85. Robert N. McLean, "Mexican Workers in the United States," National Conference of Social Work *Proceedings* (1929), 531–538. J. B. Gwin, "Social Problems of Our Mexican Population," *ibid.*, (1926), 327–332. M. S. Handman, "The Mexican Immigrant in Texas," *ibid.*, (1926), 332–339. Paul S. Taylor, "More Bars Against Mexicans?" *The Survey*, LXIV (April, 1930), 26–27.

[24] Paul S. Taylor, "More Bars Against Mexicans?" op. *cit.*, 26–27. R. N. McLean, "Tightening the Mexican Border," *The Survey*, LXIV (April, 1930), 28–29, 54–56.

[25] Los Angeles is said to have spent $155,000 to return 9,000 Mexicans to the border. See Emory S. Bogardus, "The Mexican in the United States," University of Southern California *Social Science Series* No. 8, (Los Angeles, 1934), 95.

[26] Paul S. Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States: Migration Statistics, IV" University of California *Publications in Economics*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Berkeley, 1934), 24–25.

[27] *Ibid.*, 25.

Technically, Mexican immigration could begin again at any time, limited only by the more rigid administrative restrictions as they were applied in March, 1929. Actually, any large amount of population movement probably would not be sanctioned by either country. The widespread opposition of the late twenties in the United States would reappear immediately upon the beginning of a population movement, unless it should occur during a period of exceptional economic activity. The present increase in organized labor strength over that which existed in the twenties would greatly reinforce this opposition. As indicated by its policy in the late twenties, the State Department would readily favor administrative restriction in order to avoid the possibility of quota restriction. Moreover, the Mexican government as long as it continues the present policies and programs for internal economic development would want its nationals to remain at home to assist in this development.

Social Problems Associated with the Mexicans.—The Chinese, the Hindus, and the Filipinos had all come to California almost entirely as mature males, without families or dependents. The Mexican was the only one of these groups to bring his family—and moreover, a large family it was. The labor groups other than the Mexican had involved no indigence and had been law-abiding. The Chinese and Japanese have a particularly clear record in this respect. In contrast to the others, the Mexicans have brought large-family indigence, petty law-breaking, and social and sanitary ignorance and incompetence. Since indifference and resistance on the part of the remainder of the community has frustrated most all efforts of all of these groups to become part of the community, the possible cultural contribution of any of them is a matter of little significance. It is rather evident, however, that the Mexicans had less to offer along this line than did either the Chinese or Japanese. Considering all these relatively unfavorable characteristics of the Mexican, it becomes considerably more than anomolous that it should be the Mexican in behalf of whose presence employer interests should adopt the most aggresive attitude.

The details relating to the nature of the Mexican social problem need not be recounted here. The data indicate an extremely sharp contrast to the understatements of the social problem by farm employer interests while at Washington.[28] On the one hand, the employer interests had maintained that the "homing pigeon" propensities of the Mexicans which caused them to return home every winter prevented their becoming significant social problems. On the other, employer interests indicated that they would cooperate in the solution of whatever social problems arose. Actually the asserted homing propensity was largely a myth, and the cooperation with social agencies consisted principally of criticism.[29]

A survey is reported by Mr. McLean in which 1,021 Mexicans located in twelve communities from San Antonio to Los Angeles were studied by questionnaire. Of this group, 833 had been in the United States five years or more; not one habitually spent the winter in Mexico, and 982 planned to remain permanently in the United States.[30] This may give some light on the intentions of the Mexicans and supplements the census data showing what actually happened (Table 18).

Farm employer underestimation of the social problems associated with Mexicans may have been based principally upon observations in the rural districts. But it was really in the urban districts where the Mexicans accumulated during the slack season (in lieu of returning to Mexico) that the social problems became manifest. And thus far removed, the Mexicans were of hardly greater concern to farm employers than if they actually had returned to Mexico. The following is part of the summary from the state investigation of Mexicans in 1928–1930 and indicates the broad outlines of the social problems associated with the Mexicans in California:

---

[28] For information on the Mexican social problem see Hearings on H. R. 6741, etc., *op. cit.*, 14–16; Paul S. Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States Imperial Valley," *University of California Publications in Economics*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Berkeley, 1928), 56–59, 71–94; M. S. Handman, "The Mexican Immigrant in Texas," *National Conference of Social Work Proceedings*, (1926), 332–339; J. B. Gwin, "Social Problems of Our Mexican Population," *ibid.*, 327–332; Robert N. McLean, "Mexican Workers in the United States," *ibid.*, (1929), 531–538. California State Department of Industrial Relations, etc., *Mexicans in California*, Report of Governor C. C. Young's Mexican Fact Finding Committee (San Francisco, 1930), 175–214.

[29] For instance, see Hearings on H. R. 6465, etc., *op. cit.*, 281.

[30] McLean, *op. cit.*, 538.

> The social welfare problems of the Mexicans in California are defined largely by the fact that the Mexicans constitute the largest group of unskilled, low wage labor in the state, added to the background conditions which make them willing and desirous to come into the state to occupy that economic level. In the background are the handicaps of little or no schooling in Mexico and a lack of familiarity with English; physically, in Mexico they have lived on a meagre diet with little attention to sanitation and hygiene, which manifests itself in a high infant mortality rate and high rate for tuberculosis and other communicable diseases; and their relation to authority has been feudal, making difficult their adjustment to American traditions. Added to these handicaps is the fact that racial prejudice exists, particularly against those of non-European stock whose color, customs, and habits of life differ from the American standard.[31]

Filipino Migration to California.—The Filipinos were another addition to the farm labor supply of the decade 1920–1930. Although the Filipinos had since the beginning of the century been free to move into the United States without their transfer being even so much as counted immigration, the laboring class did not begin to migrate significantly until 1923. During the seven years 1923–1929 approximately 30,000 were admitted into California. (Table 19.) The Filipino population of California and the United States changed in the decade 1920–1930 as follows: [32]

	1920	1930
California	2,674	30,470
United States	5,603	45,208
Percent of total in California	47.7	67.2

The earliest arrivals in California had come principally from the Hawaiian Islands, but were of Philippine birth.[33] These Filipinos had been brought to Hawaii by the labor recruitment activities of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.[34] [35] The proportion coming directly from Manila gradually increased during the years following 1923, possibly because of the reports by the earlier arrivals of their relatively more favorable experience in California than in Hawaii. Another immediate factor in influencing the Filipinos to migrate to California was the traffic recruitment activities of the steamship lines who spread about highly favorable pictures of the economic possibilities on the continent.[36]

The Filipino experience in California has much in common with the Chinese and Japanese experience. The Filipinos were preponderantly young males. More than three-fourths were under thirty years of age upon arrival.[37] Most of them had worked both at home and in the Islands at hand labor in intensive agriculture. They were thus prepared for the type of work most readily available in California. Like the Chinese and Japanese they herded well together and worked in gang formation, with all negotiations being made through a boss. The living standards with which they were content were approximately of the same level as the Chinese and Japanese.

---

[31] *Mexicans in California, op. cit.,* [illegible]5.

[32] Fifteenth Census of the Unit[illegible]tates (1930) *Population* Vol. III Part I, pp. 7, 233.

[33] California State Department [illegible] Industrial Relations, *Facts About Filipino Immigration into California* (San Francisco, 1930), 24–31.

[34] Bruno Lasker, *Filipino Immigration* (Chicago, 1931), 204–211.

[35] The proportion of sugar plantation labor in Hawaii which was Filipino increased from less than one-eighth in 1912 to approximately two-fifths in 1922 and to more than three-fourths in 1932. William H. Taylor, *The Hawaiian Sugar Industry* (Berkeley, 1935), 93.

[36] Lasker, *op. cit.,* 211–217.

[37] *Facts About Filipino Immigration, op. cit.,* 27.

TABLE 19.—*Filipinos admitted through the ports of San Francisco and Los Angeles 1920–29*

Year	Number			Percent	
	Males	Females	Total	Male	Female
1920	614	11	625	98.2	1.8
1921	590	95	685	86.1	13.9
1922	469	76	545	86.1	13.9
1923	2,122	304	2,426	87.5	12.5
1924	2,451	237	2,688	91.2	8.8
1925	2,245	246	2,491	90.1	9.9
1926	4,837	437	5,274	91.7	8.3
1927	5,243	278	5,521	95.0	5.0
1928	4,832	210	5,042	95.8	4.2
1929	5,610	185	5,795	96.8	3.2
Total	29,013	2,079	31,092	93.3	6.7

Source of data: State of California. Department of Industrial Relations, *Facts About Filipino Immigration Into California* (San Francisco, 1930), 22.

With such characteristics, it might be expected that they would have made a convenient and welcomed addition to the agricultural labor supply. Apparently, however, the Filipinos were not made generally welcome. Employers in the Stockton delta region found them to be very satisfactory successors to the Japanese in the squat labor of asparagus production.[38] Elsewhere their employment appears not to have been accompanied with great enthusiasm. The Pacific Rural Press condemned them as a health and racial menace.[39] The California representatives at the hearings on Mexican immigration not only indicated a lack of interest in having the Filipinos (other than to use them as a threat if denied access to Mexicans) but even made derogatory statements about them.[40] Two factors probably account for most of the lack of enthusiasm for the Filipino—his lower productivity, except under the special conditions of the delta region and his asserted propensity to associate with white women. Only when it became apparent that the probability was rather great that the Mexicans would be barred out legislatively or administratively did the attitude towards the Filipinos change. It is reported that during 1930 efforts were being made to rush them into this country on the basis of that probability.[41]

Organized labor was more vigorous in opposition to the Filipinos than to the Mexicans. The California State Federation of Labor adopted resolutions in favor of their exclusion in each annual convention, 1927 through 1931.[42] In compliance with the requests of the California Federation, the Welch bill (H. R. 13900) calling for restriction of Filipino immigration, was introduced in Congress.[43] The support of this bill by the American Federation was also secured.[44] The objective of this proposed legislation was to have the Filipinos declared to be "aliens ineligible to citizenship" and as such they would fall under the rigid exclusion of the 1924 immigration law. A memorial to Congress from the California assembly also requested legislation to restrict Filipino immigration. No legislative action was taken, however, and by 1931 the need for action was removed by a reversal of the migration tide similar to that of the Mexican. This repatriation of Filipinos was assisted by the United States action in providing free passage for the return trip to the Islands.[45] Upon being granted provisional independence in 1934, the Philippine Islands were given a quota of fifty per year.

The extent to which the Filipinos were employed in California agriculture and other comparative data can be discussed to better advantage in the second part of this chapter. Before proceeding, it should be pointed out that the charge against the Filipinos of being a health menace is not supported by unanimous opinion or actual evidence. On the contrary, Dr. George E. Ebright of the State Board of Health and Dr. J. C. Perry of the United States Public Health Service both testified before the Commonwealth Club in 1929 that there was no evidence of the Filipinos being a special health menace.[46]

---

[38] Chamber of Commerce of United States, *Proceedings of Agricultural Conference of Chambers and Associations of Commerce* (Fresno, March, 1930), 43.

[39] CXVII (January 19, 1929), 72; (April 13, 1929), 476-477; CXIX (February 15, 1930), 209.

[40] Hearings on S. 1296, etc., *op. cit.*, 29, 68.

[41] *Pacific Rural Press*, CXIX (March 8, 1930), 300.

[42] California State Federation of Labor, *Proceedings of Conventions* (1927), 93; (1928), 28, 51, 67, 87; (1929), 28, 77, 87; (1930), 29, 58, 79; (1931), 27, 53.

[43] Paul Scharrenberg, "California Labor and the Filipinos," Commonwealth Club of California *Transactions* XXIV (November 5, 1929), 349-353.

[44] American Federation of Labor, *Report of Proceedings* (1928), 134, 217, 218; (1929), 79, 139-140, 206.

[45] U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. Hearings on J. H. Res. 549, H. J. Res. 577 72d Cong. 2d Sess. (Washington, D. C., January, 1933), 18-46.

Proportion of Mexican and Filipino Immigrants Occupied as Farm Laborers.—The 1930 census found that 37 percent of the gainfully employed Mexicans in California were engaged in agriculture. Of those engaged in agriculture, 97 percent were farm laborers. Sixty percent of the Filipinos were engaged in agriculture, almost exclusively as farm laborers (Table 20). Mexicans constituted approximately 21 percent of the total California farm labor supply while Filipinos constituted 8 percent. The only other important non-white group were the Japanese who constituted 7 percent of the total. Thus the Mexicans constituted more than one-half of the total non-white portion of the farm labor supply.

It is rather surprising that so small a proportion of the Mexicans as 37 percent should have been classified as agricultural laborers and also that they would constitute so small a proportion of the total farm labor supply of 1930 as 21 percent. The common estimate of farm employers during the late twenties was that the number of Mexicans agricultural laborers was approximately 70,000 and that they constituted 70 to 80 percent of the casual labor supply. On the basis of the ratios indicated in the last column of Table 20, the Mexicans could not have accounted for much more than 50 percent of the total casual labor supply even if none of the white groups had been engaged in casual labor and all of the non-white had been. These low ratios strongly suggest that some of the Mexicans who performed agricultural labor at some time during the season must have reported their occupation as something other than agricultural laborer.[47] One important instance where this may well have occurred was in the case of the large group of Mexicans who regularly worked on construction jobs in Los Angeles during the winter months and then migrated out into the agricultural districts for employment at harvest time.

TABLE 20.—*Racial Composition of Farm Labor Supply, California, 1930*

Race	Percentage of gainfully employed engaged in agriculture	Percentage of those engaged in agriculture who are farm laborers	Number of farm laborers	Percentage of total farm laborers
Native White	12.3	40.5	84,080	42.7
Foreign-born White	16.6	44.7	33,065	16.8
Mexican	37.0	96.7	41,191	20.9
Japanese	54.8	73.3	14,590	7.4
Filipino	60.2	98.6	16,100	8.2
Indian	56.4	74.2	2,366	1.2
Chinese	13.5	82.0	2,101	1.1
Negro	8.3	79.6	1,907	1.0
Others	70.8	87.2	1,444	0.7
Total			196,812	100.0

Source of data: George M. Petersen, *Composition and Characteristics of the Agricultural Population of California* (unpublished manuscript), Tables 5, 6, 7, 9.

PART 2: ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP

> We, gentlemen, are just as anxious as you are not to build the civilization of California or any other western district upon a Mexican foundation. We take him because there is nothing else available. We have gone east, west, north, and south and he is the only man-power available to us. * * * I want to go on record as saying that California believes that it can meet and handle the social problem and develop agriculture at the same time.[48] [49]

---

[46] Commonwealth Club of California, *Transactions* XXIV (November 5, 1929), 288-301.

[47] The distribution and utilization of Mexican and Filipino labor will be further considered in the second part of this chapter.

[48] Statement by S. P. Frisselle of Kearney Park before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Seasonal Agricultural Laborers from Mexico.* Hearings on H. R. 6741, H. R. 7358, H. R. 9036 (Washington, D. C., January and February, 1926), p. 7.

[49] During the five years preceding this statement, the supply of labor in California had been in excess of demand by an average of ten percent. Only in one year, 1923, had demand exceeded supply and then only by two percent. For the two immediately preceding years, 1924 and 1925, the excess of supply had been twenty and seventeen percent, respectively. (See Table 21.)

Labor Supply During the First Half of the Twenties.—It was feared in the spring of 1919 that the labor shortage of the seasons of 1917 and 1918 would still be experienced during the coming harvest season and that the patriotic efforts of the two previous years should be continued.[50] This expectation, however, never materialized. No labor shortage appeared. Actually, in some localities the number of people looking for work exceeded the number of jobs.[51] Likewise, the season of 1920 presented no particular difficulties in securing an adequate supply of workers.[52]

Having examined the non-quantitative historical information relating to the adequacy of the labor supply throughout the history of California agriculture, the writer would estimate that the seasons of 1919 and 1920 represented a situation which, with the exception of a few instances of mal-distribution, the supply of and demand for labor were on the whole in approximate equilibrium. Against this judgment, there are the estimates of the crop correspondents to the United States Department of Agriculture as to the relative adequacy of supply with respect to demand. These estimates indicate that for the years 1919 and 1920 the supply in California was only 90 and 81 per cent, respectively of demand. (Table 21.) During the following season (1921), when there was conflict between labor groups for employment and a considerable volume of unemployment,[53] supply was estimated to be only 106 per cent of demand. An approximate equilibrium in terms of these estimates is indicated for the year 1923 when supply was 98 per cent of demand. And yet in the season of 1923 there were apparently no instances of shortage but many of surplus, and unemployment.[54] Evidently there is "shortage" of labor, as conceived by California farm employers, whenever an unemployed reserve does not exist!

TABLE 21.—*Demand for and Supply of Farm Labor in California 1918–1930 (As of April First)*

Year	Percent of Normal		Percent of Supply to Demand	Year	Percent of Normal		Percent of Supply to Demand
	Supply	Demand			Supply	Demand	
1918	80	103	78	1925	103	88	117
1919	93	103	90	1926	100	94	106
1920	84	104	81	1927	101	94	107
1921	99	93	106	1928	104	91	114
1922	107	96	111	1929	102	91	112
1923	94	96	98	1930	105	87	121
1924	102	85	120				

Source of data: United States Department of Agriculture. *Crops and Markets*, Monthly Supplement (current issues).

The supply of labor in 1921 was greatly in excess of demand and wage rates fell precipitously.[55] During the winter of 1921, unemployment was so apparent that the Valley Fruit Growers of Fresno asked their members to employ white men to do their pruning. It was urged that if each grower employed a small number of white men and spread the work over a long period rather than hiring a gang of Japanese, Hindus or Mexicans and doing it up in a hurry the additional administrative cost of employing white men would be compensated for in part because the whites would be intelligent enough to vary the technique when conditions demanded it.[56] Migration of workers by automobile first occurred in noticeable proportions in 1921. "Auto campers" assisted in the harvests in the foothill fruit areas and in the raisin district at Fresno. Their appearance was greeted with enthusiasm and they were looked to as a fine means of replacing Oriental with white labor.[57]

Employer complaints during the seasons of 1922 and 1923 were against the still too high wage rates and having to bid against other industries for labor rather than against scarcity as such.[58] For 1924 and 1925 the supply was superabundant and the prospect of lower wage rates was welcomed by employers because of the decline in crop prices.[59]

---

[50] *Pacific Rural Press* XCVII (June 14, 1919), 802.

[51] *Ibid.*, XCVIII (August 9, 1919), 161; (October 11, 1919), 478.

[52] *Ibid.*, C (July 31, 1920), 132, 142.

[53] *Ibid.*, CII (July 30, 1921), 100; (November 12, 1921), 494; (December 10, 1921), 590.

[54] *Pacific Rural Press* CV (June 16, 1923), 741; CVI (September 29, 1923), 313. George C. Roeding, "Immigration and Farm Labor Discussion," California State Department of Agriculture *Monthly Bulletin* XIII (June 1924), 39–43.

[55] Statistical data on wage rates are given in Tables 36–38, Appendix A.

[56] *Pacific Rural Press* CII (November 12, 1921), 494.

[57] *Ibid.* (December 10, 1921), 590. "Floating white laborers always will be too hard to feed and board, but the auto campers can cook for themselves and are delighted with the nice grove with water and showers."

An interesting development of the early twenties was the development of the practice of employer standardization of wage rates. The precedent was set during the war. In several western states employers and laborers met with the state farm labor agents and determined uniform wage rates within specified areas. This was done in the interest of preventing competitive bidding among employers which would encourage laborers to look about for better paying jobs and thus cause much loss of working time. Attempts were made along this same line in several localities of California.[60] After the war, the idea was carried along, but with the determination of uniform wages now being made solely by employers. In 1921 the Valley Fruit Growers (San Joaquin) set a scale which they succeeded in having adopted locally and they endeavored to have the same scale apply to the whole Pacific Coast. The purpose was still claimed to be the prevention of useless floating around in search of a better paying job.[61] In the following years this activity was carried on by the State Farm Bureau Federation, local chambers of commerce, growers' associations and others, particularly where piece work rates were being paid. The San Joaquin Labor Bureau, sponsored by six county farm bureaus, six county chambers of commerce, and the raisin, cotton and fresh fruit industries of the San Joaquin Valley was organized in 1925 and with standardization of wage rates as one of its objectives.[62] This organization has remained in a dominant and influential position in determining wage rates and employment policies in the San Joaquin Valley.

Some difficulty was experienced in the earlier years in getting employers to stand by the uniform wage. In 1922 a temporary shortage of grape pickers occurred at Fresno. Some growers departed from the agreed rate and paid one half cent more per tray with the result that an all around raise of the same amount was eventually made. The conclusion at the end of the season was "that most of this grief could have been avoided had growers not started cutting each others' throats," and that "not a single incident was noted this season where a vineyard which offered good housing was short of help at the critical hour." [63] Again in 1926 the cotton growers of San Joaquin Valley with the exception of those at Corcoran failed to adhere to the agreed rate for cotton picking. Corcoran growers were able to obtain an adequate labor supply even though they failed to make the one quarter cent per pound increase and their action in not breaking the agreement was praised by the manager of the San Joaquin Labor Bureau.[64] Apparently there has been little difficulty from the employers' side in maintaining the rate agreements since 1926.

The Genesis of "Dependence" On Mexican Labor.—Mexicans had been retained since pre-American times as *majordomos* and *vaqueros* in cattle ranching in the southern part of the state.[65] Their employment other than on cattle ranches also had been concentrated principally in the south where they had provided a supplementary labor supply to the whites in building up the citrus industry to its point of development prior to 1900. After 1900 the Mexicans in the citrus industry came into competition with the Japanese. The employment of the latter in this industry was greatly in excess of the Mexicans in 1909.[66]

Employers in the north who had had little or no experience with employment of Mexicans thought of them as possible substitutes for both the Chinese and the Japanese. Chinese exclusion was little more than one year old when, in 1883, the possibility of bringing in Mexicans was being considered by fruit growers.[67] Again when exclusion of the Japanese barely had been secured in 1907, plans were being laid to import Mexican peons who "are plentiful, generally peaceable, and are satisfied with very low social conditions." [68] But in both instances the pressure to import Mexicans was relieved by the recurrence of economic depression which reduced the employment opportunities of the domestic population. As was indicated above, California farm employers did not respond to the opportunity to bring in Mexicans under the emergency exemption provisions of 1917–1920. When eventually Mexicans in significantly large numbers did become available for employment in California agriculture it was of their own volition and not the result of direct encouragement of farm employers.

---

[58] *Ibid.*, CIV (August 26, 1922), 198; CV (March 31, 1923), 366-367; (June 16, 1923).

[59] Survey of Prof. R. L. Adams reported in the *Pacific Rural Press* CVII (June 14, 1924), 778. The percentage of supply to demand for 1924 and 1925, according to the crop correspondents, as 120 and 117, respectively.

[60] Adams, *op. cit.*, 9-12.

[61] *Pacific Rural Press* CII (November 5, 1921), 462; (November 19, 1921), 522.

[62] *Ibid.*, CIV (August 26, 1922), 198; CV (June 16, 1923), CVII (June 14, 1924), 778; CXIII (April 2, 1927), 469.

[63] *Ibid.*, CIV (October 14, 1922), 408.

[64] *Pacific Rural Press* CXIII (April 2, 1927), 469.

[65] U. S. Dept. of the Interior. Census Office. *Report on the Productions of Agriculture* (1880), p. 1033.

[66] U. S. Immigration Commission, *Reports* 24, pp. 22, 30-31.

[67] Proposed by Wm. C. Blackwood at the October, 1883 meeting on the State Horticultural Society *Pacific Rural Press* XXVI (November, 1883), 379.

[68] *California Fruit Grower* XXXVI (August 24, 1907), 1.

The first important points of concentration in employment of Mexicans were in the Imperial Valley and in the citrus industry of the southern counties. Mexicans did not come to be relied upon as the main labor group for Imperial Valley until after 1917.[69] In the citrus area, the Mexicans soon regained the position which they had lost to the Japanese between 1900 and 1910. The California Fruit Growers Exchange in 1919 reported that the numbers of Mexicans employed in citrus orchards and packing houses had increased during the previous five years from 2,317 to 7,004. The latter figure (for 1919) was reported as representing thirty percent of the total employed.[70]

Even though Mexican immigration did not become large until 1923 and after, they became a significant proportion of the casually employed labor supply early in the decade 1920–1930. In the now widely prevalent labor unit—the migratory family—Mexican families were really the pioneers. As we noted above, the migratory family units (auto campers) first were noticed in 1921. In the following year, the State Bureau of Labor Statistics found that the migratory fruit-picking families were preponderantly Mexican. The nationalities of the fathers of 312 migratory families in seven widely scattered counties during 1922 were as follows: [71]

	Number	Per Cent		Number	Per Cent
Mexican	215	68.9	Italian	5	1.6
Spanish	43	13.8	All Others	11	3.5
American	28	9.0			
Portuguese	10	3.2	Total	312	100.0

In the same year Mexicans were the leading foreign nationality group in the labor camps (agricultural and other) which were inspected by the State Commission of Immigration and Housing. The composition included in the five leading groups was: 49,381 Americans, 5,538 Mexicans, 3,568 Italians, 2,652 Japanese, 1,765 Chinese.[72]

One field in which the Mexicans became important successors to the Japanese and Chinese was in grape-picking around Fresno.[73] In cotton production in the San Joaquin Valley the Mexicans stood in the same relation as the Japanese had done to sugar beet production—the industry developed with them as the principal labor supply. The truck crop industry experienced rapid growth into a significant position during the decade 1920–1930, and the Mexicans contributed a very substantial proportion of its itinerant labor supply.

The increase in employment of Mexicans as agricultural laborers during the first half of the decade apparently attracted little attention one way or another. The conception of dependence on a Mexican labor supply first began to become generalized among farm employers during the spring of 1926. The articulation of a concerted demand for additional Mexican laborers appears to have arisen with the California Development Association. Although no record has been found of labor shortage during the season of 1925, all indications in fact being to the contrary, this association arrived at the conclusion in their meeting of January, 1926 that "there appears sufficient evidence pointing to an insufficiency in farm labor supply for the harvesting of cotton, fruits, and grapes in the season of 1925 and evidence further points to greater shortage of labor for the season of 1926." [74] The possibility of immediate quota restriction of Mexicans appears not to have been known to the members of this association at this time. Their demand as expressed in the resolution from which the above quotation was taken was that a plan be provided which would permit a still larger number of Mexicans to cross the border temporarily for employment during the harvest season. This resolution was carried to Washington by Mr. S. P. Frisselle, who represented both the California Development Association and the California Farm Bureau Federation.[75] In his supplementary remarks before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Mr. Frisselle maintained the immigration law of 1924 had resulted in an unjustified hardship on farm employers by limiting the number of Mexicans to cross the border by charging both a head tax and the visa fee. This made a total of $18, which was an increase of $10 over what the cost of migrating prior to 1924 had been.[76]

---

[69] Paul S. Taylor, "Mexican Labor in the United States: Imperial Valley," University of California *Publications in Economics* Vol. 6, No. 1 (Berkeley, 1928), 16–18.

[70] *The California Citrograph* V (December, 1919), 23.

[71] California State Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Twenty-First Biennial Report* (1923–1924), 96.

[72] California State Commission of Immigration and Housing, *Ninth Annual Report* (January, 1923), 46.

[73] *Pacific Rural Press* CIV (October 14, 1922), CXIII (April 2, 1927), 469.

[74] U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Seasonal Agricultural Laborers from Mexico*, Hearings on H. R. 6741, H. R. 7358, H. R. 9036. 69th Cong. 1st Sess. (Washington, D. C., January and February, 1926), 4.

In March, 1926 a regional conference for the "formulation of a sound agricultural program applicable to California and adjacent territory" was held at Fresno under the sponsorship of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. The discussion at this conference with reference to farm labor dealt almost exclusively with the necessity of Mexican labor.[77] The members of the conference were urged to oppose the quota restriction of Mexican immigration and to support the San Joaquin Labor Bureau.

With the above described action of the California Development Association, the appearance of Mr. Frisselle in Washington, and the action of the Chamber of Commerce, the foundation for a program of concerted resistance to quota restriction of Mexicans was laid. Since no legislative action was taken on the quota restriction proposals of 1926, the issue in California momentarily subsided. But this foundation to a program of resistance was ready to be utilized immediately when the issue was again brought up late in 1927 and when legislative action was again being considered in 1928.

The Economics of Employer Demand for Convenient Access to the Mexican Labor Supply.—Two lines of defense were used by the California farm employer interests through the years 1926–1930 in their demand that Mexican augmentation to the labor supply should not be curtailed by quota restriction. One of these was the arguments made in behalf of the Mexican and the other was the threat that if denied the possibility of further additions of Mexicans, the employers would be forced to import or encourage the migration of Filipinos, southern Negroes, or Porto Ricans. The latter line of defense was usually supplemented by pointing out that these alternatives to the Mexicans would surely constitute a less desirable element in the population than the Mexicans. The positive arguments in favor of the Mexicans can be roughly classified into three groups:

(1) Employers were not able to obtain any other labor. The statement of this argument varied over a wide range. In some instances the extreme position was taken that there was an absolute scarcity of unskilled labor of all classes and races. The more moderate and more usual statement, however, was that white labor refused to perform the unpleasant or "menial" tasks of agriculture which required working in uncomfortable positions in uninviting climatic or other working conditions. White people were being educated to seek "white collar jobs" and managerial work and were thus no longer available for employment in the more elementary functions of agriculture.

(2) If Mexicans were not available to perform these "menial" tasks, agricultural production would stagnate and thus depress the level of economic welfare of all other industries in California. The terms of statement of this argument also varied over a wide range. In its extreme form, it was asserted that absolute stagnation and ruination of all agriculture was in prospect if Mexican immigration were greatly restricted. In its most mild form it was stated that cutting off of the additions to the Mexican labor supply would mean higher production costs and that consumers would be forced to pay higher prices for farm products. The most usual form of the arguments lay in between these two extremes.

(3) Mexicans were ideal farm laborers who constituted a very important economic asset to the community. One popular version of the arguments which fall into this classification was that the Mexican was a "homer" who shunted back and forth across the border as his services were required. Thus he did not become an immigrant and did not give rise to social or racial problems. Those who did not argue along this quite apparently fallacious line maintained that the Mexicans constituted a desirable addition to the population, for they were a class of people who always would be content with performing the menial tasks, thus leaving other people free to engage in a higher order of enterprise.

---

[75] Ibid., 4-22.

[76] Ibid., 9-10.

[77] Chamber of Commerce of the United States. *Proceedings of Agricultural Conference of Chambers and Associations of Commerce* (Fresno, March 26-27, 1926), 39-46.

Such arguments implicitly rejected the supposed American ideal of democratic equality.

Some of the details of each of these types of arguments will now be considered, in the same order as given above.

The spokesman for the farm employer interests opposing quota restriction of Mexicans repeatedly maintained that the reason for their interest in the Mexicans was not that they wanted to introduce cheap labor. They pointed out that farm wage rates in California were very high as compared with other parts of the United States. Moreover, the Mexicans were paid substantially the same rates as the whites and hence, they asserted, the Mexicans were no more cheap labor than anyone else. The problem was said not to be a question of wages. White labor refused at any price to perform the type of work for which the Mexicans were needed.[78] Mr. R. H. Taylor was questioned by members of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization as to why it should be that white labor in California refused to do the same types of work which they regularly performed in other parts of the United States. This representative would not concede that the reason for whites, particularly young people on school vacation, not seeking or accepting employment in California agriculture was the presence and usual employment of Mexicans, Filipinos, Japanese, etc., in these types of work. The reason, Mr. Taylor maintained, was that whites had gone from the country to the city and refused to return.[79]

The employer representatives appearing at Washington objected to the suggestion that attempts to provide for a supply of labor to which only seasonal employment could be offered were in fact only attempts to obtain cheap labor, regardless of the fact that relatively high wage rates were paid during the period of employment. Mr. S. P. Frisselle, who had just presented a resolution asking for Mexicans to meet the seasonal labor demand at harvest time, responded to the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on this point as follows:

> Mr. Holaday. This question really resolves itself down to a question of obtaining cheap labor.
>
> Mr. Frisselle. Not in my mind.
>
> Mr. Holaday. Is not that the real question?
>
> Mr. Frisselle. No.
>
> Mr. Holaday. Of obtaining cheap labor?
>
> Mr. Frisselle. Leave out the word "cheap" and I will agree with you.
>
> Mr. Holaday. Of obtaining the labor?
>
> Mr. Frisselle. Yes, sir.
>
> Mr. Holaday. And the question of obtaining labor becomes one of the wage?
>
> Mr. Frisselle. If it does not——
>
> The Chairman. It is the question of obtaining the labor for a short period?
>
> Mr. Frisselle. No; all the year.[80]

Two of the members of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization pointed out that to insure the availability of the colored labor supply in the south, employers were forced to develop supplementary enterprise so as to offer as constant employment as possible. If colored people were offered employment for only two, three or four months per year, they said, labor shortage would surely occur. In response to this Mr. Taylor was brought to admit that if, in bounteous California "we should be forced to maintain our labor when it is idle we would be forced out of business." [81]

An old argument of California farm employers—that they must have a reasonably priced labor supply because of the long haul and high transportation costs to market—was again presented by Mr. Taylor.[82] In view of the generally critical attitude of many of the committee members, it would not have been at all surprising if someone had asked how it could happen that in California much of the land devoted to production of commodities subject to the long haul could be valued at $1,000 and more per acre. Under general circumstances it is to be expected that high transportation costs will be offset in lower land values rather than in lower wages. Labor, being a mobile factor, will tend to receive approximately equal real remuneration over all geographic areas, whereas land, being immobile with respect to market centers, can command a return only equal to its productivity net of transportation costs. The necessity for a reasonably priced labor supply was less a function of high transportation costs than of capitalization of land values upon the basis of past cheap labor.

---

[78] Hearings on H. R. 6741, etc., *op. cit.*, 6, 16. U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, *Immigration from Countries of the Western Hemisphere.* Hearings on H. R. 6465, H. R. 7358, H. R. 10036, H. R. 11687. 70th Cong. 1st Sess. (Washington, D. C., February to April, 1928), 309-310, 312-315. U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Immigration, *Restriction of Western Hemisphere Immigration.* Hearings on S. 1296, S. 1437, S. 3019. 70th Cong. 1st Sess. (Washington, D. C., February and March, 1928), 26-27, 49, 78. U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Western Hemisphere Immigration.* Hearings on H. R. 8523, H. R. 8530, H. R. 8702. 71st Cong. 2d Sess., (Washington, D. C., January, 1930), 229, 231, 233.

[79] Hearings on H. R. 6465, etc., *op. cit.*, 308-314.

[80] Hearings on H. R. 6741, etc., *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[81] Hearings on H. R. 6465, etc., *op. cit.*, 308. Mr. Taylor reported that an offer had been made by a labor contractor to supply 20,000 Negroes to California. But in order to get the Negroes to come, a much higher wage than they were presently receiving would have to be paid. And moreover, "they probably would not stay at farm labor anyway." (*Ibid.*, 304.)

[82] *Ibid.*, 306, 308, 315.

Under close questioning by the members of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Mr. Frisselle was brought to admit that it would be better for the *agriculture of the State* if all of the labor demands could be satisfied by permanent residents.[83] Something of the underlying purpose of these representations in the name of agriculture as a whole is indicated by the fact that Mr. Frisselle, a few moments earlier, had told the committee that "*we*, in California, would greatly *prefer* [italics mine] some set up in which our peak labor demands might be met and upon the completion of our harvest these laborers returned to their country." [84]

Another indication that labor costs had considerably more to do with the issue than the employer interests usually cared to admit was given by Dr. George P. Clements at the agricultural conference of the Chamber of Commerce in 1926. At this time Dr. Clements said as follows:

> The old fashioned hired man is a thing of the past. He has left the farm. There is no place for him, and *the farmer, who does not wake up to the realization that there is a caste in labor on the farm, is sharing too much of his dollar with labor.* [Italics mine.] * * * California requires a fluid labor. We are not husbandmen. We are not farmers. We are producing a product to sell and in most cases we go out of our industry to take care of our livelihood.[85]

Within California there was some objection by small farmers to the program of the large farm employing interests in opposing quota restriction of Mexicans.[86] Their objection was that small farmers do a large proportion of their own labor and did not hire Mexicans or very much of any other labor. The value of their labor as independent operators was determined by how much the large farm operators paid to Mexican labor. *The California Cultivator* undertook to refute this argument saying that the value of the small operators' labor was determined by demand and supply for his commodities and it matters little whether one figures his time to be worth $2 or $6 per day.[87] Had the attempted refutation of this argument been carried on a little further, it would have become apparent that the labor return of an independent operator does have a close relationship to the wage rates which are being paid by other producers to hired labor. With the prices of commodities produced and the prices of land and other productive agents all being based on the general level of labor costs, the rate of labor return which is earned by an independent operator cannot avoid being influenced by the wage level at which labor is available for hiring.

The extreme claims that shutting out of additional Mexicans would mean stagnation and ruination for California agriculture were made principally in Washington and were little used within California.[88] The more reluctantly assumed but more realistic positions were that investments and capitalized values rather than production *per se* were in jeopardy, and also that cost of production would rise, should the additions to the Mexican labor supply no longer be permitted. Mr. R. H. Taylor summarized his view of the probable immediate effects in a prepared statement before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization as follows:

> (a) Competitive bidding for labor not only in the West but in eastern industrial centers with consequent increase in the prices of the growers' commodities.

---

[83] Hearings on H. R. 6741, etc., *op. cit.*, 12-13.

[84] *Ibid.*, 8.

[85] Chamber of Commerce of the United States, *Proceedings of Agricultural Conference*, *op. cit.*, 29.

[86] *California Cultivator* LXX (January 21, 1928), 58.

[87] *Ibid.*, 58.

[88] These extreme positions are fairly well illustrated by that taken by Mr. Frank J. Palomares, manager of the Agricultural Labor Bureau of San Joaquin Valley. Asked by the chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization what would be the effect on California if economic conditions in Mexico were favorable enough to prevent Mexican immigration, Mr. Palomares responded: "We could not exist." (Hearings on H. R. 8523, etc., *op. cit.*, 152.)

(b) Reaction felt by the banks through inability of the small man to engage successfully in this labor competition.

(c) Increased freight rates due to higher maintenance costs on the part of carriers.

(d) Rise in prices of all agricultural commodities to the consumer.[59]

This ostensible preoccupation with the welfare of the "small man" appeared at several points throughout the period of opposition to quota restriction of Mexican immigration. During the course of the same presentation as the above statement was made, Mr. Taylor further emphasized that he represented the small operator as well as the large. The charge that it was only the big operators who wanted additional Mexican laborers was declared to be unfounded. "All our experience shows that the small operator practically always gets hit the quickest and hardest whenever a labor shortage occurs, and we have had many such in California," asserted Mr. Taylor.[60] At a later point we shall have an opportunity to check the validity of this assumed representation of the small operator.

Another view of the alternative to the current system of farm organization was given by Mr. Taylor at the divisional meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States at Ogden in 1929. The only feasible alternative to specialized farming and itinerant labor was one-man farms, but as the experience of the south clearly indicates, one-man farms would mean peasantry. A consideration of "Utopian versus practical aspects" left, according to Mr. Taylor, but one feasible alternative—an ample supply of itinerant labor to meet one peak demand after another. Otherwise, each operator would be restricted to what he himself could handle at harvest time.[61]

It cannot be presumed that the demand of farm employer interests for additional Mexican laborers was based wholly on the anticipation of exploitation through making large profits from employing cheap labor. When the economic consequences of employing cheap labor are carefully examined, it is found that employers, as such, and over the long run, stand to gain little or no benefit. Competition among employers for the use of labor and land tends to influence wage rates and rents upward. At the same time, the output is increased and the pressure on the prices of farm products is downward. The result of these forces is that the differential gains from employing cheap labor are absorbed in the share going to land and capitalized into land values. Hence, employers stand to gain only to the extent that they are land owners. But owners who have purchased their land at values already based upon the income received from the employment of cheap labor stand not to make large gains from the continued employment of cheap labor. On the other hand, if, after buying land capitalized on such a basis, real wages, *ceteris paribus*, commence to rise, the owner stands to suffer more than book losses.

This evidently was the situation in which many California land owners found themselves during the twenties. A large proportion of the land in the larger farms and in the specialized areas had been capitalized on the basis of five decades of cheap labor. When in the post-war decade wage rates failed to decline to their pre-war level, a pressure on capitalized values and investments occurred. This pressure evidently was a far from insignificant factor in causing farm employing interests to take so aggressive a stand in behalf of continued access to the Mexican labor supply.

The same situation prevailed in the newly intensified cultivation areas of the southwest. Employers in these areas had not had long periods of experience with various groups of cheap labor as had employers in California. But when the lands were being sold for purposes of intensive cultivation, Mexican labor was available. And land values, according to Professor Handman, were based partly on the expectation of continued availability of Mexican labor. The sellers had pocketed their gains and were "sitting pretty." Present owners on the basis of such high land values could not pay competitive wages. Only decapitalization of land values would do away with the necessity of Mexican labor.[62]

The defense of the position that the Mexican was a highly desirable laborer caused the representatives appearing in Washington a considerable amount of trouble. Some of the congressional committee members suggested the alternative of the Japanese. The representatives admitted that the Japanese were both more efficient laborers and a more law-abiding and self-sustaining people. The basis for the preference of the Mexicans is made apparent in some of the responses of the representatives to questions along this line. Mr. A. C. Hardison's position was as follows:

---

[59] Hearings on H. R. 6465, etc., *op. cit.*, 324. Compare Charles C. Teague, "A Statement on Mexican Immigration," *Saturday Evening Post* 200 (March 10, 1928), 169-170.

[60] *Ibid.*, 312.

[61] Mr. Taylor's address at Ogden was reproduced in Hearings on H. R. 8523, etc., *op. cit.*, 227-230.

[62] M. S. Handman, "Economic Reasons for the Coming of the Mexican Immigrant," *American Journal of Sociology*, 35 (January, 1930), 601-611.

> There is no comparison between the Chinese and Japanese and the Mexicans. California was particularly anxious for the exclusion of Japanese labor, one of the principal reasons being the fact that the Japanese became a landowner in immediate competition with the American landowner.[93]

And subsequently:

> Mr. Schneider. You spoke of the Chinese and Japanese, the Japanese particularly being very desirious of owning land. In the case of the Mexican, if he were desirous of owning land and being independent, what would be the attitude of your association toward the Mexican?
>
> Mr. Hardison. You have asked a hypothetical question.
>
> Mr. Schneider. No; it is just a comparative question with your answer as to the Japanese.
>
> Mr. Hardison. That trait has not yet been developed. I presume that human nature would take its course.
>
> Mr. Schneider. In other words, you would have no use for them?
>
> Mr. Hardison. As far as the whites are concerned, there probably would be a little antipathy—that is, greater than it is.[94]

Since Mr. Hardison was a tariff-protected lemon grower, he was questioned as to the relationship of tariff protection for commodities as against unrestricted movement of labor. A tariff, he said, should at least cover the difference in cost of production and America should produce all of its essentials and luxuries if it can. In some cases, however, American labor will not perform the essential menial tasks, even in production of necessities. In this case it becomes necessary to import labor, which, according to Mr. Hardison, it is possible to do without lowering the American standard.

> Mr. Schneider. You do not think, then, that the Mexican lowers the American standard?
>
> Mr. Hardison. No, sir.
>
> Mr. Schneider. Do you think that the Japanese lowered the American standard?
>
> Mr. Hardison. The Japanese was bound, if permitted to enter unrestrained, to lower the American standard. It could not be otherwise.
>
> Mr. Schneider. Would that have been true, provided he would have continued as a laborer only?
>
> Mr. Hardison. Probably it would not have been true.[95]

And again, before the Senate Committee on Immigration:

> Senator Willis. Do you think we ought to adopt here a class of people who have no ambition to become home owners and landowners? Do you want here a peasant class that does not want to own land or does not want to own a home?
>
> Mr. Hardison. You have asked a rather difficult question to answer. I am pretty well satisfied that if in the course of the evolution of our civilization we do not at least temporarily have that class, that we will force a large proportion of our own people into that class. I can not see it otherwise; and that would be unfortunate.
>
> Senator Willis. I must admit that I do not follow you. You say that if we do not have that class we are going to have them.
>
> Mr. Hardison. The work must be done or we cannot exist.
>
> Senator Willis. Must be done by people who have no ambition to own land or have homes; that is what I want to know?
>
> Mr. Hardison. If it is done by the type of people you suggest, our standard of living is bound to be lowered.
>
> Senator Willis. Why?
>
> Mr. Hardison. Because everybody will be engaged in menial tasks.
>
> Senator Willis. What is it that lowers the standard of civilization if the man working on the farm has an ambition some time to own a farm and have a farm of his own; how does that lower our civilization? How does that

---

[93] Hearings on H. R. 6465, etc., *op. cit.*, 254.

[94] *Ibid.*, 258.

[95] *Ibid.*, 263-264.

defeat our civilization? I just cannot follow you, sir. (Five lines of irrelevant material are deleted.)

Senator WILLIS. Let us talk about farming. I have worked on a farm, and I know something about it.

Mr. HARDISON. And I have. I am asking how big a farm can you and your family do all the work on. *What would be your station in life if you could not hire a soul?* [Italics mine.]

Senator WILLIS. Well, sir, I am not on the witness stand. I do not know whether it would be interesting to tell it, but the farm on which I was raised—my father and his boy had a farm of about a hundred acres. We did the work, and it was at very infrequent intervals that we hired labor of any kind.

Mr. HARDISON. Was your station in life equal to that of today? You were not then a United States Senator?

Senator WILLIS. It was a good deal better, if you are talking about some portions of it. The provender was much better. We had a fair standard of living, and clothes enough to keep us warm.

Mr. HARDISON. We have always had enough to eat. There has been enough to eat in the world anyway.

Senator WILLIS. That is all very interesting. But the question I asked you was, Is the Chinese or Japanese a better laborer than the Mexican? That is the question.

Mr. HARDISON. I would prefer the Mexican.

Senator WILLIS. Why?

Mr. HARDISON. Because he is a better type of laborer and gives less economic competition.

Senator WILLIS. That is, he is content not to endeavor to improve his condition; he is content just to work along, and does not want to own anything; he is just a drifter; is that the idea?

Mr. HARDISON. He is probably more that way than is common among the Japanese and Chinese.[96]

The attractive characteristics of the Mexican laborer were summarized by Dr. George P. Clements as follows: "No labor that has ever come to the United States is more satisfactory under righteous treatment. He is the result of years of servitude, has always looked upon his employer as his padron and upon himself as part of the establishment."[97] The casual labor supply of California agriculture must be fluid, and therefore "unAmerican." Crouching and bending operations must be performed in climatic conditions to which only the Orientals and the Mexicans are adapted. But, of the Mexicans, the Cholos and hybrids should be excluded and only the peons allowed to come in.[98]

The threat of bringing in Porto Rican Negroes, southern Negroes or greater numbers of Filipinos if access to the Mexican labor supply should be cut off was more generally used within California than in the representations at Washington.[99] It is difficult to estimate the effect of such a threat upon the people who opposed Mexican immigration. The failure of the American Federation of Labor in 1927 to support the demand of the California Federation for quota restriction was interpreted by the editor of the *Pacific Rural Press* as being in recognition of this threatened alternative.[1] But the real reason, as was seen in the first part of this chapter, for the conservative action of the American Federation was its prior agreement with the Mexican Federation of Labor.

The issue of Mexican immigration never reached the point of a heated controversy. There were, however, a few minor clashes of opinion with attendant exchange of charges. An interesting incident occurred at the annual Agricultural Extension Service Conference in January, 1928. Dr. T. N. Carver, "another theorist who does not believe that disagreeable facts should interfere with agreeable theory" was a speaker at the conference and he took a strong stand against importation of Mexican labor.[2] The reaction on the part of some growers to this was to protest that it was not within the province of the University "to import speakers whose promulgations to the farm advisors are such as to tend toward putting into bankruptcy still greater number of fruit growers. * * * Some of us are wondering if official importations from Harvard may not be more deleterious to the California fruit grower than pickers imported from Mexico."[3]

---

[96] Hearings on S. 1296, etc., *op. cit.*, 52.

[97] George P. Clements, "Mexican Immigration and its Bearing on California Agriculture," *California Citrograph* XV (November, 1929), 3, 28–29.

[98] *Ibid.*, 3.

[99] *Pacific Rural Press* CXIV (November 12, 1927), 522–523; (December 17, 1927); 686; CXV (January 14, 1928), 36; (January 21, 1928), 111. *California Cultivator* LXX (January 21, 1928), 66–67. *California Citrograph* XV (November, 1929), 3. Also Charles C. Teague, "A Statement on Mexican Immigration," *Saturday Evening Post* 200 (March 10, 1928), 169–170.

[1] *Pacific Rural Press* CXIV (November 12, 1927), 522–523; CXV (January 14, 1928), 36.

In an editorial entitled "The Issue is Sense, Not Sensitiveness," the *Pacific Rural Press* responded to the charge that California farm employers were attempting to introduce *peon* labor. Their response, in part, was this:

> Peons? Isn't the word peon a little out of character when applied to a Mexican family which buzzes around in its own battered flivver, going from crop to crop, seeing Beautiful (sic) California, breathing its air, eating its food, and finally doing the homing pigeon stunt back to Mexico with more money than their neighbors dreamed existed?[4]

Both Mr. Fred J. Hart and Mr. Ralph H. Taylor, while in Washington in 1930, sought to impugn the actions of the California Senate and Assembly in sending resolutions to Congress asking for enactment of the proposed quota legislation. Mr. Hart asserted that the California legislature did not represent the best interests of the people and that it was not a "business" government.[5] Mr. Taylor charged that the resolution was approved by the assembly on a trading basis and that the senate voted it through in a last-minute rush without knowing what it was doing.[6] Mr. Taylor also declared a report on Mexican immigration prepared for members of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization by Roy L. Garis to the "faulty and inadequate research" which, if accepted as a true picture by the Committee, would put in serious jeopardy the fate of the inhabitants of one-third of the area of this country.[7] The emphasis of the Garis report was that there was already a more than sufficient Mexican population to handle the itinerant labor needs and that the accumulation of this population in the cities was resulting in serious social problems.[8]

In their more conciliatory demands, the California farm employer representatives asked Congressional committees to delay action on restricting Mexican immigration until an investigation of the farm labor needs be made. Since Congress took no action towards such an investigation, it was undertaken in 1928 by a special committee representing several California State agencies.[9] The portion of this investigation dealing with the employment of Mexicans in agriculture was assigned to the College of Agriculture, University of California.[10] Part of the data assembled by the College of Agriculture was collected by use of a questionnaire. Questionnaires were returned by 1,320 farmers, 55 secretaries of Chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade, 27 Horticultural Commissions, and 143 presidents and chairmen of California Farm Bureau Federation farm centers.[11]

Some of the findings of this investigation are in rather sharp contrast to the arguments which California farm employer representatives had made both in Washington and within the state. One of the items in the questionnaire sent out by the College of Agriculture asked about the probable effect on agriculture of curtailing Mexican immigration. The results, depending upon acreage as a measure of size, do not vindicate Mr. R. H. Taylor's position that it was the "small man" who would be most damaged by curtailment of the Mexican labor supply. Apparently, the operators of the larger farms, despite Mr. Taylor, were much the more concerned over the possibility of shutting off of the Mexican labor supply. An interesting contrast is afforded by comparing the above result with the percentage of operators who hired Mexicans out of the total who hired some kind of non-white labor.[12]

---

[2] *Pacific Rural Press* (January 14, 1928), 36.

[3] Frank T. Swett, "Doctor Carver and the Advisors," *Pacific Rural Press* CXV (January 28, 1928), 115.

[4] *Pacific Rural Press* CXIV (December 17, 1927), 676.

[5] Hearings on H. R. 8523, etc., *op. cit.*, 200–201.

[6] *Ibid.*, 212–213.

[7] *Ibid.*, 217.

[8] *Ibid.*, 424–454.

[9] California State Department of Industrial Relations, Department of Agriculture, Department of Social Welfare, *Mexicans in California*, Report of Governor C. C. Young's Mexican Fact Finding Committee (San Francisco, 1930), 214 pp.

[10] *Ibid.*, 153–171.

[11] *Ibid.*, 158.

[12] *Ibid.*, 160, 168.

Percentage of Employers Reporting[1]

Size of Farm	"No Effect"	"Presents Difficulties"	"Probably Would Help"	Total
5-20 Acres	53	34	13	100
20-40 Acres	30	62	8	100
40-80 Acres	30	65	5	100
80 and over Acres	18	78	4	100

Size of Farm	Per cent hiring Mexicans of total hiring some non-whites	Per cent reporting that restriction would "present difficulties"
5-20 Acres	75	34
20-39 Acres	71	62
40-79 Acres	63	65
80 and over Acres	53	78

[1] *Mexicans in California, op. cit.*, 168.

Evidently many large operators who *did not* hire Mexicans were apprehensive of possible restriction while small operators who *did* hire Mexicans were not frightened at the prospect.

The form of the question with which the estimates of the effect of Mexican restriction were obtained was changed several times during the course of the investigation. To a large percentage of the farm operators it was put in the following words:

What would be the effect upon your farm operations if the United States should limit the number of Mexicans permitted to come into the United States as is done with other peoples?—A tabulation of the answers to this question by farm operators only (leaving out managers of citrus associations, etc.) presents some interesting aspects of the question. In this tabulation (Table 22)[13] the answers of the 651 farm operators who made definitive responses to the question (many left it blank) are classified according to a further extension of size categories. Also, the answers of those estimating some effect are broken down into those anticipating an increase in wage rates and those who believed that the non-availability of labor would force them to change their production operations.[14] Table 22 indicates that more than half of the farm operators in this sample expected no effect from Mexican restriction. Nineteen per cent expected that it would increase wages; only thirty per cent supposed that it would seriously affect their present mode of operation. The percentage reporting "no effect" decreases with increase in size until the largest size category. Most of the farms in this size were employing mainly Filipinos and their answer was evidently based on the assumption that Filipinos would continue to be available. The percentages expecting to be affected by rising wages or necessity of changing operations tends also to rise with increase in size, up to the largest size category. Many of those reporting "no effect" further amplified their position by saying that restriction would be good, or it would: (1) reduce production and raise prices, (2) raise the labor income for operator laborers, (3) give idle white people a chance for employment. Some of those estimating that Mexican restriction would "raise wages" indicated specifically that they did not disapprove of this result.

---

[13] Made by the writer, who wishes to acknowledge the kindness of Prof. R. L. Adams in making these questionnaires available to him.

[14] I have had to classify some rather ambiguous answers into this category. Very few answered specifically that they would be forced to retrench in their production of any one crop or in all crops. Most of the answers were that the effect would be "bad", "disastrous", or "cause hardship." Whenever the answers were definite enough to indicate that a serious labor shortage was expected, they have been classified into the category "alter operations". The cases for the categories "no effect" and "raise wages" (without altering production) were usually very clear.

TABLE 22.—*Farmers' Estimates of the Effect of Restricting Mexican Immigration on the Operation of their Farms, Classified by Size of Farm, California, 1928*

Size of Farm in Acres	No Effect		Some Effect				Total	
			Raise Wages		Alter Operations			
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
5-19	67	76	10	11	11	13	88	100
20-39	86	53	29	18	48	29	163	100
40-79	81	53	30	20	41	27	152	100
80-159	48	47	17	17	38	36	103	100
160-319	25	33	16	22	34	45	75	100
320-639	11	31	11	31	14	38	36	100
640-1,279	4	18	7	32	11	50	22	100
1,280 and over	7	58	2	17	3	25	12	100
Total	329	51	122	19	200	30	651	100

Source of data: Tabulation from the questionnaire schedules used in the 1928 investigation of Mexicans in California.

Another item in the questionnaire asked whether employers now using Mexicans would resort to white labor upon curtailment of the Mexican supply. Of 656 replies that gave an opinion, 458 answered "yes", 198 "no." Seventy-four of those answering "yes" added such qualifications as "if available," "if they'd work", etc.[15] This leaves 384 out of 656 or more than 50 percent who unqualifiedly answered "yes." This is quite in contrast to the endeavors at Washington to show that there absolutely was no alternative to the Mexicans.

The final conclusion of the College of Agriculture portion of the investigation was that: "A material and abrupt reduction in the present available supply of farm labor will force changes in California agriculture." [16] Note that this conclusion specifies a reduction in the *present available supply* and not *future additions* to the supply and that *changes* would be forced in agriculture, but not that *production per se* would necessarily be reduced. This is again quite in contrast to the pictures of agricultural ruination and stagnation which the California employer representation frequently painted for the Congressional committee members. Since a large proportion of the farm operators reporting in this investigation were members of the producers' organizations represented through the California Agricultural Legislative Committee, the California Development Association, etc., it is evident, according to the findings of this investigation, that the representatives of agriculture appearing at the hearings in Washington, did not in fact represent the majority opinion of the California farmers.

The Proportional Importance of Mexican and Filipino Employment.—The common estimate of 1927–1929 was that Mexicans constituted 70 to 80 per cent of the total casual labor supply. Charles C. Teague, president of the California Fruit Growers Exchange, states in 1928 that it was agreed among farm advisors, labor agencies and ranch managers, that in the San Joaquin Valley, in the citrus and walnut districts south of the Tehachapi and the irrigated districts of Coachella and Imperial Valleys, that the Mexican proportion of all casual labor was between 70 and 80 per cent.[17] Dr. George P. Clements of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce estimated that Mexicans, Filipinos and Asiatics together accounted for 80 per cent of the total casual labor supply. The number of Mexican workers was estimated at 72,000.[18]

The most adequate information on the relative importance of Mexican and Filipino labor applies to 1928 and 1930 when the survey by the College of Agriculture and the census are available. The 1,287 respondents to the College of Agriculture questionnaire indicated that the number of operators employing different groups was as follows, with some of the operators employing several of the groups.[19]

---

[15] *Ibid.*, 168.

[16] *Ibid.*, 171.

[17] Charles C. Teague "A Statement on Mexican Immigration," *Saturday Evening Post* (March 10, 1928), 169–170.

[18] George P. Clements, "Mexican Immigration and its Bearing on California's Agriculture," *California Citrograph*, XV (November, 1929), 3, 28-29.

[19] Mexicans in California, *op. cit.*, 158–159.

No help hired	27	Chinese	52
None of specified groups employed	330	East Indians	48
Mexicans	814	Negroes	35
Japanese	247	Porto Ricans	18
Filipinos	194		

The percentage distribution of all non-white labor according to district indicates a concentration of Mexicans in Southern California, in the Imperial and Coachella Valleys and the San Joaquin Valley:[20]

	Mexican	Japanese	Filipino	Hindu	Chinese	Others	Total
Imperial and Coachella Valleys	75	7	7	0	0	11	100
Southern California	84	5	6	2	2	1	100
Central Coast	47	21	18	1	6	6	100
Northern Coast	35	28	15	2	14	5	100
Sacramento Valley	32	29	18	12	6	2	100
San Joaquin Valley	56	17	17	2	3	4	100
Mountain and Desert	21	29	15	32	3	0	100

The same type of percentage classification, according to type of production follows:[21]

	Mexican	Japanese	Filipino	Hindu	Chinese	Others	Total
Deciduous fruit	51	21	15	4	5	4	100
Grapes	55	20	13	4	5	2	100
Citrus fruits	76	7	12	1	2	1	100
Field crops	60	14	12	4	5	5	100
Truck crops	63	15	14	4	2	2	100
Diversified	61	9	16	6	3	5	100
Nuts	71	16	8	1	2	2	100

Evidently both Mexican and Filipino employment was pretty well generalized. Japanese employment was relatively slight in citrus fruits and diversified farming.

Table 23, based on 1,207 questionnaire replies, presents a classification of the percentages of farm operators which employed either Mexican or Filipino labor, by size of farm in acres and by diversification in production.[22] Of the farms under 20 acres, only 38 per cent hired Mexicans or Filipinos. The proportion increased with larger sizes—for all farms over 640 acres, more than 90 per cent hired one or the other of these labor groups. The proportion hiring Mexican or Filipino labor apparently increased also with the larger number of enterprises per farm. This, however, is due to a correlation between size and diversity of enterprises—most of the large farms had a greater number of enterprises than the small. Two-thirds of all the farms in this sample hired Mexicans or Filipinos sometime in 1928. The number of farms hiring Filipinos but not Mexicans was relatively small.

TABLE 23.—*Percentage of Farms Hiring Mexican or Filipino Labor Classified by Size and Diversification of Farms, California, 1928*

Size of farm in acres	Number of Crops or enterprises						All farms
	One	Two	Three	Four	Five	Six or more	
5–19	30	51	38	[1] *35*	----	----	38
20–39	63	54	44	56	53	*60*	54
40–79	58	68	57	65	50	*67*	61
80–159	79	76	84	67	72	*77*	76
160–319	90	96	82	91	80	87	87
320–639	*80*	81	82	*79*	*93*	*80*	83
640–1279	*85*	*100*	*100*	*75*	*100*	*100*	92
1280 and over	*100*	*100*	*100*	*80*	*100*	*89*	94
All farms	58	66	62	68	72	86	66

[1] Italicized percentages are those based on less than 15 cases.

Source of data: Tabulation from the questionnaire schedules used in the 1928 investigation of Mexicans in California.

---

[20] *Ibid.*, 159.

[21] *Ibid.*, 160.

[22] This tabulation was made by the author from the College of Agriculture questionnaires.

Wage Rates for Mexican and Filipino Labor.—The differential in wage rates of Mexican and Filipino labor as against white labor was smaller than the corresponding differential for Chinese and Japanese had been during each of their respective regimes. Employers claimed unanimously that Mexicans were paid the same wages as whites were paid, for the same kind of work. Where the employment of both took place on a piece rate basis this was probably generally true. As for time rates, however, there appears to have been a slight differential in favor of the whites and Japanese as the following data for 1928 from the College of Agriculture investigation of Mexican labor indicates.[33]

[These columns correspond to groups as arranged on left side.]

	Average Wage Rates (Without Board)			
	Dollars Per Day		Cents Per Hour	
Whites and Mexicans	$3.60	$3.46	38.8	37.2
Whites and Filipinos	3.70	3.47	37.5	36.2
Whites and Japanese	3.70	3.76	39.0	38.9
Mexicans and Filipinos	3.43	3.44	36.5	36.4
Mexicans and Japanese	3.43	3.73	35.7	39.1
Filipinos and Japanese	3.43	3.58	36.9	37.3

Mexicans and Filipinos were paid equal wages and generally 20 to 30 cents per day less than the rates paid to whites and Japanese.

Another of the questions asked in the state investigation was concerned with reasons for employing Mexicans, Filipinos, Japanese, etc., in place of whites. The main reasons were given in the following order:[34]

Available	328	More satisfactory	33
Dependable	119	Cheaper	24
Not enough white help	60	Steady	19
Work at tasks repugnant to white workers	55	More efficient	16
Better workers	42	Stand heat better	14
Stay with job	37	Willing	11

According to this estimation of reasons for not employing whites, the cheapness of Mexicans, Filipinos and others was one of the relatively less important.

The fact that Mexicans and Filipinos were paid approximately the same wages as whites does not mean that the effect of their employment was not to depress wages. On the whole, the employment of the Mexicans and Filipinos was evidently much less complementary than the employment of either the Chinese or Japanese had been. Domestic labor was much less scarce during most of the decade 1920–1930 than it had been during the decades 1880–1890 or 1900–1910. Even in employers' own terms, as we have seen, labor supply for most of the years 1920–1930 was in excess of demand. Quite apparently, a more nearly equilibrated situation in the labor market, *ceteris paribus*, would have produced a higher wage level.

Significance of Mexican and Filipino Labor to California Farm Organization.—In many respects the beginning of the decade 1920–1930 was as strategic for California farm organization as the beginning of the decade 1900–1910 had been. Both of these points in time had been preceded by a period of Oriental augmentation of the labor supply followed by an augmentation from depression-opportunity domestic population.[35] The situation in the spring of 1920, as seen by Prof. R. L. Adams, was this:

> * * * if California is to go on with her agriculture, as now organized she must continue to constantly recruit a supply of labor able and willing to do the hand work necessary to the harvest of many fruits, the growing and harvesting of many field crops as rice, cotton, sugar beets, and beans, the production of truck crops in the delta, and the growing of cantaloupes and lettuce in Imperial Valley. Either the supply must be kept up or else a reorganization in our scheme of production is bound to be necessary. Such

---

[33] Mexicans in California, *op. cit.*, 169.

[34] *Ibid.*, 162.

[35] With the exception of the two war years, 1917 and 1928, when the augmentation was by a patriotic response of the domestic population.

> a readjustment, as matters now stand, may ultimately be best from the community viewpoint, but it certainly can not be accomplished without heavy financial losses to certain industries which have been built up with reliance on classes of labor that thus far have been to a considerable extent available. Reliance upon labor as now available without future augmentation, greater use of machinery, or similar recommendations, will result in a change from many specialized crops of high acreage value to general crops of low acreage values, if no other relief is forthcoming. It does not necessarily follow, though, that the total available food supply will be materially reduced; rather with some crops such as cantaloupes, strawberries and certain fruits, the opposite is likely to be the case. The change can not, however, be brought about without losses to certain producers. * * * In conclusion may I add there still exists in my mind a question as to what the remedy should be. Are we not better off to reorganize on the basis of what we have and to quit fostering industries whose existence depends upon the constant recruiting of such peoples as Mexicans, Japanese, Chinese, Hindus, or will the economic advantages of a continuation of this sort of thing more than offset the rather evident social disadvantages? It is an important question and upon its correct answering depends the future of our agriculture in many of its important phases.[36]

The question as it stood in 1920 was answered in the Mexican and Filipino augmentation of the labor supply rather than in reorganization. Now, in retrospect, what can be said of the influence of the Mexican and Filipino augmentation of the labor supply upon California farm organization?

Considering the continued abundance of the labor supply throughout the decade and the changes in types of production which took place (see Table 42, Appendix A), the effect in general was evidently this: The labor supply without the Mexicans and Filipinos would probably have been adequate not to cause any difficulties in field crop and livestock production, for these two lines of production remained relatively constant throughout the decade, and moreover, had never been heavily dependent upon outside sources of labor supply. The principal exceptions to this are sugar beets and cotton. The volume of sugar beet production was greatly restricted throughout the twenties by pest problems and by higher prices in alternative lines of production. The very great expansion of cotton was in association with the utilization of considerable Mexican labor. Fruit and nut production in the aggregate expanded about 30 per cent during the decade. Had no competition developed elsewhere within agriculture for the domestic labor supply, this expansion could probably have been accomplished without the Mexicans and Filipinos and without substantial alteration in the type of farm organization. Fruit producers possibly would have had to pay slightly higher wages and to follow through their plans of the beginning of the decade for improving housing and other conditions of employment. The questionable matter was in truck crop production, which more than doubled during the decade. Would this expansion have been possible without the Mexican and Filipino augmentation to the labor supply? Whether it was the availability of a convenient labor supply which played an important part in determining the advance in truck crop production would depend upon the competitive ability of truck crop producers in being able to attract workers from other fields of agricultural employment. Truck crop producers are reported to have said in 1929 that they could pay 50 per cent more in wages and still make a pay crop.[37] Truck crop producers were probably in a better position to pay higher wages than fruit producers. The fact that former field crop land was being changed over into the higher alternative use, truck crops, probably did help to place truck crop employers in a stronger competitive position with respect to securing labor. Values and rents of land suited to truck crop production were not so fully adjusted to profits above the labor costs of an abundant labor supply as were values and rents of fruit land. Hence, it would have been the fruit employers who stood to be hardest hit if a state of active competition for labor had developed.

But the decade was one of a sufficient labor supply that even without the Mexicans and Filipinos, both truck crop and fruit production could most likely have expanded on a large scale and specialized basis. Wages would have tended to be higher and greater efforts might have been made to improve housing and other conditions of employment. Any substantial betterment in the terms of employment would have tended to encourage augmentation of the domestic labor supply through migration of whites and Negroes from the South and Southwest. With a less abundant and more expensive labor supply, expansion in both truck crops and fruits and nuts might not have been so great. Correspondingly higher prices for products would have enabled the higher wage scale to have been paid. The demand for labor in all fields of production most probably would have been offset to some extent by more rapid development of labor-saving machinery and techniques.

---

[36] Letter from Prof. R. L. Adams to Mr. F. L. Lathrop, California State Board of Control. In California State Board of Control, *California and the Oriental*, (Sacramento, 1920), 126-127.

[37] *California Citrograph*, XV (November, 1929), 29.

The conclusion therefore must be that Mexican and Filipino immigration served to assure the abundant labor supply required for large-scale and specialized farming. But even though Mexicans and Filipinos had not become available the actual and potential domestic labor supply was sufficiently large to perpetuate and expand the already established system. Without the Mexicans and Filipinos the expansion might perhaps have been less rapid and labor costs would have been higher.

BIBLIOGRAPHY TO CHAPTER VII

Adams, R. L. and Kelley, T. R. "A Study of Farm Labor in California," University of California, College of Agriculture. Agricultural Experiment Station *Circular* 193 (Berkeley, 1918), 79 pp.

Adams, R. L. "The Farm Labor Problem," Reprint from the University of California *Chronicle*, XXII, No. 3, 19 pp.

American Federation of Labor. *Report of Proceedings*, Forty-Seventh Annual Convention (1927), pp. 96–98.

Bloch, Louis. "Facts About Mexican Immigration Before and Since the Quota Restriction Laws," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XXIV (March, 1929), 50–60.

Bloch, Louis. "Report on the Mexican Labor Situation in Imperial Valley," California State Bureau of Labor Statistics *22nd Biennial Report* (1925–1926).

Bogardus, Emory S. "The Mexican in the United States," University of Southern California *Social Science Series* No. 8 (University of Southern California Press: Los Angeles, 1934), 126 pp.

California Citrograph (December, 1919), p. 30; (August, 1920), 314, 330.

California Cultivator, LXVI (May 8, 1926) through LXXLV (February 15, 1930.)

California Fruit Grower, XXXVI (August 24, 1907), p. 4.

California State Board of Control. *California and the Oriental* (Sacramento, 1920), 231 pp.

California State Bureau of Labor Statistics. *Twenty-First Biennial Report* (1922–1924).

California State Commission of Immigration and Housing. *Ninth Annual Report* (January, 1923).

California State Department of Industrial Relations, Department of Agriculture, Department of Social Welfare. *Mexicans in California*. Report of Governor C. C. Young's Fact-Finding Committee, (San Francisco, 1930), 214 pp.

California State Department of Industrial Relations. *Facts About Filipino Immigration into California*, Special Bulletin No. 3 (San Francisco, 1930), 76 pp.

California State Federation of Labor. *Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention* (September, 1927), 26, 61, 63, 79–80.

Chamber of Commerce of the United States. *Proceedings of Agricultural Conference of Chambers and Associations of Commerce* (Fresno, March 26–27, 1926), 39–46.

Clark, Victor S. "Mexican Labor in the United States," Bureau of Labor Statistics *Bulletin* No. 78 (Washington, D. C., 1908), pp. 466–522.

Clements, G. P. "Mexican Immigration and its Bearing on California's Agriculture," *California Citrograph*, XV (November, 1929), 3, 28–29.

Commonwealth Club of California. "Filipino Immigration," *Transactions*, XXIV, No. 7 (November, 1929), pp. 307–378.

Commonwealth Club of California. "Mexican Immigration." *Transactions*, XXI, No. 1 (March, 1926), pp. 1–34.

Feldman, Herman. *Racial Factors in American Industry* (Harper & Brothers: New York, 1931), 318 pp.

Gamio, Manuel. *Mexican Immigration to the United States* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1930), 262 pp.

Gwin, J. B. "Immigration Along our Southwest Border," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 126–130.

Gwin, J. B. "Social Problems of our Mexican Population," National Conference of Social Work *Proceedings* (1926), 327–332.

Handman, M. S. "Economic Reasons for the Coming of the Mexican Immigrant," *American Journal of Sociology*, 35 (January, 1930), 601–611.

Holmes, S. J. "Perils of the Mexican Invasion," *North American Review*, 227 (1929), 615–623.

Lasker, Bruno. *Filipino Immigration* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1931), 445 pp.

Lescohier, Don D. "The Vital Problem in Mexican Immigration," National Conference of Social Work *Proceedings* (1927), 547–554.

Lively, D. O. "Agricultural Labor Problems During the Past Season," California State Commission of Horticulture *Monthly Bulletin*, VII (January, 1918), 70–73.

McLean, R. N. "Mexican Workers in the United States," National Conference of Social Work *Proceedings* (1929), 531–538.

McLean, R. N. "Tightening the Mexican Border," *The Survey*, LXIV (April, 1930), pp. 28–29, 54–56.

McWilliams, Carey. "Getting Rid of the Mexicans," *American Mercury*, 28 (March, 1933), 322–324.

"Mexican Invaders Relieving our Farm-Labor Shortage," *Literary Digest*, 66 (July 17, 1920), 53–54.

"Mexican Labor Situation," *The Blue Anchor*, V (February, 1928), p. 30.

National Grange, Patrons of Husbandry. *Journal of Proceedings*, Sixty-First Annual Sessions (1927), p. 144.

Pacific Rural Press. Vol. XCIII (January, 1917) through Vol. CXXX (July, 1935).

Pressey, H. F. "The Housing and Handling of Mexican Labor at Rancho Sespe," *California Citrograph*, XV (December, 1929), 51, 72.

"Results of Admission of Mexican Laborers, Under Departmental Orders, for Employment in Agricultural Pursuits," *Monthly Labor Review*, XI (November, 1920), 1095–1097.

"Should Quota Law be Applied to Mexico? Arguments pro and con," *Congressional Digest*, 7 (1928), 155–164.

Slayden, James L. "Some Observations on Mexican Immigration," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCIII (January, 1921), 1921–126.

Spaulding, C. B. "The Mexican Strike at El Monte, California," *Sociology and Social Research*, XVIII (August, 1934), 571–580.

Stowell, J. S. *Near Side of the Mexican Question* (George H. Doren: New York, 1921), 123 pp.

Taft, Donald R. *Human Migration* (Ronald: New York, 1936), 590 pp.

Taylor, Paul S. "Mexican Labor in the United States: Imperial Valley," University of California *Publications in Economics*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Berkeley, 1928), 94 pp.
Taylor, Paul S. "Mexican Labor in the United States: Migration Statistics," University of California *Publications in Economics*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Berkeley, 1929), pp. 237–255.
Taylor, Paul S. "Mexican Labor in the United States: Migration Statistics," II, University of California *Publications in Economics*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Berkeley, 1933), pp. 1–10.
Taylor, Paul S. "Mexican Labor in the United States: Migration Statistics, III," University of California *Publications in Economics*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Berkeley, 1933), pp. 11–22.
Taylor, Paul S. "Mexican Labor in the United States: Migration Statistics, IV," University of California *Publications in Economics*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Berkeley, 1934), pp. 23–50.
Taylor, Paul S. "More Bars Against Mexicans?" *The Survey*, LXIV (April, 1930), pp. 26–27.
Taylor, William H. *The Hawaiian Sugar Industry* (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of California, 1935), 216 numbered leaves.
Teague, Charles C. "A Statement on Mexican Immigration," *Saturday Evening Post*, 200 (March 10, 1928), 169–170.
Thomson, C. A. "Restriction of Mexican Immigration," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, II (1927), 574–578.
U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Hearings on Japanese Immigration*, 66th Cong., 2d sess., (Gov't. Print. Off.: Washington, D. C., 1921).
U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Immigration from countries of the Western Hemisphere.* Hearings on H. R. 6465, H. R. 7358, H. R. 10955, H. R. 11687, 70th Cong., 1st sess., (Gov't. Print. Off.: Washington, D. C., 1928).
U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Seasonal Agricultural Laborers from Mexico.* Hearings on H. R. 6741, H. R. 7559, H. R. 9036, 69th Cong., 1st sess., (Gov't. Print. Off.: Washington, D. C., 1926).
U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Western Hemisphere Immigration.* Hearings on H. R. 8523, H. R. 8530, H. R. 8702, 71st Cong., 2d sess., (Gov't. Print. Off.: Washington, D. C., 1930).
U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Immigration. *Emergency Immigration Legislation.* Hearings on H. R. 14461, 66th Cong., 3d sess., (Gov't. Print. Off.: Washington, D. C., 1921).
U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Immigration. Hearings on S. 4304, 66th Cong., 4th sess., (Gov't. Print. Off.: Washington, D. C., 1921).
U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Immigration. *Restriction of Western Hemisphere Immigration.* Hearings on S. 1296, S. 1437, S. 3019, 70th Cong., 1st sess., (Gov't. Print. Off.: Washington, D. C., 1928).
U. S. Department of Labor. "Mexican Immigration into the United States from Nogales District, Sonora," *Monthly Labor Review*, 26 (March, 1928), 685–686.
U. S. Immigration Commission. *Immigrants in Industries. Reports*, Vol. 24 (Washington, D. C., 1911), 1045 pp.
Walker, Helen W. "Mexican Immigrants as Laborers," *Sociology and Social Research*, XIII (1928), 55–62

CHAPTER VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The first six decades of economic life in California (1769–1833) were principally within the confines of the Spanish-founded mission system. Productive activity in the missions was largely dependent upon the labor service of native Indians whose availability was in part obtained through mild and indirect forms of impressment. But since the objectives of the mission system were not wholly economic or political, the degree of impressment involved in securing the service of Indians was not designed to permit slavery or exploitation. Rather, the ostensibly benevolent intention was the imposition upon the natives of foreign social, economic and religious ideals; a closely related purpose, of course, was to hold the territory.

Each mission, once well established, engaged in agricultural production to the extent of providing practically all subsistence and nearly sufficient fibers, with occasional small surpluses in both as well. Since the mission fathers were schooled in the concept of virtue through poverty and since the Indian neophytes cared little for abundance in worldly goods, economic objectives did not correspond to the customary norm for private enterprise. Hence, there was no conscious endeavor to obtain maximum production. Moreover, since the great problem of discipline was rendered more simple by keeping the neophytes at work, it was advantageous not to develop the most efficient methods or to utilize labor-saving devices.

The transition from mission to civil life, beginning in 1834, brought a change in objectives with respect to the utilization of land and labor. Lands formerly used on a temporary non-title basis by the missions were granted in large units to individuals to be used for private gain. Part of the Indians who had been domesticated by the missions became the laborers of the private ranchos. Their employment was frequently not a matter of free contract, however, for impressment methods varying all the way from debt peonage to outright seizure and force were common. Indian laborers were retained in a feudalistic manner on the larger ranchos and seldom were paid in money or in excess of subsistence. Indian labor was so cheap that growing crops were protected from cattle by Indian guards rather than by fences.

Since there were but thirteen years of private enterprise between secularization of the missions and seizure of control of the territory by Americans, this feudalistic or latifundia system did not have a chance to become well established. Americans and other foreigners had commenced to participate as rancheros in this economic structure prior to 1846. And until California entered the Union in 1850 as a free state the tendency was to extend the system of forced labor rather than to curtail it. Prior to 1850, the Americans legislatively strengthened the forcing of Indian labor and commenced to move Negro slaves from the South. Gold discovery in 1848 and the consequent rapid influx of an anti-slave population was the determining factor in the overthrow of forced labor and in the entry of California into the Union as a free state. Had it not been for the historical accident of gold discovery, California would evidently have played a far different role in the history of the slave question in the United States.

Very little of the institutional structure with respect to land and labor was able to survive this sudden transition from a Roman to a Teutonic culture. Upon assuming control of the territory, the Americans did undertake to guarantee the titles of the Spanish and Mexican land grants. But the indefinite terms and conditions of these titles, together with the difficulties of administration of justice in so remote a territory, made complete fulfillment of this guaranty an impossibility.

Thus the precedent of large scale farming with an abundant and cheap labor supply was established for California in Spanish and Mexican colonial times. That large scale farming subsequently did come to exist is, however, entirely independent of the Hispanic labor institution and largely independent of the Hispanic land institution. In the evolution of the subsequent pattern of farm organization, the large size of the Spanish and Mexican grants and the concentrated ownership into which the valuable portions of the public domain fell were less important than the characteristics of the population.

Even if the land titles during the pre-American period and during the two decades of agricultural experimentation and adaptation before 1870 had represented small units, it is quite possible that with a population such as California had, an amalgamation of holdings into large units might well have taken place. The characteristics of the population of 1870 and after which made it an important factor were these: At one end of the economic scale was a labor population, composed largely of Chinese, whose economic alternatives were so limited as to force them into the unattractive working position of casual and itinerant laborers. On the other end of the scale were men possessed of exceptional entrepreneurial abilities, including the ability to command large amounts of capital. Such a population was quite in contrast to the much more homogeneous one with which the organizational structure of middle-western agriculture was established. It is therefore not surprising that the patterns of organization of the two areas should greatly differ.

There were elements in the population of the early American period which considered the possibility of importing laborers from the Orient to stand in the same relation of the agriculture of California as did the Negro slaves to the agriculture of the South. But these elements were in a minority and the influence of their views was negligible. Other than the soliciting of Chinese labor which was done by the builders of the Central Pacific Railroad, the migration of Chinese to California was unassisted so far as American employers were concerned. The conception of the future of California agriculture, as it was expressed by the community leadership of the two decades 1860–1880, was that it should become a community of diversified family farms. When specialized large scale grain farms were being established in the sixties and seventies, they did not have the approval of a large proportion of the community. Grain growers, through the State Agricultural Society, criticized themselves for following a system of cultivation which underemployed the working population, failed to establish desirable rural communities and depleted the soil. Grain growers took so highly a speculative attitude towards their enterprises as to discourage planning for stability or attempting to develop supplementary enterprises to increase the employment of themselves or their laborers. Similarly, this short-range point of view was instrumental in establishing the precedent of extremely poor housing and living conditions on California farms. Under the circumstances, neither the temperament nor the bargaining position of laborers encouraged the provision of more than the absolute minimum of living facilities.

Except for the very early fifties, before the yields from surface mining began to decline, the labor supply for agriculture was not as scarce as is commonly supposed. In terms of the high anticipations of some employers as to production possibilities there was indeed a labor shortage. But in terms of actual production alternatives as limited by lack of knowledge of production technique and lack of markets, the labor supply was relatively adequate. The supposition that it was the scarcity and high price of labor which encouraged the relatively rapid development of large scale methods in grain farming in California is largely unfounded. The long dry harvesting season, the smoothness of the terrain, and the necessity only of a superficial preparation of the seed-bed were much more important factors in the adoption of large scale methods. Native Indians, Chinese and disappointed gold-seekers were sufficient in the early years to supply the seasonal and casual labor needs of the large scale grain operators.

Tentatively, the system of large scale specialized grain farms was tolerated, with the anticipation that the completion of the railroad would bring an influx of small farmer population and open up markets for a wider variety of production. It was supposed that when a small farm operator population began to arrive in the territory, the large land holdings would begin to be subdivided into family farms. To hasten this process, the State Agricultural Society offered small bounties for new lines of production and attempted to stimulate the migration to California of a small farmer population. Other immigration agencies also directed their endeavors towards building up a small farmer and small entrepreneurial population rather than towards an abundant labor supply.

Despite these endeavors, the laboring constituents within the population grew more rapidly than the small entrepreneurial. During the seventies and eighties, when production and marketing conditions favored the transition from livestock and grain to intensive fruit farms, labor was abundant. Labor was so abundant, in fact, that it was possible to convert extensively cultivated farms into intensively cultivated farms without substantial subdivision of the land. This was possible because the labor supply was so large relative to employment opportunities that workers were available for casual and seasonal employment during temporary rushes. Chinese laborers were the principal constituent of this abundant casual labor supply.

As casual laborers the Chinese were ideal. They worked in gangs under the direction of a "head boy" or "China boss." They did their own cooking and furnished most of their sleeping accommodations. This left the employers with little or no obligation with respect to living facilities. Furthermore, the employer dealt only with the "boss" who furnished the crew and took charge of the work. Since the Chinese were relatively young and had no families, they were very mobile.

Many community-conscious people believed the specialized large scale fruit farms likewise to be an abnormal development. Fruit growers themselves freely admitted this. It was frequently foreseen that eventually the labor needs of agriculture must be supplied by a more normal population—at least by a population with dependents. When legislation to cut off the additions to the Chinese labor supply was demanded by the metropolitan working class, farm employers made no resistance. A large proportion of the community, including the employers of the Chinese, presumed that this would bring an end to the supposedly transitional phase based on the employment of Chinese labor.

But the transitional phase was not to be done away with so easily. Wherever intensive cultivation had already begun or was in prospect, land values were capitalized on the basis of actual or anticipated returns from the employment of the cheap and convenient Chinese labor supply. To the prospective small operator, this meant paying so high a price for land as to permit him a labor return approximately equal to the wages of Chinese. Since wages of Chinese were approximately equal to those prevailing in Europe and below the general level in the United States, such a prospect did not encourage either European immigrants or people from East to come to California. Established farm operators in the eastern states would have had to sell their less highly capitalized land in order to buy the more highly capitalized land of California, and pay the high costs of migration as well. And there were other factors discouraging to settlement of small farm operators. One of these was the relative heterogeneity of the soils and climate and the differences in systems of cultivation as compared with the more homogeneous eastern and midwestern areas. Such variability in conditions contributed to many failures, some of them arising out of incompetence, others out of fraud and misrepresentation in the sale of lands. The already high price of land was frequently augmented by the speculative possibilities of minerals, of oil, and of exotic forms of agriculture.

Thus, in order to subdivide and sell the large holdings to prospective small operators, a considerable depreciation in valuation would have to be suffered. On the other hand, to perpetuate the large units would require an abundant labor supply. Although farm operators during the period 1876–1882 had made no resistance against the exclusion of further Chinese immigration, they soon after exclusion joined in concerted action to prevent the resident population from being driven away. Chinese antagonists, having secured exclusion legislation, (1882) proceeded further to demand removal of the Chinese already established in

California. Farm employers now resisted this pressure by organizing protective associations which were active through 1885 and 1886. The early post-exclusion years also saw discussions of the possibilities of augmenting the labor supply from Mexico and Japan as well as actual attempts to augment it by importation of Negroes from the South.

During this period of great concern about the labor supply—1883 through 1888—many employers agreed that there was no real or permanent solution of the "labor problem" short of a reorganization of agriculture such as would reduce the amount of dependence upon hired labor and decrease the proportion of seasonal and casual labor. Many employers declared their willingness to incur the losses which would be involved in making such an adjustment. But other elements in the employer group were determined to protect their immediate interests, by importation of labor, if necessary.

Except for the above-mentioned period of the eighties, there was no necessity for immediate concern with respect to the adequacy of the labor supply. Beginning in 1889 and extending throughout the nineties, depression in non-agricultural industries released a large number of workers from employment. This created an abundant labor supply for agriculture—even though the labor demand of agriculture expanded throughout the period. The Chinese labor supply was being gradually reduced by death and emigration so that by 1900 the casual labor group was constituted principally of whites. So limited were employment alternatives during the nineties that whites were forced to succeed to the labor status of Chinese without substantial improvement in either employment or living conditions. Such a condition of labor abundance permitted the system of large scale specialized farms not only to be perpetuated but to be expanded. And, with improvements in the techniques of canning and drying and provision of additional irrigation facilities, fruit production expanded very rapidly.

When, at the turn of the century, economic recovery threatened to deplete the ranks of the cheap labor supply, immigration from Japan replenished them. The Japanese, although appearing initially in California under the same economic alternative conditions as had the Chinese, soon indicated a less pronounced docility. The manifestation of a degree of aggressiveness by the Japanese in wishing to advance their economic position both as laborers and as independent operators was not pleasing to farm employers. Employment of Japanese as casual laborers in agriculture during the years 1902 to 1907 was a matter of necessity and not of employer enthusiasm. In recent years the spokesmen for farm employers had attempted to create the impression that it was they (farm employers) who took an active part in securing the exclusion of the Japanese laboring class in 1907. The fact, on the contrary, is that farm employer activity was directed towards preventing total exclusion. Despite the Japanese lack of docility, farm employers were still dependent on them. It was not until after Japanese exclusion (demanded again principally by the metropolitan laboring class), when resident Japanese began rapidly to establish themselves as independent operators and competitors, that the present generalized hostile attitude toward them in the rural districts developed.

Pressure of labor scarcity and doubt as to the permanent solution of the labor problem with an Oriental supply were factors in encouraging a program during 1902–1904 to stimulate migration of farm laborers from the East. At first a program of propaganda through solicitors and literature was tried. But the results were so disappointing that employers decided to improve the terms of employment by offering better living facilities. Just as they were about to undertake such a program of improvement, temporary decreases in demand for labor together with greatly increased Japanese immigration removed the necessity of stimulating such increases in the labor supply. When pressure of labor supply again occurred in 1906–1907, the idea of encouraging additions to the labor supply from the East gave way to demand that the immigration laws be so amended as to permit additions of Chinese and Japanese.

But again there was no necessity of following through the demands of 1906–1907 for modification of the exclusion laws to permit Oriental augmentation of the labor supply. A relaxation of the labor scarcity appeared in 1908 and continued, with general superabundance in most of the years until 1916. Stagnation in non-agricultural industries was again the means of releasing an abundance of labor for agriculture. Revival of economic activity in 1916 brought an approximate equilibrium of labor supply and demand. With the entry of the United States into the war, labor supply became a critical problem.

To meet the emergency of war-time, special exemptions to the general immigration law were made to permit farm employers of the United States temporarily to import Mexican agricultural laborers. Also arrangements were made to facilitate the utilization of juvenile labor, of women, and of metropolitan residents who would not ordinarily seek employment in agriculture. The demand of farm employers in California, however, was for the permission to import Chinese. California employers also considered the possibility of getting laborers from the Caribbean, Hawaiian, and Philippine Islands and from Porto Rico. But an efficient utilization of the domestic labor supply enabled the crops of 1917 and 1918 to be harvested without significant loss. California farm employers hardly took advantage of the emergency exemptions for importing Mexicans. There were, however, Mexican additions during the war to the farm labor supply, for without employer assistance Mexicans were beginning to filter through to California from the Southwest.

Through the early part of the decade 1920–1930 the already relatively adequate labor supply for California agriculture was augmented by an influx of Mexicans. They were the pioneers in establishing a new labor unit—the migratory family, with the automobile as the means of conveyance. The number of Mexicans increased fast enough to make them a substantial part of the casual labor supply by the middle of the decade. Mexico, along with other countries of the western hemisphere, was not limited to quota immigration in the laws of 1921 and 1924. When Mexican immigration continued on an unexpectedly high level during the first part of the twenties, pressure arose throughout the United States in 1926 to extend the application of the quota law to include them. Of those employer interests which resisted the proposed quota restriction, California farm employers were among the most conspicuous. Two lines of argument were used by California farm employers in opposition to quota restriction. One was the asserted benefit of the Mexicans to agriculture and hence to the community. The other was the threat that if denied continued additions of Mexicans, they would be forced to import Filipinos, Porto Ricans, or Negroes from the South.

None of the bills to extend the quota restrictions to include the Mexicans was ever passed. Administrative restriction of Mexican immigration beginning in 1929, and the immediately succeeding depression removed for the time being the necessity for quota restriction. Since 1930, at least one-fifth of the 1930 Mexican population of the United States has been repatriated. In the meantime, the ranks of the casual labor supply have been kept more than abundant through additions of drought and depression refugees from within the United States.

Another supplementary addition to the casual labor supply for agriculture during the latter twenties was the Filipinos. Employers in general were less enthusiastic about the Filipino than the Mexican. The principal exception to this appears to have been in the river delta regions where employers found the Filipinos to be highly satisfactory laborers, particularly in the production of asparagus. Before 1934 Filipinos were permitted to move to the mainland without their movement being counted as immigration. With the granting of provisional independence in 1934 a quota of 50 immigrants per year was assigned to the Philippine Islands. And the Filipinos, like the Mexicans, have been returning to their home land since 1930.

Thus, with two very brief exceptions, California since 1870 has had available an abundant labor supply whose limited employment alternatives left them no better opportunity than casual employment in agriculture. The sources of augmentation to the casual labor supply have been alternatively immigration from low economic standard countries and the movement of depression-opportunity members of the domestic population into agriculture. The first brief exception to the situation of general labor abundance was in 1888. At this time a high level of general economic activity, recent exclusion of the Chinese, and rapid expansion in agriculture formed a combination which brought pressure on the labor supply. Employers at this time sought relief in the importation of Negroes. The second brief exception was in 1917–1918 when patriotic response from the domestic population secured the help of individuals who otherwise would not have been available for agricultural employment.

All of the above-mentioned immigrants with the exception of the Mexicans were confined principally to California. This state did not participate significantly in absorbing immigrants from Europe as did the eastern and mid-western states. The Italians, Portuguese, Dalmatians, and Swiss who did come to California in significant numbers to engage in agriculture worked principally for their countrymen and many advanced their position into operatorship. They have engaged to a large extent in livestock and dairy production. None of the European elements has ever constituted a significant proportion of the casual labor supply.

The extent to which this continued availability of an abundant labor supply for the performance of casual and seasonal tasks is related to the economic structure of agriculture cannot be precisely measured. A precise analysis would require a knowledge of the interrelations with some of the factors not within the scope of this investigation. They include the technical economics of scale and the arrays of relative advantage of the several areas for the production of different types of output.

With respect to economics of scale, it is doubtful that there have been any of great importance outside of the economic characteristics of the population. The large scale equipment used on the early grain farms probably did represent definite efficiencies of size. But the operation of such equipment was closely related to superficial methods of cultivation which could not have prevailed for long. Even if grain production had not given way to other forms of production, it is quite possible that considerable modification in the system of cultivation would have been required in order to effect the required soil conservation. Quite probably this modification would have been towards smaller, more diversified units.

The succeeding intensive forms of cultivation involved no large scale equipment or extensive division of labor. The problem of irrigation facilities may early have been a determinant factor in efficient size. Prior to the development of the irrigation district and the Wright Act of 1887 there was no well established basis for cooperative action in the provision of irrigation facilities. Individual activity, for most types of surface diversion, had to be on a large scale. The cooperative basis of activity, as worked out in the irrigation district, permits continuous diversifiability of farm units.

As far as regular farm operations were concerned, their nature was such as not to give large scale units any particular advantage over family units. California farm journals have repeatedly asserted the greater efficiency of small farms as against large. Beyond the minimum size required to utilize a four-horse team (formerly) or a farm-all tractor (now) there evidently have been and are no particular economies of scale. Large scale units are generally achieved by duplication of standard sizes of equipment rather than by employing continuously larger equipment. Selling economies associated with quantity operations have been achieved by cooperative marketing associations.

Within the economic characteristics of the population there has been a powerful force towards large scale farming operations. With a continuously abundant labor supply available to meet seasonal and casual needs, the opportunity to specialize in entrepreneurship was relatively great. Individuals with command of large amounts of capital could organize and operate large units, confident that they would be able to get enough extra labor during rush periods. This tendency was accentuated by the presence of individuals with relatively large capital backing.

The frontier population of California, compared with that of the middle-western frontier, was much more heterogeneous—with extremes on both ends of the economic scale. The combination of such a population with the large land units of the Spanish and Mexican grants did not permit the establishment of a homogeneous structure of family farms in accordance with the ideals of the community.

Likewise, the abundance of labor to perform casual and seasonal tasks is directly related to the degree of specialization. There are, of course, instances where the advantage of an area for a particular line of production are so much greater than any other that diversification in production cannot exist, even though specialization means considerable idleness of labor. The more general situation for most of the areas in California is one of several approximately equal production opportunities. Where there are several production opportunities, one of the factors tending towards diversification is the endeavor to increase the amount of employment. Where labor is self-employed or employed on long-term contracts, labor-time is an overhead cost. As far as it is practical it will be profitable to develop supplementary enterprises to increase the annual amount of employment per man. The extent to which diversification for this purpose can take place depends upon the relative values of the various production opportunities and the amount of overlap in the timing of labor demand. For California, the continued availability of a labor supply for short-term employment has meant that labor has not been an overhead cost factor tending to encourage diversification of enterprise.

With the continuance of a cheap labor supply, augmented alternatively by immigration from low economic standard countries and by transfer of workers from non-agricultural industries during times of depression, there has come a change in the attitude of the community. During the sixties, the seventies and the early eighties the development of large scale farms was considered an abnormality which it was supposed would eventually give way to the more normal family farms. The activities of the State Agricultural Society and of the various immigration associations were directed towards realization of this transition. In the eighties when the "labor problem" began to emerge, farm employer interests commonly recognized that casual employment and a homeless existence for laborers were not consistent with American ideals of enterprise—farm employers ought to take the lead in improving the employment and living conditions of their laborers. Farm laborers (except for Orientals) ought to be helped to advance their economic position so as eventually to become operators themselves.

By the turn of the century the terms of idealism had changed to this: The labor supply ought to be constituted of Americans rather than Orientals. Farm employer interests put on campaigns in the East to induce American farm laborers to migrate to California. But they made no endeavor to improve the terms of employment—with respect either to wages, amount of work, or living conditions—and so their program was a fiasco.

Finally, by the twenties the concept of abnormality associated with employment of itinerant and casual workers had largely passed away. California agriculture was declared *by nature* to be such as to demand a permanent supply of itinerant laborers. Since white people refused to perform such "menial" tasks, such a labor supply by its very nature had to be "un-American". In demanding that immigration restriction upon Mexico should not prevent continued augmentation of the farm labor supply, employer spokesmen talked of the "practical versus Utopian" aspects of the farm labor problem—with the explicit interpretation that the *status quo* was "practical"—all else being "Utopian".

APPENDIX A

TABLE 24.—*Acreage and Value of Land in Farms, California, Census Years, 1850–1930*

Census Year	Acreage of farm land					Value of land and buildings		
	In all Farms (000)	Improved in all farms (000)	Irrigated in all farms (000)	Average per farm	Average improved per farm	All farms (000)	Average per farm	Average per acre
1850	3,094	32		466	37	$3,874	$4,443	$3.90
1860	8,730	2,468		466	132	48,727	2,606	5.58
1870	11,427	6,218	58	482	262	141,240	5,953	12.36
1880	16,594	10,670	300	462	297	262,051	7,293	15.79
1890	21,427	12,223	1,004	405	235	697,117	13,180	32.53
1900	28,829	11,959	1,446	397	165	707,913	10,980	24.56
1910	27,931	11,390	2,664	317	129	1,450,601	16,447	51.93
1920	29,366	11,876	4,219	250	101	3,073,811	26,122	104.67
1930	30,443	11,466	4,747	224	65	3,419,471	25,203	112.33

Source of data: Ninth Census of the United States Vol. III, pp. 81, 86, 90, 341. Compendium of Tenth Census of the United States, pp. 746–747. U. S. Dept. Inter. Census Office. Compendium of the Eleventh Census, Part III, pp. 606, 618. U. S. Dept. Com. Bur. of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States. Agriculture. Vol. II, part 3, p. 516; *Irrigation of Agricultural Lands* (1930), 87. Paul S. Taylor and Tom Vasey, "Historical Background of California Farm Labor," *Rural Sociology* I (September, 1936), 3.

TABLE 25.—*Number of Farms in California Classified by Total Acreage, Census Years, 1860–1930*

[In Percentage of total number]

Size in total Acreage	1860	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930
Under 10 acres	5.9	9.2	3.4	5.3	9.4	12.0	14.3	21.3
10–19 acres	7.8	4.6	4.0	7.6	11.4	13.5	14.7	16.2
20–49 acres	16.7	12.9	9.7	14.5	18.1	23.4	27.0	25.9
50–99 acres	17.3	13.6	11.0	11.0	11.1	12.2	12.7	12.0
100–499 acres	46.6	51.6	56.3	46.4	36.1	27.8	22.7	17.2
500–999 acres	3.8	5.1	8.6	8.3	7.3	5.8	4.3	3.6
1,000 and over acres	1.9	3.0	7.0	6.9	6.6	5.3	4.3	3.8
Total under 20	13.7	13.8	7.4	12.9	20.8	25.5	29.0	37.5
Total over 500	5.7	8.1	15.6	15.2	13.9	11.1	8.6	7.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Number of Farms	[1] 18,716	23,724	35,934	52,894	72,542	88,197	117,670	135,676

---

[1] The size distribution given by the census totals to 14,044, although the number of farms is elsewhere given as 18,716.

Source: Calculated from data as follows: 1860–1870: Ninth Census of the United States Vol. III, p. 340. 1880–1890: U. S. Dept. Inter. Census Office Compendium of Eleventh Census Part III, p. 610. 1900: U. S. Census Office. Twelfth Census of the U. S. Census Reports Vol. V, Part I, p. 198. 1910–1930: U. S. Dept. Com. Bur. of the Census—Census Agr. 1935, Vol. II, p. 942.

TABLE 26-A.—*Distribution of Farms by Size in Total Acres California, 1930*

[Cumulative percentages of totals]

Acreage in farm	Number of farms	Acreage of all land in farms	Acreage in farm	Number of farms	Acreage of all land in farms
Under 20 acres	37.5	1.3	Under 260 acres	87.5	17.3
Under 50 acres	63.4	4.8	Under 500 acres	92.6	25.4
Under 100 acres	75.4	8.6	Under 1,000 acres	96.2	36.4
Under 175 acres	83.9	13.8			

TABLE 26-B.—*Distribution of Farms by Value of Product Sold, Traded and Used California 1930*

[Cumulative percentages of totals]

Value of product	Number of farms	Total Value of all products	Value of product	Number of farms	Total Value of all products
Under $400	13.6	0.7	Under $4,000	71.2	22.1
Under 1,000	31.1	3.2	Under 6,000	81.5	32.7
Under 1,500	41.6	5.9	Under 10,000	90.0	46.8
Under 2,500	57.0	12.2			

Source: Varden Fuller. *An Analysis of the Increase in Numbers of Farms in California, 1910 to 1935* (Unpublished Manuscript, Giannini Foundation Library, University of California), Tables 15, 18.

TABLE 27.—*Number of Large-Scale Farms*[1] *in California and Proportion California of United States Total, 1930*

Type of farm	Large-Scale farms			All farms, percentage California of total
	United States	California	Percentage California of total	
Truck	785	469	59.7	9.2
Fruit	1,924	1,157	60.1	36.7
Cash-grain	486	160	32.9	1.0
Cotton	441	133	30.2	0.2
General	50	22	44.0	0.4
Crop-specialty	699	212	30.3	0.2
Dairy	882	357	40.5	0.3
Stock ranch	1,829	230	12.6	7.2
Poultry	225	119	52.9	9.3
Animal-specialty	408	26	6.4	0.4
Country estates, feed lots, etc	146	7	4.8	2.4
All farms	7,875	2,892	36.7	2.2

[1] Farms with a gross income of $30,000 or more in 1929.

Sources of data: Large-Scale farms: U. S. Dept. Com. Bur. of the Census. Monograph on large-scale farming in United States, 1929, Table 1, p. 21. All farms: Fifteenth Census of United States, 1930, Agriculture, Vol. II, part 3, p. 23.

TABLE 28.—*Proportions of Large-Scale Farming by Type of Farm California, 1929*

Type of Farm	Percentage of total for farms of each type					
	Number farms	Land in farms	Acreage crop land harvested	Value of land and buildings	Expenditures for labor	Value of Products
Truck	7.0	39.0	43.4	28.8	53.4	53.0
Fruit	2.2	23.0	22.1	22.2	32.7	27.3
Cash-grain	3.7	20.2	22.4	23.8	31.1	29.7
Cotton	4.8	38.0	36.4	29.2	40.5	35.1
General	0.5	8.8	22.5	19.2	45.4	19.9
Crop-specialty	2.4	12.2	15.9	14.8	31.4	23.3
Dairy	2.4	11.1	9.9	13.5	31.3	21.1
Stock ranch	4.5	35.8	32.5	34.5	44.5	45.2
Poultry	0.8	4.3	5.6	5.1	23.0	9.0
Animal-specialty	1.3	9.2	10.6	12.0	29.7	17.0
All types	2.1	25.4	21.4	19.8	34.6	28.5

Source of data: U. S. Dept. Com. Bur. of the Census, *Large-Scale Farming in the United States, 1929.* (Washington, D. C., 1933), p. 25.

TABLE 29.—*Proportion of General[1] and Self-Sufficing[2] Farms California Compared with United States and Divisions, 1929*

Divisions	Thousands of farms			Percentage of total	
	All types	General	Self-sufficing	General	Self-sufficing
New England	125	17	11	13.6	8.8
Middle Atlantic	358	81	24	22.6	6.7
East North Central	967	276	52	28.5	5.4
West North Central	1,113	266	49	23.9	4.4
South Atlantic	1,058	125	142	11.8	13.4
East South Central	1,062	123	148	11.6	13.9
West South Central	1,103	102	52	9.2	4.7
Mountain	241	34	10	14.1	4.1
Pacific	262	21	9	8.0	3.4
California	136	4	2	2.9	1.5
United States	6,289	1,044	498	16.6	7.9

---

[1] "General" farms are those where the value of products from any one source did not represent as much as 40 percent of the total value of all products of the farm. Where the value of the products from two specialized combination types such as fruit-truck, dairy-poultry, etc., were equal to 40 percent of the total, the farm was classified into the type dominant in the locality.

[2] Farms where the products used by the family were equal to 50 percent or more of the total value of all products.

Source of data: U. S. Dept. of Com. Bur. of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, *Agriculture.* Vol. III, Part 3, p.

TABLE 30.—*Proportion of Total Value of Products Sold, Traded, and Used; Contributed by Products Consumed on the Farm, 1929; California Compared with United States and Divisions by Type of Farm*

Type of Farm	New England	Middle Atlantic	East North Central	West North Central	South Atlantic	East South Central	West South Central	Mountain	Pacific [1]	California	United States Total
	Percentage of total value										
General	21.2	18.3	18.5	18.6	26.8	28.3	24.2	14.7	15.2	11.0	20.8
Cash-grain	9.9	14.1	3.8	9.0	15.7	16.7	6.1	6.9	3.8	1.7	8.2
Cotton			14.3	7.9	18.0	18.0	13.8	3.4	1.5	1.5	15.4
Crop-specialty	5.5	8.6	11.7	7.4	15.1	17.6	8.6	5.6	2.9	1.9	10.8
Fruit	6.2	7.1	8.1	10.9	5.3	12.3	13.0	5.4	2.3	1.9	4.3
Truck	7.7	7.4	8.2	10.2	8.1	13.2	9.4	5.4	1.5	1.1	6.4
Dairy	10.0	9.5	12.3	13.2	8.6	10.9	7.9	8.6	5.6	3.1	10.6
Animal-specialty	9.6	8.5	7.9	8.3	13.5	12.3	9.4	4.7	5.8	3.9	8.8
Stock ranch		9.3	1.9	4.3	8.6	6.5	2.7	3.6	2.4	1.9	3.4
Poultry	9.6	9.7	14.1	17.1	14.2	16.7	15.5	8.4	6.0	2.3	10.7
Self-sufficing	66.2	64.6	62.6	62.4	67.9	67.6	64.7	65.1	65.8	68.5	66.1
Abnormal	19.3	21.6	18.6	8.8	32.6	26.8	15.7	11.4	13.1	5.7	18.7
All types	11.6	12.3	13.1	11.0	19.8	22.2	13.0	6.5	4.3	2.8	12.7

[1] Including California.

Source of data: Calculated from U. S. Dept. Com. Bur. of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Agriculture: Type of Farm Vol. III, Part 3, pp. 24-33.

TABLE 31.—*Specialization of Types of Farming, 1929, California Compared with United States and Divisions in Terms of the Diversification of Value of Products*

Divisions	Percentage of the total value of all products sold, traded, or used								
	Livestock and livestock products sold or traded from—					Crops sold or traded from—			
	Cash-grain farms	Cotton farms	Crop-specialty farms	Fruit farms	Truck farms	Dairy farms	Animal-specialty farms	Stock ranches	Poultry farms
New England	14.8	....	5.6	9.1	8.4	6.1	6.0	....	4.4
Middle Atlantic	23.2	....	16.9	11.8	7.2	9.2	15.2	1.2	8.0
East North Central	25.3	7.1	24.6	11.7	8.5	9.1	12.4	1.9	7.9
West North Central	24.4	5.6	16.3	13.8	8.3	8.1	8.9	7.5	5.4
South Atlantic	22.2	5.7	5.8	5.0	6.3	9.5	10.9	3.9	10.4
East South Central	15.2	5.1	16.2	8.4	6.0	10.1	13.8	8.5	9.0
West South Central	13.8	8.7	6.9	7.3	5.1	7.0	15.0	3.5	10.0
Mountain	15.9	5.1	14.3	9.0	5.3	12.0	18.0	4.6	10.3
Pacific [1]	10.4	4.9	7.6	3.5	1.6	7.0	15.1	5.4	5.2
California	10.0	4.9	5.6	3.0	1.4	6.0	16.1	5.9	4.7
United States Total	21.5	7.0	11.5	5.6	5.5	8.6	10.5	4.9	7.0

[1] Including California.

Source of data: Calculated from U. S. Dept. Com. Bur. of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States, Agriculture, 1930, Vol. III, part 3, pp. 24-33.

Table 32.—*Seasonal Labor Need for California Crops, Labor needed in addition to that supplied by operators and regularly employed laborers (As of the season 1935–1936)*

Month	Numbers of workers required	Percent of average	Percent of maximum
	(1)	(2)	(3)
January	61,649	70	43
February	50,500	57	35
March	48,173	55	33
April	73,035	83	50
May	103,240	117	71
June	102,810	117	71
July	93,728	106	65
August	130,330	148	90
September	144,700	164	100
October	126,835	144	88
November	65,610	74	45
December	56,760	64	39
Total or average	1,057,390	100	61

Source of data: Col. (1) from R. L. Adams, "Seasonal Labor Requirements for California Crops," University of California, College of Agriculture, Agricultural Experiment Station *Bulletin* 623 (Berkeley, 1938), 23. Cols. (2) and (3) calculated from Col. (1).

Table 33.—*Number of Farms, Farm Laborers and Farm Laborers per Farm California, Census Years, 1880–1930*

Census year	Number of Farms	Number of Farm Laborers [1]	Number of Farm Laborers Per Farm
1870	23,724	16,231	.68
1880	35,934	23,856	.66
1890	52,894	51,532	1.03
1900	72,542	67,493	.93
1910	88,197	109,679	1.24
1920	117,670	119,827	1.02
1930	135,676	190,022	1.40

[1] Wage workers only.

Source of data: Number of farms from Table 25. Number of farm laborers from: Ninth Census of the United States (1870) Vol. I p. 722. U. S. Department of Interior Census Office. Statistics of population at the Tenth Census (1880), p. 811. Report on the population of the United States at the Eleventh Census (1890), Part II pp. 536–537. United States Census Office. Twelfth Census of the United States (1900), *Census Reports*, p. 510. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Thirteenth Census of the United States (1910) Population Vol. IV p. 438. Fourteenth Census of the United States (1920) Population Vol. IV, p. 882. Fifteenth Census of the United States Population, Vol. IV, p. 174.

Table 34.—*Number of Farms Hiring Labor and Wages Paid By Type of Farm, California, 1929*

Type of farm	Per cent of farms hiring labor	Per cent of total wages paid	Wages paid as a per cent of the total value of products
General	57	1.0	13.8
Cash-grain	79	3.9	14.8
Cotton	78	5.0	30.6
Crop-specialty	71	7.7	19.8
Fruit	81	44.0	26.2
Truck	78	14.4	31.5
Dairy	67	9.9	13.9
Animal-specialty	67	1.1	14.4
Stock ranch	64	4.4	10.7
Poultry	45	2.1	5.0
Self-sufficing	22	0.0	3.9
Abnormal	64	6.5	49.2
All types	67	100.0	20.9

Source of data: Calculated from U. S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Agriculture: *Type of Farm*. Vol. III, part 3, pp. 385, 396, 424.

TABLE 35.—*Days of Hired Labor Used Per Acre of Farm Land and Per Acre of Crop Land Harvested, 1929, California Compared with United States and Divisions*

Division	Days of hired labor used: acreage of crop land harvested		Days of hired labor used: acreage of all land in farms	
	Per Acre	Percent United States Average	Per Acre	Percent United States Average
New England	4.5	409	1.1	275
Middle Atlantic	2.5	227	1.0	250
East North Central	1.1	100	0.5	125
West North Central	0.6	55	0.3	75
South Atlantic	2.1	191	0.7	175
East South Central	0.9	82	0.3	75
West South Central	1.0	91	0.3	75
Mountain	1.3	118	0.2	50
Pacific	3.9	355	0.8	200
California	5.6	509	1.2	300
United States	1.1	100	0.4	100

Source of data: Calculated from U. S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Agriculture. Vol. II, part 3. pp. 24, 522.

TABLE 36.—*Wages of Hired Farm Labor California, 1850–1864*

Years	With Board	
	Per Month	Per Day
1850–1854	$60.00	$3.00
1855–1859	40.00	2.25
1860–1864	35.00	1.75

Source of data: George K. Holmes, "Wages of Farm Labor," U. S. Department of Agriculture. Bureau of Statistics Bul. 99, p. 19. Edward Young, *Labor in Europe and America*, 44th Cong. 1st Sess. H. R. Ex. Doc. No. 21, pp. 730–744. California State Agricultural Society, *Transactions* (1880), p. 347.

TABLE 37.—*Wage Rates of Hired Farm Labor, California, 1866–1935*

Year	Rate Per Month [1]		Rate Per Day [1]		Year	Rate Per Month [1]		Rate Per Day [1]	
	With Board	Without Board	With Board	Without Board		With Board	Without Board	With Board	Without Board
1866	$30.35	$45.71	$1.72	$2.26	1914	$34.80	$50.10	$1.44	$2.05
1869	28.60	46.38	1.50	2.13	1915	35.00	51.00	1.55	2.10
1874–1875	28.60	44.50	1.30	1.84	1916	36.70	52.50	1.57	2.17
1877–1878	26.27	41.00	1.23	1.65	1917	43.00	63.00	2.04	2.67
1879–1880	27.12	40.93	1.27	1.95	1918	54.20	78.00	2.60	3.25
1880–1881	25.67	38.00	1.21	1.76	1919	66.30	91.20	2.99	3.90
1881–1882	26.90	38.25	1.29	1.71	1920	79,00	107.00	3.60	4.60
1884–1885	25.00	38.75	1.15	1.57	1921	55.00	79.00	2.55	3.35
1887–1888	25.67	38.08	1.18	1.60	1922	55.00	79.00	2.53	3.40
1889–1890	22.40	35.50	1.15	1.55	1923	56.00	82.00	2.80	3.70
1891–1892	24.50	36.50	1.17	1.60	1924	57.12	82.62	2.44	3.40
1893	26.37	38.25	1.05	1.47	1925	59.12	85.38	2.58	3.48
1894	23.66	35.88	.97	1.38	1926	61.00	87.62	2.57	3.58
1895	21.36	33.30	.89	1.29	1927	62.88	89.25	2.66	3.58
1898	24.01	35.08	1.03	1.42	1928	61.62	88.50	2.63	3.58
1899	25.64	36.87	1.10	1.51	1929	62.38	89.88	2.59	3.56
1902	29.38	40.90	1.20	1.62	1930	60.75	88.12	2.55	3.45
1906	32.32	44.82	1.40	1.78	1931	47.25	72.38	1.91	2.78
1909	34.17	47.30	1.43	1.94	1932	34.38	55.00	1.38	2.14
1910	33.00	47.00	1.44	2.02	1933	30.12	49.12	1.40	1.91
1911	33.50	48.20	1.48	2.05	1934	33.88	54.50	1.60	2.26
1912	33.40	48.10	1.48	2.03	1935	37.62	60.00	1.70	2.44
1913	35.10	50.70	1.44	2.01					

[1] For the years 1866 through 1889–1890 rates per month are on the basis of hiring by the year and rates per day are for employment other than in the harvest. For the years 1891–1892 through 1935, rates per day and per month are on average of season and annual contracts.

Source of data: Years 1866–1923 from the U. S. Department of Agriculture *Statistical Bulletin* No. 17 (Washington, D. C., 1927), 152. Years 1924–1935 computed from quarterly data published in *Crops and Markets*. The annual average is computed by giving a weight of 1 to January, of 2 each to April, July, and October, and 1 to January of the following year. Monthly rates computed by H. J. Stover, Giannini Foundation *Mimeographed Report* No. 50 (Berkeley, 1936), 35–36. Daily rates computed by author.

TABLE 38.—*Wage Rates of Hired Farm Labor, Relatives of 1910–14 Base, California, 1850–1935*

Year	Rate per month		Rate per day		Average [1]	Year	Rate per month		Rate per day		Average [1]
	With board	Without board	With board	Without board			With board	Without board	With board	Without board	
1850–1854	177	-------	205	-------	191	1913	103	104	99	99	102
1855–1859	118	-------	154	-------	136	1914	103	103	99	101	102
1860–1864	103	-------	120	-------	112	1915	103	104	106	103	104
1866	89	94	118	111	103	1916	108	108	108	107	108
1869	84	95	103	105	97	1917	127	129	140	131	132
1874–1875	84	91	89	91	89	1918	160	160	178	160	165
1877–1878	77	84	84	81	82	1919	195	187	205	192	195
1880–1881	76	78	83	87	81	1920	233	219	247	227	232
1881–1882	79	78	88	84	82	1921	162	162	175	165	166
1884–1885	74	79	79	77	77	1922	162	162	173	167	166
1887–1888	76	78	81	79	79	1923	165	168	192	182	177
1889–1890	66	73	79	76	74	1924	168	169	167	167	168
1891–1892	72	75	80	79	77	1925	174	175	177	171	174
1893	78	78	72	72	75	1926	180	179	176	176	178
1894	70	74	66	68	70	1927	185	183	182	176	182
1895	63	68	61	64	64	1928	181	181	180	176	180
1898	71	72	71	70	71	1929	184	184	177	175	180
1899	76	76	75	74	75	1930	179	180	175	170	176
1902	87	84	82	80	83	1931	139	148	131	137	139
1906	95	92	96	88	93	1932	101	113	95	105	104
1909	101	97	98	96	98	1933	89	101	96	94	95
1910	97	96	99	100	98	1934	100	112	110	111	108
1911	99	99	101	101	100	1935	111	123	116	120	118
1912	98	99	101	101	100						

[1] Each of the four relatives is assigned equal weight.

Source: Calculated from Tables 36 and 37.



Source of data; Table 38

TABLE 39.—*Crop and Livestock Production, California, Census Years, 1850–1930*

Census Years	Wheat (bu)[1] (000)	Oats (bu)[1] (000)	Barley (bu)[1] (000)	Hops (lbs)[1] (000)	Cotton (bales)[1]	Dairy Cattle (No.) (000)	Other Cattle (No.) (000)	Sheep (No.) (000)
1850	17	----------	9	----------	----------	4	254	18
1860	5,928	1,043	4,415	([2])	----------	205	949	1,088
1870	16,677	1,758	8,783	625	34	164	461	2,768
1880	29,018	1,341	12,464	1,444	----------	210	452	4,152
1890	40,869	1,462	17,548	6,547	----------	317	1,049	2,475
1900	36,534	4,972	25,149	10,125	----------	307	1,137	2,563
1910	6,203	4,144	26,442	11,995	183	467	1,610	2,417
1920	16,867	3,967	21,807	12,610	46,418	779	1,229	2,400
1930	10,958	2,162	29,038	7,908	253,881	574	1,529	4,064

[1] Production data apply to the previous year.

[2] 80 pounds.

Source of data: Ninth Census of the United States (1870), pp. 82-83, 87, 89, 91. Compendium of the Tenth Census of the United States (1880), pp. 678, 680, 746-747. Compendium of the Eleventh Census of the United States Part III, pp. 638-639, 658. U. S. Dept. Com. Bur. of the Census. Thirteenth Census of the United States (1910), Vol. 5, pp. 352, 401, 591, 601, 606, 681, 699. Fourteenth Census of the Uuited States (1920), Vol. V, pp. 530, 559, 564, 839. Fifteenth Census of the United States (1930) *Agriculture*, Vol. II, Part 3, pp. 61, 79, 81-82, 91, 93.

TABLE 40.—*Values of Orchard and Market Garden Products in California Census Years 1849–1879*

Year	Value of Orchard Products	Value of Market Garden Products	Year	Value of Orchard Products	Value of Market Garden Products
1849	$17,750	$75,275	1869	$1,384,480	$1,059,779
1859	754,236	1,161,855	1879	2,017,314	796,663

Source of data: Ninth Census of the United States Vol. III, pp. 81, 86, 90. Compendium of the Tenth Census of the United States, 689, 746. Compendium of the Eleventh Census of the United States Part III, p. 618, 663.

TABLE 41.—*Production of Selected Fruits and Nuts in California, Census Years, 1889–1909*

	1889	1899	1909
Apples (bu)	1,654,636	3,488,208	4,935,073
Apricots (bu)	970,941	2,547,064	4,066,823
Peaches (bu)	1,691,019	8,563,427	9,267,118
Pears (bu)	577,444	1,912,825	1,928,097
Plums & Prunes (bu)	1,202,573	5,632,036	9,317,979
Grapes (lbs)	([1])	721,433,400	1,979,686,525
Oranges (boxes)	([1])	5,882,198	14,436,180
Lemons (boxes)	305,598	874,305	2,756,221
Almonds (lbs)	15,251,098	6,902,610	6,692,513
Walnuts (lbs)	13,802,400	10,619,975	21,432,266

[1] Data not available.

Source of data: U. S. Department of Interior. Census Office. Report on the Statistics of Agriculture, Eleventh Census of the United States (1890), p. 568. Census Reports. Twelfth Census of the United States (1900), Vol. VI, Part II, pp. 617-619, 701, 707-708.

U. S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Thirteenth Census of the United States (1910), Agriculture Vol. V, pp. 710-713, 716, 718, 723.

Table 42.—*Index Numbers of Estimated Hired Labor Needs in California Agriculture, 1909–1935*

[1910-1914=100]

Year	Type of Production				Weighted average
	Field Crops	Truck Crops	Fruits and nuts	Livestock	
1909	97	75	92	89	91
1910	98	84	95	95	95
1911	100	94	98	101	99
1912	100	100	102	101	101
1913	101	121	105	107	106
1914	104	127	108	107	108
1915	105	135	113	110	112
1916	110	147	116	112	115
1917	121	138	110	114	114
1918	118	156	121	116	118
1919	119	165	126	114	123
1920	100	162	131	108	110
1921	92	137	136	104	117
1922	89	174	146	104	123
1923	85	190	152	106	126
1924	83	193	163	107	131
1925	85	222	177	107	138
1926	84	275	188	108	146
1927	83	303	193	114	151
1928	88	307	197	119	186
1929	93	365	195	119	159
1930	95	392	183	115	154
1931	91	378	182	115	152
1932	88	404	180	112	151
1933	89	365	175	109	146
1934	88	405	175	107	147
1935	88	448	171	106	147

Source: Varden Fuller, *Wage Rates and Expenditures for Labor, California Agriculture 1909-1935.* (Unpublished Manuscript, University of California, 1937), Table 23.

Table 43A.—*Relative Values of Extensive and Intensive Crops In California, Census Years 1869–1929*

Year	Value of Crop (000)		Percent of Total	
	Extensive	Intensive	Extensive	Intensive
1869	$35,007	$2,444	93.4	6.6
1879	69,304	2,814	96.1	3.9
1889	62,604	----	----	----
1899	53,111	40,442	56.7	43.3
1909	70,246	68,887	50.5	49.5
1919	204,692	346,249	36.6	63.4
1929	109,903	397,030	21.6	78.4

Source of data: Paul S. Taylor and Tom Vasey, "Historical Background of California Farm Labor," *Rural Sociology* I (September, 1936), 286.

TABLE 43B.—*Index Numbers of Extensive and Intensive Crop Production in California Census Years 1869–1929*

Year	Value of Crop Production (000) Adjusted for Price Changes		Index of the Price of Farm Products	Indices of Crop Production (1909=100)	
	Extensive (1)	Intensive (2)	(3)	Extensive (4)	Intensive (5)
1869	$27,340	$1,910	128	38	3
1879	96,256	3,908	72	134	6
1889	93,438	----------	67	130	----------
1899	82,986	63,190	64	116	90
1909	71,680	70,293	98	100	100
1919	92,621	156,673	221	129	223
1929	74,764	270,089	147	104	384

Source of data: Col. 3 G. F. Warren and F. A. Pearson *Prices* (New York 1933), pp. 26–27. Cols. 1 and 2 are obtained by dividing value data in Table A by corresponding figures from Col. 3. Cols. 4 and 5 are obtained by dividing each figure by the 1909 value, x 100.

APPENDIX B

I. RESOLUTION OF PAJARO VALLEY FRUIT-GROWERS' ASSOCIATION REQUESTING AMENDMENT OF THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT

To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress assembled:

The Pajaro Valley Fruit-Growers' Association of Watsonville, in the State of California, in compliance with the subjoined resolution, would most respectfully but earnestly request that your honorable bodies so amend the Act commonly known as the "Chinese Exclusion Act," that a limited number of Chinese laborers, but sufficient for the actual needs of the farmers and producers, be admitted to this country.

We are all aware that there has been in years past, in the minds of many in certain portions of our State, a deep-seated prejudice against the Chinese as a class or nationality, and their exclusion has been generally demanded. This prejudice has, we believe, been created in a large degree for political effect; but such prejudice is fast fading from the minds of the substantial portions of the people of our State, especially the producers and farmers, who feel the pressing need of their labor.

While we do not by any means desire that the gates be thrown wide open to the indiscriminate admission of all who may choose to come, we do earnestly insist that a number of common laborers be admitted sufficient for our actual needs, the numbers to be determined by a careful investigation of our necessities in that regard. In a word, we favor wise and judicious restrictions, but not exclusion.

We have learned by long experience that the Chinaman gives satisfaction as a common laborer in the business where his services are mostly needed. He is industrious, patient, docile, and generally reliable. If the farmer, the agriculturist, the horticulturist, and fruit-grower are entitled to any consideration at the hand of our lawmakers, then we respectfully submit that no more appropriate or effectual way of promoting his interests and welfare can be devised than that which shall afford him an opportunity of obtaining the necessary labor to enable him to harvest and market his crops. If it be claimed that the employment of a limited quantity of Chinese labor tends to degrade American laborers, we say the reverse is true, because the Chinese laborer is usually employed to perform such menial tasks as American laborers will hesitate or refuse to perform.

These considerations, looking to friendly relations with China, by not thrusting in her face an absolute Exclusion Act, naturally suggests the very great advantage commercially, to this nation, by an unrestricted trade with that vast Empire. But an elaboration of such considerations, even if space would permit, might be out of place here; our principal and primary object being to emphasize the fact that the farmer, the horticulturist, the fruit-grower, the sugar-beet-grower, berry-grower, and the grower of vegetable products generally, are sadly and urgently in need of more common or unskilled laborers. We have waited patiently for years, vainly trusting that the condition in this regard would improve. We have been paying and offering to pay higher wages than are paid for such services anywhere else in the world. We have endeavored to make terms with transportation companies as to rates, such as would induce laborers to come to us from the Eastern States, but have not succeeded to any considerable extent.

Our demand is not for "cheap Chinese labor"; Chinese labor is not cheap labor; but for labor at any reasonable price, whereby we may save, harvest, and market our crops, after they have been raised.

For the several years past, in the vicinity of Watsonville, and the Pajaro Valley, and other fruit and vegetable growing portions of the State, the industries above named have greatly suffered from the want of necessary labor. For the season just passed, it is estimated that not more than two-thirds of the amount requisite to properly handle the crops raised could be obtained, and that from twenty to thirty per cent of the crops in many of the places above referred to actually rotted on the ground, and much that was marketed was in an over-ripe condition, whereby great loss was sustained by the grower.

And besides, this disparity between the want and supply of labor is constantly and rapidly increasing, that we have every reason to apprehend that unless some means can be devised whereby the necessary labor adapted to our peculiar wants can be obtained, we will suffer still greater loss. With our genial climate and bountiful soil, so admirably adapted to the growth of fruit and products above referred to, we may, with the utmost assurance, predict that said products will continue to rapidly increase for many years to come, as new orchards and berry fields are yearly coming into bearing.

Therefore, we pray that, after the necessary investigation has been made as to our need of laborers, and our inability to obtain them, under present conditions, the present Exclusion Act be so amended as to admit a sufficient number of common laborers from China to supply our urgent and pressing necessities in that regard.

Respectfully submitted.

Pajaro Valley Fruit-Growers' Association.

Source: Twenty-seventh Fruit Growers' Convention (1902) *Transactions*, pp. 272–273.

II. LABOR UNION CIRCULAR ADVISING AGAINST IMMIGRATION OF LABORERS TO CALIFORNIA

"Don't go to California"

To workingmen and women everywhere: The California Promotion Committee, which represent all the big corporations, contractors and ranch owners of California, is flooding the United States with literature and sending lecturers all over the country for the purpose of inducing workingmen and women to come to California.

Workingmen and women, do not be deceived. California is overrun with people unable to secure work unless they work for starvation wages.

On ranches and fruit farms Chinese and Japanese were employed for years until the past year when their places were taken by white persons for less pay than received by the Asiatics. Ranch hands are compelled to sleep out of doors and furnish their own bedding, and when the fruit season is over are discharged, the managers of these places knowing that a fresh lot of victims can be secured next season.

Living is very high in California, and wages are low as in any State of the Union.

In every city in the State there are mechanics and laborers, and the country roads are lined with men tramping about looking for work, yet the railroad, the ranch owners, and the contractors are sending out literature to bring more working people to California.

Fellow-workers, take warning! Listen to those who belong to your class and who are on the ground.

Stay away from California!

Please send this to your friend in the country.

Source: *California Fruit Grower* XXVIII (July 25, 1903), 2.

III. MEMORIAL OF CALIFORNIA FRUIT-GROWERS' CONVENTION REQUESTING MODIFICATION OF CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT

To the Congress of the United States, Washington, D. C.:

Your memorialists, land-owners, farmers and producers of California and other Western States, beg respectfully to request the earnest attention of your honorable body and of the Department of Commerce and Labor, to the following statement of our needs and of the economic issues involved in the supply of Asiatic labor in the rural industries which we represent.

Long trial and earnest effort have proved the impossibility of inducing reliable white labor to engage in the primary processes of production in the orchard, vineyard, asparagus, sugar-beet, onion, celery, and other great industries in which tens of millions of dollars are invested. In California especially much of this primary labor has to be under fixed climatic conditions which the Asiatics alone will willingly endure. It is labor performed under high temperature, in a stooping or squat position, which white men will not do. With your memorialists it is not a question of cheap labor, but of reliable labor that will save these valuable crops of perishable property, worth millions in the market. The Chinese Exclusion Act has depleted Chinese labor, and extension of the exclusion policy to the Japanese leaves these imperiled industries exposed to enormous losses, and threatened with ultimate extinction. The opposition to Asiatic labor is found in the cities, due largely to the efforts of agitators who are themselves of alien blood. They and the class they influence will not do the work done by the Asiatics, at any wage. They are repelled by the physical conditions and limitations. For many years every inducement has been offered them to enter into this service, and they decline to do so. It is evident, therefore, that the labor which is willing to enter the service which they refuse, does not compete with them. On the other hand, such Asiatic labor, by performing the primary processes which it alone is willing to undertake, by passing the product into commerce, furnishes work at high wages to many forms of white labor, under conditions agreeable to it and possible of performance.

Your memorialists are aware that heretofore the voices uttered and the objections urged from the large cities have been taken as the sentiment of the whole people. We find now that our silence has permitted the achievement of an exclusion policy in nowise beneficial to those who have urged it, and at variance with correct economic principles. We get no benefit from the European immigration which crowds the Atlantic seaboard. If that immigration reaches these far states, it is under the same limitations as the white labor that is already here and shuns the work in the primary processes of the industries we represent. Our only resource is Asiatic labor. We affirm that there is absolutely no evidence that these states ever suffered industrial or economic injury from the presence of the Chinese here, prior to the exclusion law.

We present the foregoing reasons for our demand that the Chinese exclusion law be modified and that a fixed and liberal number of Chinese and an equal number of Japanese be permitted admission, annually, under the same restrictions as to sanitary and other proper conditions as are put upon the immigrants from Europe. We reject the theory of assimilation, holding that non-assimilating labor to engage in this non-competitive work relieves us of the strain upon our racial and national standards which threatens their subversion in the task of assimilating the millions of European immigrants.

Your memorialists urge the immediate attention of the Government to our needs.

(This memorial was presented by Mr. John P. Irish to the Thirty-Third Fruit-Growers' Convention and was adopted by that body with but one opposing vote.)

Source: Thirty-Third Fruit-Growers' Convention, *Official Report* (December, 1907), pp. 65–66.

IV. SUMMARY OF THE MACKENZIE JAPANESE REPORT

Summary of the report of John S. Mackenzie, Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of California of an investigation of the Japanese in California, provided for by a special act of the legislature in 1909:

"First—That the relationship existing between the farm labor utilized at the present time in the great industries of the orchard, vineyard and field and the industries themselves have been developed along lines of an evolutionary character, and which are practically impossible of modification in any material degree.

"Second—That the problem of solving the situation by drawing from the present available white farm labor supply by any known or suggested methods of modification of the conditions now obtaining in this State will afford no practical or material relief.

"Third—That the creation of an ideal intelligent class of white farm labor to be drawn from all sources within the confines of the United States is practically an impossibility, for the reason that such an effort would entail an entire and radical readjustment of the economic conditions and the relationships which now exist between the grower and the system of transportation, distribution and marketing.

"Fourth—That the perpetuity or continued development of these great and highly specialized forms of agricultural activity must largely depend upon a supply of labor from without the United States, and of such a nature and character as to conform to the condition resulting from the application of that labor to the agricultural demands.

"Fifth—That the transition from the cereal growing period to the development of specialized agriculture increased the ratio of temporary help required by the farming districts beyond the normal available supply within the State during periods of largely increasing population.

"Sixth—The necessity for providing the large number of temporary employes engaged in the harvest with employment during the various periods other than the harvest season is a vital element in the solution of farm labor problems."

Source: *Pacific Rural Press* LXXIX (June 11, 1910), p. 468.

V. RESOLUTION OF CALIFORNIA FRUIT-GROWERS' CONVENTION RELATIVE TO GREATER USE OF WHITE FAMILY LABOR ON FARMS

White Family Help

Whereas, There is a constantly growing demand on the part of the farmers of California, for reliable "white help", especially on the part of horticulture farmers; and

Whereas, There are many thousands of white families, especially in the cities, towns and villages of our State, who would be mighty glad to get the work and ought to have it; and

Whereas, As a rule as conditions now exist so far as the college and public and private school vacations are made, thousands of orchardists can not have the help of their own children without keeping them from school during the ripening period of their fruit crops, and thus many thousands of dollars are paid out in many instances to an unassimilable alien people, who are not citizens, who do not care to become citizens, and whom we do not want to become citizens—peoples who are in our country for the American dollars they can earn, who by their cheap mode of living can thrive where white people would almost starve. Vast sums of money could be saved by the farmers if they could utilize the help of their own children of proper age. Under the child labor law (which we deem wise and good and heartily approve) not even the parents have the right to keep their own children out of school; and

Whereas, It is conservatively estimated that no less than two million dollars is paid out annually for the gathering, curing, canning and packing of horticultural crops, a large portion of which work women and children (children of proper age) can do, but as the school period (with a few exceptions) comes at inopportune time, the white family help is not available and but a fraction of this vast sum of money goes to our own people. It ought to go to them and it can be made to, provided the college and school boards of California will so adjust the college and school vacation period to coincide with the ripening period of the bulk of the horticultural crops; therefore, be it

Resolved by this Fortieth California State Fruit Growers' Convention, that we request and urge the college and school boards of California to adjust the school vacation period to coincide with the ripening period of the bulk of the horticultural crops; and be it further

Resolved, That we urge the legislature at its coming adjourned session to pass a concurrent resolution urging the college and school boards to so adjust the school vacation period, and we most respectfully request Governor Hiram Johnson to include this request in his call for the meeting of the legislature, to the end that all college and school boards may make the much desired change before the ripening of the horticultural crops next year; and that our secretary be requested to send a copy of this resolution to the governor, lieutenant governor, and each member of the legislature, and to the mayors and all civic bodies of all the cities on the Pacific coast; to all the state, county, college and school boards; to all the city and county school superintendents; to the metropolitan press and all the farm journals of the Pacific coast.

Source: Fortieth Fruit Growers' Convention, *Proceedings* (December, 1911), pp. 160–161.

VI. RESOLUTION OF THE CALIFORNIA DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION AGAINST QUOTA RESTRICTION OF MEXICAN LABOR

Whereas there is a movement on foot to change the present immigration laws which would place Pan American countries on a quota basis; and

Whereas we now have a satisfactory common labor supply composed largely of Mexican immigrants, 80 per cent of which return to Mexico each year; and

Whereas if we are deprived of this source of labor we must immediately bring negroes from the southern states or from Porto Rico. Since a serious labor shortage would exist in all Western States which would result in the pirating of labor by different sections; and

Whereas negroes would create much greater social and school problems than do the Mexicans and would cause a difficult off-season labor problem; Therefore be it

***Resolved*, That the Sacramento Valley Regional Advisory Council vigorously oppose the placing of an immigration quota on Pan American countries until Congress can provide for a careful survey of all factors involved.**

W. BOUCHER,
Manager, Sacramento Valley District

(This resolution was adopted by the Sacramento Valley Regional Advisory Council and also by the Southern California Regional Advisory Council of the California Development Association in December, 1927)

Source: U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Immigration. *Restriction of Western Hemisphere Immigration.* Hearings on S. 1296, S. 1437, S. 3019. 70th Cong. 1st Sess. (Washington, D. C., February and March, 1928), p. 46.

EXHIBIT 8762–B[1]

REPORT OF STATE LABOR COMMISSIONER FRANK C. MACDONALD TO GOVERNOR JAMES ROLPH, JR., ON SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY COTTON STRIKE, SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER, 1933

NOVEMBER 3, 1933.

Honorable JAMES ROLPH, JR.,
Governor of California, State Capitol,
Sacramento, California.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR: On or about Sunday, September 17, 1933 representatives of the cotton pickers in the San Joaquin Valley announced that the cotton pickers had decided that they would pick cotton for $1.00 per hundred pounds.

On September 19, 1933 a meeting of officers and members of the San Joaquin Valley Agricultural Labor Bureau was held in Fresno. At that meeting it was decided that cotton growers would pay 60 cents per hundred pounds for the picking of cotton. The decision of the Labor Bureau Association was given publicity.

On Wednesday, October 4, 1933 an extensive strike in which some 10,000 cotton pickers were involved was declared. This strike affected the California cotton growing area of Kern, Kings, Tulare, Fresno, Madera and Merced Counties. The effect of the strike was most pronounced in Kings, Tulare and Kern Counties.

On Friday, October 6, 1933 I instructed the deputy labor commissioners in the affected counties to serve both verbal and written notices upon the cotton growers and upon the striking cotton pickers, of the desire and willingness of the Division of Labor Statistics and Law Enforcement and also of the Department of Industrial Relations to be of any possible service in bringing about a settlement of the strike. (Copies of the written notices addressed to both cotton growers and strikers are hereto attached).[2]

Both the cotton growers and the striking cotton pickers refused to accept the offer of mediation or arbitration made by us on behalf of the State of California. Thereupon I directed a corps of deputy labor commissioners to visit the various strike centers and to continuously make every lawful effort to bring about a settlement of the strike.

On Saturday, October 7, 1933 a brief physical encounter took place between the cotton growers and the strikers in Woodville, Tulare County.

Mr. Guy W. Lowe, leader of cotton growers, made the following statement to Deputy Labor Commissioner Herbert J. Williamson concerning the Woodville episode—

"Growers in Woodville District organized on Saturday, October 7, 1933 and elected G. W. Lowe, speaker, then proceeded to the open air lot next to the service station and store around which the strikers of the district were gathered. The growers notified the strikers that they would not permit any further public meetings.

"Then the growers went in automobiles throughout the surrounding highway and took away from pickets their banners and signs and notified the strikers to leave the district within twenty-four hours.

"The growers after covering about twenty miles as thus indicated disbursed until eight P. M. that evening, when they again assembled at the San Joaquin Cotton gin at Poplar Y. a mile north of Poplar and there held a meeting. During the meeting word was given that the strikers were holding a meeting at Woodville some five miles away. Growers then decided to go to Woodville and see about it, since they had warned the strikers not to hold any meetings.

"The growers drove up to the meeting at Woodville in an orderly manner and listened to a woman speaker (Carolyn Decker). Then a male striker spoke and when he had finished the growers asked to have one of their speakers talk to the crowd. This suggestion was answered by the strikers with hisses, and remarks such as 'to hell with him', 'hang him', etc. A grower shouted lets go and the fight started which lasted about a minute and a half. It got so dusty and with no lights it was impossible to continue. During the brief fight both sides seeming unarmed, a table and a chair were broken and pieces of them used as weapons. The constable from Strathmore, Don Turney, and two deputy constables, to keep guns out of the melee, had placed their guns in an adjacent auto.

---

[1] See pt. 53, p. 19494.
[2] See p. 19906.

"Strikers then invited the speaker from the growers to address the crowd. Mr. Guy Lowe representing the growers then talked from the platform, a plank placed on an auto. He told the strikers the farmer's position and his financial troubles and told them the growers were going to stick to the 60 cents per 100 lbs. Mr. Lowe then read aloud the following: 'Notice to the Public at Large':

"Porterville California, *Oct. 7, 1933.*

"Notice to the Public at Large

"We the undersigned; being Agricultural Producers and business men, operating in the Porterville, Poplar, Woodville and Tipton sections of Tulare County, State of California, do hereby, by mutual agreement, declare ourselves to be in a frame of mind of protecting ourselves from present Strike Agitators and Strikers, and do hereby, incorporate ourselves into an Agricultural Protective Association, with full intentions to legally disburse all strike agitators and strikers from our locality.

"Our Motto

'Strikers Work Peacefully or Leave the State of California.'

"Then a striker talked to the effect that growers were in fact able to pay more than the 60 cent rate. Mr. Lowe then argued the point with the speaker. The speaker then continued his talk. Then Mr. Lowe got up on the plank again and announced to the strikers that the growers had decided that they would not allow the strikers to hold any further meetings nor to picket in their district.

"At this point the strike speaker requested Mr. Lowe to ask the growers to leave the meeting quietly. The whole meeting broke up.

"As a result of the fight one grower had his arm dislocated (Nelson) and another had his head lacerated. One of the strikers had his head badly bruised."

"On October 9, 1933, the following paid advertisement was published in the issue of the Tulare Daily Advance Register:

"[Paid Advertisement]

"Notice to the Citizens of Tulare

"We, the Farmers of Your Community, Whom You Depend Upon for Support, Feel That You Have Nursed Too Long the Viper That is at Our Door.

"These Communist Agitators Must Be Driven From Town By You, and Your Harboring Them Further Will Prove to Us Your Non-Cooperation With Us, and Make It Necessary for Us to Give Our Support and Trade to Another Town That Will Support and Cooperate With Us.

"Farmer's Protective Association"

On the evening of October 10, 1933 press dispatches stated that two strikers had been killed and eight wounded in front of the cotton pickers' strike headquarters in Pixley, Tulare County. Subsequently eight cotton growers were indicted by the Tulare County Grand Jury for the murder of the two striking cotton pickers. Press dispatches of the same date also stated that one striker had been killed and a number of strikers and cotton growers had been injured during a fight at the E. O. Mitchell Ranch in Kern County. As a result of this fight seven strikers were arrested on a charge of rioting. The next day, October 11, 1933 pursuant to your instructions that I give the strike situation my undivided personal attention, I hurried to Visalia, Tulare County. I there conferred with public officials, prominent cotton growers and with responsible leaders of the district and urged the wisdom and necessity of mediation or arbitration as a settlement of the strike.

On evening of October 11, 1933 I again notified a committee of growers assembled in the Farm Bureau, Visalia, of the State's desire to be of every possible service in bringing about a settlement of the strike. I warned them of the dangerous conditions that might develop, of the financial losses that had been incurred, and of the tremendous losses that would occur in case of rain storms in the cotton area. I also informed the persons present at this meeting that assurances has been given to the deputy labor commissioners, whom I had working in the district, by strike leaders and by growers of their willingness to submit the controversy to an arbitration board. I insisted that if the growers' case was such as they claimed it to be they should be willing to submit their case to arbitration. The growers' committee accorded me a courteous hearing but declined to submit the matter to arbitration.

It was reported that on October 13, 1933, the strikers were to hold a demonstration in front of the Court House in Visalia and that they were going to demand immediate indictments of the persons responsible for the killing of the two striking cotton pickers and the wounding of eight others and that they were also going to demand immediate prosecution of the case by the District Attorney. I therefore sent deputy labor commissioners to wait upon the strikers and to urge upon them the necessity of keeping the peace and to request them not to hold a demonstration in Visalia and to assure them that the Grand Jury and the Courts would deal with the matter in a fair and impartial manner. On October 13, 1933, acting in compliance with the suggestion of Mr. J. R. Fauver, Chairman of the Grand Jury, I appeared before the Tulare County Grand Jury, and after conveying your greetings and assurances of the cooperation of the State, I advised the Grand Jury that we had not been successful in receiving assurances that the demonstration would be called off but that both the deputy labor commissioners and the Mexican Consul, E. Bravo, had been assured by the strikers that if the demonstration was held, it would be peaceful and orderly.

My purpose in addressing the Grand Jury was to give them assurance and to, if possible, remove fear from their minds because approximately one-half of the grand jurors are housewives of Tulare County, who have had no contact with strikes or violent outbreaks, and it was feared that they might become terrorized if a demonstration was held. Fortunately our efforts were successful and the demonstration was called off.

Owing to the tense, dangerous situation maintaining in the strike area, the deputy labor commissioners in the district and I, assisted by Mexican Consuls E. Brava and J. L. D. Acosta, redoubled our efforts to bring about the termination of the strike. We were informed by a large number of strikers and also by a number of cotton growers of their willingness to settle the strike by mediation or arbitration. I thereupon phoned to San Francisco to Mr. Edward Fitzgerald, Conciliator of the United States Department of Labor and advised him of the danger of the situation, urging him to come immediately to Visalia to assist in bringing about a settlement of the strike. Commissioner Fitzgerald arrived in Visalia on Friday, October 13, 1933, and after we had conferred upon the situation, Commissioner Fitzgerald, Mexican Consuls, E. Bravo, L. D. Acosta, Deputy Labor Commissioners Huss, Williamson and myself met with a committee representing the cotton growers, the cotton gin owners, representatives of financial interests and others, in the Farm Bureau Headquarters in Visalia. During the meeting Mexican Consul Bravo stated that the Mexican strikers had informed him that they had four hundred guns and were prepared to die defending their rights.

Commissioner Fitzgerald earnestly urged the wisdom and advisability of the growers agreeing to arbitration of the controversy. He informed the members of the Committee present that after conference with Mr. George Creel, Chairman, California Division, NRA. you had appointed an arbitration commission composed of the following persons:

Most Reverend Edward J. Hanna, Roman Catholic Archbishop.
Dr. Tully Knoles, President of the College of The Pacific.
Orrin K. McMurray, Dean of School of Jurisprudence, University of California.

In reply to the appeal of Commissioner Fitzgerald for arbitration, the committee representing the cotton growers definitely stated that they would not submit the controversy to arbitration, but that they would be agreeable to presenting their case to an impartial fact finding commission, subject to the understanding that they would not be bound by the decision or the findings of the Fact Finding Commission. The committee further informed us that they had no power or authority to agree that their members would be bound by the findings of any Commission. They also took exception to members of the Commission appointed by you and submitted names of persons they desired to have act as members of the Fact Finding Commission instead of some of the members named by you. It was finally agreed that a Fact Finding Commission should pass judgment and render findings upon the following two questions:

1. The picking wages that cotton growers are able to pay under prevailing conditions.

2. The wage scale necessary to enable the pickers to maintain a proper standard of living.

At the adjournment of this conference, Federal Commissioner Fitzgerald and I prepared a statement for the information of the growers, strikers and general public of the facts and issues to be submitted to the Fact Finding Commission. We incorporated in this statement a copy of your telegram, a copy of the telegram of George Creel, Chairman, California Division National Recovery Administration, the statement of the San Joaquin Cotton Committee of the California Farm Bureau Federation and statements of E. Bravo, Consul of Mexico, Edward Fitzgerald, U. S. Commissioner, R. C. Branion, Emergency Relief Administrator, and the undersigned. I had several thousand pamphlets printed in both Spanish and English and distributed among the strikers, growers and interested public citizens. Copies are hereto attached.[1]

I respectfully call your attention to the fact that in this pamphlet we urged the strikers to return to work pending a decision of your Fact Finding Commission. In reply the strikers stated they accepted arbitration and would remain on strike pending the decision of the Commission.

A Fact Finding Commission composed of the Most Reverend Edward J. Hanna, Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, Dr. Tully Knoles, University of the Pacific, and Dr. Ira B. Cross, University of California (Dr. Cross having been substituted for Professor Orrin K. McMurray, Dean of School of Jurisprudence, University of California, who was unable to serve) held public hearing in the Municipal Auditorium in Tulare on October 19, 1933 and October 20, 1933. At these meetings all interested parties, striking cotton pickers and cotton growers and their representatives were accorded full opportunity to present all their evidence to the Commission.

During the strike, the strikers had continuously used what is known as "mass picketing tactics". On October 23, 1933, a large number of striking pickets, principally Mexican men and women, proceeded along the highway until they came to the Guiberson Ranch near Corcoran where they found strike-breakers at work, picking cotton. The strikers invaded the ranch and in the fight which ensued between the strikers and strike-breakers, a number of persons were struck with clubs and fists. It is also reported that the sacks containing cotton were slashed and ripped open.

On that same day, October 23, 1933, your Fact Finding Commission announced the following decision:

"Your Fact Finding Commission appointed to investigate strike conditions in cotton areas in San Joaquin Valley after two day session at which both sides had full and ample opportunity under leadership of attorneys and other representatives to present their cases, begs leave to report as follows: It is judgment of Commission that upon evidence presented growers can pay for picking at rate of seventy-five cents per hundred pounds and your Commission begs leave, therefore, to advise this rate of payment be established. Without question civil rights of strikers have been violated. We appeal to constituted authorities to see that strikers are protected in rights conferred upon them by laws of State and by Federal and State Constitutions.

"Signed: E. J. HANNA, *Chairman.*
"IRA B. CROSS,
"TULLY C. KNOLES."

Immediately following the announcement of this decision, Deputy Labor Commissioners Fred C. Huss, John S. Kilsby, Charles Crook, E. B. Daniel, and L. A. Barnes, and I, waited upon cotton growers and their representatives, striking cotton pickers, their leaders and representatives, and urged them to accept the decision of your Fact Finding Commission. The leaders of the striking cotton pickers refused to accept the 75 cents per hundred decision of the Fact Finding Commission and issued a demand for 80 cents per hundred, a copy of which demand is attached hereto.[2] Leaders of the cotton growers also declined at that time to accept the 75 cents per hundred rate decision of the Fact Finding Commission.

Thereafter, on October 25, 1933 representatives of the cotton growers of Kern, Kings, Tulare, Fresno, Madera and Merced Counties assembled in Fresno and accepted the findings of your Fact Finding Commission and served public notice of their willingness to pay 75 cents per hundred pounds for the picking of cotton.

---

[1] See pp. 19906–19908.
[2] See p. 19908.

Thereafter, acting in conformity with your authorization, I served the following letter upon the strikers on the afternoon of October 25, 1933:

"OCTOBER 25TH, 1933.

"*To the Officers and Members of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union.*

"GREETINGS: You are hereby officially notified that the Cotton Growers of Kern, Kings, Tulare, Madera, Fresno and Merced counties in meeting assembled in Fresno this 25th day of October, 1933, did accept by formal vote the decision of the Fact Finding Commission appointed by Governor James Rolph, Jr., and that the aforesaid Cotton Growers did by vote of their Association agree to pay 75 cents per hundred pounds for the picking of cotton in the aforesaid counties.

"The aforesaid cotton growers have officially informed Governor James Rolph, Jr., of their acceptance of the Governor's Fact Finding Commission's decision and of their agreement to abide thereby.

"I am authorized by Governor James Rolph, Jr., to advise you of the aforesaid action of the cotton growers and inasmuch as the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union were parties to the hearings before the Governor's Fact Finding Commission, they thereby became equally obligated and subject to its decision with the Cotton Growers.

"You are, therefore, hereby officially requested to declare off and terminate the cotton pickers' strike and authorize your members to proceed with the picking of cotton in the aforesaid five counties at the rate of 75 cents per hundred pounds.

"Very sincerely,

"(Signed) FRANK C. MACDONALD,
"*State Labor Commissioner of California.*"

Late that evening, October 25, 1933, I received information to the effect that the strikers would not declare off the strike and that they would not pick cotton for 75 cents per hundred pounds. The next morning, accompanied by Deputy Labor Commissioners Huss and Kilsby and by the Mexican Consular representative L. J. Acosta, we proceeded to the strike headquarters in Tulare and to the Central Strike Encampment at Corcoran. We informed strike leaders and strikers that they were not acting in good faith; that they had previously given us assurance on numerous occasions that they would accept the Fact Finding Commission's report, would declare off the strike and would pick cotton for 75 cents per hundred pounds.

At about 11:00 o'clock A. M., October 26, 1933, W. V. Buckner, Sheriff of Tulare County, addressed the strikers at their camp in Corcoran and served notice that the strikers must evacuate the camp by 3:00 o'clock P. M. that day. Prior to addressing the strikers a cordon of some 30 California State Traffic officers, accompanied by a corps of Deputy Sheriffs, formed a line in front of the Sheriff, armed with revolvers, and I am informed, with gas bombs, ready to meet the dangerous emergency of riot and blood-shed, which threatened.

The notification served by Sheriff W. V. Buckner that the camp must be evacuated by 3:00 o'clock P. M. was met with angry hoots and jeers and cries of "We won't leave" by the assembled mass of strikers. A most critical and dangerous situation threatened.

The least overt act by any person would undoubtedly have precipitated a bloody battle. Shortly after the serving of the ultimatum by Sheriff Buckner, strike leaders, who our Deputy Labor Commissioners were urging to terminate the strike, protested that the Sheriff's ultimatum was illegal, that the strikers were legally occupying the camp site, that the State Health Authorities had not condemned the camp and therefore they had a lawful right to resist any attempt of the Sheriff to evict them. They insisted that the Sheriff had no lawful right to serve an evacuation notice until the matter had been passed upon by the courts and that any attempt upon his part to enforce his ultimatum by force, would be resisted. Strike leaders also insisted that they had not had time, since receiving my written request, that they accept the 75 cents per hundred pound rate and terminate the strike, to have a vote taken thereon.

These strike leaders then definitely promised and agreed that they would furnish us with a written reply of their acceptance or rejectance of my proposal of termination of the strike by 3:30 o'clock on that afternoon of October 26, 1933. Immediately after securing this agreement, I conferred with Sheriff W. V.

Buckner and advised him of the definite agreement we had reached with the strikers to the effect that they would advise us in writing of their decision regarding termination of the strike on that afternoon, October 26, 1933. I therefore insisted that Sheriff W. V. Buckner should agree not to make any effort toward enforcing his ultimatum that the camp must be evacuated by 3:00 o'clock that afternoon because the ultimatum was unnecessary and any attempt to enforce it would precipitate a battle. I emphatically informed him that it was my firm conviction that the strike committee would on that afternoon accept the 75 cents per hundred pounds rate for cotton picking, officially terminate the strike, evacuate the camp, and proceed with the picking of cotton on the next day.

I also informed the Sheriff that prior to 3:00 o'clock P. M., I would advise the strikers of his agreement to extend the time of evacuation of the camp and the reasons for so doing, namely, the request of the Strikers' Central Committee for time in which to take a vote on the question of accepting your Fact Finding Commission decision of 75 cents per hundred pounds for picking cotton.

During the afternoon the strikers massed their men at the entrance to their camp and informed the Deputy Labor Commissioners that they would resist any attempt to force them and their women and children, which it was estimated at that time to be some 2,500 persons, to leave the camp.

A large number of cotton growers and their sympathizers also assembled at the camp and angry threats were made by persons thus assembled to the effect that they would force the strikers to leave the camp. Unquestionably, had such an effort been made at that time an entirely unnecessary and unjustifiable bloody battle would have been precipitated. The lives of many would have been taken and numerous men, women and children would have been injured, for it must be remembered that not only were the authorities armed but the Mexican strikers had significantly notified Mexican Consul Bravo that they had four hundred guns. The situation was gravely tense and dangerous. At a quarter to three o'clock, I caused an automobile truck to be driven to a point immediately in front of the striking cotton pickers who were massed at the entrance to their camp. Standing on the platform of the truck I then addressed the strikers and advised them of the request that had been made by the Central Strike Committee for an extension of time of evacuation of the camp and also of the assurance that had been given by the strike committee that they would that day vote upon the question of accepting the 75 cents per hundred pounds for picking cotton. I urged the strikers as far as I could consistently so do, without derrogation to the honor and dignity of the State of California which I was privileged to represent, to accept the 75 cents decision of the Fact Finding Commission and to declare the strike off. Mexican Consular representative L. J. Acosta, then addressed the strikers and translated my remarks into Spanish to the assembled strikers, the great majority of whom were Mexicans. Thereafter, at 3:30 o'clock P. M. on that day, October 26, 1933, the Central Strike Committee accepted the 75 cents per hundred pounds rate for cotton picking, subject to conditions that were not requested nor agreed to at the time of their appearing before your Fact Finding Commission. Hereto attached you will please find copies of the acceptance of the 75 cents rate [1] and of a statement issued at the same time by the authority of the Central Strike Committee.[2]

The next morning Deputy Labor Commissioners Huss and Kilsby and Mexican Consular representative Acosta went to the headquarters of the strikers in Tulare City and requested the strike leaders to accompany them to the camp at Corcoran for the purpose of inducing the strikers to leave the camp and to forthwith proceed with the picking of the cotton crop. After considerable discussion, Carolyn Decker, Secretary of the Strike Committee, accompanied Deputy Labor Commissioners Huss and Kilsby and Mexican Consular Representative L. J. Acosta, to the strikers' camp at Corcoran. Upon arriving at the camp, the aforesaid Carolyn Decker notified the strikers that the cotton picking strike had been officially terminated and declared off and that they should proceed to pick cotton for 75 cents per hundred pounds. After conferring with the strikers, Carolyn Decker informed Deputy Labor Commissioners Huss and Kilsby and Consular Representative L. J. Acosta that the strikers had decided that the camp would be evacuated in a peaceful and orderly manner that day and that the strikers would proceed to Kern County, there to pick cotton. Carolyn Decker further informed them that although the strike had been terminated and declared off that the former strikers would not pick any cotton in the Corcoran district. Strikers informed Deputies Huss and Kilsby and Mexican Consular Representative L. J. Acosta that the reason they would not pick cotton for growers in the Corcoran district was because strikers had been illegally beaten, shot and murdered by growers and their sympathizers in that district.

---

[1] See p. 19909.

[2] See pp. 19909-19910.

Later on that day, Mr. George Creel, Chairman, California Division, National Recovery Administration, phoned me at Visalia from San Francisco, stating that he had been informed that although the strike had been officially terminated by the strikers, yet they were refusing to pick cotton in the Corcoran district and that therefore the cotton growers had petitioned him to immediately send one thousand men who were on Federal relief to Corcoran to pick cotton. I confirmed the report that the strike had been officially terminated by the strikers and that the strikers would not pick cotton in the Corcoran district. I later conferred with cotton growers as to the actual need in the district, as they were claiming that there was urgent need for five thousand cotton pickers. After further investigation it was decided that Mr. Creel would request the Federal Employment Service to send one thousand cotton pickers to the City Hall at Corcoran, where they would be met by Mr. F. L. Buckner, United States Labor Employment Agent of the district, who would arrange to assign the cotton pickers to the growers in that district who were in need of their services.

It was also agreed that as soon as it was established that additional pickers were needed that they would be sent to the district to report to Mr. F. L. Buckner and that all interested parties would be informed that the strike had been officially declared off and terminated by a vote of the strikers on October 27, 1933.

The strikers kept their previous agreement and evacuated the Corcoran camp on Saturday, October 28, 1933, proceeding to Kern County where they resumed the picking of cotton for 75 cents per hundred pounds.

Inasmuch as the strike had been officially terminated and the matter of supplying cotton pickers to the Corcoran district was a matter falling exclusively within the jurisdiction of the United States Employment Service, I felt that the services of the Deputy Labor Commissioners and myself were no longer necessary and we therefore returned to our respective offices.

It is an indisputable fact that throughout the strike, illegal threats were made both by the strikers and the cotton growers and that both sides were responsible for infractions of the law. Because of the intensity of feeling and the bitter hatreds that had been engendered, there was a continuous danger of violence and bloodshed. It is also true that the strikers' camps, because of lack of adequate water supply and sanitary facilities, presented a danger of contagious disease epidemics.

In conclusion, I deem it my duty to respectfully call your attention to the exceptionally able and impartial manner in which Mr. E. Raymond Cato and his corps of State Highway Traffic Officers conducted themselves during the very trying period that they were in the strike zone.

The traffic officers confined their activities exclusively to the enforcement of the traffic rules and laws of the State of California, but their very presence in large numbers in the district, unquestionably caused both strikers and employers to refrain from acts of violence which would have precipitated riots attendant with loss of life and property, and injury to numerous persons.

I also deem it my duty to report that Mexican Consular Representative L. J. Acosta rendered every possible assistance in prevailing upon the strikers to respect and observe the laws of this State and Nation and also in urging them to accept the decision of your Fact Finding Commission. Mexican Consul E. Bravo also rendered valuable assistance in these efforts.

May I also respectfully call your attention to the fact that Deputy Labor Commissioners Huss, Williamson, Kilsby, Daniel, Barnes and Crook served continuously, night and day, and without regard to long hours of service or holidays, rendering most able and valuable assistance in maintaining peace and in bringing about the termination of this strike which was fraught with such great dangers, involving violation of our State and Federal Laws and also with the possibility of causing international complications between the United States of America and the United States of Mexico.

Very respectfully submitted,

______
State Labor Commissioner.

MacD:KK

[Enclosure—See page 19899.]

State of California

Department of Industrial Relations

DIVISION OF LABOR STATISTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

State Building, San Francisco

FRANK C. MACDONALD, STATE LABOR COMMISSIONER

From Branch Office at
Eighteenth and L Streets
Bakersfield

To the Cotton Growers of the San Joaquin Valley,

GREETINGS: I have been requested by Mr. Frank C. MacDonald, State Labor Commissioner, to offer the services of the State Department of Industrial Relations and the Labor Commissioner's office in the matter of mediating the dispute which has arisen between the San Joaquin Valley Cotton growers and their picking labor.

Accordingly, the undersigned will appreciate receiving an early expression from your group as to whether the above offer to mediate meets with your approval.

The Department stands ready to serve.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) E. B. DANIEL,
Deputy Labor Commissioner.

[Enclosure—See page 19899.]

State of California

DIVISION OF LABOR STATISTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

State Building, San Francisco

FRANK C. MACDONALD, STATE LABOR COMMISSIONER

From Branch Office at
18th and L Streets
Bakersfield
October 6, 1933.

To the striking cotton pickers of the San Joaquin Valley.

GREETINGS: I have been requested by Mr. Frank C. MacDonald, State Labor Commissioner, to offer the services of the State Department of Industrial Relations and the Labor Commissioner's office in the matter of mediating the dispute which has arisen between the San Joaquin Valley cotton growers and their picking labor.

Accordingly, the undersigned will appreciate receiving an early expression from your group as to whether the above offer to mediate meets with your approval.

The Department stands ready to serve.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) E. B. DANIEL,
Deputy Labor Commissioner.

[Enclosure—See page 19902.]

OFFICIAL NOTICE

Visalia, California October 16, 1933

TO ALL COTTON GROWERS AND STRIKING COTTON PICKERS

The Government of the United States of America has directed its representatives to arrange for arbitration of the dispute between the cotton growers and the cotton strikers.

The Government of the United States of Mexico has agreed through its Consular Representatives to accept and assist in the arbitration proceedings.

Governor James Rolph, Jr., acting for the State of California, has requested all interested parties to submit their case to an impartial arbitration board.

The authorized committee representing the cotton growers have accepted arbitration.

The striking cotton pickers have agreed to arbitration.

The Representatives of the Government of the United States of America have agreed with Governor James Rolph, Jr., to the following commissioners: Archbishop Edward J. Hanna, San Francisco; Professor O. K. McMurray, Dean of College of Law, University of California; and Doctor Tully Knoles, President of the College of the Pacific.

It therefore becomes the duty of the striking cotton pickers to proceed with the picking of California's cotton crop subject to the decision of the Federal State Arbitration Commission's findings and decisions.

It is also the duty of the cotton growers to forthwith re-employ the cotton pickers who have been on strike.

The Governments of the United States of America and of the State of California have authorized their Representatives to furnish food, clothing, and, if necessary, medical attention to cotton pickers and their families who are unable to earn sufficient money for these necessities for themselves and families.

The Consul of the United States of Mexico has agreed to help to prepare and to present evidence and data to prove justification of the wage rate which the striking cotton pickers claim should be paid to them.

Because of the above stated arbitration arrangements and the acceptances of arbitration by the interested and affected parties, the cotton growers and the cotton pickers are requested to proceed with the picking of California's cotton crop beginning on Monday, October 16, 1933.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE CREEL, CHAIRMAN CALIFORNIA DIVISION NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION

"As Western Administrator of National Recovery Administration and California Representative of National Labor Board, I congratulate San Joaquin Valley on cotton strike settlement. Urge all workers to get back on job Monday morning and tell them every force of Federal Government will be used to effect a just settlement that will remove every cause of complaint."

STATEMENT OF GOVERNOR JAMES ROLPH, JR., GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

"Urge cotton pickers return to work Monday morning and assure them that every power of State of California is behind Archbishop Hanna, Dean McMurray and Doctor Knoles in the determination of these gentlemen to effect a settlement that will give justice to all."

STATEMENT OF E. BRAVO, CONSUL OF MEXICO

"The spirit of friendship between Mexico and the United States in mutual accord to solve the present situation of the cotton picking has decided to submit the problem to an arbitration board of experts with such outstanding citizens of California as Archbishop Hanna, Dean McMurray, and Doctor Knoles, who are going to render an impartial decision based on facts furnished by the strikers and the growers. This accord urges the immediate work of the pickers. Food, medical attention is assured immediately by the United States Federal Relief Administration.

"Countrymen, return to your work with the full assurance that the Mexican Government is watching your interests."

STATEMENT OF EDWARD H. FITZGERALD, UNITED STATES COMMISSIONER OF CONCILIATION

"The statement presented here by Officers of the Federal Government, the Government of the State of California, the Government of the United States of Mexico, the California State Labor Commissioner, with that of the Federal-State California Relief Administrator, and the committees of the San Joaquin Cotton Growers, all in harmony and agreement that the proper and peaceful method to settle this unfortunate dispute is by a fact finding arbitration committee who are unbiased and assure an impartial award. It is urged upon the cotton growers that all of these cotton pickers be returned to their jobs without prejudice. It is urged that the cotton pickers return to the cotton fields in a 'status quo' position. It is understood that the United States Government State Relief Administrator will see to it that proper food stuffs, medical attention, and other necessities will be furnished to the cotton pickers for the relief of cotton pickers and their families pending the decision of the Fact Finding Commission. It is urged that this action be taken on Monday morning, October 16, 1933."

STATEMENT OF F. C. MACDONALD, STATE LABOR COMMISSIONER

"The deplorable conditions in the cotton industry must be thoroughly investigated and a just decision rendered to settle the controversy. The official Fact Finding Commission necessarily must not only consider the claims of the growers but also those of the cotton pickers to the end that justice be done."

"The arbitration agreement has my absolute approval."

STATEMENT OF THE SAN JOAQUIN COTTON COMMITTEE OF THE CALIFORNIA FARM BUREAU FEDERATION

"A committee of representative cotton growers of the San Joaquin Valley, organized under the leadership of the Farm Bureau, have analyzed the cotton strike situation. The Committee feels that the best interest of the public at large, growers and strikers, demands that this controversy be submitted to a 'Fact Finding Committee' of outstanding California citizens, in order that picking may be speedily resumed in the interest of all parties involved."

STATEMENT OF R. C. BRANION, FEDERAL-STATE EMERGENCY RELIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF CALIFORNIA

"My office will do everything within its authority to see that no needy unemployed family goes without relief pending strike arbitration."

A certified copy of this document is placed on file with the United States Postmaster of the City of Visalia, California, to be held available for the inspection of any interested person.

[Enclosure—see page 19902.]

PROPOSALS OF THE COTTON STRIKE CENTRAL STRIKE COMMITTEE

Issued in Tulare, October 24, 1933.

1. That, inasmuch as the cotton growers have met in Bakersfield and have publicly offered eighty cents (80¢) per hundred (100) for picking cotton, The Central Strike Committee has voted to recommend to the strike Locals that they adopt the following demands:

   1. That 80¢ per 100 pounds of picked cotton be adopted as the wage for picking cotton in the entire strike area.
   2. Recognition of the Cannery & Agricultural Workers Industrial Union.
   3. No discrimination in rehiring because of race, color, creed or union or strike activities.
   4. Immediate unconditional release of Pat Chambers and all arrested strikers.

2. These demands will be presented before every strike local tonight for adoption or rejection.

3. Intensified picket lines pending growers acceptance of demands.

4. That the "Fact Finding Commission", which has proved in reality to be an arbitration board, will consider and adopt our demands.

[Enclosure—see page 19904.]

BASIS OF SETTLEMENT AS VOTED UPON BY MAJORITY OF STRIKE LOCALS IN STRIKE

OCT. 26, 33.

1. That seventy-five cents (75¢) shall become the minimum wage for picking one hundred (100) pounds of cotton in the San Joaquin Valley.
2. That we demand the IMMEDIATE withdrawal of armed forces from the strike area so that the strikers shall return to work in an organized manner. We call the government to task on this, in face of their assertions that they wish the strike ended in a "peaceful and orderly manner".
3. That cotton pickers shall be hired by the growers free of charge from locals of the Cannery & Agricultural Workers Industrial Union in their respective territories.
4. No striker shall return to work until they are placed on union-contracted ranches by their Union local.
5. An intensified continuance of the mass defense and fight to free our comrades who are rotting in jail because of their militancy in the interest of the strike.

These decisions are voicing the sentiment of the mass of 12,000 cotton strikers, and hereby becomes the conditions on which the strike in the San Joaquin Valley will be called officially to an end.

(Signed) CAROLINE DECKER,
(For the Cotton Strikers Central Strike Committee.)

[Enclosure—see page 19904.]

STATEMENT OF THE COTTON STRIKE CENTRAL STRIKE COMMITTEE, OCTOBER TWENTY-SIXTH, 1933

Today brings to a close the third week of the strike of 12,000 cotton pickers in the San Joaquin Valley. During this period every form of intimidation and terror has been employed by the growers and governmental officials to break our strike. The government, acting for the finance corporations and large gin interests, has used their armed forces in an attempt to force the strikers back to work, and today they are threatening to take by armed brute force the miserable shacks and tents the cotton pickers call home. Throughout this terror the workers have remained a solidified unit through their own union, the CANNERY & AGRICULTURAL WORKERS INDUSTRIAL UNION. The representatives of the government have made clear to us that the government does not wish to recognize our union. It is clear to the workers, that the government will not recognize any union which has a militant policy of struggle in the interests of the working class. We also understand that only the mass organization of the workers into the union will force the government and employers to recognize us even against their desires.

We are therefore issuing this statement as a result of a majority vote in every strike local; and this statement becomes the basis on which we officially call off the strike of cotton pickers.

EXHIBIT A

The Division of Labor Statistics and Law Enforcement of the Department of Industrial Relations of the State of California invites both factions involved in the present labor dispute in the San Joaquin Valley to meet with the division's representatives for the purpose of effecting mediation between the parties whereby they may speedily and satisfactorily adjust their difficulties.

OCTOBER 25th, 1933.

To the Officers and Members of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union.

GREETINGS: You are hereby officially notified that the Cotton Growers of Kern, Kings, Tulare, Madera, Fresno and Merced counties in meeting assembled in Fresno this 25th day of October 1933, did accept by formal vote the decision of the Fact Finding Commission appointed by Governor James Rolph, Jr., and that the aforesaid Cotton Growers did by vote of their Association agree to pay 75-cents per hundred pounds for the picking of cotton in the aforesaid counties.

The aforesaid cotton growers have officially informed Governor James Rolph, Jr., of their acceptance of the Governor's Fact Finding Commission's decision and of their agreement to abide thereby.

I am authorized by Governor James Rolph, Jr., to advise you of the aforesaid action of the cotton growers and inasmuch as the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union were parties to the hearings before the Governor's Fact Finding Commission, they thereby become equally obligated and subject to its decision with the Cotton Growers.

You are, therefore, hereby officially requested to declare off and terminate the cotton pickers' strike and authorize your members to proceed with the picking of cotton in the aforesaid five counties at the rate of 75-cents per hundred pounds.

Very sincerely,

FRANK C. MACDONALD,
State Labor Commissioner of California.

THE STRATEGY OF THE STRIKE IN AGRICULTURAL FIELDS

Proposed by the Committee of Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union. Offices of the District, 81 Post Street, San Jose, California

Since the arrival in the fields of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union, thousands of workers have been organized and have taken part in the struggle to obtain better wage and living conditions. Considerable experience has been obtained in the revolutionary struggle and strike methods. Today, when there are more workers than ever in the fray, is the time to consider the various methods and tactics employed in the preparation, beginning and conducting strikes of field workers. This is necessary in order that all workers, conscious of class warfare, may profit by the experience gained in past struggles.

In general, three methods have been used in calling a strike; these are: (1) The method of open meetings which may be called the open or public method, (2) The method of calling secret preliminary conferences of delegates of workmen, or the quiet method, (3) Following are shown the advantages and disadvantages of these two methods:

1. THE OPEN METHOD

Many of the recent strikes have been called by the open or public method. That is, the Union, through loose leaves or other type of notices, calls a public meeting of workers to consider the matter of a strike. If the majority of those present are in favor of striking, a strike is called, a strike committee is elected at the meeting and general instructions as to pickets, etc., are issued.

Some of the advantages are: This may be the only manner of entering new territory or a district where the union is weak. This method often brings new and valuable members to the union. The open method is the most rapid one of starting a strike and very often rapidity decides victory or defeat. This method has been quite successful on several occasions.

The disadvantages of the open method are: (1) The results of a public meeting with little or no preliminary work are uncertain. It is difficult to prepare for unforeseen occurrences. (2) A public meeting shows up the workers bravely in favor and may bring about their dismissal from work even before the strike is declared, and therefore many workers who are very desirous of taking part will not declare themselves at such meetings. (3) The open method gives employers the opportunity to gather strike breakers and gives the police time to collect gangsters and other armed forces for oppression. (4) Such method carries with it the danger of having spies in the general strike committees. (5) It is a difficult matter, at such meetings, to make the necessary preparations or to have a free discussion between workers regarding conditions and problems. (6) A representative mass of workers cannot be counted upon at such meetings. (7) To call a strike when workers are unemployed increases the difficulty of keeping strikers in picket lines.

[Translation from Spanish.]

2. THE QUIET METHOD, OR METHOD OF DELEGATED CONFERENCE

This method is connected with preliminary conferences of delegates of workers representing as many ranches as possible, especially the larger ranches, usually[1] members of the union working in the ranches, or unemployed members of the union, who can make contacts early in the morning while in search of work. A great deal can be accomplished in this manner in obtaining delegates during the breakfast period.

---

[1] [Literal translation reads: "usually establishing the workers to the conference of the union working in the ranches * * *"]

This method of having conferences of delegates before the actual beginning of the strike has a number of important advantages. (1) The greatest advantage is that the employers do not know the identity of the more active workers. (2) The employers and the police department, although they may hear rumors of a strike, are never sure and when the strike is declared, are caught unawares. (3) This "quiet" method offers opportunity for detailed discussions as to conditions, wages, feeling of the workers as to the strike, advisable date of declaring same, demands, and which are the more important ranches as concentration points. At such conferences, it can be ascertained at which ranches the Union is strong, at which it is necessary for union members to secure employment and at the same time to get in contact with the delegates. By working in the ranches it is possible to work from within, which is always more effective than working from the outside. (4) At these preliminary conferences it is possible to establish the whole machinery of the strike before the beginning of the strike itself—such things as auxiliary committees, publicity, general strike, etc., committees. (5) At such preliminary conference there is an opportunity of explaining the part which the Union plays and to obtain new members. Delegates are there given detailed information as to the method of conducting a strike, will be apprised of the "red menace" cry which the employers will raise and to prepare an extensive campaign for the strike.

The disadvantages of this method come about when the union is weak, when few members of the union are working in the ranches or when few contacts have been established. Another disadvantage of the "quiet" method is that it may be too much so—in other words, that the workers are not aware of the date of the strike and will be as much surprised as the employers. To avoid this, care must be had to see that a campaign of agitation is conducted among the workers before the preparatory conferences. Workers will then respond when called to strike. On all occasions we must courageously call and insist upon the right of workers to organize, strike and have pickets.

3. A COMBINATION OF THE "OPEN" AND "QUIET" METHOD

The third method is a combination of the other two. A preliminary meeting of delegates is held before and a general meeting the day preceding the strike. This is the most common method. Naturally, this combination has the advantages and disadvantages of the two simple methods.

When our comrades select their method, they must consider the circumstances of their particular situation. As our Union grows and our experience widens these methods will be improved upon and we shall find new and better ways of improving the standard of life for the workers and finally we shall bring about the establishment of a government of workers, bringing to an end for all time the exploitation of workers and affording them a decent standard of living.

The method used is immaterial—we must give special attention to the following, if we are to be successful in strikes:

(1) **Preliminary preparations.** It is of utmost importance that a local and regional machinery operate properly. Committees must meet regularly. Detailed reports are necessary regarding the area where the strike will be called, number of workers, ranches of importance, roads to ranches, strategic points for picket lines, automobiles to be used during the strike, etc.

(2) **Strike committees.** General and central committees must at all times maintain contact with the ranch committees to keep posted as to the progress of the strike in each ranch, to know which of the employers are willing to sign, etc. The general strike committee must meet at least once a day, to discuss and find conditions which they propose to change.

(3) **Assistance.** The question of assistance is often a deciding factor in a strike. The machinery must be prepared beforehand, lists, subscriptions, busses, etc., must operate the first day with a responsible committee; friends, liberals, and those sympathizing must be used in this work and small merchants and ranchers should be called upon in order to have their help in the strike.

(4) **Defense.** (a) The ordinary methods of employers to break the strike is to arrest the leaders of the workers. Each leader must therefore be prepared so that one committee or another may take up his work, (b) Defense committees must be prepared to surround comrades who speak, (c) to work with the International Labor Defense to report arrests and to supply money to bail them out, (d) to see that pickets are maintained solid and that no comrades are alone, (e) each camp must have a defense squad to warn workers of the arrival of police,

(f) defense committees should be composed of the braver comrades who would serve as example in action against the fear of the police.

(5) The unemployed. A great deal of agitation is necessary among the unemployed so as to prevent their being "scabs" and that they may assist in the picket lines.

(6) Publicity—education campaign. Publicity must be carried forth in the shape of general meetings, notices, leaflets, etc., continually during the strike. Whenever possible, pictures should be taken of the picket lines. In order to maintain alive the militant spirit in the picket lines, comrades should not only speak of political agitation, but it is equally important that they instruct the workers in the role and functions of the Union. As a great portion of the members are migratory workers, it is of utmost importance that they be told that they must always conduct themselves as members of the union wherever they may be at work.

(7) Picket lines. Picket lines must be established and maintained from the first day on. It is important that the lines may be formed early in the morning so that strike-breakers may not come in to work. Experience has shown that it is better to mobilize workers at the picket lines, rather than gather at some other point first and then starting together to picket.

(8) The leaders. It is necessary that leaders take a minimum amount of rest and sleep during the strike so they may be sufficiently awake to cope with new developments from day to day and from hour to hour.

(9) New leaders. In each strike new comrades appear who show themselves to be qualified to act as leaders and they are to be taken into the more important committees.

(10) Enlisting of new members. The question of obtaining new members and to strengthen the union is of equal importance to the success of the strike. A committee for new members must at all times have in its possession sufficient books and other literature from the Union to be used in picket lines, in general meetings or at committee meetings. This committee must be under the orders of the Financial Secretary.

(11) The district office. All reports of the strike, from its inception to the end must be sent to the district office of the union. It is only through the constant cooperation of the several local and regional offices of the Union with the Central of the district that we can expect to construct a strong and powerful union.

Attention: This paper is to be distributed among the members of the union and must be fully discussed in all regional (sectional) and local committees.

(Translation from Spanish.)

EXHIBIT 8763[1]

HEARINGS HELD ON THE COTTON STRIKE IN SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY BY THE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY JAMES ROLPH, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, HELD IN VISALIA, OCTOBER 19TH, 1933, IN THE CIVIC AUDITORIUM

Members of the Committee are as follows: Dr. Ira B. Cross, U. C., Archbishop Hanna and Dr. Tully Knowles, Pres. College of Pacific, Stockton. Chairman—Archbishop Hanna, San Francisco.

Approximately 250 persons present.

Meeting called to order at 3:40 P. M.

Archbishop HANNA states "This is a fact finding committee. We have been called to help you and to get the facts so that we may come to an agreeable settlement. We are reasonable men and you are reasonable men, and getting the facts from both sides, there is no reason why we should not arrive at a kindly settlement. May I bespeak therefore for our committee, your kindly consideration. We are here only to help. May I ask that in representing your facts from your side that you present them kindly. They will be received kindly and out of that kindly consideration we should have peace."

EDSON ABEL (Attorney for Calif. Farm Bureau Federation, 802 Balboa Bldg., San Francisco). The growers are ready to present their side of the case. However, on behalf of the growers it is my duty to state that they do not regard that their case will be considered with impartiality by the personnel on the committee. Many growers are not satisfied that the problems of the farmer will be given fair consideration. The position of the growers may be stated in a very few words. In spite of the demands for higher wages being put up to the growers by the pickers the price fixed by the Agricultural Labor Bureau of 60¢ per 100 pounds is all that the price of cotton will stand. The price of cotton is a world price. It is fixed by competition between the various growing areas of the world and California must compete in that world market. The growers must do their best to come within this world price. With that statement we will call the first witness.

L. W. FRICK (Bakersfield rancher). I reside in Bakersfield, occupation rancher, have been in the Valley since 1919 and have been farming since that time in the Bakersfield area, have been growing cotton since 1920, and at the present time have 500 acres of cotton.

ABEL. You also have some relationship with the Agricultural Labor Bureau of the San Joaquin Valley, have you not?

FRICK. Yes.

ABEL. Of what is the membership of the San Joaquin Labor Bureau composed?

FRICK. Chambers of Commerce, fresh fruit, dried fruit, cotton, farm bureaus.

ABEL. How long has the labor bureau been in existence?

FRICK. 8 years.

ABEL. How long have you been with it?

FRICK. 7 years.

ABEL. What was your relationship to the Bureau?

FRICK. President of the Bureau.

ABEL. Do you know the date that the wage for cotton picking was fixed this year?

FRICK. About September 15th.

ABEL. Were you present at that time?

FRICK. Yes, I was.

ABEL. Will you explain how that wage was fixed?

FRICK. The Bureau has never established any wage scales. We supply labor when the farmers need it; make recommendations to farmers as to prices to be paid for getting employers help. Of the cotton acreage in the Valley there was about 90% present. A price of 60 cents was settled upon for the 1933 crop.

---

[1] See pt. 53, p. 19495.

Last year's price was 40¢ on the basis of 6¢ cotton and this year it is 50% higher with only a 35% increase in the price of cotton.

Abel. The wage fixed for picking of cotton in 1933 is the result of concerted action on the part of growers?

Frick. Yes.

Abel. Was that the price on which cotton was based last year?

Frick. A big majority.

Abel. Any labor trouble?

Frick. No.

Cross. What is the price of cotton at the present time?

Frick. Approximately 9¢.

Cross. Has cotton been selling for less than that?

Frick. Yes, sir.

Cross. And some has been sold for more than that?

Frick. Yes, sir. Of course there are varying prices on different grades of cotton.

Abel. The grade differs with the land and the farmer?

Frick. Yes, sir.

Abel. Do you recall the wage fixed in 1931?

Frick. 50¢ per hundred.

Abel. Was it adhered to by all the growers that year?

Frick. Yes, sir.

Abel. What was the wage scale in 1930?

Frick. 75¢ per hundred.

Abel. What was the price of cotton that year?

Frick. I cannot remember but believe about ten cents.

A. L. Wirin (Attorney for Pickers' Committee). What proportion of the growers would you say, in terms of acreage, paid 50¢ instead of 40¢?

Frick. I do not know.

Wirin. Do you know of any growers who paid 50?

Frick. No.

Wirin. Was it not being stated in the community that some growers paid 50¢?

Frick. Yes.

Wirin. About how much cotton does the average cotton picker pick?

Frick. 300 to 350 pounds per day.

Wirin. How much can a woman pick?

Frick. 300 to 350 pounds per day was an average for both men and women.

Wirin. How much in terms of dollars and cents does the average picker earn on the basis of a six day week at 60¢ per hundred?

Frick. $11 to $12 per week. This is the average for both men and women. I do not have actual figures. This is a guess.

Wirin. If we were to show you figures that the average picker makes from $7 to $8 per week would you say this is incorrect?

Frick. I would say not correct.

Wirin. If we showed figures that women make from $6 to $7 per week for a six day week would you say that was incorrect?

Frick. Yes—incorrect.

Wirin. What factors do the growers take into consideration when they fixed the price of 60¢ per hundred as a fair wage? Did you take into consideration what the worker could buy working at the rate of 60¢ per hundred?

Frick. No sir.

Wirin. Did you take into consideration the habitation and the needs of these workers?

Frick. Yes. Nearly all were furnished by the growers.

Wirin. What is furnished by the growers?

Frick. Cabins, free wood, water, lights, stoves, beds.

Pat Chambers. The statement is made that the San Joaquin Valley Labor Bureau fixes the labor rate.

[Note.—No definite comment made on this.]

Wirin. Do the farmers furnish workers with sacks?

Frick. No.

Wirin. Do the ranchers furnish overalls?

Frick. No.

Wirin. Gas and oil?

Frick. No, they have no occasion to use them.

Dr. Cross. What is the cost of a picking bag?

Frick. $1.00 to $1.25. They last one season.

Wirin. How long does the picking season last?

Frick. From 4 to 5 months.

Wirin. How many picking days are there in the season, on the average? Taking into consideration time out for rain, time for crop to mature, etc.

Frick. I have no record.

Dr. Cross. Do you know the average number of working days in the season? How much do the workers lose in time? That is, do you say a worker loses a week or a month in a season?

Abel. Depends upon the character of the weather. There are gaps in the season on account of the rate of boll development.

Dr. Cross. Have you no data on the average number of picking days?

Abel. No. The Chamber does not know.

Dr. Cross. It is very necessary for us to have this data. Can you get it?

Abel. I will look into the matter.

CARTER LEWIS, California Cotton Growers Association of Bakersfield.

Abel. Where do you reside?

Lewis. Bakersfield. I represent the California Cotton Growers Association which has been in existence since 1927.

Abel. How many farmers are in your membership?

Lewis. About 800.

Abel. Have you any figures as to the fixation price of cotton by membership for this last season?

Lewis. Sold 32,000 bales at 9.25 per hundred FOB Bakersfield. Average price based on middling cotton December market.

Abel. Where do you get those figures?

Lewis. From the records of the Cotton Growers Association.

Abel. About how many acres were planted this year?

Lewis. I do not have that information.

Dr. Cross. May I ask what is the location of these 800 farmers?

Lewis. The San Joaquin Valley from Chowchilla to Bakersfield, and as far south as they raise cotton except that we do not go out of the San Joaquin Valley.

Dr. Cross. You state that the price of cotton is fixed in the international market or the national market?

Lewis. Well, I guess it would take an expert to discuss that. We get daily market quotations as shown on the N. Y. Cotton Exchange and they are used by us in fixing prices.

Dr. Cross. What is the object of your organization?

Lewis. It is a cooperative marketing association. We are part of the American Cotton Association of New Orleans.

Dr. Cross. Do you advance money upon the bill of lading, cotton or what?

Lewis. We advance money upon the growing cotton.

Dr. Cross. What is the rate of interest this year?

Lewis. 6½%.

Dr. Cross. Why do they pay 6½% when they can get cheaper money elsewhere?

Lewis. They do not get the service.

Abel. A number of the growers would like to know how they can get lower rates, and how they can get these loans.

Cross. Financing has something to do with the price of cotton? What does the Intermediate Credit Bank of Berkeley charge?

Lewis. 3½%.

Cross. Do you take care of the marketing of the cotton?

Lewis. Yes, we pick up the cotton from the gin yard, have it compressed and ship to world ports.

Cross. Does the association own gins?

Lewis. No. We loan money to growers who are members of the cooperative association. No money is loaned to gins.

Cross. What proportion of growers are in your association?

Lewis. Quite a number of them.

Cross. Would you say 70 or 80 per cent?

Lewis. I cannot say.

Cross. Your association has nothing whatever to do with the labor policy of the growers?

Lewis. No, sir.

Wirin. Have cotton prices gone up?

Lewis. No, sir.

Wirin. Are growers expecting the 10 cent price level before another season?

Lewis. No, sir.

Wirin. What price do you expect cotton to reach before the season is over?

Lewis. I would not say.

W. D. Hammett (striker). With cotton at 9.25 and 50 points added it would sell at 9.75 for delivery in December.

Lewis. I believe the average would be 35 points.

Hammett. That would make 9.60.

Lewis. We require the grower to sign up with us to market his cotton through us for two years.

Hammett. If cotton was sold nine months ago at 8 cents per pound then would not that cotton have been picked regardless of the present price of commodities?

Lewis. Yes.

Abel. You take a chattel mortgage when you loan money do you not?

Lewis. Yes, a chattel is secured on nearly everything the grower has.

Dr. Cross. Say a man agrees to sell you his cotton, do you make him sell at 9.25?

Lewis. No. When cotton is 7 cents per pound and the grower wants to borrow money on it we ask him can you raise cotton at 7 cents per pound? If you cannot afford to grow it at 7 cents we cannot loan you on 7 cents. We sell a small percentage of his crop at the market price on the day we sell it. Each day you will find market quotations on the N. Y. Market Exchange. On the day the cotton is sold to us we hedge to prevent loss on a decline of the market.

Dr. Cross. He shares co-operatively in that action?

Lewis. Yes. We do not speculate on the market for any one.

Hammett. Mr. Lewis, if you loan at 7 cents per pound on a 500 pound bale that would bring $35 would it not?

Lewis. Yes.

Hammett. That bale has to be grown, picked and harvested within $35 regardless of how much it cost?

Lewis. Yes, sir. We do not loan a man the full amount. It is our policy this year to advance $15 or $20 per acre.

Dr. Cross. What does that amount to on a bale?

Lewis. We do not figure on that basis.

Dr. Cross. How much does that man make off an acre of cotton?

Lewis. 440 pounds per acre at 9.16. About $36 plus.

Abel. We have a lot of that kind of information available. When is the first month the Association sells any cotton?

Lewis. Depends upon the grower, his attitude as to price at the time. The price fluctuates so much even during the Spring months the average is 7 to 10 cents. The average Fall count will run 35 points at present.

Abel. Will all this cotton be sold at 9.60?

Lewis. At present 3 to 5 cents less.

Abel. These contracts you have entered into at 9.25 are dependent entirely upon the quality of the cotton, delivery under contract? Some of the cotton sold later in the season sells about 3¢ off from the basic price.

Wirin. Do you know whether or not the 60 cents per hundred price was given consideration by the cotton growers on the 7¢ per pound price?

Lewis. No.

Hammett. Are you the only cotton financing company in the San Joaquin Valley?

Lewis. Yes.

Dr. Cross. What is meant by an independent grower?

Lewis. That means that he does not borrow any money on his crop.

Dr. Cross. It does not mean that he does not belong to the Association?

Lewis. No, sir.

Abel. Do you know of any growers in the Valley who are able to finance their own cotton?

Lewis. No, sir.

Abel. Would they belong to the Association still if they could finance themselves?

Lewis. Yes. The Intermediate Credit Corporation is a subsidiary of the farm credit association and has only been in operation a few years.

H. E. WOODWARD, Director California Cotton Growers Association. Farmer and cotton grower.

Abel. Where do you reside?

Woodward. Bakersfield. I am a farmer and cotton grower. Have been seven years in the Bakersfield District and have 300 acres of cotton. I am a director of the California Cotton Cooperative Association.

Abel. Have you any information as to the number of growers of that Association who required financing this season?

Woodward. No.

Abel. You have some familiarity with conditions in the valley?

Woodward. We estimated that there were about 5% of the growers in the Valley who were independent growers; another 5% do their financing through the Bank, the balance through financing companies or other processes.

Abel. How long have you been picking?

Woodward. Two weeks.

Abel. With how many men?

Woodward. 50 to 100.

Abel. How about the amount picked?

Woodward. I have figures for the last three days on some 30 or 40 men and women:

White men, Monday 421 lbs; Tuesday 293 lbs; Weds. 373 lbs.
Colored man, wife, Monday 553 lbs; Tuesday 585 lbs; Weds. 958 lbs. (with daughter help).
Colored man, Monday 407 lbs; Tuesday 207 lbs; Weds. 414 lbs.
White man and daughter, Monday 614 lbs; Tuesday 607 lbs; Weds. 641 lbs.
Colored man and wife, Monday 409 lbs; Tuesday 367 lbs; Weds. 374 lbs.
Colored man and wife, Monday 606 lbs; Tuesday 634 lbs; Weds. 210 lbs.
White man and daughter, Monday 589 lbs; Tuesday 331 lbs; Weds. 443 lbs.
Colored man, Tuesday 332 lbs; Weds. 322 lbs.
White man, Monday 265 lbs; Tuesday 299 lbs; Weds. 283 lbs.

(At this point Mr. Woodward submitted the remainder of his figures to the committee for record.)

Woodward. Our crew has averaged slightly over 300 pounds per person. One man, the first day he ever picked, picked 151 pounds, the second day 169 and the third 160 pounds.

Abel. How many hours per day?

Woodward. The hours vary. The women work shorter hours than the men as they have to prepare the meals, etc. The average picker on our ranch last week was out between seven and eight and in about 4:30. The picking started somewhat later on account of moisture conditions.

Abel: How many days per week?

Woodward. We attempt to work six days a week. On Saturday the crew is always short and quit about noon.

Abel. Have you any estimate of the number of days a week the pickers work?

Woodward. They started about Sept. 1st last year and it was after the first of October. Depending upon the season, we pick up to the 1st or the 15th of February.

Dr. Cross. Have you any record of the picking days in the year?

Woodward. No.

Dr. Cross. Would they lose one month?

Woodward. No. Our boys at the ranch work right through except for weather interference.

Archbishop Hanna. Is the employment steady when they move from ranch to ranch?

Woodward. Our boys have pretty steady work.

Wirin. How many days during the average season are there that they cannot pick?

Woodward. Considerably less than a month.

Wirin. The figures you gave were for the last few days. Have you any figures of last season?

Woodward. I do not have everything here. I did not know I was going to be here until this noontime.

Wirin. Would you say that the average picker picks an average of 200 pounds per day during the season?

WOODWARD. The average on our ranch is about 300 pounds.

WIRIN. Is there anything particular about your ranch that would account for this higher scale?

WOODWARD. Not particularly. We have experienced men. I know that I could not pick over 150 pounds.

WIRIN. You are not willing to state that 200 pounds per day is an average figure?

WOODWARD. It might be in the Valley but not on my ranch.

WIRIN. Is it not accepted by the ranchers that the average picker picks no more than 200 pounds a day?

WOODWARD. I never heard an opinion expressed by a rancher.

WIRIN. You have never heard an opinion expressed?

WOODWARD. I have never heard it expressed in averages. I would hear what certain people would pick.

WIRIN. How early do the pickers start?

WOODWARD. The foreman gets out about 6 A. M. It depended upon moisture conditions.

WIRIN. How late would they work?

WOODWARD. Up until 5 P. M. or to complete the bag or row they happened to be working on.

WIRIN. Any requirements as to the hours they have to work?

WOODWARD. No. As early as they want or late as they please.

HAMMETT. During the Fall season are there not quite a few days in which the pickers cannot go out?

WOODWARD. Yes.

HAMMETT. Is it not true that one half of the time they cannot pick?

WOODWARD. No, I cannot say, but it is not an extended period.

HAMMETT. When it rains in the San Joaquin Valley how many days are they kept out of the field?

WOODWARD. It depends upon how much rain.

HAMMETT. You say the average man can pick 300 pounds in good weather. At the end of the season hasn't he done well if he has averaged 200 pounds per day?

WOODWARD. I cannot state.

HAMMETT. If a man picks cotton all the Fall and his average was 200 pounds a day would you not say he had done good in averaging 200 pounds—would you not say he had done well? Picking from sun up to sun down?

WOODWARD. I cannot answer.

HAMMETT. Assuming the average picker works every day and he has a number of working days off because of rain. Assuming that at the end of the season he has picked an average of 200 pounds per day, that season, would you say that was above the average: Or below the average?

WOODWARD. I cannot tell you. I would say that this picker loses no more than the average farm laborer.

ABEL. How many times do you pick over the crop?

WOODWARD. Two times, perhaps more.

ABEL. Any increase in wage for the second picking?

WOODWARD. We have raised the picking prices some years; some year not.

HAMMETT. That means that you may have to go back and pick the third time?

WOODWARD. Yes.

HAMMETT. The time depends upon the weather?

WOODWARD. Partly.

HAMMETT. Is there ever an increase in wage on the third picking?

WOODWARD. I do not recall on my ranch more than two pickings.

HAMMETT. Do fogs interfere with the picking?

WOODWARD. Fogs affects the quality of the cotton and reduce the price the farmer gets.

WIRIN. Does a worker pick less on the third picking than on the first picking?

WOODWARD. Of course, we are talking about an average.

WIRIN. Would you consider 60¢ per hundred in 1933 a fair American wage?

WOODWARD. Yes, sir. We picked all our crop at 40¢. We had no third picking.

WIRIN. You consider 60¢ the maximum amount which the growers are willing to pay regarding the price of cotton?

WOODWARD. On this basis this will leave no return on the investment for ourselves.

WIRIN. How much money does the average grower have to borrow in order to get his crop completely harvested?

WOODWARD. He has to borrow right from the beginning.

W. H. PARSONS, cotton grower.

Abel. Are you growing this year?

Parsons. Yes, 1200 acres about 12 miles north of Barkersfield. I have been growing cotton since 1927 in this location.

Abel. Have you prepared a statement of costs of production applicable to your operations this year?

Parsons. Yes, I worked out two sets of figures (Mr. Parsons turned over typed costs of production statements to the Committee for record). We have to get out about 20 bales of cotton per day. We have to have 100 pickers who average 300 pounds per person per day. A good picker picks 400 per day. They work 8 or 9 hours a day. They work when they want to and they quit whenever they have made what they think is enough for that day. Many of our best pickers have returned to Los Angeles until this trouble blows over. In one case we had a man who did not want to be a row boss at $12 per week because he could make more money picking. The 100 picker crew on our ranch will average 300 pounds. Some turn out less of course—some only 125 pounds due to short hours or they are relations or for some other reasons. We furnish cabins, lights, water, etc.

Abel. Have you the approximate cost of production?

Parsons. On our 1200 acres we were out $18,050 before picking,—up to September 1st.

Abel. What is your average production?

Parsons. We average a little less than a bale to the acre—1075–1100 on 1200 acres.

Abel. At 69¢ per hundred for picking charges do you go in the hole?

Parsons. Just about break even.

Hammett. You say you furnish cabins?

Parsons. Yes; the houses are 1, 2 or 3 rooms depending upon the size of the family.

Hammett. How many live in those cabins?

Parsons. As a rule the families are not large.

Hammett. Do the children pick cotton on your ranch?

Parsons. On Saturdays some times.

Hammett. What is school age?

Parsons. 18 years. From 16 to 18 they can get a working permit.

Hammett. Does not this 300 pounds per day include children?

Parsons. No, that is on our particular ranch. They are not a factor in our section at all.

(Mr. Parsons listed various costs for cropping, irrigating, etc. which he turned over to the Committee for record.)

Hammett. Do you consider $8.10 a fair wage?

Parsons. Yes. Our pickers have been happy and healthy. The average picker lives on from $2 to $2.25 for his food.

Hammett. Do you consider that a fair American standard of living?

Parsons. I cannot comment on that but can only say this is what they pay for their food.

Abel. Are the growers responsible for the presence of children in the cotton fields?

Parsons. We do not put them in the fields.

Abel. Are they not there at the insistence of their parents?

Parsons. Yes.

Hammett. But you do not discharge them.

Hammett. Do you know whether the cabins, water, lights, etc. you speak of are furnished free by all the ranches?

Parsons. It is my impression that this is quite general.

Hammett. If a man is not furnished his house, wood, lights, etc. do you think he should be forced to pick at the same rate as one who does receive these things?

Parsons. I would not like to say.

L. T. ROBINSON, employee of J. G. Boswell Co., Corcoran growers and processors of cotton.

Abel. Does Boswell finance other growers?

Robinson. Yes.

Abel. Have you costs of production of growers who have been financed by Boswell Co.?

Robinson. Yes.

Abel. I would like to ask you whether or not you know whether those costs are accurate.

Robinson. They are taken from our records. We financed the growers on these properties and maintain accurate records of their cost of production.

(Mr. Robinson turned over to the committee for record itemized costs of production of several growers financed by the Boswell Co.).

Hammett. In your statements did you not say that the farmer's labor was not included in the costs?

Robinson. The item is known as living expenses for the farmer.

Hammett. The fact is, Boswell loaned $20.06. A certain amount was set aside as living expenses for the farmer, chopping, power, etc.

Hammett. When cotton was sold at 8/05 per pound on a 500 pound bale it would amount to $40.

Hammett. For what period was cotton sold for 12¢?

Robinson. About 24 hours.

Hammett. How high has cotton been this season?

Robinson. 12.18 approximately.

Hammett. How high has it been this month?

Robinson. Approximately 10.25.

Hammett. Have you any idea as to the average?

Robinson. No sir; there was a quotation every day and the average can be worked out.

J. W. GUIBERSON, rancher and banker at Corcoran, has farmed here for 45 years. Been in Corcoran since 1905. Growing cotton since 1920. Has 500 acres but plowed 125.

Abel. Did you prepare any statement as to the amount of cotton picked per day on your ranch?

Guiberson. I took the following actual account yesterday: 35 Mexican men, women and some children, picked 996 pounds, average 284½ per picker at 60¢ would be $1.70 per day.

White crew averaged 387½ pounds at 60¢, would be 2.32½¢ per day. We are paying for ranch labor $1.50 per day. I think the fact finding committee should look into two things: (1) Cost of production, how much the farmer can pay and break even. (2) How much can the picker afford to pick for and maintain a reasonable living standard.

My costs of production at 60¢ per hundred for the picking, and estimating 500 pounds to the acre as the yield, and estimating $13 per ton for seed, not including any personal supervision, will give me $4.85 to the acre to the good which will probably pay something for the personal supervision. These are our costs, they may vary with other ranchers. I think you should go into these two questions and see for yourselves rather than attempt to find out from the figures you get here.

Abel. What would you say as to the number of cotton ranches which are under mortgage?

Guiberson. Most of them are.

Abel. Most of them have principal and interest to meet.

Guiberson. Yes, or else they lose their ranches.

Wirin. You stated that one of the things this committee should take into consideration is the amount a picker can be expected to live on.

Guiberson. Yes, sir.

Wirin. You show $1.50 per day for pickers on your ranch? Is that for a six day week?

Guiberson. Yes. Nine hours per day.

Wirin. Do you consider that a fair American rate?

Guiberson. I can answer that by asking you whether it is fair for the American farmer to have been working for nothing for the past few years.

Wirin. What has been your budget for food, automobile, movies and other interests, or comforts of life?

Guiberson. I cannot answer that. I can only say I have lost money in farming.

Wirin. You drive a Pierce-Arrow automobile?

Guiberson. Yes, but I did not buy it this year.

Wirin. You would say that the average cotton picker picks 200 pounds a day during the season that would be a fair average?

Guiberson. That depends upon climatic conditions. There is nothing that stops picking except rains. When he gets one job done on a ranch he goes to another.

Wirin. Let us take the last two years in the San Joaquin Valley. Would you say that the average cotton picker picked more than 200 pounds per day?

Guiberson. I would say he averaged more than 200 pounds.

Wirin. What is your judgment as to what the average cotton picker picks?

Guiberson. I do not want to state. It would only be a guess.

Mr. **Bravo**, Mexican Consul, presented typed records of costs of living, etc., for the records.

Caroline Decker commented to the effect that Consul Bravo does not represent either the Mexican or American cotton pickers.

Meeting adjourned at 6 o'clock, until 8:30 Friday morning, Oct. 20th.

Hearing Held on the Cotton Strike in San Joaquin Valley by the Fact Finding Committee Appointed by James Rolph, Jr., Governor of the State of California, Held in Visalia. Second Day, October 20, 1933

Members of the Committee present: Archbishop E. J. Hanna, Chairman, Dr. Ira B. Cross, Prof. of Economics, University of California, Berk., Dr. Tully Knoles, President of the College of the Pacific, Stockton. Approximately 800 persons present. Meeting held in the Civic Auditorium. Called to order by Chairman Archbishop Hanna at Nine o'clock A. M.

L. D. ELLETT, Corcoran cotton farmer and cotton gin man.

Abel. How long have you been in that occupation?

Ellett. Thirty or forty years.

Abel. How long have you been in the Corcoran area?

Ellett. Eight years.

Abel. Are you familiar with the costs of production of Hart Bros. Inc.

Ellett. Yes, sir.

Abel. Can you state if those costs on that sheet are correct?

Ellett. Mr. Hart got this statement up and these are actual figures of the bookkeeper.

[Note.—Sheet of costs of production of Hart Bros. Inc. filed with Committee.]

Abel. Will you state from your experience whether those costs are representative of the Corcoran area?

Ellett. They are a fair average.

Dr. Cross. How can you say they are a fair average. Yesterday none of the growers could produce actual figures on the average number of days worked by the pickers and yet it is possible for you to tell us that those costs are average for the Corcoran area. How can you say that the costs of this one man would be representative costs for the whole Corcoran area?

Abel. I do not know, but I think you are in error when you have the impression that the average number of days of work has anything to do with the cost of picking cotton.

Cross. Yesterday we were trying to get at the average day's work of a picker and the average number of days they worked. These averages we could not get from the growers. Now on costs of production which are so hard to get the growers are able to produce these costs.

Abel. Well, it is due to difference of view point. The growers are only incidentally interested in the days of work of pickers. The pickers run around the country and the growers have no means of keeping a record of the average number of days worked by the individual. I can point out to you and you can see for yourself that it is practically impossible for the growers to get such a record.

Dr. Cross. Some of your growers keep their men throughout the year do they not?

Abel. Some of the men undoubtedly pick for the growers throughout the season.

Cross. We are very desirous of ascertaining the income of these pickers. We want the information from the growers as well as the pickers. Undoubtedly the strikers will present their data upon the matter and we want the data from the growers as well. We could get an estimate of average costs from the growers but could not get an estimate of the average days work of pickers and the average picking for a day.

Abel. So far as the average number of days of the pickers go the only way we can find out is to find out what the average picker picks on an average day and by taking the amount per 100 pounds, find out what he gets and find out what he earns throughout the season, but it is my opinion that very few growers do this.

Wirin. Mr. Abel says the growers are concerned only incidentally with the income of the pickers. That is our contention that the growers have only been concerned with the income of the farmer and not of the picker.

Abel. That is the trouble with your side. You are not concerned with the income of the farmer.

Ellett. I represent the Pacific Cotton Seed Corporation who finance a great many of these farmers. In the Corcoran district we advance on somewhere between ⅓ and ¼ of the acreage. I am basing that on the average for the Valley. I think our growers on their side and on the side of the finance companies will average about the same as other finance companies. I find they run about the same.

Abel. From your experience can you state what percentage of the cotton raised in the Corcoran area is ginned prior to December 1st?

Ellett. Somewhere between 80 and 85 per cent.

Abel. Do you know whether that percentage is true throughout the Valley?

Ellett. The Valley runs about the same.

Abel. Have you any information as to the percentage of bad weather up to January 15th?

Ellett. Up to January 15 as a general thing we have a few light rains and some fog.

Abel. What can you say as to the supply of pickers after December 1st.

Ellett. A great many people come in here to pick and as a general thing they go out just as soon as the bad weather starts. Remnants of cotton are picked by the home people.

Abel. Have you any figures on the average earnings of each family?

Ellett. Yes, it depends upon the size of the family, how many able bodied men and women, children, old people, etc. that are picking. I would say that a family averages from $3 to $10 per day.

Abel. Do you find that cotton picking affords an opportunity for labor by people who would not be employed in other occupations?

Ellett. There are a great many people who would not be able to do manual work but who can pick cotton.

Abel. Is it fixed what the average amount is that a picker can pick?

Ellett. All men will not pick the same. An experienced person can pick from 300 to 400 pounds a day.

Abel. Are amateurs included?

Ellett. No. Older women and women who are not strong naturally cannot pick as much as an able bodied woman. I find there are lots of people who pick cotton in the Fall who never make a dollar at any other time.

Abel. Are children employed in the cotton fields to any extent?

Ellett. No. On Saturdays the pickers usually quit at noon, draw their money at that time. On Saturday mornings the children pick some. If the farmer finds children in the fields he orders them to leave.

Abel. The farmers do not employ these children?

Ellett. Not if they know it. They often pick a small amount of cotton and put it in the parents' sack.

Abel. Do you think the amount of cotton picked by the children has any significance?

Ellett. No.

Abel. Do you handle the selling of cotton for farmers?

Ellett. Yes.

Abel. Do you handle all the cotton of the farmers you finance?

Ellett. Not all.

Abel. But you do handle a substantial percentage?

Ellett. If the farmer comes in to get a loan for his cotton crop during the season it is seldom the cotton is sold until it is up. He will sign up with the association to sell at the best of our ability. We always consult the rancher first. We always have him sign an authorization. We do not buy it. We have two outlets for buying and whichever pays the most we sell it to. The farmer gets what the cotton is sold for.

Abel. Have you any more to add?

Ellett. The later pickings are left in the field. They always get more money for that picking. We term it third picking—bolly crop. There is no set price for picking bolly. There will be a group of pickers who will pick the bolly crop and have it ginned and then give us a dollar or two a bale. Some farmers think it better to plow it under.

Dr. Cross. Have any growers paid more than 60¢

Ellett. I do not think so.

Dr. Cross. Are you having any violence down your way?

Ellett. There has been quite a lot of trouble and excitement in this way: If a man has a bunch of pickers in his field picking cotton and living there; maybe they do not belong to the strikers and then these people come out in trucks and go into the fields and urge the pickers to quit.

Dr. Cross. The strikers have trespassed on land owned by ranchers?

Ellett. Yes, sir.

Dr. Cross. You say this is still going on?

Ellett. Yes, sir.

Dr. Cross. Would you say you had adequate protection in your community?

Ellett. I would not say that. We have had the sheriff and two deputies. The highway patrol is in and out.

Dr. Cross. What has the highway patrol been doing?

Ellett. When the strikers go out and congest the road the Highway patrol keep the roads open.

Dr. Cross. Have they been doing anything else besides keep the road open?

Ellett. No; we have a great many inquiries from all classes of people that they would like to pick cotton as soon as it is quiet. The agitators go out and scare them out of the fields.

Dr. Cross. Has there been a clash between the State Highway Patrol and the strikers?

Ellett. No; from what I can see the Highway people have been just as nice to one side as to another.

Dr. Cross. Are the growers satisfied with the present police protection?

Ellett. The growers would like to have protection so that people who went to work would be allowed to work.

Dr. Cross. Is it customary to live on the ranches or to live in camps?

Ellett. Both ways. Lots of them have homes and go back and forth and pick cotton. The people who come into the country are furnished tents or cabins by the ranchers and they stay there.

Dr. Cross. If the strikers were to try to get to these men they would have to trespass on the property of the grower?

Ellett. Yes, sir. In some instances they send a woman in.

Dr. Cross. Have the State Highway patrol tried to keep the strikers off the main roads and on the side roads?

Ellett. They have not tried to keep them off of any roads that I know of at any time. At Corcoran when they began to drive their car out and load them with people to pick one or two of the Highway patrols generally come up and go in the procession just to keep the road open but do not prevent them from going.

Hammett. Are you a cotton farmer?

Ellett. Yes.

Hammett. Do you go out in the fields and work yourself?

Ellett. I do not. The way we farm is by partner with Harold Botts. He and I have one partnership and then my wife has farmed 160 acres for five years and she goes down on that ranch. She does not go out in the field and work because it takes all her time to pick the personnel and see that the work is being carried on properly.

Hammett. You are not a real farmer?

Ellett. I was born and raised on a farm.

Hammett. Did you not make the statement that you represented the Pacific Finance Company?

Ellett. Yes.

Hammett. Do you not draw full pay for part of your time?

Ellett. I consider that a personal affair.

Hammett. Is it not a fact that in the Corcoran District there is an arrangement whereby the school children go to school half a day and pick cotton half a day?

Ellett. No.

Hammett. You say some families made from $3 to $10 per day picking?

Ellett. Yes sir.

Hammett. You said that at 60¢ a hundred 1,500 pounds of cotton would be $9.00?

Hammett. You told this committee that the children working in the fields did not amount to anything?

Ellett. I did not say that children did not amount to anything. I told them it was not a large percentage, that they were living with their parents and the whole family would have to pick 1,500 pounds to make $9.00.

Miss **Decker.** I am sorry but the Strikers' Committee refuses to go on unless the Chairman, Pat Chambers, is present.

Wirin. The District Attorney's office promised that Pat Chambers would be present at this meeting and if he is not present I do not think this meeting should go on.

[**Note.**—Pat Chambers arrives with two deputies.]

Abel. In this computation you made of $9.00 how many people were contributing to that sum of money?

Ellett. This is an average of families. When a picker from Mexico comes into the community he brings his entire family which consists of himself, wife, perhaps their parents and sometimes other old people. This would be the general family. Maybe one or two of the old people pick some cotton, the women quit in time to prepare the meals. This does not mean that the whole family picks cotton all day long and that all the people are cotton pickers.

Abel. Are the grown children included, and do they contribute to that amount?

Ellett. Yes; old people and children.

Abel. The question of schools was brought up. What school facilities are provided for the children of the pickers?

Ellett. The school laws require that school children of school age go to school and they are sent. If a farmer did not see that they went to school he would be arrested.

Abel. They have a system of migratory schools?

Ellett. Yes. Where necessary, they are maintained for the children of the cotton pickers.

Abel. Do the cotton pickers contribute anything to the maintenance of these schools?

Ellett. No.

Wirin. This figure of $9.00 which includes a family, might include six or nine or ten people?

Ellett. Yes. Some of them old, young, sick, etc.

Wirin. Would it be an average for a family of six?

Ellett. No, it might be any number.

ROY M. FILCHER.

Abel. Where do you reside?

Filcher. Corcoran. I am a farm manager.

Abel. Do you raise any cotton?

Filcher. No, sir.

Abel. What do you raise?

Filcher. Live stock, wheat, grains, alfalfa, hogs.

Abel. How many men do you employ?

Filcher. 15 to 30.

Abel. For what purpose do you employ these men?

Filcher. Foremen, irrigators, cook, milker, truckmen, farm hands, teamsters and laborers.

Abel. What wage do you pay these people?

Filcher. I have a copy of the payroll here.

Milkers with board, about 11 hrs	$1.50	per day
Irrigators " " " 9 "	1.35	" "
Hog man with board, about 10 hrs	1.35	" "
Tractor drivers "	1.00	" "
Truck " "	1.00	" "
Cook "	1.50	" "
Ranch hands, teamsters, hay pitchers, men who look after stock, men who pump water, with board	1.00	" "
Roustabouts " "	.75	" "

Also work a few men who board themselves and get $1.50 per day.

Abel. You run a boarding house for these men and make investigations as to how much your costs for running the boarding house has increased over last year?

Filcher. We have our own milk and eggs. It cost 51¢ per day to board them in September 1932, three meals a day. We have our own meat which we charge at cost. In September 1933 it was 56¢, an increase of about 9½%. That I think is a fair average of the cost of furnishing board to these men.

Abel. This wage scale is considerably lower than it was four years ago?

Filcher. Four years ago it was $2.50 per day; three years ago we paid $2.00 and broke even; two years ago we paid $1.50 and lost money; last year we paid $1.00 per day and we will about break even. We do not have to pay any interest.

Abel. You say you broke even—you have not charged yourself any interest.

Filcher. No interest. I am paid a salary for supervision and a share of the profits. I drive a second hand Ford.

Hammett. I do not think his evidence has anything to do with the cotton strike at all. We can easily see that the N. R. A. has no effect on him. He lets men work for 75¢ a day and board.

Filcher. The man who gets the 75¢ is old and is lucky to get that much. Most of the men are married and have families and do not live there. We are furnishing labor to these men and as the N. R. A. takes hold and we make progress undoubtedly we will distribute these profits.

Hammett. In the words of the President of the United States any industry which cannot pay a living wage should close its doors.

ERNEST A. MERRITT, of Merritt and Ochletree, Madera.

Abel. Do you grow cotton?

Merritt. Yes, 420 acres.

Abel. Do you raise anything besides cotton?

Merritt. Yes.

Abel. How long have you been growing cotton?

Merritt. Four years. My partner since 1914.

Abel. Have you prepared a statement of costs of production?

Merritt. Yes.

Abel. That statement was obtained where?

Merritt. Off of our books and off of the gin statements.

Abel. Do you know of your own knowledge that the facts set forth are true and correct?

Merritt. Yes.

Abel. Will you state what the result is?

Merritt. The total cost per acre on an estimated yield of 440 pounds is $39.03; the returns from the lint figures 9.16—$40.30, ginning costs $4.55. Returns on seed $4.96 less ginning costs of $4.45 leaves a net return of 41¢. There was a net profit of $1.68.

Abel. You are picking cotton now?

Merritt. We started two weeks ago last Monday.

Abel. How many pickers?

Merritt. 32.

Abel. Have you a statement as to the amount of cotton pickers pick per day?

Merritt. Yes. The cotton was not opened as well last week as it is this week. The more it is open the easier it is to pick.

Abel. How much did the 32 pickers average?

Merritt. 260 pounds. The range was from 200 pounds up to 1,400 pounds by two families.

Abel. You heard Mr. Filcher's statement as to the wages paid common labor in Corcoran. Is that true for Madera?

Merritt. It runs from $1.25 per day without board.

Dr. Cross. With board how much?

Merritt. We do not usually board them. I do not know.

Wirin. How many persons in these families picking 1,400 pounds?

Merritt. Five in each family.

Wirin. Ten persons picking 1400 pounds. Do you use a weigher?

Merritt. There were four persons in the first family and five pickers in the second family.

Wirin. They picked 1400 pounds a day each?

Wirin. You have given a figure of 250 pounds for each day last week. Every day last week was a picking day. The average over the entire season when you take out for rain and fog would be less than 250?

Merritt. Yes, sir.

Wirin. You stated that the income per acre was something over $1.00. In arriving at that figure did you include living expenses?

Merritt. Absolutely not.

Wirin. When you made out the budget $50 per month was set aside for yourself and partner?

Merritt. Yes.

Wirin. But that figure of $1.00 was arrived at above living expenses.

Merritt. I took $50 out of the budget for my partner and myself but it came out of other farm products and not out of cotton.

H. V. EASTMAN, Chowchilla.

Abel. What is your occupation?

Eastman. Rancher and in addition handle rental ranches on nonresident rancher land owners.

Abel. Are you a cotton raiser?

Eastman. I have not personally operated any ranch for three years. But I rent ranches and in that way come in contact with cotton growers.

Abel. You have had some experience in cotton raising?

Merritt. Three years ago I grew cotton every year and among other things rented ranches on a 50-50 basis with an average of as high as 25 to 30 rentals a year.

Abel. Have you made a study of the cost of producing cotton in the San Joaquin Valley in 1933?

Merritt. Mr. Eckman (a Kern County grower) and myself were members of a committee appointed by the Farm Bureau and one of the duties of that Bureau was to make a study of these costs. ' We took data which we found available from Tulare County and also from adjoining counties and did arrive at several sets of cost figures.

Abel. Have you prepared a computation of costs of production which you ascertained from the study of these records?

Merritt. We have.

[Note.—Copies of this cost statement given to the Committee and to Attorney Wirin.]

[Note.—Caroline Decker, Secretary of the Uuion and Central Strike Committee, Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union, rendered a brief summary of the strike for the benefit of the committee and before calling upon witnesses. She read a statement about the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union, the main office of which is in San Jose. Outlined the organization structure of the Union. Read a statement of the progress of the cotton strike. Read a statement from the newspaper on the Corcoran camp addressed to Mexicans. This newspaper was turned over to Professor Cross. Miss Decker stated that three growers in Bakersfield are now paying $1.00 per 100 pounds for picking. Stressed the necessity of breaking contracts of growers with gins and financing companies. She read wage demands of the strikers. Miss Decker stated growers stores are supposed to be non-profit but they add 20%.]

Dr. Cross. Do they only charge this extra 20% to pickers?

Decker. No; they would probably charge every one alike.

[Note.—Miss Decker read table of comparative costs of living as indicated by prices of various foodstuffs, clothing and other necessities.]

Decker. On September 19th the Agricultural Labor Bureau met at the Californian Hotel in Fresno and at which meeting the price was set for picking cotton. At this meeting we had several representatives from the pickers' union but they were not recognized; at this meeting the demands of the Union were presented to the growers. It is a false statement that we did not make their views known. At the meeting of the growers one of the growers got up and said that he could pay $1 and would pay $1.

[Note.—At this point Miss Decker gave details of reported refusal of Tulare County Hospital to admit woman picker. She died later.]

[Note.—At the request of Dr. Cross, Miss Decker permitted Enrique Bravo, Consul for Mexico to read a statement before she began calling her witnesses. Consul Bravo filed a statement with the Committee, the high points of which are: It is my desire to interpret the desires of the Mexican pickers. In 1917 during the war Mexicans were brought here to work while others were at war. The Mexican laborer has been here for many years, long before cotton was planted in this Valley. The Mexican people with whom I have been in contact state that they are willing to work for 60¢ for 60 pounds. They inform me that the average cotton picking is as follows, as stated by the Mexican headquarters: three to four per cent of the Mexican pickers pick over 300 pounds; about 30 per cent of the pickers pick 200 to 300; 65 per cent pick about 200 pounds. These families usually have children; the children have to work in order to help in the support of their families. They often have to come from other towns and spend a week or ten days picking places to work.

[On checking the costs of foods with the stores, I make the following comparison: Flour, $1.50 last year—$3.65 this year (per 100). Beans, $2 last year, $5.00 this year. Carrots, 1¢ a bunch last year, 5¢ this year. Gasoline 10¢ to 11¢ last year, this year 18¢. The Mexican people consume much meat. A steak last year was 10¢, this year is 18¢. Milk 7¢, now 11¢.

[The average man can pick about 200 pounds per day; that is $1.20; that is, a man alone. If he works 5½ days he will make $6.60 per week. If prolonged for 52 weeks, or a year, he will make $343.40 on an average picking of 200 pounds. If this man were able to pick 300 pounds he would make $1.80. 5½ days a week he would make $9.90. $9.90 for 52 weeks would give him $514.80. A survey by the University of California points out that the lowest a man should have is $600 per year.

[My information from Mexican women pickers is that they cannot pick over 150 pounds a day and then she must have time out to fix dinner. This would be 90¢ per day; 5½ days she would make $4.95 per week; 52 weeks, $237.40. This would be about $580 per year for both man and wife together, while the State of California wage for man and wife is $900.

[Let me give you the following prices: Sacks increased from 60¢ to $1.25; large sacks from 90¢ to $1.75. Wages increased 40 to 60 cents, an increase of 50%; the increase in food prices is about 100%. I believe the 60¢ rate was set some time ago when commodity prices were less and do not take into consideration the increase prices of the present time.

[The Mexican has been an honest, just and a loyal worker, he is liked by the grower, he is easy to handle. In case of war they would then be willing to cooperate. They are obedient to the laws of this country. Due to the increased costs of N. R. A. this year he needs higher wages. The Mexicans have a right to protection under the laws of this country. They have the right to picket. They are acting in accordance with the laws of this country. I wish to reach a just and fair amount of wages for these laborers which they need for the support of their families.]

CROSS. What action have you taken to protect the rights of the citizens of your country in the strike now going on?

BRAVO. I took data on the Pixley shooting and statements from the different persons in regard to the action of the State and County authorities. I forwarded data to the Mexican Consul General at San Francisco for transmission to the Mexican embassy at Washington for my government.

CROSS. Have any local authorities refused to help the citizens of your country?

BRAVO. No; they have cooperated.

CROSS. Have you ever asked local authorities to give the Mexicans in these camps or in these meetings protection?

BRAVO. Yes.

CROSS. Have they been given that protection?

BRAVO. Yes.

WIRIN. In what way have the Mexicans been protected?

BRAVO. We are in communication every day with the Governor's office in Sacramento with regard to things happening in this State.

CROSS. But what protection has been given?

BRAVO. I cannot make that statement. I am not in a position to criticize local authorities. I am here to cooperate with the local authorities. The two countries are friendly and are trying to cooperate with each other.

ABEL. What is the cotton picking wage in Mexico?

BRAVO. $1.50 Mexican money, 50¢ American money.

ABEL. This Mexican cotton comes into competition with the cotton produced in this country?

BRAVO. Yes, we do not have an N. R. A. to increase prices.

CROSS. What do you mean by saying $1.50 Mexican is 50¢ American?

BRAVO. That is the rate of exchange. There is also a great difference in the cost of commodities in the two countries. In Mexico food is plentiful and cheap.

ABEL. If conditions are so genial in Mexico why do the Mexicans come here?

BRAVO. Your emissaries go to Mexico and bring the laborers here. They pay the transportation and entry fee at the border.

DECKER. In the opinion of the union it makes no difference how Mexicans get along in Mexico. We find that Mexican workers are being exploited in Mexico the same as in the United States. The same interests that are oppressing the working men in the United States are oppressing them in Mexico.

Bravo. We are not speaking of the Mexican financiers but of wage rates for picking cotton here. The young lady has never been in Mexico, and knows nothing about the country.

[Note.—Miss Decker introduces first witness for the pickers.]

SAM GOODWIN, San Francisco.

Decker. What is your occupation?

Goodwin. Writer, salesman, have worked in the harvest fields and as a young man sold newspapers.

Decker. At the present time what are you doing?

Goodwin. I am a writer.

[Note.—Goodwin outlined purported refusal of Tulare County hospital officials to take in Gonzales Conejo, who had been wounded. I went to the home of Rev. R. V. Whitaker, Tulare. Some one on the phone said there was a certain man who had been refused admission at the hospital. Rev. Whitaker investigated and was informed that this individual was shot the night before. Mrs. Tubbs, County Welfare worker, said they were entitled to first aid treatment but to receive further treatment they must have a permit. Conejo was treated the first time but they would not treat him the second time in the morning. We asked Mrs. Tubbs for a permit. She said she would get in touch with Mr. Elliott. I said are you going to argue while a man is bleeding to death. Elliott finally arrived and finally sent Conejo to the hospital because if he did not he was afraid of the adverse publicity.]

MARTIN WILSON, San Francisco, International Defense League.

I was in Pixley at the time of the shooting. I was in the Court House with Judge Swanson. About ¾ of an hour before the shooting took place we asked Judge Swanson to lower the bail on the three men who had been arrested and also asked the judge for warrants for the arrest of armed farmers. The Judge informed me that he was not in a position to do this.

Cross. Were these farmers deputized?

Wilson. I do not know.

Cross. Did they have permits to carry arms?

Wilson. I do not know. Sheriff, or undersheriff, Bob Hill, I think, I am not sure, and two officers were there. I believe they were State Highway patrolmen. A young fellow came in and said that there were some armed farmers coming up the road. Hill told the two officers to investigate. They came back with seventeen workers. These seventeen workers were brought in and they kept trying to tell the officers that there were some armed farmers coming up the road. Some of them came by and one of the workers said there they are, why don't you go out and get them? Hill said he did not have enough officers. I then asked the Court for warrants to arrest the armed farmers, which he refused. I then said, how about the 17 here, these pickers? He said that was for a misdemeanor and that he would not issue warrants for a felony. A few minutes after that the shooting began. This idea that there were no officers present is disproved.

Cross. Was there shooting on both sides?

Wilson. On one side.

Abel. Were you present at the shooting?

Wilson. I have affidavits that the shooting was on one side. The shooting was premeditated.

Cross. What was the reason for the shooting? What were the farmers trying to do? Were the growers trying to force the strikers out of town?

Wilson. My opinion is that the farmers were trying to terrorize the pickers—not so much the farmers, the farmers are the tools of the finance companies.

Cross. I judge you were holding a meeting?

Wilson. Yes, across the street from here. These armed farmers were parked along the road at the time I was asking for the warrants for their arrest. A few minutes after the shooting these two officers were gone. I said to Hill "Why don't you stop the shooting?" He said, "I cannot, I have not enough officers." Then I went out. The shooting was over. There were a lot of wounded men. Before we went out one of them came to the door and wanted to get in off the street. He was shot in the hip. Hill refused to open the door until we told him the man was wounded. Then we went out on the street and Hill claimed officers were being sent from Tulare. About three minutes after the shooting there were enough officers to control the whole State of California. I asked some of the officers to carry this man to the hospital. They said they could not, they had to stay and see that the farmers did not come back.

At the Coroner's inquest one of the Negroes testified that he saw officers there and that these officers were running and as a result of this this Negro is in jail at Pixley charged with reckless driving.

ABEL. All the testimony was given at the Coroner's inquest and copies can be secured.

ABEL. Are you a cotton picker?

WILSON. No.

ABEL. What is your occupation?

WILSON. Architectural draughtsman.

ABEL. Are you doing any work in this vicinity?

WILSON. International Labor Defense at the present time.

ABEL. You say you were in Judge Swanson's chambers. How far is the chambers from where the shooting took place?

WILSON. About ½ a block.

ABEL. I thought you said you were present at the shooting.

WILSON. No.

ABEL. You asked the judge for warrants for the arrest of armed farmers?

WILSON. Yes. There were three workers who had tried to get warrants for the growers. I was there when the judge denied them warrants. The workers agreed to sign affidavits. They wanted those armed farmers off the road.

ABEL. Do you know whether Judge Swanson talked to the District Attorney about issuing the warrants?

WILSON. I do not know.

ABEL. Do you know whether Judge Swanson is a lawyer?

WILSON. I do not know and I do not see that it makes any difference.

ABEL. There were three men arrested previously and their bail set at $300. Do you think that a high bail?

WILSON. Yes.

ABEL. This was for a misdemeanor?

WILSON. Yes.

ABEL. What is the possible penalty for that?

WILSON. Six months.

ABEL. There is also a possibility of a fine of $500?

WILSON. Yes, but I never heard of it being applied.

ABEL. The Judge was not obliged to issue a warrant simply on the basis of this man's statement. The District Attorney is his superior officer and he would not be entitled to issue a warrant until he was absolutely certain that there had been a violation of the law.

WILSON. These officers went out for armed ranchers and came back with strikers.

ABEL. Do you happen to know where they found these 17 individuals?

WILSON. No.

ABEL. I understood you to say that some of these men were wounded and went to the hospital. Do you know where they are now?

WILSON. No.

ABEL. You have not gone around to see them?

WILSON. No.

ABEL. Were they taken to the hospital?

WILSON. I understood they picked one of them up off of the highway.

ABEL. From your knowledge, can you give any information as to the activity of the State patrolmen? Were they there all the time of the shooting?

WILSON. I can say that the State patrolmen were there at the time of the shooting. They took a very peculiar part in the affair. The State patrolmen were behind the workers.

ABEL. Did you present your evidence to the Grand Jury?

WILSON. They did not call for me.

ABEL. Did you offer yourself?

WILSON. No. The officers were out to get one man of the 16 who got away from them.

WIRIN. The testimony at the inquest shows that the police officers led the calvacade of cars of growers to Pixley.

MR. FLOWER, Cotton Picker.

Decker. How long did you pick cotton?
Flower. Five days.
Decker. For how many years?
Flower. Five years.
Decker. Did you go out on strike when the Union called?
Flower. No, I came before the strike.
Decker. About how many pounds of cotton can you pick a day?
Flower. I have my record here. First day and wife and children picked 428 pounds, second day 462, third day 302, fourth day 347, fifth day 253 pounds up to noon.
Wirin. How many hours did you work?
Flower. From as early as I could see until I could not see.
Abel. What is your experience in picking?
Flower. Since I was five years old.
Abel. Did you pick any cotton last year?
Flower. Yes.
Abel. The year before?
Flower. Yes.

G. H. BELLFLOWER, Pixley.

Decker. You were an eye witness to the shooting?
Bellflower. Yes.
Decker. Are you a picker?
Bellflower. No.
(Bellflower then ruled out as a witness as he was not a picker.)
Abel. May I state at this time that the inquest records may not be available to the Committee until some later date.

J. L. HARMON, Cotton Picker.

Decker. How many pounds of cotton can you pick?
Harmon. About 150 pounds.
Decker. How long have you been picking cotton?
Harmon. Since 1928 and picked up to this year every season. Also in Arizona.
Decker. Did you pick cotton last year?
Harmon. Yes.
Decker. How much did you get?
Harmon. 50 cents a hundred most of the time—at first 40 cents, then raised to 50.
Decker. Have you any of your family working in the fields?
Harmon. No.
Decker. How much do you think you can make a week at 60¢ a hundred?
Harmon. I can pick about 150 pounds a day.
Chambers. At what place did you work last?
Harmon. The C. D. White ranch at MacFarland.
Chambers. What were the sanitary facilities?
Harmon. None. One toilet for men, women and children.
Chambers. Did you get your board?
Harmon. No, not on the C. D. White Ranch. I did my own cooking and boarded myself.
Decker. Did you buy your own sacks?
Harmon. Yes, a 12 foot sack cost 90¢. I used three sacks last year.
Decker. Did you buy your overalls?
Harmon. Yes, and the knee pads. Cost about $1.25.
Decker. You paid for your own sacks?
Harmon. Yes.
Decker. Have you attempted to buy a cotton sack this year?
Harmon. I asked the price. They said $1.95 for the same 12 ft. sack.
Abel. How many hours a day do you work to pick 150 pounds?
Harmon. About 11 hours.
Abel. How old are you?
Harmon. 56.
Abel. You say you bought three sacks last year?
Harmon. Yes.
Abel. Did you wear them out?
Harmon. Yes, the adobe ground cuts them up.

Abel. They were priced at MacFarland at $1.95. Is that right?

Harmon. Yes. Last year at Montgomery Ward an 8 ft. sack was $1.35.

Abel. Where did you attempt to get the sacks at MacFarland?

Harmon. At the store.

AUGUSTINE CAMARENA, Cotton Picker.

Decker. Did you pick this year?

Camarena. No.

Decker. Why?

Camarena. Out on strike.

Decker. Did you pick cotton last year?

Camarena. Yes.

Decker. How much did you get paid?

Camarena. 50¢ and 45¢.

Decker. How many pounds can you pick a day?

Camarena. About 200.

Decker. Is that supposed to be a good picking?

Camarena. No.

Decker. Is that a good or a bad picking?

Camarena. It is a regular picking.

Decker. Did you live on the ranch?

Camarena. Sometimes.

Decker. Do you live on the ranch now?

Camarena. No, in town.

Decker. Did you live on the ranch last year?

Camarena. No.

Decker. How did you live?

Camarena. In a tent.

Decker. What are the sanitary conditions?

Camarena. Only have water. Have to get the wood somewhere else. Have no lights and have to buy our own kerosene. Outside toilet.

Decker. Do you buy any cotton sacks? Or overalls?

Camarena. Yes.

Decker. How much did you pay?

Camarena. 50 to 60 cents.

Decker. How many sacks did you use last season?

Camarena. Two.

Decker. Do you buy more than one pair of overalls a season?

Camarena. Two or three pairs of overalls.

Decker. Do you have any children?

Camarena. Yes, one child 4 years old.

Decker. Where you worked on the ranch were children working in the fields?

Camarena. Yes.

Decker. Does your child help you?

Camarena. No, too young.

Abel. Is this child of school age?

Camarena. No.

Abel. How old were the children you saw in the fields?

Camarena. From 9 years up.

Abel. Was school not in session then?

Camarena. Yes.

Abel. Where are you living now?

Camarena. Porterville.

Abel. Your wife is in Mexico?

Camarena. Yes.

Abel. Do you send her money?

Camarena. Yes.

Abel. Are you working at all?

Camarena. No.

Abel. How are you supporting yourself?

Camarena. I live in the strike camp at Porterville. There are about 500 in the camp. I have about two meals a day.

Abel. Where does the food come from? Where do you eat?

Camarena. Sometimes at my mother's and sometimes at the camp. I eat with my mother because my father is very old. He has no income nor support from the agencies and picks up and eats whatever he finds in the alleys of the town. Sometimes he sells a little wood.

Abel. Do the strikers get food from Branion (Federal Relief Administrator)?

Camarena. Up to now we are getting nothing but hereafter we will get food from the State.

Abel. Your father and mother have lived every day since 1928 in the County of Tulare?

Camarena. Yes.

Abel. Have they ever applied to the County for aid?

Camarena. No.

Chambers. Is it not a fact that when a Mexican appeals to the County for aid he has to sign a waiver that they can send him back to Mexico?

Abel. I do not know of it.

Archbishop **Hanna.** Have you proof of that?

Camarena. No.

Chambers. How many pounds of cotton can you average per day?

Camarena. Impossible to average 200 pounds per day. Some days on account of the rain, only 35 pounds.

MRS. PAULINE DOMINGUEZ, Cotton Picker, 8 children.

Decker. Have you picked this year?

Dominguez. No, last picked in 1930.

Decker. Why did you not pick this year?

Dominguez. Prices too low.

Decker. Does your husband pick cotton?

Dominguez. Yes.

Decker. Did he pick this year?

Dominguez. Yes.

Decker. When did he stop picking cotton?

Dominguez. The day of the strike.

Decker. How much cotton can you pick?

Dominguez. 100 to 125 pounds a day.

Decker. How much do you get paid?

Dominguez. I got 75¢ in 1930.

Decker. How large a bag do you carry around?

Dominguez. 9 foot. This holds 60 pounds.

Decker. Do you know the State does not allow a woman to carry more than 50 pounds on her back?

Dominguez. No.

Decker. How much can you average a week?

Dominguez. Between 6 and 7 dollars.

Decker. When do you start?

Dominguez. About 5:30.

Decker. Do you know that the State provides $13.50 minimum wage for women?

Dominguez. No.

Decker. Are you American born?

Dominguez. Yes.

Abel. Have you a permanent place of residence?

Dominguez. No, we do not make enough to pay rent. We live on farms. We do not pay rent.

Abel. How long have you been in Tulare County?

Dominguez. A little over two months. Before that we were in Orange County where my husband was picking lemons. We were there for the last three years before coming up here. We went from one place to another in Orange County. Went from beets to oranges, to lemons, to tomatoes, to beans.

Decker. Your children do not have shoes?

Dominguez. They have not worn shoes since 1930, unless some one gives them to them.

Decker. Do the children work in the fields?

Dominguez. Yes, if they did not they would starve.

Decker. What hours do they work?

Dominguez. From morning to night.

Decker. How much do they pick?

Dominguez. It varies—40 to 50 pounds.

Decker. Do you live at the camp at Corcoran?

Dominguez. Yes.

Decker. Have the growers ever objected to the children working in the fields?

Dominguez. No.

Decker. Has the school attendance officer?

Dominguez. Yes, last year but not this year.

Decker. What are the conditions in the camp at Corcoran now? Why are you there?

Dominguez. We are there because we are striking for higher wages. We were evicted unless we would work for 60¢.

Decker. What are the conditions at Corcoran now?

Dominguez. Sanitary conditions are good now but some of the children are suffering because of insufficient food.

Decker. How many children died at camp?

Dominguez. Two that I know of.

Decker. Do you know why they died?

Dominguez. Undernourishment.

Dr. **Cross.** Can you get food from the County?

Dominguez. Yes, but they ask so many questions that some of the Mexican people are afraid to sign the paper.

Decker. Sheriff Hill of this County stated that they would be in the bull pen if they did not return to work.

Dr. **Cross.** What was their objection to placing their names on the questionnaire?

Decker. The questionnaire is one from Branion. The Union has instructed the workers not to give car license or whether or not they are citizens. This was used as evidence against them if ever they were picked up. Mr. Harvey, Mr. Branion's assistant has agreed that these questions need not be answered.

Decker. Do your children ever get sick?

Dominguez. Yes.

Decker. What do you do with them?

Dominguez. When I can I take them to the County hospital.

Decker. Does the County always attend to them when they are brought in?

Dominguez. Yes.

Decker. Have you been on the picket lines?

Dominguez. No, my husband is.

Decker. Do the police bother anyone?

Dominguez. They have arrested several men they called the leaders but who are not leaders.

Decker. Are they Mexicans or Americans?

Dominguez. Both.

Decker. What were they charged with?

Dominguez. No.

ROY DOMINGUEZ (Child of Mrs. Pauline Dominguez)—7 years old.

Decker. Have you picked cotton? For how long?

Roy. Yes for months.

Decker. Do you go to school?

Roy. No.

Decker. Do you get very tired in the field when you are picking?

Roy. Yes.

Decker. You begin at what time?

Roy. 7 A. M. and quit at night time.

Decker. How many pounds can you pick in a day?

Roy. 65 pounds.

MARY RIGOLETTO, Cotton Picker.

Decker. How long have you picked cotton?

Rigoletto. About 6 years.

Decker. How many pounds can you pick?

Rigoletto. 125.

Decker. Did you pick cotton last year?

Rigoletto. Yes.

Decker. What were you paid last year?

Rigoletto. 40 cents.

Decker. Did you carry a sack on your back?

Rigoletto. Yes.

Decker. How many pounds.

Rigoletto. About 50 pounds.

Decker. Have you any children?

Rigoletto. One child 2 years old.
Decker. Does your husband work?
Rigoletto. I have no husband.
Decker. Do you support yourself and child?
Rigoletto. Yes.
Decker. Do you supply everything for yourself and the baby?
Rigoletto. Yes.

ALVINA YBARRA, Cotton Picker (through interpreter).

Decker. How long have you picked cotton?
Ybarra. 12 years.
Decker. Any children?
Ybarra. Seven.
Decker. Do your children pick cotton?
Ybarra. With the exception of the ones under age.
Decker. How old are the ones who pick cotton?
Ybarra. From 15 to 20 years of age.
Decker. Are any of the children going to school?
Ybarra. Yes.
Decker. When do they go to school if they pick cotton?
Ybarra. They go to school when we can support them with clothes and food.
Decker. Can you ever support them with food and clothes?
Ybarra. No.
Decker. How heavy a sack do you carry on your back?
Ybarra. 50 to 60 pounds.
Decker. Does your husband pick cotton?
Ybarra. Yes.
Decker. About how many pounds a day can he pick?
Ybarra. From 100 to 150.
Decker. How long has he been picking cotton?
Ybarra. 15 years.
Decker. Describe the house you live in, conditions of life.
Ybarra. Have no tent. Covers a canvas over the truck and trailer.
Decker. Would you live any better if it was not for the strike?
Ybarra. No.

LILLY DUNN, has been a cotton picker and has 2 children, 2 and 6 years old.

Decker. Are you picking cotton now?
Dunn. No, on strike.
Decker. How many pounds are you able to pick per day?
Dunn. 150 average.
Decker. Is this the average of what any woman can do?
Dunn. Yes.
Decker. About how many hours?
Dunn. 14 to 16 hours per day.
Decker. Does your husband pick cotton?
Dunn. Yes.
Decker. About how much can he pick?
Dunn. About the same as I do, 150 pounds per day.
Decker. How do you get along?
Dunn. We worked four days and made $6.00.
Decker. With both you and your husband picking and getting 60¢ a hundred could you take care of your family decently?
Dunn. No, we could have no shoes or clothes.
Decker. What are the sanitary conditions?
Dunn. We have no water, lights, or toilets. We were threatened with eviction because they wanted to put cotton pickers in the house. The Land Company threatened to evict us. They wanted to put pickers in who would pick for 60¢ per 100 pounds.
Decker. What do you do when the children get sick?
Dunn. Unless we have money for medicine we just wait for them to get well. One child died two years ago because of insufficient food.
Decker. Do your children work in the fields?
Dunn. I would not let them.
Decker. How heavy a sack do you carry on your back?

Dunn. About 50 pounds. I would like to say something about the shooting at Pixley where I was almost shot. Judge Swanson said he could not issue a warrant on a felony but only on misdemeanor. There were 20 to 50 farmers with guns turned on 17 strikers. I asked why he did not disarm the farmers. He said he could not issue a warrant on a felony. The strikers were arrested for misdemeanors.

Dr. Cross. What caused the shooting?

Dunn. The farmers opened fire for no reason but the judge made no attempt to disarm them.

Cross. Was there a traffic officer at the head of this procession?

Dunn. Not that I know of. Jack Hill knew that they had guns but did not disarm them before the trouble. They did not do anything toward disarming.

Cross. Have any of the smaller farmers been sympathetic towards these strikers?

Dunn. Yes.

Cross. Have any of them stated they were willing to pay more than 60¢?

Dunn. Yes; they could pay $1.00 per hundred and have $4.50 left out of the bale of cotton, some said.

Abel. When you pick cotton do you get the meals for the family?

Dunn. We pack lunch when there is anything to pack.

Abel. Does your husband pick cotton? If so how much per day?

Dunn. Yes; he picks about the same amount per day that I do.

Abel. How long have you been picking?

Dunn. Since 13 years ago. I am now 26.

Abel. How long has your husband been picking?

Dunn. Seven years but not all the time.

Abel. Did you pick cotton last year?

Dunn. Yes. On the California Land Co. property.

Abel. Where is that?

Dunn. Two and a half miles from Tipton on Poplar Avenue.

Highway Patrol **Officer.** You spoke of cars. Whose cars were they?

Dunn. I supposed they were farmers' cars.

Officer. Where were you when the shooting started?

Dunn. I was almost at the back of the hall.

Traffic Officer. Were you in a position to see the officers and farmers?

Dunn. No.

M. B. KEARNEY, Independent Farmer.

Dr. Cross. Were you present at the meeting of the growers?

Kearney. Yes.

Dr. Cross. When was it?

Kearney. Two weeks back last night I was invited to the meeting in Corcoran of the growers. When we got to town the meeting was at the Legion Hall but it was not big enough and we went to the ball park. Mr. Ellett, the manager of the Ellett gin said he did not want them to think it was a gin meeting but that it was a growers' meeting. He said the time had come when the growers would have to take the law into their own hands because they could not get any protection. The previous night the pickers had been put out of somebody's cabin. Then another man started to talk and their conversation was that we had to use force to get rid of these pickers so that we could get new pickers.

I jumped up and some one in the crowd shouted "Put him out." I said, "Gentlemen, I am strictly an American and I do not believe in mob law. You are getting into deep water. I refused to sign the petition to take the law into our own hands. I did not read the petition. It went around to seven or eight and it got back to the banker, Mr. Guiberson. Mr. Guiberson said "I could not sign that because it said 'eliminate'." About that time two or three got up and hollered "Let's go across the track and clean them out now." Mr. Ellett did not object.

Now as to whether the growers cannot pay over 60¢. In the first place the grower has to be financed for his power bill and financed for six months to live on. He borrows money from the gin, which represents the finance corporation. This year I signed a $425 note with the manager of the Cooperative at Bakersfield. The gins state in their contract that this money must be paid back with cotton at the market price less 40 to 50 points.

[Note: Mr. Kearney gave in considerable detail an account of his operations with the Finance company.]

Cross: Do you think that the growers can or can not pay more than 60¢ a hundred?

Kearney. I am coming to that. We will be glad to pay more to the poor slave who has to do the work. Under present conditions we cannot do it.

Cross. Have conditions changed within the last two weeks?

Kearney. Did this association that was organized to take the law into their own hands think that conditions had changed in the last two weeks so that the growers had to take things into their own hands?

Kearney: I do not think it was ever necessary for growers to take things into their own hands. It leads to murder.

Decker: Will you explain why the farmer cannot pay more than 60¢. Were you referring to the Clayton-Anderson and Boswell interests and the large growers who own 500 or 600 acres, or are you referring to the small farmers like yourself?

Kearney. I do not think that either the large or the small farmer, the way things are being manipulated, could pay. If the finance companies and the San Joaquin Light and Power Company were put in their right places we could pay enough so that they could eat.

Cross. As a cotton grower, do you think you need police protection from cotton pickers?

Kearney. No.

Cross. Did any cotton pickers threaten you?

Kearney. No.

Cross. Do you know of instances where small farmers have been threatened for paying high wages?

Kearney. The only instance I know of is Ellett.

Cross. Did you ever hear of strikers speak of taking the law into their own hands and shooting growers?

Kearney. No.

Cross. Have you ever attended any strikers meetings?

Kearney. Yes, many meetings.

Chambers. You have been to meetings and heard me speak. Have I ever told workers to take arms or give them to understand that they were to use arms or force against growers?

Kearney. No.

Chambers. How many times have you heard me speak?

Kearney. Six or seven times.

Chambers. Have you any knowledge that on a certain night a plot was laid out by Ellett to invite workers to come over to a certain gin for the purpose of shooting them down?

Kearney. No. All I heard him say was "We will have to take the law into our own hands."

Chambers. Since the time Ellett said "We must take the law into our own hands," has he been arrested on charge of criminal syndicalism?

Kearney. No.

Chambers. Is he not liable under the criminal syndicalism law?

Kearney. I am supposed to be with the independent growers. If a man violates the law he should be arrested. Both sides should be given the same treatment.

Chambers. I am arrested under criminal syndicalism law because of an alleged statement, yet Ellett is free. I say Ellett should be arrested for this statement.

Cross. Have you brought a complaint?

Chambers. No, we would have no luck in this county.

Abel. Did you testify before the grand jury?

Chambers. No.

Abel. You were careful to pay attention to what Ellett said? Can you give me the exact words?

Kearney. There was a shorthand report taken of what was said.

Abel. Just what did Ellett say?

Kearney. He said he did not want people to think that this was only the gin's fight.

Abel. No—I mean the statement of violence.

Kearney. He said the time had come when we should take the law into our own hands. Mr. Ellett said the time had come when the growers could get no protection and I attempted to show him he could make out a warrant for any man who violated the law and he could get service from the Sheriff because I knew we could get it.

Abel. Did you say you heard him say that force would have to be used to get rid of the leaders of the pickers?

Kearney. Yes.

Abel. What was this statement he made about making room for others?

Kearney. He said we would have to get together immediately and get rid of the leaders. He said to take the law into our own hands and get them out of the camps so we could get new pickers in. I believe he said that half of them would come back to work if it were not for the leaders.

Abel. Did any group go at that meeting over to the camp?

Kearney. Two or three wanted to go right over and run them out of town.

Abel. How many scores have you?

Kearney. Sixty.

Abel. Is that all being farmed this year?

Kearney. Yes.

Abel. How much of that have you rented?

Kearney. All.

Abel. How much did you charge your renters?

Kearney. I furnished the ranch, machinery, tractor, gas and oil, half the power bill, furnished the seed, kept up the investment and got half of the cotton.

Abel. Did you actually sign a note?

Kearney. I have signed their notes.

Abel. Was that not a release as the owner of the land?

Kearney. No, there used to be a waiver slip but in the last three years a note.

Abel. You have had some trouble with Johns?

Kearney. He tried to pick a row with me after that meeting.

BILL (W. C.) CHANNEL, Cotton Picker since he was a child. 23 years old now.

Decker. Did you pick last year?

Channel. Yes.

Decker. How much did you get?

Channel. 40¢ for the first picking; 45¢ for the second, 50¢ for the third.

Decker. How much do you pick a day?

Channel. 150 to 175 pounds.

Decker. Is that considered the average for a picker?

Channel. Yes, the average picker picks from 135 to 150 pounds.

Decker. Do you live on a ranch?

Channel. Yes, in Corcoran.

Decker. Do you work on the ranch that you live on?

Channel. If the strike is settled I will then.

Decker. Do you have any gas expense?

Channel. Most of the time I will have to drive from 4 to 6 miles, except for 20 acres close to the camp.

Decker. Do you have to buy everything you use?

Channel. Yes, everything, overall, sacks, etc.

Decker. Are you married and do you get your board?

Channel. I am not married and I supply my own food.

GEORGE LEWIS, Cotton Picker since 1912.

Decker. How old were you when you started picking cotton?

Lewis. Eight years.

Decker. Did you pick cotton this year?

Lewis. Yes.

Decker. How long did you pick cotton?

Lewis. Five hours and then went on strike.

Decker. How many pounds did you pick?

Lewis. 79 pounds, in five hours. I pick about 155 pounds in a full day's work.

Decker. Have you a family?

Lewis. Yes, three children.

Decker. Does your wife work?

Lewis. Yes, she picks 165 to 170 pounds per day.

Decker. Do you and your wife make enough to live comfortably?

Lewis. Absolutely not. We live hand to mouth.

Decker. Do they supply board where you work?

Lewis. No, they supply cotton sacks at $1.25 each.

Decker. What are the sanitary conditions on the ranch?

Lewis. I did not see any, no lavatory, no running water.

Abel. Did you pick any cotton last year?

Lewis. No.

Abel. Did you pick the year before?

Lewis. No, not since 1925 up to this year. The first cotton I picked was——

A. B. DELAY, Cotton Picker. Raised in the cotton fields until I was 18 years old.

Decker. How old were you when you started to work picking?

Delay. I was six years old when I started to pick cotton.

Decker. You have been picking cotton ever since?

Delay. No, eleven years I did not pick. In the last two years I averaged about 200 pounds per day when I picked. I have picked 300 or more, but not every day.

Decker. What is a good average for a picker?

Delay. 200.

Decker. Have you any children?

Delay. Six children.

Decker. Does your wife work?

Delay. Yes, she picks cotton. The children do not work.

Decker. Do you and your wife earn enough to keep your children in a decent way?

Delay. No.

Decker. Do your children ever get sick? What do you do?

Delay. Yes. The best we can.

Decker. Do you take them to a clinic?

Delay. Yes.

Decker. Do you live on a ranch?

Delay. Yes.

Decker. What do they furnish you?

Delay. Tent, water.

Decker. How about sanitary conditions? Does the lavatory have running water?

Delay. It is just a hydrant with water from the house.

Decker. Do you have gas expense in getting to your work?

Delay. Yes.

Decker. How much does it amount to during the week?

Delay. I do not know, but I would say about four gallons a week.

Abel. Did you pick cotton last year?

Delay. Yes, 14 days.

Decker. Do you have any idea what the average number of picking days during the season is for a cotton picker?

Delay. About 40 days.

Decker. The season is from 3 to 4 months. Do you say you pick only about 40 days?

Delay. Yes, either rain or other causes stop us.

Abel. When do you begin picking cotton?

Delay. At the beginning of the season.

Abel. Why did you quit?

Delay. Because there was not a living in it.

JOHN ROBINSON, Cotton Picker for seven years in the Valley.

Decker. Did you pick cotton this year?

Robinson. Yes. Picked ¾ of a day and quit. I made 95¢.

Decker. How many pounds a day?

Robinson. Last year I picked the following:

First Week	Second week	Third week	Fourth week	Fifth week
184 lbs	225 lbs	217 lbs	186 lbs	217 lbs.
180	200	224	196	208.
114	207	192	179	200.
114	210	190	186	172.
	203	176	194	102.
	87	83	86	
Earned $6.42	Amount not given.	Earned $10.82	Earned $10.29	Earned $9.02.

Decker. Have you any family?

Robinson. No.

Decker. How long is the cotton season?

Robinson. The first picking does not last very long.

Decker. How many days were you able to pick during the season?

Robinson. I picked every day except when it was bad weather.

Decker. What do you furnish?

Robinson. I furnish everything.

Chambers. Is there any difference between the first and second picking.

Robinson. Yes, on the second picking there is nothing to pick.

Chambers. A gentleman testified yesterday that the second picking was as good as the first.

Robinson. I never knew of any.

Chambers. Is there any difference between the second and third picking?

Robinson. I never heard of a third picking.

Abel. When you were picking last year was there anyone—was there anyone picking in the same field who picked more than you did?

Robinson. Some of them.

Abel. How old are you?

Robinson. 58 years.

Chambers. What was the difference between what the others picked and what you picked? Was it a big difference?

Robinson. No, probably 20 or 25 pounds.

H. C. MERRITT, Jr., Manager of Tagus Ranch, Tulare County.

Abel. Where is your residence?

Merritt. Tagus ranch, Tulare County.

Abel. How many acres?

Merritt. 7000.

Abel. In connection with your operations do you run a commissary?

Merritt. I do.

Abel. Is it open to the public?

Merritt. It is.

Abel. Do the workers on your ranch patronize your store?

Merritt. They do.

Abel. Have you a list of the customary food products purchased?

Merritt. I have a list of about thirty commodities. The list was given out just before the time of our strike so we would have an idea of what we could afford to pay and what it would cost to live.

[Note: Mr. Merritt turned in the list to the Committee.]

[Note: Mr. Merritt refused to be questioned by Pat Chambers or his committee stating that he did not propose to dignify any criminal or communist organization by submitting to questioning. Dr. Cross explained to Mr. Merritt that both sides had been given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and that his committee would refuse to accept the testimony of any witness who refused to comply with this rule. Mr. Merritt said he would comply. Dr. Cross said that is the proper spirit.]

Chambers. I am sorry we did not know that Mr. Merritt was to testify. Had we known, we would have had workers come in and testify. At the time of the Tagus strike we had information that the management * * * (Chambers interrupted by Archbishop Hanna and Professor Cross and told to confine himself to discussion of data submitted by Merritt.)

Becker. (Striker) Is it not a fact, Mr. Merritt, that you sold milk at the time prior to the strike on the Tagus ranch, the tall cans four for 25¢? Do these commodities represent the selling costs? I can buy four tall cans of milk at the chain stores for 19¢.

Chambers. Then you do not know whether these figures are based on actual costs?

Merritt. Yes, I do. These figures are based on actual figures as shown by our books of record. Considerable time ago when the costs of living were rising and the prices of commodities were not, it gave us considerable concern. We have records which will be open to the Fact Finding Committee. We have run the store for some time at a loss as a matter of accommodation.

Decker. We are willing to submit this data to the Committee to check with the daily changes.

Merritt. These figures are based on those goods for which there is the greatest demand by our employees.

Decker. (Note) At this point Miss Decker turns to the audience and says: "How many of you are cotton pickers? How many of you have children under 15 in the fields? We have been accused of coaching the witnesses. Now we are willing to have the Committee pick any one from the audience and place him on the stand for questioning." The Committee did not accept the offer, stating that they had made no charge or inference that any of the witnesses had been coached.

JOHN CURRY, Cotton Picker from MacFarland. (Directed picketing of farms).

Abel. What picket line were you on?

Curry. MacFarland.

Abel. What happened?

Curry. The first trouble we had on the picket line was a farmer by the name of Jess Lake drove out with one of the Finance Company men, I do not know his name. He drew a gun on P. C. Stewart and J. E. Maston.

Cross. Were they picketing?

Curry. Yes, they were picketing off of the pavement but not on the property. They were on the shoulder of the road, on the right of way. This man came up to Stewart first and drew his gun and said "drop that gun." The word "picket" was on the sign. He laid it down in front of his gun and said he had a right to be there.

Abel. Were you there?

Curry. I saw it from a distance. I could hear Maston but not Stewart as he spoke in a low tone. That was all that happened on that date. On the 11th of this month the man who had charge of that picket line sent a picket out, heard a shot, the man came back shot. Some were hit with guns by passing autos.

Cross. Have you had any trouble with the police in the last few days?

Curry. A man is in jail in Bakersfield now and all he did was holler. His name is M. M. Thompson and he is in jail for disturbing the peace.

Cross. Is there any legal objection to a picket hollering?

Curry. No.

Cross. Have you ever had the traffic police interfere with the pickets by edging them off the highway?

Curry. Not to my knowledge. At the time the first trouble occurred a man drove his car zigzag along the highway, on the shoulder so that the pickets had to get on the right of way to avoid being hit.

Cross. Who did this?

Curry. A farmer.

Cross. You were in charge of the pickets. Have any of you carried arms?

Curry. I instruct my men if any of them are armed to remove them before going on duty, obey the law, and do not trespass, do not block traffic and comply with the law in every respect. In warm weather the pickets are not allowed to wear their jackets. I have ordered them to cooperate with the officers in every way. Within the last two days a farmer came on the highway with a Winchester. The officers saw him and never requested him to get off the highway with his Winchester.

Cross. Did you see them?

Curry. No, but I can get witnesses. On the same day that this man was arrested an equipment car owned by the Power Company did the same zigzagging to run the picket lines into the ditches.

Cross. What is the reason for the zigzag?

Curry. To drive the picket over on the farmer's land so the farmer could shoot him.

Abel. How much of this statement is going to be substantiated by witnesses?

Curry. I will furnish any number of witnesses.

[Note. Pat Chambers and Curry described at length other contacts between farmers and pickets, most of which testimony is incorporated in the Grand Jury hearings.]

[Note. Aida Handler and Matilda Carter, University of California students described for the Committee their visit to the picket line in trucks and their arrest by officers.]

[Note. W. E. Snell, State Highway officer told of the activities of the State Highway police in this strike. He said the only interest he had was in the protection of people on the highway and to see that motor vehicle laws are not disturbed. He also described his part in the Pixley affair. Pat Chambers questioned the officer considerably about his movements at the time of the Pixley shooting but Dr. Cross interrupted to say that the Committee was not interested in the matters which were to come up at the trial of Pat Chambers and that his attorney could handle that.]

Decker. Mr. Chairman, what we want do here is to find out whether the pickers are to get $1.00 per hundred for picking cotton and it is not up to us here to bring up testimony as to the guilt of any one.

Mrs. **Lincoln Steffens** spoke on the civil rights of those in jail. Mrs. Steffens described a portion of a recent newspaper editorial as inciting trouble, stated that both State and County officers had been requested to prevent trouble but nothing had been done. Said strikers were being held in jail under excessive bail.

Decker. In her closing statement presented to the Committee a list of the strikers' demands, stated that Attorney Wirin was giving his service to the strikers gratis.

Attorney **Edson Abel** stated his services also were gratis to the growers.

J. E. ENGLE, Rancher, Tulare County, farms cotton and grapes.

Abel. How long have you been picking cotton?

Engle. I was one of the first to begin—I began about a week ago. I have seven steady pickers. Am going on my 24th bale now.

Cross. Can you give me the daily picking?

Engle. Yes, one Mexican and his wife and one white man and his wife, picked 1504 pounds, four people; Mexican and his wife average 672 pounds. Three other pickers around 300; one man over 62 years old picked between 250 and 300 pounds in one day.

Abel. You said you had a surplus of $10,000 four years ago. How much have you now?

Engle. I have none of it and I am pledged up to $3100.

Abel. You are $13,000 worse off now than you were four years ago.

Engle. More than that.

Mr. E. J. MOONEY; Rancher.

Abel. Are you raising cotton?

Mooney. I have 300 acres this year.

Abel. How many pickers?

Mooney. Between 30 and 40.

Abel. Have you a record of how much cotton you have picked? What is the range of the amount picked by those pickers which you have?

Mooney. I had some six pickers who had never picked before and who picked about 180 pounds each.

Abel. What is the highest average of the amount you have picked per day?

Mooney. Three colored people, 801, 1029, 1058. One colored man, 342.

These people said that if the strikers would leave them alone they would stay and work for 60¢ a hundred. They are willing to work but they are scared. They are all working this afternoon.

Abel. Do you have records of picking?

Mooney. Yes, as follows: 277, 407, 268, 110, 110, 389, 303. I have a family that has been with me for three years and they picked 712 pounds. When the whole family is picking they pick 1200 pounds per day.

Decker. Are the children working on the ranch?

Mooney. I mean children 14 or 15 years old with permits to stay there.

Chambers. It would be of a good deal of interest to have the pickers themselves come here and testify what they pick rather than have the growers tell us what the pickers pick in a day.

Mooney. The pickers can't come in to testify as they are working.

Abel. Do you refuse any man work when he presents himself?

Mooney. No, I have no grudges.

Abel. You do not test a man as to his ability before he goes to work?

Mooney. No.

Decker. The feeling is only that the people cannot live on the 60¢ per hundred weight. The strikers are entitled to hold out for more than 60¢. They have organized their picket lines and are trying to get the scabs out of the fields. If you wish and the growers wish we can meet in a small group with you or them and submit proposals to our strike locals.

Abel. Miss Decker has no proposal?

Decker. We have our proposal.

Cross. Mr. Abel will you meet with the small group?

Abel. I will say right now that until the grower is provided with more money for his cotton he cannot afford to pay more than 60¢. When prices are higher then they will pay more for picking but only when conditions will permit.

Cross. We have given you the names of some people who are already paying $1.00 per hundred.

Decker. I wish to announce that Benjamin Heddon Bros. of Arvin signed up with the Union and are paying $1.00.

Cross. That is the only one?

Decker. Yes.

Cross. Are you talking as an attorney who must earn his fee or are you voicing the opinion of the growers?

Abel. I am getting no fee for my services.

Cross. Then there is no possibility of a compromise being affected?

Abel. You have seen the cost records. If you can show how the farmers are going to pay $1.00, the farmers will be glad to have your method explained to them. The farmers are faced with a set of facts in this matter, not with theory.

Cross. Mr. Guiberson put up two points yesterday to keep in mind during our hearing, to wit: How much can the rancher afford to pay considering the price of cotton, and what must the picker have, considering the costs of living. We have heard the arguments advanced by both sides. Presumably if the growers are not willing to meet with the committee of the strikers that ends that situation.

BEN OVERLAND, Rancher.

Abel. What is your occupation?

Overland. Farming. I am a cotton grower; have between 500 and 600 acres. Have between 50 and 60 pickers at the present time. We have been picking since last Monday.

Abel. Have you any records to show what these men picked?

Overland. Yes. 289, 346, 579 (man and wife), 456, 352, 627 (man and wife), 612 (2 pickers), 394, 463, 311, 379, 288, 311, 301.

They start in the field about 6:30 A. M. and start leaving about 4 P. M. I furnish light, water, wood and a place to live.

Chambers. Quite a number of Overland's workers came off the ranch.

Overland. Only a few. I moved them off of the ranch the first day and since that time my crew have been happy and are working.

L. D. ELLETT.

Abel. Did you make a statement to the effect that the growers had to take the law into their own hands?

Ellett. I did not.

Abel. Do you recall any such language used by you at the meeting?

Ellett. I do not.

Chambers. What about the petition that was circulated?

Ellett. I do not recall the exact wording of the petition. We will get the committee a copy of that petition.

Chambers. Bring down a copy of the first petition, before that one word was removed.

Ellett. I cannot get you the first certificate. I do not have it.

Cross. What was the object of that organization?

Ellett. We wanted protection.

Cross. How were you going to get it?

Ellett. We asked the Sheriff for more deputies but they had no more money.

Cross. If you organized yourselves how could you have had any objection to the strikers organizing?

Ellett. We have none whatever.

Cross. Have you published any pamphlets, circulars. placards or such?

Ellett. No.

Decker. Did the growers put a notice in the Tulare newspaper? Warning business men not to support the strikers and help drive out the agitators? Are you a member of the Farmers Protective Association which was organized at Corcoran?

Ellett. I am a member.

Decker. Did you know there was a Spanish leaflet in Corcoran stating that Pat Chambers got $6000 at the Tagus Ranch strike?

Ellett. I did not. I would like to say another word. The meeting at Corcoran was attended by the whole neighborhood and if there was a bunch of outlaws and cut throats there they were our own people.

Decker. May we take back a definite answer to our proposal to our strike locals as to the position of the growers assuring us that they will meet with us in a smaller group or that they will do something about it, or some definite answer.

Guiberson. It is our understanding that your committee is a fact finding one and that after getting the facts and studying the facts that you would come to some conclusion; that you would recommend something; that would be time enough for us to get together.

Cross. We might possibly recommend that this or that be done without regard to the wages. We might suggest anything to the Governor not involving wages. Dr. Knowles will not be available until next Monday. Archbishop Hanna will not be available until next week. It will take time to check over the material. In the meantime there is a possibility of a serious disturbance in the community and continued privation of the strikers. The grower has his crop coming on and cannot market it. If we cannot get together we might as well close up shop now.

Guiberson. The growers wish a proposal that comes honestly from the pickers.

Cross. What do you mean by honestly?

Guiberson. I mean coming from pickers.

Cross. But we would have to work through representatives. The strikers are organized as are the growers and use committees to carry out their ideas.

Guiberson. We would like to have a committee picked from real representative pickers and not from those who are out for what they can get.

Cross. All labor is now represented by business agents who never do any of the work of the industry and in this case are not pickers.

Decker. Of the officials of the Union in the Valley all but two are elected by the workers. The Union has been unanimously backed up by the pickers. They represent in this fight.

Abel. Before the price was fixed in Frenso at 60¢ the growers were advised by the Cannery and Agricultural Industrial Union that they would demand $1. That was all that they asked. That was what the growers would have to pay. At this meeting the growers fixed the price at 60¢.

Decker. The representatives of the Union were present at the meeting in Fresno at the California Hotel, Fresno, when the price of 60¢ was fixed but they were not recognized.

Abel. Prior to that meeting the news was spread that the Union would demand $1.

Decker. We held a conference and it was decided to find what wage they (the workers) wanted. The demand was read.

Cross. I was hoping that we might be able to arrive at some sort of an agreement between the parties that would lead to a settlement of this matter. We have learned what the strikers are going to do. We have been notified that the strikers will strengthen their picket lines, etc. We are wondering what the growers are going to do. Is this cotton belt of ours going to be an armed camp? The strikers are willing to listen to a proposal. Have you any suggestions to make to us. If the suggestion is made we will probably deal through mediation.

Guiberson. In order to give Dr. Cross a chance to investigate conditions for a few days I would suggest that in the meantime we declare an armistice. We have nothing against the pickers. They have a right to do all the things they have done but we do not wish to listen to tales we know nothing about. If we can get together immediately we shall be glad. Dr. Cross, you should go to the fields and camps and see for yourself instead of sitting here and reading a lot of stuff that has no connection with the case in hand. We only want a fair proposition.

Abel. This committee was to keep in mind two things: (1) What the growers could afford to pay. (2) What is a fair wage to the pickers. We do not think it is fair to ask the growers to go beyond what they can pay.

Cross. We do not demand, we have no right to demand anything. Anything I have said is along the line of suggestion.

Abel. The manner in which your suggestion comes puts it in the nature of a demand.

Decker. I would like to ask Mr. Guiberson what he means by an armistice.

Guiberson. I mean for the pickers to withdraw from the picket lines and go back to their camps for a few days, until this committee has a chance to study the facts.

Decker. Will the growers suspend all picking for the same length of time?

Guiberson. We would not do that.

Cross. On behalf of the committee I wish to thank the citizens of this community for the very courteous treatment we have received from everybody. The Committee is a fact finding body. All we can do is submit the facts as we find them, although we would like to get both sides together for a settlement before we leave here. It will be some days before we will be able to make the findings public because of the absence of the other members of the Committee from San Francisco. I shall be glad to remain here Saturday and Sunday and in the meantime if either side wishes to present a proposal from me I will be only too pleased to work on it.

Exhibit 8764[1]


DISARM
THE RICH
FARMER
—OR—
ARM—

Pickets in 1933 Cotton Strike.

Picket Caravan—1933 Cotton Strike.

---

[1] See pt. 53, p. 19495.

PICKETS ON THE HIGHWAY CALLING WORKERS FROM THE FIELDS, 1933 COTTON STRIKE.

CAMP WHERE EVICTED STRIKING WORKERS CONCENTRATED, CORCORAN, CALIFORNIA—1933.

Documentary History of the Strike of the Cotton Pickers in California 1933

By Paul S. Taylor and Clark Kerr

INTRODUCTION

As the faulting of the earth exposes its strata and reveals its structure, so a social disturbance throws into bold relief the structure of society, the attitudes, reactions, and interests of its groups. In the San Joaquin Valley of California the alignment of groups, their opinions and behavior under stress of an unfamiliar situation were exposed by the cotton pickers' strike of 1933, when thousands of agricultural workers, largely of alien race and under communist influence, clashed with conservative American growers. The significance of the event is far more than incidental. It exhibits in full detail the essential characteristics of numerous lesser conflicts in California agriculture both before and since, in which ardent organizers agitate and lead, incensed "vigilantes" organize and act, growers, officials and laborers each overstep the law, and citizens finally cry to the State authorities for peace, if necessary at the hands of troops. The documentation and analysis of this early impact of labor organized under radical leaders on a previously undisturbed rural community is undertaken to illuminate and record an unsettled situation, which in its basic features persists despite truces, and flares up again and again through the valleys of California as harvest after harvest rises successively to its peak.

There need be no surprise that this extended uprising of cotton workers occurred in California earlier than the unrest which had developed among Southern sharecroppers. For in California the pattern of cotton culture approximates that of industrial production, and the "family-farmer" is subordinated to the large-scale "grower." More than 30 percent of all the large-scale cotton farms of the country in 1929 were located in California, all or practically all of them in the San Joaquin Valley. ("Large-scale" means annual gross income of $30,000 or more). The concentration of big operations which this represents is all the more striking because in the same year California produced less than 2 percent of the nation's cotton. Large numbers of wage laborers are concentrated under few employers under the predominantly "industrialized agriculture." Sharecroppers are virtually non-existent. Thus the growth of paternalism which traditionally has moderated labor relations in the cotton belt is discouraged by the size of the labor force, and practically prevented by the dependence in California upon migrant wage workers who, with few ties to the community, come and go with the seasons.

The historical background of organized labor unrest in California lies in the rapid changes in the utilization of the valley lands of the State which have occurred during the past two generations. From cattle raising and the production of grains by rainfall farming, the basis of rural economy has steadily been shifted to irrigated agriculture, with emphasis upon production of fruits and vegetables, grapes, sugar beets, and latterly, cotton. This transition to intensive farming with its insistent and increasing demands for great hordes of hand laborers, has given the State an agricultural proletariat, practically landless and propertyless, and exceedingly mobile. It accounts in large measure for the waves of immigrant laborers—Japanese, Hindustani, Mexican, and Filipino—which have swept successively into California and found employment there. Cotton, of recent appearance in the central valley of the State, has added southwestern whites and Negroes to the diversity of nationalities already at work in the fields. But the Chinese had practically abandoned agriculture before cotton became important in the San Joaquin Valley, neither Japanese nor Filipinos pick cotton, and Hindustani pickers have long been numerically inconsequential. Of the 15,000 or more pickers engaged in the harvest of 1933, probably 75 percent or more were Mexicans and the balance were southwestern whites and Negroes with many more of the former than of the latter.

California agriculture has not been entirely free of labor disturbances in the past. The Wheatland hop riots of 1913 focused the attention of the entire State and called forth the notable investigation by Carleton Parker at the request of the Governor of the State. During the war, especially, strikes broke out in the citrus belt and elsewhere, some of them, like the Wheatland strike, led by the I. W. W. Sporadic refusals of small groups to work under certain conditions have often occurred, but generally these have exhibited little or no semblance of organization, and should hardly be dignified by the term "strike."

In 1928 there sprang from a Mexican mutual benefit society a labor organization among the Mexicans of Imperial Valley, which became involved in a sort of "strike." The following year leaders from the Trade Union Unity League, sponsored by communists, sought to conduct another strike of Mexican laborers in the Valley. As a result, a number of the leaders were tried for criminal syndicalism and some were convicted.

During the first years of depression, strike activities in agriculture remained at a low ebb. Outbreaks among agricultural laborers were confined chiefly to violence and threats by white laborers against Filipino competitors.

In late 1932 a strike occurred among the orchard pruners of Vacaville, and the spring of 1933 ushered in a whole series of strikes, many of them under communist leadership, which effected most of the important harvests of California. They began in the pea harvest in the Santa Clara Valley and in the berry crops near El Monte, east of Los Angeles, continued in the sugar beet, apricot, peach, lettuce, and grape harvests,[1] and reached a climax in the cotton harvest.

The cotton pickers' strike centered on Kern, Kings, and Tulare counties, in the southern San Joaquin Valley where more than half of the cotton acreage of the State was awaiting harvest. It directly involved over 10,000 pickers, held up harvesting for more than three weeks, and threatened, with longer duration, to spread to areas where the harvest was late and thus tie up practically the entire crop of the State.

THE STRIKE INTERRUPTS THE HARVEST

The opening cotton bolls in Kern County were the signal for picking to begin. Crews of pickers were mobilized, ready to enter the fields at a word from the grower. On many farms this word was given, and the first bales came from the gins at the end of September. Suddenly picking slowed down, then practically ceased, as pickers responded to the October 4 strike call of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union, and to the activity of the strike pickets.

The shock of the first cessation of work travelled almost instantly through the elements of the population immediately concerned with cotton—the pickers, the growers and ther Labor Bureau, the ginners and finance companies, Chambers of Commerce and the Farm Bureau. It involved immediately the local officers of the law and soon the merchants, ministers, American Legion, and even the P. T. A. Metropolitan papers carried the news, emotions, and tragedy of the clash to the public of the State. Sympathizers with the pickers became interested, sent aid, and investigated. Soon the health, relief, conciliation, and highway patrol agencies of the State were actively involved under orders of the governor, and the national guard awaited his call. Even the Federal Government was affected through participation of the National Labor Board of the NRA, the presence of a federal conciliator, and use of federal relief funds. Even the international aspects of a situation involving thousands of alien laborers was thrown into relief by the killing at the hands of armed growers of an honorary consular representative of Mexico, and by the investigations and activities of a Mexican Consul.

The drama of the strike as it unfolded can be well and succinctly told in the very form in which it played upon the emotions of the public by using the headlines carried by valley, metropolitan, and communist press. These reveal the main events, the widening clash of interest, the increasing involvement of different elements in the community, and the charged and unconcealed feelings of the participants. A chronological panorama is therefore presented in these terms to give perspective on events and attitudes before embarking upon more detailed analysis and documentation of the attitudes and activities of principal groups.

September 21. Cotton picking price is raised in San Joaquin. Schedule is set at 60 cents for each 100 pounds at Fresno conference. (Bakersfield Californian)

Thus was announced the action of several hundred assembled growers who raised the picking rate above the 40 cent rate of the preceding year, but rejected the $1 rate demanded by the pickers' union. The San Francisco Western Worker (communist) thereupon announced that battle would be joined:

September 25. Cotton pickers prepared to strike.

The first blow fell in Kern County, where the harvest begins, and the strike quickly spread over the valley. Picketing, arrests, underestimation by growers of the strength of the strike, and assertions of their determination to stand pat, featured the early headlines:

---

[1] See "Agricultural strikes of 1933" in Hearings before the House Committee on Labor, 74 Cong., 1 Sess., n H. R. 6288, pp. 342-367.

October 2. Cotton workers' strike hits Wasco area. Arvin agitators fail in efforts to halt picking. (Californian)

October 3. Eleven arrested Kern cotton strike. Few workers leave fields. (Californian)

October 4. Valley cotton pickers' strike is commenced. (Tulare Advance-Register)

Kings growers to stand pat on cotton pay. Corcoran meeting agrees to stick to 60-cent scale; not worried over strike. (Hanford Journal)

Strike agitators are thwarted in cotton districts. (Californian)

Evictions of strikers from the growers' camps and activities of pickets, including the appearance of mass picketing, were announced:

October 5. Growers evict cotton strikers in Kern area. (Fresno Bee)

Thirty-five families are ousted in cotton strike. (Advance-Register)

Agitators intimidate Kern cotton pickers. (Californian)

October 6. Picket caravans active locally. (Advance-Register)

The growers formed "protective associations" and armed themselves. They sought to disperse strikers, and to resist picketing. Violence or anything that appeared like an overt act breaching the peace was featured:

October 6. Growers form group to buck cotton strike. (Journal)

Valley cotton men organize; fight strikers' wage demands. Protective league for valley now being planned. Kern growers meet at Wasco. (Visalia Times-Delta)

Growers to protect Kern pickers. (Californian)

October 7. Ranchers arm as precaution. Strike trouble spreading. (Bee)

Cotton pickers become violent in cotton areas. Assault and damage to car asserted in allegations against 25 suspects. Battle against agitators in many districts planned by growers, citizens. (Californian)

Woodville farmers break up meeting of striking pickers. (Advance-Register)

Offers of mediation by state labor officials were spurned by the growers, who continued to organize, sent their own parading caravan into the Kern cotton district, centered their attack on "reds and agitators" and clashed with the strikers. The Corcoran camp of the evicted strikers, so anathema to the growers, sprang into being and became one of the dramatic features of the strike. The Western Worker featured the communist effort to drive a wedge between the large and small growers:

October 8. Growers reject mediator offer to stop strike. Won't deal with "radicals." Can take care of own problems, officials told. (Journal)

October 9. Four thousand growers to protect labor. Organization perfected by farmers. Cotton areas visited by five-mile parade. (Californian)

Growers organize to smash strike. (Bee)

Growers plan to drive out agitators. (Times-Delta)

Small farmers with strikers. (Western Worker)

October 10. Farmers form strong unit to halt picketing. Over 700 cotton growers sign as members. Plan vigilante set-up. Present wage upheld. Assert unrest caused by work of professional agitators. (Tulare Times)

Four more arrested. Three thousand cotton pickers camp near Corcoran. (Journal)

Report three slain, several beaten in Arvin Strike riot. Hugh Jewett seriously injured. Many hurt in grim battle. (Californian)

Violence again flares up in cotton strike; new clash at Woodville. (Advance-Register)

[Gov.] Rolph not to send troops into valley. (Times)

Then came the Pixley tragedy, federal intervention, appeal by the Mexican consul to disarm the growers, and the arrest of growers and strike leaders:

October 11. Three strikers dead, twenty wounded in Pixley, Arvin riots. Eleven growers in murder net. (Journal)

Strikers threaten Visalia Jail. (Californian)

Rolph to send troops here if he is asked to. (Advance-Register)

October 12. U. S. takes action to end strike. Chief federal mediator. Department of Justice agents on visit. (Californian)

Mexican consul asks Gov. Rolph to take guns from farmers. (Advance-Register)
Pat Chambers [strike leader] nabbed on riot charge after Visalia strike investigation. Valley quiet after Tuesday uprising. (Times-Delta)
Strikers face starvation. Hatred, misery spread through trouble area as new outbreaks loom. (San Francisco Chronicle)
October 13. Kings sheriff to take charge of Corcoran strikers camp. (Advance-Register)
Mexican consul to probe Arvin riot death. (Advance-Register)
Three more strike leaders arrested at Corcoran. (Journal)
Chambers admits communist record as agitator. (Journal)
Deputies sworn in as ranchers make threats. (Times-Delta)

Strong efforts to accomplish mediation failed when the strikers refused even at the urging of the Mexican consul to resume work pending investigation. Announcements of the end of the strike proved premature. The consul alleged that the growers who killed the consular representative at Pixley were being "whitewashed" by the authorities. "Mass funerals" were held for the dead strikers and the communist press cried out against the armed growers. Federal relief found its way to the strikers:

October 14. Strike is due to end as growers agree to mediate. (Bee)
Mexican consul Bravo urges national return to picking. (Times-Delta)
Consul gets death threat. Raps whitewash of growers. (Chronicle)
Huge crowd attends rites for two men slain at Pixley. (Advance-Register)
Governor says strikers to be provided food. (Times)
October 15. Cotton strike ends, picking begins Monday. All agree to mediation to settle charges. (Journal)
Martial law faces cotton strike area. (Chronicle)
October 16. Strikers refuse to return to work. Idleness in cotton fields continues in face of arbitration. (Times-Delta)
Pickers refuse to resume work. Reject U. S. food. Milk sent by U. S. left to sour by hungry men. (Bee)
Tense feeling in valley masked by ominous Sunday calm. (Chronicle)
Fifteen thousand cotton strikers defy thugs. (Western Worker)

Confusion and contradiction characterized the reports of a kaleidoscopic situation in which there were more premature announcements of peace. An investigating board, appointed by the Governor, appeared on the scene. Its members were Archbishop Edward J. Hanna, Dr. Tully C. Knoles, and Professor Ira B. Cross.

October 17. Workers return to fields. Five hundred and fifteen bales ginned in Kern as farm strike is broken. (Californian)
Pickers remain on strike. Demand $1 wage, U. S. relief, Chambers' release. Huge caravan pickets cotton ranchers. (Journal)
October 18. Strike virtually ended. (Californian)
Creel [NRA administrator] arrives by airplane to settle cotton strike. (Advance-Register)
Striker's infant dies in Hanford of malnutrition. (Advance-Register)
Corcoran group say camp health menace. Want closing order. (Journal)
Five pickets arrested on Tulare Ranch. (Advance-Register)
October 19. Arbitration board meets today to iron out strike troubles. Cotton picking price in valley is best in United States. (Advance-Register)
Kern ginning jumps to 724 bales. (Californian)
Radical leaders and students take hand in local cotton strike situation. "Cocky" strikers defy officers. (Times-Delta)

As the Governor's Fact-finding Committee began its hearing, each side plead its cause, and an outraged rural community made dire threats against radicals and recalcitrant aliens. Even before the Governor's Committee could make its report, the growers sought to repudiate it. The State Director of Industrial Relations immediately came to the valley and made a vain effort to settle the strike along the lines desired by the growers, probably acceptable to the strikers, but unacceptable to the federal government.

October 20. Growers, pickers tell board of financial plight. Mediators hear same plight from both sides. (Bee)
Grand Jury indicts 8 ranchers and 16 strikers; Chambers, strike leader, charged with syndicalism. (Pixley Enterprise)
Strikers face deportation. "Bull Pen" looms for communists and aliens. (Corcoran News)

October 21. Cotton strike in deadlock. Cross' peace plea fails. (Bee)
Growers refuse mediation. Growers' committee explains objections [to] Fact-Finding Committee. (Times-Delta)
Food is offered workers to quit [work] sheriff charges. (Journal)
Merritt [manager of Tagus ranch] flays Chambers as communist in strike hearing. (Advance-Register)

October 22. Reardon [Director of Industrial Relations] here. Devises plan to end cotton pickers' strike. (Times)
Federal credit group enters strike parleys. Credit administration has millions in loans in valley. (Journal)
Move to close schools to aid cotton picking.
Strike headquarters reeks with communist literature. (Times)

The fact-finding committee made its recommendation of a 15 cent wage increase. The growers reluctantly accepted it; the strikers delayed during four tense days, then finally returned to work at the 75 cent rate. Even before the end of the cotton strike fears were voiced of communist strikes to come in the citrus harvest, and threats were heard of secret organizations against strikers, and of enforced repatriation of Mexican pickers.

October 23. 75 cent rate fixed by commission. (Times-Delta)
Kern cotton growers wire U. S. for help. Declaring they have lost faith in State officers, ranchers demand federal mediators. (San Francisco Examiner)
Rolph manoeuver fails; strike solid.
Evidence shows police, growers planned Pixley massacre. (Western Worker)

October 24. Troops asked to quell strikers. Pickets invade cotton fields, clash with workers. Bloodshed feared at Corcoran as mob of 1,000 threatens officers; eleven nabbed. Growers refuse 75 cent wage. (Journal)
Militia may invade strike zone. One hundred highway police sent into Corcoran area to halt riots. (Californian)
Growers ask government to reduce relief. Legion will investigate communism. (Times)

October 25. Rolph moves to force 75 cent wage. Pickers won't get aid, no loans to farmers if new wage ignored. (Times)
Cotton men accept 75 cent rate. (Californian)
Officers seize autos. Pickets have to walk.
Night raiders take [working] families from ranch.
Texas Negroes are invited to harvest crop. (Times)

October 26. Mailed fist ends strike, but riots seen in Corcoran. (Chronicle)
Strikers turn down 75 cent offer. Stick to 80 cent wage and other demands. (Times)
Valley strikers defy U. S. (Chronicle)
Strike in Kern vanishing. Cotton gins busy. (Californian)
Corcoran strikers defy officers; refuse either to pick cotton or evacuate camp. Sheriff Buckner broadcasts message and is booed by strikers. State patrol will not participate in attempt to force evacuation; officers temporize. (Times-Delta)
Southland fears "reds" will launch strike in citrus area. (Times)

October 27. Strike crisis believed over. Union fighting for recognition. Cotton strike spreads into Merced area. (Times)
Five thousand pickers busy in Kern cotton fields. (Californian)
Strikers make daring attack on government. Say officers working for [cotton] finance companies, gin interests, use force against strikers. (Journal)
Girl's p[illegible] ends strike in state's cotton area. Thousands of pickers will return to their jobs today at wages fixed in meet. (Examiner)
Repatriation of Mexicans now looming. (Times)

October 27. Ku Klux crosses flame in warning to valley strikers. (Chronicle) [1]

---

[1] Growers protested against this headline.

As the strikers finally returned to work, the angry growers vented their wrath on officials for their part in the strike, just as the strikers had done; and a handful of students on the picket line gave occasion to attack the State University for "teaching radicalism." The communist press hailed the outcome as a victory, demanded release of arrested strikers, and cried for infliction of the death penalty on the Pixley growers. A threat of extensive importation of pickers from Los Angeles increased tension.

October 28. Strikers break camp at Corcoran. Families set out for cotton fields. (Times-Delta)
Cotton growers ask "shake-up" as strike aftermath. (Examiner)
U[niversity of] C[alifornia] probe of student action in cotton strike asked. (Oakland Tribune)
November 6. Cotton pickers win 25 percent raise. Workers agree to accept 25 percent if the growers hire union pickers. Many farmers signing up, while those in Corcoran region can't get pickers.
Two million dollar raise in wages. Rolph admits victory won by communist leadership. Strong communist party and fighting union will guarantee victory. (Western Worker)
Four thousand Mexicans [imported from Los Angeles] invade valley in strike peril. (Chronicle)

In the aftermath of the cotton strike came the trials of the strike leader charged with criminal syndicalism, and of the growers charged with murder of the strikers. Then the rumble of strike fears in other areas, and the shift of the scene of conflict to the citrus belt and to Imperial Valley, as new harvests came ready.

November 11. Communists back of cotton strike, [district attorney] Haight says in talk at Porterville.
Strikers freed after entering pleas of guilty. (Times-Delta)
November 13. Demand release of cotton strikers. (Western Worker)
November 18. Citrus belt strike threatened. Agitators stir up new trouble in citrus belt. County growers meet with officials here. Groves to be patrolled. (Times-Delta)
November 20. Only communists lead, cotton pickers learn. (Western Worker)
November 27. Pat Chambers on trial; send your protests to Visalia at once. Cotton strike leader faces growers court. Police and machine guns guard court to keep workers out. Sheriff conspires with [Governor] Rolph to frame leader. (Western Worker)
December 4. Chambers trial procedure shows growers plan to frame-up leader. Visalia court keeps workers off jury panel. (Western Worker)
December 6. Chambers jury fails to agree. (Times-Delta).
January 4, 1934. Tulare seeks to oust ex-leaders of cotton strike. Mayor rejects union demand for relief; says city is not hot-bed for radicals. (Bee)
January 8. Death penalty for killers of cotton strikers demanded. Attempt whitewash. (Western Worker)

As the new year began, the noise of conflict was coming from Imperial Valley where vigilantes abducted an attorney of the American Civil Liberties Union and a California Congressman demanded investigation of communist activities in California agriculture. The accused ranchers of Pixley were found not guilty, and the criminal syndicalism charges against Pat Chambers were dismissed. But amid the closing of old cases came news of the spread of the Imperial Valley strike from lettuce to peas, and the rumble of more conflict to come in the San Joaquin Valley, as farmers there were "organizing quietly into vigilante committees, determined to prevent a recurrence of agricultural strikes," and communists "planned to call a strike in Imperial County as soon as cantaloupes and other melons were ripe; to move from there into vegetable fields, and to continue with harvests until the cotton harvest next fall."

January 13. Imperial Valley police fight strikers. Both sides toss bombs when attack is made on Brawley quarters. (San Francisco News)
Jails filled in Imperial Valley row. Meeting of strike leaders in valley dispersed by bombs. (Tribune)
January 24. Wirin kidnapped by vigilantes. Striking cotton pickers convicted [of disturbing peace at Arvin.] (News)
February 1. Pixley ranchers "not guilty." Applause greets verdict returned after three hours. Defendants weep as verdict is read before Judge Lamberson. (Times-Delta)

February 7. Valley striker is freed of charges [Chambers criminal syndicalism case dismissed]. (Examiner)

February 10. Labor agitators ready for action [in San Joaquin Valley harvests]. (Berkeley Gazette)

February 11. Valley farm vigilantes set for red war. San Joaquin ranchers organized secretly to resist onslaughts of harvest foes. Special investigators in filed to uncover plots for labor riots.

Imperial pea harvest halts. Agitators scare 4,000 men from fields. (Chronicle)

THE UNION ATTACK

The strike of the California cotton pickers did not come unannounced. Indeed, as early as May, strikers in the berry crop at El Monte had warned a labor agent of the Valley growers that "You'll have to do better [in the matter of wages] in the San Joaquin."

The Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Union which was organizing the series of strikes among migratory agricultural laborers gew out of a strike in lettuce workers in the Imperial Valley in January, 1930. As one of the results of its early activities, eight leaders were convicted of criminal syndicalism by a local court.[3] For the next three years the union was comparatively inactive among the masses of laborers. However, it was developing an organization through communist channels, affiliated as it was with the (communist) Trade Union Unity League. Headquarters of the union were established in New York, but principal strike activities were confined mainly to California.[4]

Western district headquarters were maintained at San Jose. In a statement before the Governor's Fact Finding Committee, the District Secretary described union organization and membership requirements as follows:

> All workers in the agricultural industry who agree to abide by the principle of the union are eligible for membership. To date, the Union membership in the state of California numbers twenty thousand [see comment below], including in its ranks workers of every color, creed, nationality, or political belief. It is an economic organization which has as its main principle the organization of the agricultural worker for the purpose of bettering his living and working conditions.
>
> The District of the Union is divided into sections and sub-sections, these, in turn, are divided into locals. The Local is the basic organization of the Union and no decisions of policy are valid without majority approval by the entire membership.
>
> There are only two paid functionaries of the Union. One, the District organizer who receives $5 per week. Two, the District Secretary, who receives $7.50 per week. The District organizer and Secretary are elected at District-wide conventions. Section organizers are elected at Section Conventions, and Local presidents and secretaries are elected directly by each local.
>
> The Union recognizes and maintains the unalienable (sic) right of the workers to ORGANIZE, STRIKE, AND PICKET, and urges this method to better living and working conditions, when other methods fail.

---

[3] American Civil Liberties Union, A strike is criminal syndicalism in California. March, 1931. In April 1930, a series of raids netting 103 arrests, was made "in anticipation of the coming opening of the cantaloupe season. A number of meetings have been held, with a view to organizing for increased wages and to formulate demands as to working conditions." (Brawley News, April 15, 1930)

[4] Chronology of principal strikes, or attempted strikes, in which Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union representatives were active during 1932, 1933 and early 1934: (a) in California, June, 1932, San Mateo pea pickers; July, Brentwood fruit pickers; December, Vacaville orchard pruners; January, 1933, continuation of Vacaville strike; April, Monterey lettuce workers, San Jose and Alameda County pea pickers; May, pea pickers' strike continued, San Diego and El Monte strawberry harvesters, Watsonville pea and lettuce workers; June, San Leandro pea pickers, San Jose cherry pickers, San Gabriel Valley berry pickers; July, San Gabriel Valley berry pickers' strike continued, Contra Costa apricot workers, Modesto apricot pickers; August, Salinas sugar beet workers, Sacramento and Fairfield pear pickers, Bakersfield grape pickers, San Diego tomato and chile harvesters, Chico peach cutters, Salinas lettuce pickers, San Jose pear pickers, Tagus ranch and Fresno region peach pickers; September, Gridley peach cutters, Oxnard beet workers, Fresno grape pickers; October, Lodi grape pickers, southern San Joaquin Valley cotton pickers; November, Imperial Valley pea pickers; December, Imperial Valley lettuce workers; January, 1934, lettuce workers strike continued; February, Imperial Valley pea pickers; April, Alameda County pea pickers, and Florin berry pickers. (b) In other states of the western district. June, 1933, New Mexico cotton choppers, Oregon strawberry pickers; July, Arizona melon workers; August, Oregon pear pickers; September, Oregon hop pickers; October, Salt River Valley of Arizona cotton pickers.

Dues

	Dues per month	Initiations	Membership books
Employed	25¢	25¢	5¢
Unemployed	5¢	10¢	5¢

Forty percent of this fund is retained by the local of the Union, thirty percent by the Section and thirty percent by the district. A small per capita fee is paid to the National office.

The claim to a membership of 20,000 is, of course, not to be accepted at more than a fraction of its face value. Indeed, the Western Worker itself, at almost the same date, October 16, claimed only 4,000 members among the strikers, where the union strength was greatest, and on November 20 asserted that "The membership is around 7,000 and constantly increasing as a result of the victory." Because of fluctuating conditions affecting low paid migratory laborers, and the fact that many are members only nominally, it is impossible for the outsider to determine the exact membership as one might the membership of a stable urban trade union. Dues-paying, steady, membership, however, is probably even less an index of potential power to sway large numbers of migratory agricultural laborers than it is of power to influence the actions of urban industrial workers.

At the close of 1932 and in early 1933 the emphasis of communist activity in California was shifted, at least insofar as it involved public agitation of masses of people. As numbers of unemployed were drawn back into employment, as relief became more adequate under federal direction, and as prices and wages stiffened, "hunger marches" and protest meetings declined, and strike activity in the field of agriculture, long neglected by the American Federation of Labor, assumed increasing importance.[5]

As the cotton pickers gathered in the San Joaquin Valley in preparation for the 1933 harvest, the union established nineteen locals in the southern cotton district.[6] Demands, among which a wage of $1 per hundred pounds for picking was prominent, were prepared and approved by a large conference of delegates elected by these locals. Additional demands were: Abolition of the contract system—gangs working under contractors instead of directly for farmers; hiring to be done through the union; no discrimination among pickers. (Western Worker, Sept. 25.)

The growers assembled later at Fresno on September 19, to the number of from 300 to 500, to fix the picking wage in their usual fashion. Pat Chambers, chairman of the strike committee of the union, was permitted to read, but not to discuss the resolution of the union asking a rate of $1. Immediately he departed, and the meeting deliberated. A prominent grower summarized the issue:

> I had advocated seventy-five cents, but was in a minority of one. Some growers wanted the wage set at fifty cents. Growers objected to the seventy-five cent wage saying that if we set seventy-five cents, they would strike for eighty-five cents, and so on; it was, therefore, better to stand on sixty cents. I thought that at seventy-five cents there would not be so much cause for striking. The wage was set at sixty cents.[7] (Interview).

Probably sensing a possibility that revision might become necessary, as well as intending to maintain unity of action among growers, it was decided that no change should be made in the rate without convocation of another growers' meeting.

The reaction of pickers to the growers' decision was, of course, not uniform. But dissatisfied elements among them naturally appealed to the union in their midst which skillfully organized, spread, directed, and fanned the discontent. A strike leader described the beginning of the process:

---

[5] The transition in emphasis which came in early winter, 1932, shows clearly in the trend of the headlines of the Western Worker: Hunger march 'Frisco Jan. 11 (Jan. 1, 1932); Open winter relief fight (Aug. 15); Many counties preparing for hunger marches (Sept. 1); 3,000 mass at Alameda Hall of Records for jobless relief (Oct. 24); 400 ranch workers strike at Vacaville (Nov. 28); Jobless to march on Sacramento (Dec. 5); Fight for cash relief (Feb. 4, 1933); Rally to Mooney meet (March 20); Strike ties up Cal. pea fields (April 24); 1,500 strike in So. Cal. fields (June 12); Cherry pickers heroic stand against terror (June 26); Workers answer "Recovery Act" with strikes (July 17); Strikes sweep California fields (Aug. 21).

[6] Located at Fresno, Dinuba, Earlimart, Reedley, Visalia, Farmersville, Woodville, Exeter, Tulare, Tipton, Pixley, Delano, McFarland, Wasco, Shafter, Bakersfield, Arvin, Corcoran, and Hanford.

[7] The growers' reasoned public defense of this wage rate is set forth on page 116 (MS).

> Word spread that there was something the agricultural workers could do to better their condition and that was to strike, to struggle. Individual workers came in to the union headquarters at Tulare, established at the time of the Tagus ranch strike and delegations came in from the ranches and we advised them to organize, which they did * * * Incensed the workers gathered and waited for the picking to start. They organized locals in tents, in hovels and in holes in the walls. Strikers who had taken part at the Tagus ranch had experience and formed the nucleus. The strike cry began to ring through the valley—"Not a pound for less than $1 a hundred." (Speech.)

The tactics of the communist leaders have been worked out carefully in the light not only of their own experiences, but those of the American Federation of Labor unions and the Industrial Workers of the World as well. Following the 1933 strikes in California agriculture, a manual of tactics for conducting agricultural strikes was prepared which described the modus operandi in ample detail. It provided instructions:

(1) for intimate survey of the territory preceding a strike, including establishment of contacts with workers, small growers, and even large growers or their agents;

(2) for setting the strike demands, which should be very few, and vital to the workers (in contra-distinction to demands the leaders may think the workers ought to make); and for calling the strike at exactly the time "when the boss needs the workers most;"

(3) for organizing small meetings, then committees, in order to draw in workers, especially in the places from which large ranchers will draw their workers;

(4) for calling a wage conference with broad representation, but "not so broad that it exposes itself to the police and growers;"

(5) for organizing the central strike committee, and for developing leadership among the workers;

(6) for organizing auxiliary activities, such as relief, finance, legal defense in cooperation with organizations such as International Labor Defense, negotiation, publicity through both strike bulletins and releases to the newspapers "answering the slanders against the strike, and presenting the workers side of the struggle;"

(7) for enlisting maximum active strike participation of even women, youth, and children, the first in relief, and all on the picket lines, with children taught to play "workers against growers" instead of "cops and robbers;"

(8) for organizing and equipping union headquarters, to be open "where possible", with "reserve strike headquarters where comrades can gather in case the open headquarters are attacked;"

(9) for organizing picketing and defense "against vigilante attacks;"

(10) for making the settlement, taking into consideration the mood of not only the "vanguard of the workers," but also that of its "most backward sections;"

(11) for avoiding jeopardy of the success of the strike, or loss of confidence in Communist leadership, by premature issuance of leaflets by excessive promises of the leaders, by exposure to seizure at a single time of all equipment or all leaders, by correction or immediate removal of leaders who show signs of discouragement;

(12) for avoiding disruption by continual advance warnings to the strikers of the guises in which it might come;

(13) for bringing the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union, the Trade Union Unity League, Communist Party, and Young Communists League to the favorable attention of the strikers, the two first by appealing to them as authorities on strike tactics, the latter two by utilizing "every incident in the strike to prove that the government is on the side of the bosses and that we must have also a Party that will bring the government on the side of the workers."

As the union proceeded with its campaign to organize and solidify the ranks of the pickers, its visible strike tactics unfolded. Mass meetings were held for the workers congregated on farms, on vacant lots of towns, and in "Mexican towns across the tracks"; union "literature" and membership cards were liberally distributed. In this campaign the union was favored by the late maturity of the crop, which was retarded about two weeks. The situation might have been materially different had work engaged the pickers immediately upon arrival in the cotton area. But waiting in idleness, union meetings became the center of attention, and the coming strike the chief topic of conversation.

In addition to meetings with speakers, mass demonstrations were staged upon appropriate occasions during the strike in order to enlist active participation by the pickers and stir their enthusiasm. The shooting of strikers at Pixley furnished opportunity for a meeting of protest in Visalia:

> Strikers from all parts of the county formed a caravan of cars and drove from Tulare to Visalia before noon. As the caravan entered the county seat, it consisted of 30 cars and trucks loaded with striking workers, accompanied by an escort of state traffic patrolmen in cars and on motorcycles.
>
> Assembling at the main entrance to the court house, approximately 600 workers heard their leader, Pat Chambers, assert that the strikers would hold county officials responsible for the slaying of the two members of their union. (Tulare Times, October 11)

The meeting approved a 4-point demand which included "Death penalty for slayers of the two workers killed at Pixley."

Although communists disapprove of organized religion, they welcome "impressive ceremony" upon suitable occasion, such as granting a charter to a union local. They are quick to recognize that a funeral of slain strikers, even when performed with religious rites, offers good, if somewhat incongruous, opportunity for a demonstration. So it was when the Pixley victims were buried at Tulare:

> With a huge crowd in attendance, last rites for Delfino D'Avila, 55, and Dolores Hernandez, 50, victims of the Pixley cotton striking rioting last Tuesday, were observed at the St. Aloysius Catholic Church here under the auspices of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union.
>
> Estimates of the crowd ranged from 1,200 to 4,000, with experienced observers setting it at a little over 1,500.
>
> Assembling in the city park adjacent to the Southern Pacific tracks, strikers formed an orderly line of approximately a thousand persons and marched down Kern Street to the church. The members were segregated into groups representing various local chapters of the Union, with captains in charge of each corps.
>
> Banners and placards evenly distributed along the ranks of the marchers advertised the policies and demands of the strikers, while marchers from each district carried a placard giving their location.
>
> "We demand the release of Pat Chambers," said one poster. A broad banner borne by two men revealed: "The Mexican Consul represents Mexican bosses." A third observed, "Rolph sends aid to Pixley—24 Special Deputies, 12 Patrolmen—we want food."
>
> The crowd filed into the church until all available space had been exhausted. All seats and most of the main aisle were filled, yet they accommodated but a minor portion of the crowd; outside were hundreds of others, waiting patiently the conclusion of the long ceremony. (Tulare Times, October 14)

A mass protest and appeal directed at the Kern County Board of Supervisors illustrates another type of demonstration, of which there were a number during the strike:

> Approximately one thousand men, women and children bearing banners claiming that they were striking cotton pickers, assembled at the courthouse grounds early this morning in an orderly manner and after marching down the street to the south end of the building, took up a position near the old city jail platform near the city hall, where various speakers addressed the throng.
>
> The strikers sent deputations of men and women, some of the latter with children, to attend a meeting of the Board of Supervisors. This deputation walked quietly into the board room and took seats in the spectators gallery while the board was holding a road hearing.
>
> Two men of the delegation presented a petition to the supervisors for the board's consideration. In substance it was as follows:
>
> "We, the Cannery and Agricultural Industrial Workers' Union, demand: (1) The release of Ladislado Guerro. (2) Relief for strking cotton workers.

> (3) That armed guards and thugs be kept out of strike areas. (4) Hot lunches and clothing for our school children. (5) No evictions from cotton ranches. (6) The right to assemble. (7) Sanitary camps."
>
> Seven striking cotton field workers addressed the supervisors after presenting the petition. Thomas E. Ferry, one of the spokesmen, said that their pickets had been instructed to carry and use no weapons—that they were not armed even with pen knives. He contended that many farmers, to the contrary, were armed with rifles and shotguns.
>
> Mrs. R. E. Walker made a plea for warm lunches for their childrem in the schools. Chairman Perry Brite said he understood all schools furnished warm lunches. Mrs. Walker said this was so providing the child had 10 cents with which to pay for his lunch. She said she did not have the money herself and the children needed food.
>
> Carl Walker, of the deputation, said the Los Angeles Welfare Department had ordered him up here to get to work picking cotton. He said he couldn't earn enough money picking cotton to support his sick wife and children.
>
> The idea which the strikers expressed was to keep peace and "provide relief for the kids."
>
> Chairman Perry Brite and Supervisor Stanley Abel said the board would do its utmost to keep peace and maintain order and that no citizens properly belonging to this county will be allowed to starve.
>
> The meeting was a very quiet one and perfectly orderly . . .
>
> Guerro, referred to in the demand of the deputation attending the board, was being held for investigation by United States Immigration officers, it was reported, with some question as to his entry into the United States involved. (Bakersfield Californian, October 9)

The excitement of the parades, the fiery talks, the cheering, appealed to the Mexicans particularly, and race discrimination, poor housing, and low pay, especially the latter, were rallying cries which appealed to a class of workers with adequate personal experience to vivify the charges hurled by communist leaders, and rendered exposition of the theories of Karl Marx superfluous.

Furthermore, the union was not entirely strange to most of the assembled pickers; the communist leaders already had gained prestige in earlier strikes, in which some of the pickers had even participated. Though the union never had organized the cotton pickers before, it had organized many of the same people when engaged in other harvests, for members of its inner corps, most if not all of whom were communists, had followed the laborers as they migrated from crop to crop, and from region to region. Indeed, from among these people with past training in strike activity, Mexicans, Negroes, and whites, was formed the nucleus of local organizations and subordinate leadership. Emphasizing the importance of these junior leaders, a communist leader said, "Only because we developed leadership from the rank and file were we able to conduct and win the cotton strike. Leaders arose from the ranks—they were not sent from Moscow." Thus the groundwork for the cotton strike was laid in a score of places scattered from the El Monte berry fields to Tagus Ranch and the vineyards of Lodi.

Although the original communist leaders were white Americans, unable to speak Spanish, this proved no great barrier in establishing effective contact with the Mexicans. Most of the latter understood a little English, and plenty of young Mexicans, raised in this country and possessing a fair knowledge of English, were ready to serve as lieutenants and interpreters. And with ample time hanging on the hands of most of the strikers, the additional time required to translate speeches was no serious drawback. As for the race difference between white leaders, and Mexican and Negro led, both the latter groups welcomed cordially the unaccustomed vigorous championship of their cause by members of the dominant race. A communist leader described the welding of the races under stress of common strike experiences:

> Mexicans, Negroes, and whites picked together [they had done this before without unionization], lived, cooked, were beaten and went to jail together. Southern [white] workers would say to Negroes, "Comrade, would you do this? Comrade, you're elected to that committee." [Interview.]

Unlike the organizers of the union, few members or even minor leaders were communists. They were manual workers, not professional organizers. However, with the common immediate aim of winning the strike the two types functioned together effectively. Special efforts were made by the communists to instill in the mass of workers a sense of their own importance and leadership.

> An incident at the Corcoran Camp illustrates the rank and file spirit of the strikers, the spirit of unbreakable collective leadership. When the bosses set up a loud speaker in front of the camp to intimidate the strikers, they asked for the leaders to step out and meet the bosses. "We are all leaders" came back the spontaneous shout. (Western Worker, November 20, 1933)

This incident is to be understood, of course, as an evidence of esprit rather than as a statement of literal fact. A Kings County official laid counter-emphasis on the undoubtedly powerful influence of the central group of leaders:

> Those strikers at the Corcoran camp tried to tell me they didn't have any leaders, that they were all equal and were all leaders. But when I went down to tell them that the camp would be condemned if it wasn't sanitary, they found a leader quick enough to talk to me. They had leaders all right who gave them orders just what to do. (Interview)

With the leadership and organization described, the union began the stoppage. As cotton picking started in Kern County, union "agitators" entered the fields. On October 2, the Bakersfield Californian brought in the first strike reports:

> That between 750 and 1,000 cotton pickers in the Wasco area of the county are on strike for higher picking wages was reported here today. Motorists travelling down the highways noted pickets bearing the legend on wrapping paper, "This field under strike." Approximately 30 pickets were observed.

Agitation failed in the Arvin and Weed Patch district, but Pat Chambers predicted optimistically that 5,000 pickers would be on strike the following day. On the 3rd, the strike spread to the Shafter and McFarland districts; in the latter, 15 percent of the pickers were reported on strike, but at Arvin, again "picking was proceeding as usual." Among those who continued to work during this strike were newcomers from the Southwest. As a white union leader said: I don't know whether they come from Oklahoma or not, but that's what we calls 'em. They'd work for ten cents a day and think they were getting good money." (Interview.)

Outwardly, the growers did not appear seriously worried as yet, and generally both growers and peace officers minimized the effectiveness of the strike:

> Cotton men said today the striking was not sufficiently serious to cause them undue worry over harvesting the crop as the labor supply is plentiful in the county. They [growers] did not care whether the cotton was picked immediately or not. They said they could leave it standing on the stalks till next spring if necessary and lose only a few points in price due to standing. (Californian, October 2, 3. Hereafter newspapers cited only by name and date of publication, unless further identification necessary.)
>
> Cotton growers are not particularly concerned over the threat of the strike. (Journal, October 4.)
>
> Claims of strike agitators at Tulare that 3,000 pickers were out on strike in the Corcoran district got a laugh from local officers who said that only about 200 were out to date. (Journal, October 5.)

The following day the Corcoran News estimated 2,000 on strike.

Union leaders tended to maximize the extent of the stoppage, just as growers tended to minimize it:

> Valley strike headquarters * * * claimed practically complete walkouts in most localities, while grower spokesmen claimed the strike was slipping in these same localities. (Times, October 5.)

Obviously, each party had sufficient motive to shade estimates in its own favor.

In fact, the extent of the walk-out rapidly increased after October 4, the date set by the union for general cessation of picking. It continued to grow in Kern, Kings, and Tulare Counties under the spur of union strike activity until final settlement, except when growers, by advancing wages above 60 cents, induced pickers to resume work. This was done most extensively in Kern County toward the close of the strike.

At no time did the strike spread to include the farms of Fresno, Madera, and Merced counties, although numerous threats and a few belated walk-outs occurred. (Times, October 13; Times-Delta, October 26.)

An index of the effectiveness of the strike is the record of ginnings. Ten gins in Kern, Tulare, and Kings counties which had ginned 57.4 percent of the season's total the year before by the end of October, had ginned only 19.1 percent by the same date in 1933. A late season in 1933 was only partly responsible for the great retardation, undoubtedly the strike was the principal cause.

The increasing success of the strike made its conduct of picketing activities the most conspicuous of union tactics. Picketing scores of thousands of acres of cotton presents new aspects of an old problem. It is only partially comparable to picketing a factory in an industrial center, or a coal mine which has a restricted location; even peach orchards or pea fields involve production in a comparatively confined area. But the cotton strike extended 100 miles from south of Bakersfield almost to Fresno with a varying width up to thirty and even forty miles, and included over 2,000 cotton-raising farms in three counties.

The endeavor to prevent "scabbing" over such a wide area was new to both strikers and leaders. Picketing was even newer to the growers and local law officers who had had little or no experience with strikes, than it was to the strike leaders. This inexperience lent itself to mistakes and excesses on the part of all three parties.

Picketing followed the initial walk-out immediately and continued intermittently and with varying intensity in different regions during the entire strike. On October 5 the Visalia Times-Delta reported the first picketing in the vicinity in "the Parkwood district where a crowd of 40 men, most of them Mexicans, were parading up and down the road and shouting to cotton pickers on a ranch there to join the strike." "Auto caravans of pickets were visiting cotton ranches in the Tulare vicinity" on October 6. Picketing continued simultaneously in Kern County where—

> two hundred strikers who paraded from the Arvin and Weed Patch district yesterday were halted by guards and prevented from entering the Kern Lake zone * * * a second parade * * * was started by strike sympathizers in the McFarland district. (Californian, October 5, 6.)

These early excursions were followed by many during the ensuing weeks.

In order to enlist active participation by a large number of strikers for its moral and educational effect upon them, as well as to enhance the effectiveness of the demonstration upon working pickers, mass picketing methods were employed. Distances to be covered and numbers of pickets to be used compelled use of automobiles and trucks, and the presence of "scabs" working on rows far from any road necessitated employment of unusual methods to attract their attention.

Caravans of cars and trucks filled with men, women and often children of striking families were formed at camps or union headquarters and dispatched to fields and districts where picking was reported. Leaders endeavored to establish picket lines early in the morning before work started, as more likely to prove effective by intercepting pickers en route to the field than lines formed after workers reached the fields. Secrecy of destination was sought in order to evade accompanying officers and the vigilance of growers who might offer resistance of various forms or withdraw pickers from the field temporarily upon the approach of pickets. But usually the caravan moved along its intended route flanked by highway patrolmen, peace officers, growers, newspaper men, and even spectators. Sometimes the caravan divided to reach different destinations or to throw watchers off the scent. Sometimes it was secretly assembled either in an inconspicuous part of town or at the point where the line was finally to be maintained that day. The pickets conducted their demonstration while driving slowly past the fields, or by dismounting to parade on foot or simply to stand along the highway. When pickers were working close to the highway, the strikers would first talk to them encouraging them to join the strike. If such persuasion was of no avail or if pickers were distant from the road, shouting and bugle blasts were resorted to. Placards and banners against "scabbing" were also used.

As strikes wear on, feelings on all sides become increasingly charged, and strike leaders endeavor to raise morale of the strikers to the highest pitch in order to maintain their resistance unbroken. A union leaflet on October 12, for example, urged vigorous picketing to take advantage of the increasing concern of the growers over loss of their crops:

> Comrade Strikers. The weather is threatening. The growers are becoming desperate. We must Mobilize All of Our Forces to Keep the Fields Clean. Do not let stool pigeons or anyone else call off the picket lines. There must not be A Scab in the Field. Mobilize more picket lines to cover

> your whole territory and call the workers out of the ranches. We have the legal right to organize, strike and picket. (Reprinted in Times-Delta, October 13.)

With such feelings, which characteristically prevail during a strike, it is obvious that the courtesies of a social gathering are not to be expected from pickets who see workers in the field undermining the cause for which they, the pickets, are sacrificing, and in the benefits of which all workers—strikers and non-strikers alike—will share if the cause is successful. Employment of abusive language, insulting cat-calls, gestures suggesting what the pickets would like to do to the "scabs," were frequent occurrences. Workers were sometimes warned that "We can't get you now, but some day you'll have to come to town, and we'll get you then." Sometimes more vigorous threats were employed. According to the Bakersfield Californian (Oct. 26.):

> A truck load of pickers en route to work in the Rosedale district was halted by strikers and threatened with death, members of the group said, if they went to work.

Strike leaders declared that they urged peaceful picketing only, and abstinence from all violence of any nature at all times:

> Each picket line, each local, received iron-clad instructions from the union against violence. We understand that one gun found in the possession of a striker will be the signal for the growers and authorities to massacre defenseless strikers. ("Brief history of the San Joaquin Valley cotton strike," document presented by the union to Governor's Fact Finding Committee.)

The unionist in charge of picket lines of the McFarland local described before the Fact Finding Committee the instructions given to pickets:

> I instuct my men if any of them are armed to remove them before going on duty, obey the law and do not trespass, do not block traffic and comply with the law in every respect. In warm weather the pickets are not allowed to wear their jackets. I have ordered them to cooperate with the officers in every way. (Hearings.)

Picketing led even to violence on several occasions, however, the responsibility resting sometimes clearly on the shoulders of the pickets, at other times less clearly so. The Arvin riot, which resulted in the death of one striker, started with picketing activity; its details are stated in the section on Law Enforcement.

The willingness of communist leaders not only to let pickets trespass, but even to organize them to do it under circumstances favorable to success, is indicated in what purports to be the manual of tactics, printed in the appendix to this study.[8] The resolution states that picket lines:

> * * * should be of two general characters; guerilla picket line, and mass picket line. Both must be utilized together and to supplement one another. In other words, even while the mass picket lines are parading up and down the highway and calling upon the workers to strike, the guerrilla picket lines must find other entrances to the ranches and help take the workers off.

This resolution was passed after the cotton strike, it is true. However, pickets actually trespassed upon the fields where pickers were at work in several notable instances during the cotton strike. For example,

> At the Hansen Ranch, it is reported, "Women picketeers who ran into fields cried to pickers to 'come on out, quit work; we'll feed you. If you don't, we'll poison all of you'." (Journal, October 25.)

The principal occasion upon which trespass occurred followed the lull in picketing while the Governor's Fact Finding Committee was preparing its report. Interestingly it took place upon the ranch of a large grower who had succeeded in maintaining a force of pickers at work during the strike, but who assumed a much more moderate attitude at the hearings than most of his colleagues.

> Striking Kings County cotton pickers today won out in a hand to hand battle with pickers on the Guiberson ranch, three miles east of Corcoran, and serious trouble threatened as bands of strikers, estimated at 500 to 800, moved in trucks and automobiles toward the Progress Land Company ranch where a large crew of pickers was busy at work, late this afternoon.

---

[8] See pp. 20028-20032.

> Kings County officers, unarmed, were unable to hold the strikers in check.
> Leaving the Corcoran strike camp this morning the strikers went to the Peterson ranch and drove pickers from the field.
>
> Arriving at the Guiberson ranch later in the day, they met opposition and a hand to hand fight followed with both sides sustaining bruised heads and faces. Pickers gave up the fight when several cotton picking sacks were slit. Considerable cotton acreage was reported trampled down.
>
> Continuing to the Hubbard ranch, the strikers stayed out of the field but served notice on the pickers to be out of the field when they came back, or they would drag them out. (Times-Delta, October 23.)

The next day, as an aftermath, it was reported that

> Protection was sought of Corcoran police yesterday by a worker from the J. W. Guiberson ranch near Corcoran, where fighting between cotton pickers and picketers occurred yesterday.
>
> Upon the man's request, he was placed in the city jail. His identity was not revealed by police. The man told officers that picketers had threatened his life after he had engaged in the affray on the ranch, and assertedly knocked one of the woman pickets down. (Times, October 24.)

On the same day picketing in another locality, accompanied by extensive trespassing, developed into a near-riot when officers, using tear gas, curbed the activities of the pickets. Strikers were reported to be deliberately planning and executing violent activity against working pickers in the following instance:

> Night riders, bands of strikers, were reported active in Tulare County during the night. One band, it was learned here, removed two families of pickers from the Overton ranch near Goshen, loading them bodily into trucks and taking them away. (Times, October 25.)
>
> Unconfirmed reports reached Pixley that strikers forcibly caused a crew of cotton pickers to stop work near McFarland. (Advance-Register, October 5.)

The various acts of the strikers to enlist the support of the majority of pickers—persuasion and appeal, covert and open threats, and occasional trespass and violence—succeeded. To measure the effectiveness of each of these elements is of course impossible. Local newspapers, officers, and growers emphasized the element of fear:

> At Woodville, very little picking was reported Thursday morning, with pickers said to be remaining out of the field through fear they might be manhandled by picketers as one picker was Tuesday. (Advance-Register, October 12.)
>
> In the Arvin, Magunden, and Weed Patch districts it was reported many pickers, intimidated by agitators, had left the cotton fields. (Californian, October 5.)
>
> With picking almost at a stand-still, pickets were on the rampage all day. Eighty-five workers were intimidated by pickets into deserting the B. A. Overland ranch in Kings County. The quitting workers admitted they were frightened. (Chronicle, October 25.)

After the strike at least one physical clash took place between those who had struck, and those who had continued to work:

> Strikers and strike-breakers sought to settle their dispute by individual combat when the Hanford Mexican colony staged a dance at Armory Hall this Saturday night. Several men were injured in half a dozen fights that broke out during the evening. (Times, October 29.)

The role of strikers' concentration camps in discouraging from picking those who otherwise might do so, the pressure exerted by growers to keep pickers from joining the strike who might wish to do so, and efforts to stiffen resistance of all growers and citizens who might be disposed to make concessions to the strikers, are discussed elsewhere.

A cherished part of the communist strategy was the endeavor to drive a wedge between small growers and laborers on the one hand and large growers and finance and power companies on the other. Even before the cotton strike they had attempted to stimulate organization among the smaller farmers to defend themselves by striking or otherwise, against those whom they regarded as opposed to their interests:

> The small farmer likewise face a desperate future. Their fight will force them to more and more unite with the workers, against the real exploiters, the finance, gin, and power companies. In the same manner as the workers organizing in union they are having to organize into the United Farmers League, are taking up the strike weapon against the exorbitant power rates, and foreclosures. (Western Worker, November 20.)

This League, sponsored by the communists, issued a statement after the strike urging its members to "Support the pickers' union by signing this union hiring contract." (Western Worker, November 13.)

Some small growers did exhibit active sympathy with the strikers' demands; doubtless more would have done so if such expressions had not been obliged to face the strong pressure of widespread grower and community opinion. But practically no growers, small or large, went so far as to pay the $1 per hundred pounds demanded by the pickers: union representatives submitted to the Governor's Committee but one such written offer. A small grower who spoke sympathetically of the pickers before the committee said, "We will be glad to pay more than 60 cents to the poor slave who has to do the work. Under present conditions we cannot do it." In the closing days of the strike a number of growers, small and large, raised the rate to 75 cents.

THE GROWERS' RESISTANCE

The initial attitude of the growers, who expected a strike, but not one which would cause great difficulty, was reported to be relatively mild; at least they would attempt no general lockout.

> No retaliatory measures will be used by the growers in case the strike should materialize, but any workers will be accepted who are willing to go to work for the 60 cent scale. (Journal, October 4.)

However, when the strike became general the attitude changed. Growers and other elements in the community interested in combatting the strike, such as gin and finance men, immediately organized local groups, which were loosely federated and known as protective associations.

The character of these organizations, which appeared throughout the strike-affected area, and their effect on the mind and emotions of the public appear from the accounts of their activities. Only a few of these groups are described here. The Bakersfield Californian (Oct. 6) gave the following survey of concerted action by growers in Kern County:

> Growers to protect Kern cotton pickers. Crops, workers will be guarded; arms to be used if necessary.
>
> Protection for Kern County's $3,300,000 cotton crop—as well as for a reported 80 percent of cotton pickers ready and willing to work at prices the growers can afford to pay, provided they are not intimidated by alleged radicals and communists, will be afforded here within the next 24 hours, the Executive Committee of the Agricultural Protective Association announced today:
>
> "Acting with great rapidity the protective association is organizing the county today—and within a few hours will be prepared to offer growers 'adequate armed protection.'"
>
> As cotton picking throughout the county has been reported paralyzed to a great extent and there is no legal recourse for the growers of the county, citizens are banding together today, with assistance solicited from the Kern County Chamber of Commerce, the Bakersfield Chamber of Commerce, and the Farm Bureau.
>
> The executive committee said:
>
> "These organizations have been solicited by land owners and producers to join in this movement of a citizens committee to prevent outside radicals and Communists from dominating and ruining a great industry.
>
> Within 24 hours we will have a countywide organization for the protection of growers and their families, as well as their property. These people have been threatened and are taking steps to protect themselves against potential hurt and damage.
>
> Ample funds will be provided for those employed by the association.

> More than 80 percent of the cotton pickers in the county want to work for the wage scale the growers are able to pay. This wage scale is as high as any paid for cotton picking in the United States.
>
> Many of the pickers, however, have been intimidated by radicals and are afraid to go into the fields and pick cotton because of numerous threats made against them.
>
> A survey made of the county showed today that very little cotton is being picked.
>
> Growers have been advised that they have the right, under the trespass law of this state to protect their property from invasion and use force if necessary in so doing."

The growers' organizations were partly open in character, and partly secret. Public mass meetings of growers, and even parades were held. The Kern County Committee to resist the strike, which was formed with the approval and support of a large meeting of growers held at Wasco, was composed of the directors of the Kern County Farm Bureau, the Executive Committee of the Kern County Chamber of Commerce, and representatives of other organizations. Non-secret committees were active at Corcoran, but a semi-secret organization was also formed, called the Farmers' Protective Association:

> Growers declined to divulge the names of leaders of the association, intimating they feared the men's property might be molested in the event they were known. (Bee, October 10. L. D. Ellett acknowledged membership before the Governor's Fact Finding Committee.)

The characteristic program of the growers groups included five main points, which will be described in some detail:

(1) *Wide publication of the fact that the growers were "standing pat" on the wage offer of 60 cents*, with insistence that this "is the maximum the farmer can afford to pay on the 1933 crop and that the wage scale is satisfactory to regular cotton pickers, practically all of whom would now be at work were it not for the alleged 'professional' agitators," and the general maintenance of a solid resistance among the growers before the pickers and the public. (Times, October 10; Journal, October 4.)

Undoubtedly, many pickers were willing to work, and regretted the intrusion of the strike. For example, a growers' agent stated that pickers would come to him with the request to "send us to some corner of the valley where there is no trouble;" that one Mexican picker who had joined in a strikers' demonstration, appeared the next morning to request a gasoline advance to move to the west side of the valley to pick, sensing no serious incongruity, and naively explaining his presence in the demonstration by saying, "They viva'd and we viva'd;" and that the Corcoran Camp guard prevented unauthorized exits of workers as well as entrances. Particularly resented by growers was a statement before the strike actually began, attributed to a deputy labor commissioner, who said, "Your people are on strike, and you don't know it." But in view of the great effectiveness of the strike, and the likelihood that many workers joining it would naturally explain their action to their employers by some excuse such as fear, the growers' estimate of 80 percent willing to work can be accepted only far below face value.

(2) *Eviction of striking pickers from camps of the growers.* When refusals to work began, many hundreds of pickers were ordered either to go to work at 60 cents or to vacate the quarters provided by the growers. (Bee, Oct. 5; Corcoran News, Oct. 6) In some instances the eviction orders were actually enforced by groups of growers. For example:

> At these [union] meetings, the pickers were instructed to remain in the cotton camps after striking, being informed that the growers would find it impossible to evict them for several weeks, if they went to courts for redress.
>
> FARMERS TAKE INITIATIVE
>
> On Wednesday afternoon, late, about 75 growers of the Corcoran district assembled at Peterson Farms and gave the occupants of the cotton camp five minutes to get their sacks and start for the field. Those who did not wish to work were instructed to leave the camp immediately. The proposition of the growers was received with derision, and within a few minutes several trucks were backed up to the cabins and farmers began loading belongings of Mexican cotton pickers on the trucks. These meagre possessions were

> dumped off on the highway a short distance from Peterson Farms headquarters, and the occupants of the camp ordered to leave forthwith, which they did peacefully. But for a few who wished to work, the camp was completely deserted by 7 o'clock. The camp at Peterson Farms was made up of a total of approximately 150 Mexicans, ages ranging from babes in arms to one old man 97 years of age. Guards were placed about the camp to prevent return of the Mexicans during the night. (Corcoran News, Oct. 6)

The eviction at the Peterson ranch was carried out "with the approval of the officers." (Journal, Oct. 5) A district attorney stated the officials' view in an interview after the strike:

> I don't know whether the growers had a legal right to evict the strikers or not, but the logic of the situation was all in their favor. Maybe, legally they should have been given thirty days notice. This talk of serving three day notices is all wrong. I think the sheriff's logic was good, that the shelter, fuel, lights and water furnished to the pickers by the growers is part of their pay for picking cotton. So, if they refuse to pick, they shouldn't get this pay any more than money. The sheriff and I told the growers not to worry about the pickers' rights anyway. The growers had all the logic on their side. If it isn't the law, it ought to be. (Interview)

The next day it was reported that "The strikers from Peterson ranch were still camped along the highway yesterday after being evicted, but are expected to leave today after their water supply is cut off." (Journal, Oct. 7) The Corcoran growers' committee appealed to the state highway patrol to "keep the strikers moving once they are evicted." (Bee, Oct. 8) At the Hansen ranch,

> some 25 ranchers began moving their belongings out onto the highway. In cases where striking pickers preferred to move their own belongings, they were permitted to do so, but where they refused to move, their belongings were loaded upon trucks and moved out. There was no trouble, the evacuation being accomplished good naturedly, some of the Mexican workers even assisting the ranchers in moving. (Journal, Oct. 6)

An eviction in Kern County was reported as follows:

> Late this afternoon * * * the situation had cleared somewhat when armed pickers numbering almost 200 men, heeded a growers' ultimatum to go to work or leave their camp ground. The camp ground, located two and one-half miles south of Wasco, was visited by an army of between 200 and 300 armed farmers who demanded evacuation. * * *
>
> Reports stated that about 100 of the pickers went back to work, heavily guarded by farmers and deputized citizens. The balance began moving out of the district.
>
> Trouble flamed early in the day when a delegation of unarmed farmers visited the camp ground, urging the strikers to go back to work and offering free transportation between the camp and cotton fields for workers who would pick at 60 cents a hundred pounds.
>
> Growers reported the strikers "became ugly," holding out with their demand for $1 a hundred.
>
> Within a few minutes after the farmers left to begin recruiting their forces, approximately 150 additional strikers were reported to have assembled at the camp ground.
>
> With reports of the "misunderstanding"—as one Wasco man termed it, a gathering of almost 400 growers assembled in Shafter, transferred its meeting place to Wasco.
>
> Following a hurried conference, the majority of the growers visited the camp ground with the ultimatum, recruited scores of pickers, and permitted the balance of the strikers to leave the area. (Californian, Oct. 10)

A minor clash occurred at a Kings County ranch when—

> approximately 50 strikers and agitators drove to the ranch for the purpose of assisting striking cotton pickers move out of the cotton camp cabins. May [the rancher] and his men met them at the highway and warned them to stay off the ranch, most of them obeying the warning. Lopez, however, broke through the guards and was going toward the cabins when he was arrested by Mr. May. The man did not specify who it was he intended to

kill, but shouted, "I'm going to kill someone," it was reported by members of the growers' committee. (Journal, Oct. 7. Lopez was released a few days later.)

Some complaint of the manner of eviction was made to Enrique Bravo, Mexican Consul from Monterey, by his nationals:

> Bravo said that Mexican workers had complained to him that they had been evicted from the Peterson, Hansen, and May ranches at the point of guns, and that at the Peterson ranch particularly their belongings had been dumped unceremoniously into the highway and the water supply cut off and no other adequate supply within 14 miles. He said they had complained that the usual three-day notice had not been given. (Journal, Oct. 12)

The strike leaders at Corcoran "instructed occupants of various cotton camps to vacate peaceably as soon as they were ordered to do so." (Corcoran News, Oct. 6) Throughout the strike area, eviction from the growers' camps was carried out practically without physical encounters, although upon some occasions the growers made a show of force to ensure evacuation. On other occasions strikers were requested courteously to leave more or less at their own convenience.

The growers felt wholly justified, morally, in evicting those who would not work at 60 cents, and used the tactic in an effort to eliminate "agitators" and to deter pickers from striking. Kern Lake growers, for example, issued eviction notices, then declared a picking holiday, and expressed the opinion that "many of their workers will resume work as soon as the strike agitators are evicted." (Bee, Oct. 6) But the extent of the strike was greatly underestimated by growers, who expected to fill the places of the strikers with other workers in the valley as had customarily been done in other years when sporadic disaffection had arisen. Growers and their sympathizers resented suggestions that wholesale eviction was a mistake, but a large grower of more moderate opinions stated:

> The growers thought that if the pickers wouldn't work, then there was no reason for them to stay and use water and fuel, and they wanted to have the places vacated for others to come in. They didn't know how unusual the strike would be, and thought others would come in from other places in the valley. As it turned out, it would have been just as well not to have evacuated them. I told the growers at the time that it was better to let the Mexicans stay; then when the strike is over, they would be right here. (Interview.)

In general, the evictions were tactically unsuccessful and proved to be a boomerang, as they forced the strikers into concentration camps easily dominated by the union.

(3) *The endeavor to "rid" the valley of "outside radicals and communists."*—The fact that most of the principal strike leaders were communists greatly inflamed the already heated feelings of the growers, and was seized upon to arouse the public. The Sacramento Bee on the third day of the strike queried editorially why such people should be tolerated:

> *People getting weary of communist agitators*
>
> People of California of all classes are in favor of decent working conditions and salaries for all categories of employees.
>
> This state has been one of the leaders in the enactment of statutes for the protection of those who toil; for abolishing the sweat shop; for providing minimum wages for women; for preventing the exploitation of children in the shops and in the factories.
>
> Public opinion strongly supports the idea of a fair day's pay for a fair day's work. And every legitimate and honest effort directed toward that end is praiseworthy.
>
> But our people are getting exceedingly weary of the activities of professional communist leaders, mostly from New York, who are notivated by no honest desire to improve working conditions, but rather propose to feather their own nests while promoting the cause of social anarchy and red revolution.
>
> And they are getting very tired of the spectacle of these unprincipled agitators, most of them of alien origin and strangers to California, actually forbidding those who want to work from working on threat of physical violence.

> They do not work themselves except in stirring up strife and disorder.
>
> They look to their dupes to supply them with food, clothing, shelter and spending money. They loaf between working seasons; and then descend upon the scene like vultures who have smelled carrion from afar.
>
> Why should they have such wide tolerance?

Growers' leaders promptly published their intention to rid the valley of the leaders of the strike. Forrest Frick, of Arvin, announced that the Kern County Committee "will seek to drive agitators out of the county." (Bee, Oct. 6) L. D. Ellett, chairman of the Committee of 14 named at a Corcoran meeting of cotton producers and business men, stated an even broader objective: "We are going to rid Kings County of all the strikers and strike agitators." (Journal, Oct. 7) Whether or not the means to be used in the elimination of strike agitators were to be solely "legal" means, was a question which later produced tensely dramatic charges and denials at the hearings before the Governor's Fact Finding Committee. The record states:

> KEARNEY (an independent farmer]: Two weeks back last night, I was invited to the meeting in Corcoran of the growers. When we got to town the meeting was at the Legion Hall, but it was not big enough and we went to the ball park. Mr. Ellett, the manager of the Ellet gin, said he did not want them to think it was a gin meeting, but that it was a growers' meeting. He said the time had come when the growers would have to take the law into their own hands, since they could not get any protection. * * * Their conversation was that we had to use force to get rid of these pickers, so that we could get new pickers. I jumped up and some one in the crowd shouted "Put him out." I said, "Gentlemen, I am strictly an American and I do not believe in mob law. You are getting into deep water." I refused to sign the petition to take the law into our own hands. I did not read the petition. It went around to seven or eight, and it got back to the banker, Mr. Guiberson. Mr. Guiberson said, "I could not sign that because it said 'eliminate.'" (The petition as revised and signed read: "We the undersigned pledge our support to the farmers of the Corcoran territory in protecting the workers on their ranches and legally eliminating the leaders of the strike agitation and join this organization for this purpose.") About that time two or three got up and hollered, "lets go across the track and clean them out now." Mr. Ellett did not object * * *. There was a short hand report taken of what was said * * *.
>
> ABEL [growers' attorney]: Did you say you heard him say that force would have to be used to get rid of the leaders of the pickers?
>
> KEARNEY. Yes.

Later Mr. Ellett took the stand to deny he had said that the growers had to take the law into their own hands. He resented the imputation of lawlessness to the Corcoran meeting, asserting that it "was attended by the whole neighborhood, and if there was a bunch of outlaws and cut throats there, they were our own best people." He added by way of explanation:

> We wanted protection.
>
> Dr. CROSS. How were you going to get it?
>
> ELLETT: We asked the sheriff for more deputies, but they had no money.

Events on the side of the growers moved swiftly. On the third day of the strike, a crowd of 75 growers formally ordered the strikers assembled at Woodville to disperse and either go to work at 60 cents or to leave California. After a physical encounter, in which neither side used fire-arms, a grower read aloud to the strikers the following proclamantion:

> Porterville, California, October 7, 1933. Notice to Public at Large: We the undersigned the agricultural producers and business men operating in the Porterville, Cutter, Woodville and Tipton sections of Tulare County, State of California, do hereby, by this agreement declare ourselves to be in a frame of mind to protect ourselves from present strike agitators and strikers, and do hereby incorporate ourselves into an agricultural protective association with full intention legally to disburse (sic) all strike agitators and strikers from out locality. Our motto: Strikers work peacefully or leave the State of California. (Note: We have been informed by a source believed to be reliable that the word "legally" was inserted after the proclamation had been read to the strikers)

Strike leaders and strikers were ordered generally to work or leave California—an assumption of authority to do what neither they nor the constituted authorities had power to do legally. Specifically, the "leaders of the ranchers said they had forced J. H. Bowen, a speaker at the strikers' meeting, to promise he would leave the country before 9 A. M. today" (Bee, Oct. 8). Emphatic public appeal was also made in at least one town that the agitators be "driven from town."

The intent of organized farmers then, to get rid of strike leaders, and even of strikers, is sufficiently clear from these declarations. (Note: In April, 1934, Filipino and Japanese strikers near Florin actually were forced by officers to evacuate the community en masse.)

(4) *Resistance to picketing, and insistence upon "protection" of pickers willing to work at 60 cents from the activity of strikers' pickets.*—To a very minor extent, especially in Kern County, growers in outlying sections expressed some apprehension for the personal safety of themselves and their families. After the strike a prominent grower and gin representative of Corcoran was said to be in fear of the vengeance of ex-strikers, and a bullet did strike the house of one of the farmers tried for the Pixley killings. But apprehension of growers for their own safety was exceptional; their concern over disturbance of pickers willing to work, however, was acute and general.

The sheriffs generally were reluctant to appoint numerous deputies, so growers were warned to defend their own property and advised of their right under the law of trespass to use force in so doing. Defence of property referred only slightly to infliction of physical damage to farm crops, buildings, etc.; practically it meant prevention of successful picketing. The Farmers' Protective Association of Corcoran, for example, planned as a chief objective "to prevent any untoward efforts at picketing or intimidating laborers now working or who wish to resume work in the cotton fields." (Times, Oct. 10) As an initial gesture, demonstrations of growers were arranged to counteract those of the strikers:

> Although caravans of growers were reported visiting various districts of (Tulare) county ostentatiously to break up picketing activities or meetings of strikers, no clashes were reported . . .
>
> In Kern County, a long parade of growers toured the county yesterday as a gesture of defiance to strikers. Leaders said 4,000 farmers had organized to assure protection to all pickers and to warn agitators that interference with willing labor will not be permitted * * * The caravan of farmers met with a similar parade of strikers and strike sympathizers in Bakersfield * * * but no clash occurred. (Times, Oct. 10.)

When parades and meetings of growers and sympathetic citizens proved unavailing to halt the spread of the strike, sterner measures were taken. Promptly farmers in various parts of the strike area took steps to "resist with gunfire attempts of strikers to prevent harvesting of their crops:" (Advance-Register, Oct. 7)

> Interest in Kern County centered in the Kern Lake District, where roads from the Golden State Highway into the cotton picking district are privately owned and were being guarded against strikers.
>
> Two private guards and two deputy sheriffs watched over the entrance to the district and prevented strike agitators from going into the area. (Bee, Oct. 5.)
>
> Fifty strikers attempted to rush the gates of the Kern County Land Company at Kern Lake yesterday, but were repulsed by guards and strike breaking pickers were kept on the job. (Californian, Oct. 12).
>
> [An] observer said that the ten pickers being guarded by the farmers on the John Allen ranch were men who wanted to work, and that 16 farmers with guns barred the roads when a caravan of 500 strikers came to pull them out of the field. (Times, Oct. 10.)

The clashes of armed growers and strikers which resulted in bloodshed at Arvin and Pixley are described later.

The growers in their attempt to stop picketing were on the alert to prevent strikers from exceeding what were considered to be their rights and to keep them from invading private property to pull pickers from the fields. Thus a group of growers, thinking to protect their pickers, participated in the Arvin riot ending with a fatal shooting, and other armed ranchers continually stood guard over their property determined to resist the pickets. Deputy Sheriff Hill reported on October 13:

> Ranchers told our patrolman that beginning today that they would blow to hell every striker who so much as laid a hand on the fences of their

> property * * * Armed ranchers are standing guard over their property throughout the strike area, and unless a constant watch is kept, violence will break out. (Times-Delta, Oct. 13).

A cooperative intelligence service was quickly developed by the growers:

> Pixley farmers, meanwhile, were reported to have developed a system designed to render picketing ineffective. By telephone they were declared to be informing each other when a picketing caravan was on its way. Farmers in the path of the caravan are reported to call in their crew, leaving nobody in sight when the caravan arrives. (Bee, Oct. 17.)

This method was extensively employed, as concealment of pickers in the level fields was practically impossible. Said a large rancher:

> We tried to figure how we could place the pickers in the fields to keep them away from the pickets but we couldn't. There are county roads around every section and we found we couldn't hide the pickers. (Interview)

Strikers charged that an even more drastic method was employed by one of the Pixley ranchers who was tried for murder:

> Four pickers, Billy Hoff, Jessie Silva, Ramon Sanoya, and J. R. Hudson signed a statement declaring that Kruger told his pickers that the first one to start to leave the ranch to join the cotton strikers wouldn't get off the place. (Times-Delta, Oct. 13)

John Curry, McFarland picket leader, described anti-picketing activities before the Governor's Committee:

> Curry. The first trouble we had on the picket line was when a farmer by the name of Jess Lake drove out with one of the finance company men. I do not know his name. He drew a gun on P. C. Stewart and J. E. Maston.
>
> Cross. Were they picketing?
>
> Curry. Yes, they were picketing off of the pavement but not on the property. They were on the shoulder of the road, on the right of way. This man came up to Stewart first and drew his gun and said "Drop that sign." The word "picket" was on the sign. He laid it down in front of his gun and said he had a right to be there * * * I could hear Maston but not Stewart as he spoke in a low tone * * * On the 11th of this month the man who had charge of that picket line sent a picket out, heard a shot, the man came back shot. Some were hit with guns by passing autos . . . At the time the first trouble occurred a man drove his car zigzag along the highway, on the shoulder so that the picket had to get on the right of way to avoid being hit.
>
> Cross. Who did this?
>
> Curry. A farmer * * * within the last two days a farmer came on the highway with a Winchester. The officers saw him and never requested him to get off the highway with his Winchester.
>
> Cross. Did you see them?
>
> Curry. No, but I can get witnesses. On the same day that this man was arrested an equipment car owned by the power company did the same zigzagging to run the picket lines into the ditches.
>
> Cross. What is the reason for the zigzag?
>
> Curry. To drive the picket over on the farmer's land so the farmer could shoot him.

Other direct means employed to break the strike were attempts to jail strike leaders, to dissolve concentration camps, to starve out strikers by refusing relief, to discourage the strikers by threats of incarceration in "bull pens" and of deportation of striking aliens, to disrupt the strikers' ranks and secure repudiation of communist leadership.

(5) *Efforts to increase the number of pickers at work.*—Some harvesting continued in every part of the area affected by the strike. Growers and their families who picked their own cotton were not disturbed by strike pickets. But a good many year-round hands and seasonal laborers continued at work, and just as the pickers sought to diminish their number, so the growers sought to increase it. During the cotton strike proposals were made to introduce laborers from four sources:

(a) After the strike had been in progress about two weeks it was reported that "One rancher of the Tulare district planned to put twenty-five Tule River Reservation Indians to work in his fields today." (Bee, Oct. 17.) But little if any actual use of these inexperienced Indians was made.

(b) At the close of the first week of the strike, and again, after the recommendation of the Governor's Committee had been accepted by the growers, but before acceptance by the strikers, threats of importation of Texan Negroes were made:

> Chairman L. D. Ellet of the Corcoran Cotton Growers' Committee announced that unless striking pickers return to work in that district soon, pickers will be brought in from Texas, where he declared the cotton harvest is almost completed. (Bee, Oct. 10)
>
> Importation of thousands of Texas cotton pickers to break a San Joaquin Valley cotton pickers strike was planned by growers today, L. D. Ellett, Corcoran grower, revealed.
>
> Ellett said an advertisement was carried in today's Dallas News, Dallas, Texas, inviting Negroes to California. He declined to say who placed the advertisement. (Times, Oct. 25)
>
> Ellett said that San Joaquin Valley ranchers have inserted advertisements in newspapers in Texas seeking to hire at least 8,000 Negro cotton pickers to come to California. (San Francisco Call-Bulletin, Oct. 25)

(c) Proposals were also made to bring additional pickers from Los Angeles. The first rumor appeared early in the strike:

> The Hoover ranch, which is rumored to have connections with the former president, and is located between Shafter and Wasco, is reported to have imported 300 men from Los Angeles. The "Shafter Local" [union] is reinforcing Wasco and the shouting slogan is: "No scabs can pass us. We are out to win even if we have to build a human fence around scab ranches." (Californian, Oct. 7)

Later, at the same time that talk of importing Texas Negroes was rife, while acceptance by the union of the recommendation of the Governor's Committee was awaited, further proposals to bring pickers from Los Angeles were advanced. George Creel, who had opposed such a move while negotiations were in progress, now was sympathetic:

> L. D. Ellett, chairman of the Kings County Growers' group, told the Journal last night that George Creel, member of the federal labor board and NRA administrator for the west, and Frank McDonald, State Labor Commissioner, had promised the growers "all the labor you need" and that the growers had signed requisitions for 5,000. (Journal, Oct. 28)

As rumors of incomplete acceptance by the strikers persisted even after the union authorized return to work, the threat of importation was made more definite:

> An exodus of 4,000 Mexican unemployed to the San Joaquin cotton fields started today. The jobless were transported on rail and highways to supply valley planters with pickers, Superintendent of Charity Earl Jensen announced. All have been on local charity relief rolls.
>
> The "immigration" began today when the first consignment, trucks laden with Mexican families left for the valley.
>
> Jensen said the workers were recruited from the relief rolls at the specific request of J. H. Fallin, assistant director of farm labor service. (Times-Delta, Nov. 3)

The Western Worker uncritically repeated the story, declaring that "4,000 Mexicans were cut off the relief rolls in Los Angeles County to force them to scab." (Nov. 13) But the Mexicans were still "on their way" on November 6:

> * * * a new tenseness was injected into the cotton field situation today when it was learned that 4,000 Los Angeles Mexicans were on their way into the Valley to break a threatened strike in the Pixley district * * * (Chronicle)

Very few, if any, of these laborers ever arrived north of the Tehachepi mountains. An official of the State Employment Service estimated that no more than 300 Los Angeles Mexicans arrived in the valley, and a peace officer of Kern County was of the opinion that almost none at all picked cotton in his county. A large supply of pickers was available locally, and it was unnecessary for the growers to carry out the threat.

(d) A number of local school children were attracted into the cotton fields, and it was suggested that the schools be closed to increase this help:

> With several hundred school children in the fields Saturday picking cotton, an informal movement to urge declaration of a school holiday for a short period to assist in the cotton harvest was gaining momentum here today.
>
> Children were picking on a number of ranches, while on two west of Tulare there were several crews of 20 or more students taking advantage of the opportunity to assist the farmers and at the same time earn a few extra dollars spending money.
>
> Meanwhile business men and growers gathered in groups today and discussed the situation, urging that a general meeting be called at which time a formal request would be made to citizens and students for a school holiday in order that all who could would be enabled to reap part of the $6,000 per day paid out in labor in this district for cotton picking.
>
> It was pointed out by one grower that schools frequently remain closed during the critical period of the harvest season in many sections of the state and that with nearly 60 percent of the necessary pickers in the field, the additional help from students and townsfolk would enable the farmer to save his crop without the aid of radicals who have invaded the district. (Times, Oct. 22)

The proposal of a school holiday, advanced just as the Governor's Committee was issuing its report, evoked a number of protests, of which the following is illustrative:

> Declaring 12,000 school children are being worked to break the cotton pickers' strike in San Joaquin Valley, Lincoln Steffens and his wife Ella Winter, authors, and Noel Sullivan, San Francisco capitalist, appealed to President Roosevelt today against this use of child labor. (San Francisco News, Oct. 25)

The estimate of numbers actually employed is greatly exaggerated; although it might have been possible to employ a good many had the schools been closed for that purpose.

(6) *Not only importation of strike breakers and use of local school children were talked of*, but also threats of deportation of both leaders and strikers were employed in an endeavor to break the ranks of the strikers. This tactic, too, had been employed before when Mexicans struck against California growers. In Imperial Valley in 1928, for instance, it was threatened but not carried out. During the pea pickers' strike in Alameda County in April, 1933, the following sign was posted in Spanish:

> Notice! Any person not a citizen of the United States of America who joins the "laborers union" of strikers exposes himself to deportation to his own country. For U. S. Emmigration, K. Watson. (Translation)

It is extremely unlikely that any officer of the Immigration Service had anything to do with the notice.

While the cotton strike was in progress reports of activity of immigration officers in the valley were published frequently. A mild intimation which probably in fact referred simply to the normal activities of the service, but doubtless was intended to affect the morale of the strikers, appeared early:

> Not in line with the strike situation itself but in keeping with the governmental program which calls for a close check upon aliens, the immigration department is known to be actively making investigations concerning the right of a number of foreigners to be in this country. Inquiry developed that there is a close cooperation between this department and the sheriff's office, that at least one deportation is imminent and that the inquiry runs to points generally throughout the county. (Californian, Oct. 12)

The following editorial appeared on the front page of a valley newspaper:

> Practically all of the striking cotton pickers are Mexicans, so this article is addressed to people of that nationality.
>
> First of all, many of you are visitors in this country, here only through our sufferance.
>
> You have been fools, many of you, trying to reach a goal that is not possible for you to reach, the right to dictate to American employers what they shall pay, whether they can pay it or not.

> With cotton at the price it is today, and the wage demanded by you Mexican cotton pickers, cotton growing in the San Joaquin valley would be a thing of the past. Because YOU killed the goose that laid the golden egg!
>
> If the cotton grower is finally required to pay $1.00 per hundred for picking his cotton, it is a sure and certain thing that he will not pay it to you striking Mexicans, who not only refuse to go to work at the scale of wages set but will not go to work and leave the matter to a board of arbitration of which the government of the United States will be a party.
>
> What fools many of you have been in this strike! Most of you want to work and all of you should be at work. In fact many of you will have to go to work very soon or go back to your own country * * *
>
> If the strike continues, it is more than likely that every last one of you will be gathered into one huge bull pen and given the opportunity of proving your right to be in this country. And, what will a bull pen mean to you? Many of you don't know how the United States government can run a concentration camp. First of all every last one of you will be deloused. That does not mean that any of you need it, but it will be the first step to prevent typhus. Then comes vaccination for smallpox, innoculation for diphtheria and what not. The ordeal will be sufficiently rigorous to prevent the outbreak of any disease.
>
> Do you want to face the bull pen? Do you want to be deported to Mexico? That is what you face, and don't fool yourselves about it!
>
> Your leaders told you that they could get you a dollar a hundred for picking. They HAVE NOT—and they WILL NOT, because the grower has not the money with which to pay. They will tell you now that you will not be deported. Perhaps they will be mistaken about that, too. (Corcoran News, Oct. 20)

Tulare county officials requested that the federal government deport strikers receiving relief and the sheriff threatened deportation if the strikers did not return to work pending the recommendations of the Fact Finding Committee: On the same day the Tulare Advance-Register published similar threats:

> The war-time "bull pen" may be invoked by the United States government to break the cotton pickers' strike in central California, it was learned today.
>
> Indications that over-strained federal patience and refusal of strike agitators to accept government mediation might result in a general rounding up of undesirables and their confinement under federal guard in a war-time internement camp was plainly apparent as strikers and cotton growers dead-locked over mediation plans.
>
> Deportation of undesirables, communists and agitators found not to be citizens also loomed as a possibility as federal lines tightened. That government interference was imminent was indicated by county officials, Sheriff Hill declared.
>
> "The federal government is very liable to throw some of these people into a bull pen and ship them out of the area if they remain recalcitrant to the plea of conciliator Edward Fitzgerald that they return to work until the fact-finding commission has studied the situation and determined an equitable wage.
>
> They have nothing to lose by returning to work, and if they refuse they are defying not the county government, but the federal government," the sheriff said significantly. (Advance-Register, Oct. 20)

Three days later Tulare County officials definitely requested federal authorities to deport strikers who were aliens receiving relief:

> Deportation of Mexican cotton strikers in this county was sought today in a telegram sent to the commissioner of immigration, Washington, D. C., by District Attorney Walter C. Haight, Alfred J. Eliott, chairman of the board of supervisors, and James R. Fauver, foreman of the Tulare County grand jury, in a final effort to solve a problem which Sheriff R. L. Hill said might result in slaughter within the next three days.
>
> The telegram follows:
>
> "We appeal to and urgently request you to at once take all the necessary steps to deport all those aliens, the majority of whom are Mexicans, now in this county who have become public charges, who are a menace to public peace and health, who are now and will continue to be a heavy and impossible

> charge on the resources of the county and who are subject to deportation under the treaties between the United States and their respective countires." (Times-Delta, Oct. 23)

The deportation threat had little effect. It was not carried out and little regard was paid to it by the Mexicans themselves.

Individual leaders, as well as the Mexicans in general, were warned of deporation. As early as October 9 it was reported.

> Word comes from Los Angeles that the immigration department is sending deputies into the field to investigate some of the leadership which has manifested itself among the unemployed, the report being that a number of them are in this country contrary to the immigration laws. (California, Oct. 9)

The threat was carried out to the extent of arresting at least one "white" leader of the Corcoran camp.

> Leroy Gardiner, alias Leroy Gordon, arrested twice in the last two weeks by local authorities in connection with strike outbreaks in the Corcoran district, was in further trouble last evening, when he was arrested on a federal warrant by Federal Immigration Inspector A. J. Borstadt of Fresno.
>
> Inspector Borstadt said that Gardiner admitted he was born in Canada and is still a British subject. He is being held for violation of a federal law which says that a man may be held if it is proven "that he is a member of, or affiliated with an organization, association, society or group that believes in, advises, advocates, or teaches the overthrow by force or violence of the United States or of all forms of law."
>
> Mr. Borstadt said that he expects warrants for Mexican arrests in the Corcoran area. (Journal, Oct. 28)

Special attention was given to deportability of strike leaders, and at least one was deported. The threat of deportation, however, had little or no effect on the morale of the strikers. The growers, of course, did not really want wholesale deportation of their laborers, and virtually none took place.

Curiously, the Mexican strikers used the threat of repatriation against the growers, when officers threatened to evict them from the Corcoran camp. Some of the leaders sent a telegram to former President Calles, as follows:

> We, 5,000 compatriots in Corcoran, California, district request your quick personal guarantee for we are disposed to migrate en masse to our own country because of force by business and local authorities.
>
> These committees have told us to abandon our camp at 3 p. m. because of unsanitary conditions despite the fact it is in better condition than others in the valley. Compatriots in the valley complain of conditions and ask that a representative other than Consul Bravo be sent to investigate the matter here.

But the Mexicans were no more anxious to return to Mexico than the growers were to have them. The Mexican government took no action on the telegram, and the Mexicans made no move toward voluntary repatriation.

(7) *Efforts were also made on behalf of the growers, and through the Mexican consul, to undermine the confidence of the strikers* in their communist leaders, to induce the formation of separate unions on the basis of nationality groups, and to invite direct dealings between strikers' representatives and growers which would ignore the communist-dominated leadership.

The effort to discredit the leaders in the eyes of the strikers was directed toward exposing them as communists and racketeers with ulterior motive. A Corcoran grower-ginner appealed to the Mexican government to protect its countrymen from radical leaders:

> Ellett sent a telegram to the Mexican government informing it that Mexican workmen were being terrorized and controlled by American radicals, suggesting that that government call the situation to the attention of the American government. * * * In reply, it was learned, he received a curt note informing him that the Mexican government was watching the situation through its own representatives. (Chronicle, Oct. 22)

The tactic of the communists to meet the charge of radical leadership was to inform the strikers and the public about it themselves and if possible, in advance. Two communist leaders said publicly:

> The "red" issue was sent in to demoralize the camp. It is always a red herring whenever workers are engaged in a struggle to better conditions.

> Yes, communists did organise the union * * * (Speech) Communists get at the head of the union because they are elected.
>
> The fight of the starving cotton pickers is a fight against starvation wages and the recognition of their union. The workers will not be misled by charges of Communism.
>
> In every strike the charge of agitator has been made by those serving the interests of the bosses in order to continue exploitation of the worker. I have been called an agitator. I have been agitating against starvation wages.
>
> The communists are the only ones who are fighting in the interest of the workers. No other political party has by its action shown it is for the workers. (Pat Chambers, quoted in Times-Delta, Oct. 13)

The attack against communist leaders was based not only on their radicalism, but also on charges of racketeering and discrimination. An editorial declared:

> Promotion of so-called agricultural workers "union" in California within the past two months and consequent "strikers" launched in various localities give evidence of a new type of racket which is being vigorously promoted within our borders.
>
> A variety of attempts similar to the local cotton "strike," all organized in the same manner and bearing the earmarks of the same group of racketeers directing them, have been launched at opportune times in various parts of the state * * *
>
> It is sufficient to state that a membership of some 4,000 pickers is claimed, with an initiation fee of 50 cents a head, would total several thousand dollars for the coffers of the racketeers, with additional sums to be paid from time to time in dues—should the "strike" succeed.
>
> That is the story of the farm labor strike racket in California within the past few months * * * the various strikes are one in purpose, promoted by a central group presumably principally interested in dues and in advancing the cause of communism * * * in almost every case the worker—the "comrade" has paid the bill. He is the real victim of the strike racketeer. (Advance-Register, Oct. 17)

A larger grower said, "Pat Chambers lays tribute on the workers. A picker in conference with growers told me that."

Growers and their sympathisers also pointed out that more effort was made to bail out and defend communist leaders than arrested strikers of the rank and file.

> It has been noticeable, however, and the Mexican cotton strikers are rapidly awakening to the fact, that the Union has not been so prompt to bail out the ordinary Mexican worker when he gets into jail, and they naturally want to know why. (Journal, Oct. 13)

A district attorney claimed after the strike that a half dozen trespassing pickets who pleaded guilty, and were given two years' probation

> have all turned against the strike, at least the women have, and I think the men have, too. They were all Mexicans, and they found the strike leaders didn't care anything about them but left them in jail though their bonds were only $500, while they raised $10,000 to get out Pat Chambers, the white leader. (Interview.)

To the charge of racketeering a communist leader made answer:

> Not everybody will get his head broken and go around ragged and without decent soles in his shoes. If Pat Chambers had $6,000, why doesn't he bail himself out? The workers didn't believe the charges. They knew Pat Chambers—their Pat. They knew he had no soles in his shoes, that he slept in a arbor back of the house of a friend. They knew he had not made $6,000 on the Tagus strike.
>
> American, Negro, and Mexican "stool-pigeons" were sent into the Corcoran camp * * * Some of our leaders were offered as much as $4,000 to break the strike. Some were offered a contract job to supply labor at $1.50 a head. (Interview.)

It is well known, of course, that a thorough-going, idealistic communist is anything but self-seeking in matters of material personal enrichment, however ambitious he may be in other respects. If these efforts to break the strike with money actually were made, and the report is plausible under the conditions, it must be recorded that neither the emissaries, nor offers of money, nor argument, succeeded in shaking strike morale. Attempts were made also to invite formation of separate unions or jettison of communist leadership and direct negotiation with growers. Under the title "Arbitrate with Communists?" a valley editor declared:

> San Joaquin Valley cotton farmers are right when they declare they are willing to submit their wage difficulties with striking cotton pickers to State arbitration, but they will not meet with Communistic strike leaders * * *
>
> It is to be hoped the misled workers in the fields will awaken to the fact that their worst enemies are their present communistic leaders and dictators—that under them they can accomplish nothing, for the American people will not long submit to the Mussolini edicts of these un-American vandals who hate not only the American government but as well the very American labor unions which have done so much and are doing so much for the amelioration of labor conditions. (Bee, Oct. 22)

Another valley editor made direct proposal that

> The cotton pickers have a right to negotiate with the growers and they will find out if they do so directly, cutting out the radical leaders, that the growers are their real friends, not the red agitators who do not hesitate to use them for their own selfish purposes. (Journal, Oct. 13)

Another effort was described by a communist as follows:

> The growers called in Mr. Elliott. Mr. Elliott is an American and chairman of the Tulare County board of supervisors. He talked to the white pickers. He told them they should not associate with the dirty, low-living Mexicans. He said, "Why if I saw a Mexican dying in the street, I would not help him." You whites must organize your own union—an American Union—and act in an American way. But Elliott got no further than Bravo. The workers understood him, too. (Speech)

The ranks of the strikers grew in numbers and kept solid with comparatively few defections to the end. Without becoming communists, the pickers nevertheless refused to unseat their communist leaders, or to divide their organization along separate nationality lines.

(8) *The growers endeavored to influence other elements in the community*, including local, state, and federal administrative and law enforcement officials, merchants, and even the general public, to provide protection against picketing and to refrain from rendering relief, aid, or comfort to the strikers. Some of these efforts are discussed elsewhere, but two additional points are set forth here.

It greatly incensed the growers that the merchants should aid the strikers by extensions of credit and gifts. As one grower said, "The merchants gave the farmers more trouble during the strike than any other element in the community." Or, as an official sympathetic to the workers put it, "The small local merchants are among the best friends of the laborers." The growers, regarding themselves as patrons of the merchants, believed they were entitled to full support in resisting a wage advance; they ignored the fact that the pickers are also patrons, the greater portion of whose earnings are spent with local merchants. So a bitter protest, in the form of a threatened boycott, soon appeared in the Advance-Register of Tulare, where union headquarters were located:

[Paid Advertisement]

> NOTICE!
>
> TO THE CITIZENS OF TULARE
>
> We, the farmers of your Community, whom you depend upon for support, feel that you have nursed too long the Viper that is at our door. These Communist Agitators MUST be driven from town by you, and your harboring them further will prove to us your non-cooperation with us, and make it necessary for us to give our support and trade to another town that will support and cooperate with us.
>
> FARMER'S PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION.

Not only did growers seek to bring pressure upon merchants or others who aided strikers or "harbored" them; efforts were made also to influence the tone of strike news which went out of the valley, for the growers resented much of the publicity given by the Bay newspapers, especially. To the insinuating suggestion of a growers' leader that "a reporter who would send out news as the growers wanted it sent, could make a good deal of money," the indignant reply was made, "Yes, why don't you go find such a reporter?" (Interview.)

The background for the specific tactics employed by the growers against strikers which have been enumerated above, was maintained by incessant proclamation of the well-known and undisputed fact that the principal strike leaders were communists, sharing the well-advertised aims of communists.

CORCORAN CAMP

Unplanned circumstances provided the strikers with what was in many ways their most effective weapon in prosecuting the strike—the "concentration camp." Five of these camps of strikers rose like mushrooms in three counties; the largest was that located at Corcoran, Kings County.

The union had never employed a concentration camp in its previous activities, nor did it plan for any in the cotton strike. Union leaders on the contrary "advised the pickers to settle on individual ranches and when the strike call was sounded to picket their own jobs." Furthermore

> The pickers were instructed to remain in the cotton camps after striking, being informed that the growers would find it impossible to evict them for several weeks, if they went to court for redress. (News, Oct. 6.)

In all previous strikes led by the Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union the area involved was small—a single ranch in the Tagus peach strike. Interest centered on this comparatively small area, as on a factory during an industrial strike.

This cotton strike was decidedly different, for it involved several hundred ranches scattered over a hundred miles. If the pickers had been able to follow the advice to remain scattered on the ranches the completeness of the strike might have been seriously impaired. Union leaders could hardly have reached them. Their morale could scarcely have been as well maintained as when assembled in mass. Growers would have been able more easily to exert pressure on each family. Arrangement of picket caravans and of mass meetings would have been more difficult. But, as described earlier, the growers insisted on evictions. With no other place to go, the strikers gathered in camps erected or enormously expanded by the emergency.

The Mexican, white and Negro pickers gravitated to the "Mexican towns" which turned into emergency camps at McFarland, Tulare, Porterville, Wasco and other places, and served as the homes of the strikers, as centers for mass meetings and as bases for picketing. Each of them resembled, in method of living at least, the most important of them all, the Corcoran encampment.

Corcoran camp began as a refuge for a handful of evicted Mexican workers at the beginning of the strike. Within a week the camp had almost attained its full growth. Union leaders, principally Leroy Gordon, early assumed direction and planned the arrangement and conduct of the camp. They secured permission to use the land from the lessee, Morgan, which led growers to dub the conflict "Morgan's strike."

The camp was located on a vacant field, perhaps four acres in extent, across the tracks on the eastern outskirts of Corcoran. When the camp began to attain substantial proportions, union leaders laid out rows of tents separated by dusty streets, named after towns or heroes of Mexico. Each family provided its own habitation—an old tent or burlap bags stretched between two poles and a car. These make-shift tents, in addition to the family car, cooking utensils, bedding, and the ever-present dog, represented the total possessions of the evicted pickers—with perhaps a goat or several chickens for the more fortunate. Later ten wooden toilets and a water-pipe system, extending through the middle of the "city" with frequent spigots were added. An irrigation ditch served as the collective wash tub and bath tub for the children too. Garbage was buried in open pits.

The camp was surrounded by barbed-wire fence variously said to be for the purpose of keeping growers out or of retaining pickers within. A single opening faced the Corcoran side of the camp. It was barred by a rope and generally watched by a cluster of Mexicans whose leader's approval must be secured for each entrance and exit. An assembly space with platform was maintained in the center of the camp and a community kitchen was provided for the convenience of single men.

The "Aztec Circus," an itinerant show whose customary audience was in the tent city instead on ranch camps, added a touch of levity with its nightly performances financed by voluntary collections later divided equally between the union and the circus management.

Food, at first, was whatever individual families might be able to purchase—mainly beans and flour for tortillas—and scattered donations collected by the communists and strike sympathizers. Later, the California State Emergency Relief Administration sent supplies. Firewood for cooking was procured by scouting parties which hauled it in truckloads for the entire camp.

A tent school "to take care of about 70 pupils" was opened on October 11 with two teachers, in a attempt to provide for the "approximately 800 children of school age * * *" (Journal, Oct. 11.)

Camp leaders supplemented the entertainment provided by guitar players and singers among the Mexicans, by a dance on the hard ground and by the circus with frequent meetings to discuss strike action, to listen to speakers, or to organize picket caravans.

It is difficult to estimate the number of persons at Corcoran camp. Generally it has been placed at about 3,000 but more than likely this figure is too generous, since growers wished to enhance the menace, law officers the importance of their problem, and strikers the success of the strike.

There were frequent, and usually unfounded reports of sickness at Corcoran and the other strikers' camps. Three deaths did occur in the Corcoran camp. Two were of young children suffering from malnutrition caused by weeks of starvation prior to the strike. The third was of a young mother, afflicted with pneumonia. "* * * the strike had nothing to do with her death." (Advance-Register, Oct. 19.) These fatalities were more the product of the conditions usually prevailing among Mexican migratory workers than a result of the particular situation in the Corcoran camp. However, the press generally blamed the Corcoran camp. The Los Angeles Times, for example, drew an exaggerated picture:

> This camp is the danger spot. I visited it today, and it is a dreadful place. I don't wonder that the residents of the town are terrorized. No one in state employ with jurisdictional authority should consider that mass of corruption with anything but shame.
>
> Thirty seven hundred men, women, and children are herded in a ten acre barren field on the edge of town. There is no shade and the sun is cruel. At night it is cold. The equipment consists of a few ragged pup tents but mostly a shake down on the ground. There are no sanitary precautions. No water for bathing; not much more for drinking. Three or four latrines for 4,000 persons. Long lines of misery marked humanity await their turn. There is some sickness. There is grave danger of epidemic. Promiscuity is unlimited.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> At the main entrance and at various gaps in the barbed-wire fence Mexicans armed with clubs keep people out and in. Inmates practically prisoners. They are harangued at frequent intervals by wild-eyed orators with a gift for gab, and at night picked crews are loaded onto trucks and started on their raids of sabotage and violence.

Similarly citizens, growers, and law officers all sought abatement of the tent city, ostensibly for the health protection of the Mexicans. In Corcoran "committees representing the women's club, P. T. A., Legion Auxiliary and American Legion" met on October 18 and "unanimously passed a resolution to declare the camp a health menace." (News, Oct. 20.)

It seems plain that the impetus for the abatement of the camp on grounds of danger to health came mainly from those who sought dissolution of the camp as a step in breaking the strike. After the strike a district attorney explained:

> The camp wasn't so bad. It was just about as sanitary as other cotton camps and these growers who kept wanting it condemned for being unsanitary lived six miles on the other side of town. What difference did the sanitation make to them? They just had it in the back of their minds that if they could get the camp broken up the pickers would go back to work at 60 cents. (Interview.)

The Hanford Journal hinted at the possibility of the forced evacuation of the camp as early as October 10:

> Meantime the tent city at Corcoran with its school and food and sanitation complications will bear close watching by the authorities. It is a menace in more ways than one.

> State labor camp inspectors would not allow comparable sanitation conditions in the cotton camps on ranches. It is unbelievable they will permit them in the Corcoran tent city for long.

The hint was followed promptly by a threat of forced evacuation:

> Drawn up by District Attorney Clarence H. Wilson, formal notice to make improvements in the toilet, garbage disposal and water systems at the big cotton strikers' camp in Corcoran or vacate the property by October 17 was served on the strike leaders and on the lessee of the property yesterday. Sheriff Buckner served the notice upon J. E. Morgan who leases it from the Santa Fe railroad and upon Al Gordon, representative of Pat Chambers, strike leader. Chambers was in Visalia yesterday.
>
> The notice to clean up the camp or vacate was based upon recommendations of Edward T. Ross, chief of the Bureau of Sanitary Inspection, state department of public health, who visited the camp Monday.
>
> It declared that the camp is a public nuisance as it now exists, owing to the fact that the 1,200 to 1,500 persons estimated to be occupying the premises have no sanitary toilets, no adequate water supply and no sanitary garbage disposal system.
>
> The cotton strikers and owners of the land (directly east of Corcoran) are notified that unless they carry out the following provisions they must vacate the property or be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.
>
> 1. They must build at least 10 screened, sanitary, fly tight toilets.
> 2. Must provide an adequate, sanitary water supply by installing a water storage tank with pipe lines and faucets, the exact number of faucets to be fixed by state authorities.
> 3. Must provide sanitary covered, fly tight recepticles for garbage which must be disposed of at regular intervals in accordance with good sanitary practice. (Journal, Oct. 12.)

The eviction threatened for the 17th did not occur, but instead District Attorney Wilson issued a second ultimatum on the 19th "that unless all of the requirements of the original notice regarding water tanks, faucets, pipe lines, etc., were fulfilled by tomorrow night, arrests would be made." (Journal, Oct. 20.) At about the same time it was rumored that George Creel, NRA chief, had stated following a visit to the camp that:

> * * * he would get in communication with Governor Rolph and the state board of health * * * urging upon them the necessity of abolishing the camp of striking cotton pickers at Corcoran. (News, Oct. 20.)

Evacuation threats came from still another source on October 19.

> Dr. Giles H. Porter, state health director, today ordered abatement of the San Joaquin Valley cotton strikers' encampments unless certain conditions were fulfilled immediately * * *.
>
> Porter ordered construction of 10 sanitary latrines, installation of a sanitary water supply system with storage tanks, pipe lines and faucets, and installation of garbage receptacles. (Advance-Register, Oct. 19.)

Three days later, however, he put his approval upon the camp conditions.

> Dr. Giles S. Porter, head of the state health board, spent the day at Corcoran in company with Dr. C. G. Newbecker, county health officer, taking personal charge of the health protection work of the state. He informed Dr. Newbecker and S. E. Railsback, chairman of the board of supervisors, that he found sanitary conditions at the Corcoran camp better than the average temporary camp in the state, thus definitely removing the threat of abatement of the camp as a public nuisance. (Journal, Oct. 22.)

Naturally the strikers protested against these continual threats:

> Every civic body and governmental authority has worked in an effort to disband this camp. The strikers have taken every sanitary precautionary measure, and daily the authorities find new excuses to threaten eviction. Today, the occupancy of the camp by the strikers depended upon their ability to meet with an admittedly (by health authorities) unnecessary measure—the establishment of a water tank and pipe and faucet system; while previous to this health officers have approved the existing water system. From previous experience, even if these demands are met with by the strikers, some new grievance on the part of the authorities will arise. (Brief History of the San Joaquin Valley Cotton Strike, presented to Fact Finding Committee, Visalia, Oct. 20, 1933.)

As strike tension increased, growers planned to clean out the camp by force, if necessary:

> Only the timely arrival of Kings County sheriff's officers and state highway patrolmen prevented Kings County ranchers from "cleaning out" the Corcoran cotton strikers this morning, where close to 3,000 striking cotton pickers are encamped * * *.
>
> Sheriff Van Buckner and E. Raymond Cato, Chief of the highway patrol, arrived shortly after the ranchers began to converge on Corcoran and called a meeting in the city hall. The ranchers were "talked out" of their march against the strikers, but 35 to 40 highway patrolmen joined Kings County officers in patrolling the district. (Times-Delta, Oct. 24.)

The final attempt to abolish the camp was successful. However, it was not based on menace to health, nor threats of force by growers. It came only after efforts of state and federal officials to end the strike following the growers' acceptance of the Governor's Fact Finding Committee's proposal on October 25. The next day federal relief to strikers was discontinued. This action coupled with last-minute appeal by State Labor Commissioner MacDonald forestalled forcible evacuation of the camp by the Kings County sheriff.

The sheriff originally had set the deadline for evacuation at 3 p. m. October 26:

> Camps of striking cotton pickers in the Corcoran area will be cleaned out today, according to a statement made by Sheriff E. V. Buckner of Kings County last night.
>
> All occupants of the camps, which the state health department considered likely places for breeding of epidemics and a menace to public health, will be offered work in the cotton fields.
>
> Regardless of whether the inhabitants go back to work or not, state and county officials have declared the camps must be deserted tonight. (Times, Oct. 26.)

Sheriff Buckner prepared his forces to tear down the camp at 3 p. m. as announced. He and his men lined the side of the Tulare-Corcoran road north of the camp as the time drew near. A loud speaker was secured over which the sheriff planned to broadcast the offer of the growers to pay 75 cents a hundred for picking. All those unwilling to accept the offer were to be forcibly dispossessed. The situation was tense. Labor Commissioner MacDonald realized its seriousness and prevailed upon Sheriff Buckner to desist for at least a day. An hour's wait for the arrival of the Hearst Movietone News to photograph the impending combat gave MacDonald sufficient time to win his point. The sheriff conceded and announced over the loud speaker his desire to speak with several camp leaders. The strikers shouted back, "We are all leaders." Several, however, came forward and received the sheriff's offer of a day's grace. Leroy Gordon, one of the leaders who presented himself, was arrested at this juncture despite the evident truce which had been called. MacDonald then addressed the strikers:

> A number of factors conspired to prevent the wholesale eviction of the Corcoran camp which at one hour yesterday seemed a certain thing. The factors included: waiting for a decision by the strike committee on the 75 cent rate, in connection with negotiations by State Labor Commissioner Frank MacDonald and his deputies; waiting for a reply from ex-President Calles of Mexico to a telegram from the strikers concerning their possible repatriation in Mexico; a statement by Highway Patrol Chief Raymond Cato that highway patrolmen were authorized to take no part in the wholesale eviction; and lack of support to the eviction by health officials and district attorneys' representatives. Labor Commissioner MacDonald made the final dramatic announcement that he had secured from Sheriff Buckner a 24-hour postponement of the eviction. (Times, Oct. 27.)

This action by MacDonald was partly responsible for criticisms of him resting on but the slightest pretext, and ignoring that he had brought peace and evacuation of the camp:

> But there is nothing for the State Administration to pride itself on in Deputy Labor Commissioner MacDonald's handling of the situation at Corcoran—His action was an encouragement to disorder and seems difficult either to explain or excuse.

> The spectacle of a state officer haranguing a group led by Reds and calling them "comrades" is not an edifying one. (Los Angeles Times editorial, reprinted in Visalia Times-Delta, Oct. 31.)

On the same day the camp was addressed by the Labor Commissioner, the union decided to call off the strike and posted a sign in the Corcoran camp reading "The strike is over." Immediately the camp began to break up, and in three days was deserted.

> The strike camp at Corcoran was rapidly breaking up this afternoon as processions of rickety cars carrying pickers and their few belongings left the Corcoran district for cotton fields in other sections of the San Joaquin valley. The camp, which for the past three weeks has housed nearly 4,000 men, women and children, was expected to be entirely disbanded by 6 o'clock tonight, the deadline set by Sheriff Van Buckner of Kings County. (Times-Delta, Oct. 28.)
>
> The last inhabitants deserted Corcoran's [illegible] tent city of strikers about four o'clock Saturday afternoon, and the site upon which thrived a tent city of three thousand persons during the past few weeks was returned to an uninteresting tract of barren ground. (Times, Oct. 29.)

During the entire life of the camp reports persisted that many of the Mexicans were being held virtual prisoners. On October 14, Sheriff Buckner said:

> * * * that one of the guards told him that they (the guards) armed with long billy clubs, some of them with iron bars, had been given orders to permit no strikers to move out * * * (Journal, Oct. 14.)

A reporter declared, "as nearly as I can estimate the feeling, at least 80 percent of the strikers are willing and anxious to return to work, but they are in deadly fear of the leaders." (Los Angeles Times, in Times-Delta, Oct. 26.)

These reports gained additional favor at the time of the dissolution of the camp. It was reported on October 29 that several local officers stated they had been

> told by various Mexican strikers that they had been held prisoners in the camp, that information regarding the settlement of the strike had been withheld from them, that many of those who broke away from the camp and went to work had been beaten by white and Negro leaders and that others had been threatened with beatings or death if they went to work in defiance of strike orders.
>
> Many of those coming from the camp believed until yesterday that the 60 cent scale for picking was still in effect, the leaders having held out the information that the growers had agreed to the 75 cent scale. (Journal, Oct. 29; also Times-Delta, Oct. 28, 30.)

These reports cannot be accepted as statements of fact. All available evidence points to the conclusion that the inhabitants of Corcoran camp were not held by threats of violence, that the communists did not rule by force, and that the Mexicans were not kept in ignorance of compromise offers.

One other strikers' camp, located at McFarland in Kern County, was threatened with eviction. The sheriff prepared to dissolve the camp at one time and built two bull pens to hold the prospective arrested Mexicans, but thought better of it and desisted.

> We were ready to clean them out there. We built two bull pens, one for the women and one for the men, and we are going in after them but they disarmed before we had to. (Interview.)

All of the camps disintegrated as pickers drifted back to their work. A new camp, unconnected with the cotton strike but evidently arranged by the union, rose near Portersville in Tulare County, where Mexicans were collecting to await the orange harvest. However no strike developed and the camp was abandoned. (Times, Oct. 20; Times-Delta, Oct. 28.)

MEXICAN CONSUL

Since most of the striking pickers were Mexicans, since three Mexican citizens were shot to death, since Mexicans were thrown into jail, and since hundreds of others were evicted from their temporary ranch homes, the government of Mexico, through its consular representative at Monterey, Enrique Bravo, was soon drawn into the conflict.

After the fatal shooting of Mexicans, Bravo visited the strike area and remained until the strike was settled. On October 12 he gave out his first newspaper interview:

> The Mexican Government through, Consul Enrique Bravo of Monterey, today demanded that the State of California protect its nationals by disarming cotton growers.
>
> The cotton strikers, 95 per cent of them Mexicans, are "unarmed and in perfect spirit to abide by the law," while farmers have shown radical tendencies, using force, the Consul telegraphed Governor James Rolph, Jr.
>
> Consul Bravo declared that Delfino D'Avila, one of the two Mexicans killed by enraged cotton growers at Pixley, was killed while in discharge of his official duties of investigating the cotton pickers' strike. D'Avila was Mexican consular representative at Tulare * * *
>
> Consul Bravo told the United Press at Visalia that his investigation of the strike disclosed ranchers evicted many Mexican families from their homes in the Corcoran district in 24 hours, instead of three days, as required by law; in many cases, shut off their water supplies.
>
> He planned to confer with Pat Chambers, strike leader, who was held in jail on criminal syndicalism charges, and Mexicans held on rioting charges, later today.
>
> The Consul said he had arranged for state and federal aid for Mexican families who were victims of the strike.

The text of Bravo's telegram to Governor Rolph was:

> "Honorable Governor James Rolph, Jr.: Having visited several strikers' camps and investigated the Pixley case, I found strikers are 95 per cent Mexicans, unarmed, in perfect spirit to abide by the law. On the other hand, farmers have shown radical tendencies, using force, being armed. Suggest you request proper authorities to require farmers to disarm and bloodshed will cease. Remaining here, willing to cooperate and accept your suggestions. Please wire me care Sheriff's office. Assure you highest consideration." (Advance-Register, Oct. 12.)

Bravo conferred both with the strikers whose leaders later charged him with strike breaking activity and with the growers. He

> held a conference with the growers, headed by J. D. Ellett, and was informed that the growers would welcome the workers back on the job at the old rate owing to the fact that they had found the Mexican worker particularly fitted for the job. He said they definitely refused to deal with Pat Chambers and other white strikers, but were willing to deal directly with the Mexican workers.
>
> Bravo will also confer with Tulare County authorities concerning the 17 Mexicans who were arrested at Pixley prior to the shooting and who are held for inciting a riot. He expressed hopes of obtaining their liberty soon with the completion of strike settlement negotiations.
>
> Bravo said he had been informed that while American strike leaders who have been arrested in the valley in connection with strikes have been provided with bail by the union almost immediately after their arrests, Mexican strikers who have been arrested have been allowed by the union to remain in jail without bail. (Journal, Oct. 12.)

The growers looked hopefully to Bravo to help in undermining the strikers' morale. The varied appeal which he made to his nationals was described in valley newspapers:

> After his meeting with the growers and gin men, Bravo went to the strikers' camp in Corcoran where he addressed some 2,000 workers. He told them a straight-forward story of the attitude of the growers and suggested that they deal directly with the growers through their own committee of workers rather than through the white strike agitators. His address did not meet with the approval of the strike leaders, he admitted, but was in conformance with his program of informing the growers of the workers' attitude and the workers with the growers' attitude.
>
> Fitzgerald (federal conciliator) accompanied Bravo (Mexican Consul) into the cotton fields today to select two representative strikers from each of the camps, who will meet with the arbitration board.
>
> At Pixley last night a Mexican consular representative was reported to have attempted to break up the strike union by trying to get Mexican strikers to separate and form their own union. (Bee, October 13, 14.)

The communist answer was stated by a strike leader:

> The capitalist rulers used the age-old method of "Divide and conquer." First, they wanted to separate the Mexicans from the whites and the leaders. They called in the Mexican Consul Bravo and asked him to do it. We knew Bravo. He sold out in the cherry strike, in the Salinas Valley. But the workers did not know him—he spoke their language and came from their country. So we had to tell the workers about Bravo. He went around to the camps and spoke to the Mexicans. We had to permit him to enter the camp. The Mexicans wanted to hear him, and we (strike leaders) thought it better to let him speak and expose himself. Some of them, especially the older Mexicans, wanted to rise and bow when the consul came. His line was, "You Mexicans are not Americans. You are Mexicans. You are only here to work, and participation in the strike might cause international complications. You must abide by the laws of this country. The cannery and agricultural workers industrial union leaders are not leaders. They are misleaders. They will lead you astray. Pat Chambers, one of them, stole $6,000 from you in the Tagus Ranch strike. You must organize your own union—a Mexican union— and go back to work pending settlement." But Bravo spoke only once in each camp. He never went back. The Mexicans understood him. They knew he wanted to break the strike—divide the ranks. They saw the whites and Negroes and Mexicans all working together. They saw the union leaders going without food, without sleep, struggling for their rights and their welfare. They wanted to go on that way. (Speech.)

It is extremely unlikely, however, that the Mexican consul wished to injure the chances of increased pay of his compatriots; it is more probable that he desired to cooperate with American officials in effecting a settlement without bloodshed.

Bravo remained in the region during the remainder of the strike. He advised the pickers again to return to work in the "Aviso Oficial" circulated by Federal Conciliator Fitzgerald, and though repudiated by union leaders, he appeared before the Fact Finding Committee where he plead for the picking rate of $1 a hundred demanded by the strikers. When the consul left the valley, the Hanford Journal reported:

> Bravo's straightforward handling of the strike situation brought him into marked disfavor with the strike agitators, particularly the whites, and it was repeatedly reported that his life had been threatened. Bravo from the first urged his countrymen to obey the laws and to deal directly with the cotton growers rather than through their white agitator leaders.
>
> His attitude seemed to have found favor with most of his countrymen in the camp by Friday night when they admitted they had followed their communist leaders because they had no others. When they learned yesterday for the first time that the 75 cent scale had been adopted by the growers, their confidence in Pat Chambers and his white lieutenants seemed further shaken. (Oct. 29. The validity of the last sentence is very doubtful.)

The Mexican government, as noted earlier, was introduced to the situation once more when Corcoran camp leaders, threatened with eviction, telegraphed former Mexican President Calles, pleading for the repatriation which valley citizens and law enforcement bodies professed to desire. The telegram to Calles read:

> We, 5,000 compatriots in Corcoran, California, district request your quick personal guarantee for we are disposed to migrate en masse to our own country because of force by business and local authorities.
>
> These committees have told us to abandon our camp at 3 p. m. because of unsanitary conditions despite the fact it is in better condition than others in the valley. Compatriots in the valley complain of conditions and ask that a representative other than Consul Bravo be sent to investigate the matter here. (Times, Oct. 27.)

The telegram was later repudiated by the Mexican leader of the strike camp.

> It was learned directly also yesterday that Lino Sanches, well known Corcoran Mexican and so-called "mayor of the strike camp," and that the telegram sent to Elias Calles, Mexico's immigration minister and former president had been signed with Sanches' name without his knowledge or consent by some of the other strike leaders.
>
> Sanches told Enrique Bravo, Mexican consular representative, who was ordered by the Mexican ambassador to check the telegram, that he did not

> know the telegram had been sent until he received Friday morning a telegram of acknowledgment from Mexico City informing him that General Calles was ill in bed. Sanchez said he protested the unauthorised use of his name to the strike leaders remaining in camp yesterday and almost came to blows over it. (Journal, Oct. 29.)

No move at voluntary repatriation was made by the Mexicans and the Mexican government took no action on the telegram.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

The problem of maintaining the peace and at the same time protecting all parties to a labor conflict in the exercise of their legal rights has generally proved difficult for American officers. Even when authorities wish to preserve an equal balance between the parties to the dispute, they are confronted with vagueness and uncertainty in the law, and with heavy pressure from interested parties. The problem proved particularly difficult during the cotton strike in communities inexperienced in labor conflict.

The sheriffs and their deputies concentrated their efforts on the following program: (1) suppression of violence, but not including the disarming of growers; (2) prevention of anything but "peaceful" picketing, variously interpreted, with primary consideration for pickers working in the fields; (3) arrest of strike leaders as violators of the law. Also, growers were assisted in eviction of strikers from their temporary camps (described in section on Growers' Resistance), and "undercover men" were placed among the strikers. (Proceedings, California State Sheriffs Association, 1934, pp. 20, 23.)

The program was based on the "axiom" stated by the District Attorney of Tulare County, "The crops must be harvested." (Chronicle, Oct. 29). The attitude to which this led is suggested by the statements and actions of some of the officers. Sheriff Hill, for example, wished to handle the strike in his own way, declaring:

> I know I can handle the situation, but I don't know whether it would meet with the approval of the growers or the public at large. (Times-Delta, Oct. 19.)

He warned the strikers:

> We're going to try to force them to obey the law * * * if they won't obey, we're going to have a scrap, that's all. (Times-Delta, Oct. 24.)

Hill's son, a deputy sheriff, is reported to have told University of California students when they objected to interference with picketing on the grounds that strikers had a legal right to picket:

> We had a meeting last night and changed all that. We make the law in Tulare County. (Testimony before Fact Finding Committee.)

The sheriff of only one of the three counties made active preparation for the strike. According to an under-sheriff in Kern County the officers—

> knew the strike was coming and we were well prepared. We had two machine guns. We bought one thousand dollars of tear gas. We swore in forty five deputies during the strike and secured fast cars to cover the county. Cars were better than motorcycles on the rough roads and the men could protect themselves better. We tried to prevent trouble in every way. As a result there was fifty per cent picking all during the strike because we protected our farmers. The strikers didn't dare do nothing here. We had them covered and they knew it. They were afraid. (Interview.)

The sheriff of Tulare County was reluctant to create new deputies, not wishing to assume responsibility for their actions. He had but two deputies at the time of the Pixley shooting and created more only as the strike progressed and the seriousness of the situation appeared to demand them.

> The board of supervisors * * * vested Sheriff R. L. Hill with full power to take all steps necessary to hold the strike situation under control, authorizing him to swear in as many deputies as he wants and purchase all needed equipment. * * *
>
> Shortly after receiving authorization of the board of supervisors, Hill sent in an order for some gas shells to be used in 12-gauge shotguns.
>
> Hill has had no special deputies on duty during the strike, and his only help has been that of his regular deputies assisted by the California Highway patrol and the Constables of the County. (Times-Delta, Oct. 12)

However, eighteen special deputies were sworn on October 13, and fifty-one were on duty by the 24th. (Times-Delta) Sheriff Buckner of Kings County created four special deputies to take care of the situation.

The special deputies which numbered more than a hundred in the three counties, were even more inexperienced in handling strikes than the sheriffs and their judgment was continually in danger of being warped by their prejudices. Many of the deputies were ranchers, ranch managers, and gin employees. There is no report that any of them were from the ranks of the strikers.

The focus of clashes between employers and strikers is commonly the picket line, and so it proved during the cotton strike. This device is one of the most conspicuous and tangible of the efforts of the strikers to increase their adherents, and its defeat is a major aim of employers endeavoring to maintain active operations. Definition of permissible conduct during picketing, therefore, is of high importance to the parties to a labor dispute, and to officers who must enforce the law. In California the law on picketing was in somewhat the same condition of confusion as elsewhere in the country, the legality or illegality depending upon such vague criteria as the circumstances surrounding each case, and the conduct of the pickets themselves. Since the guiding decisions of California, as elsewhere, refer principally to conditions obtaining around factories or places of business on crowded city streets, their discussions of specific situations are not very helpful to officers confronted with rural conditions. Some have thought that California courts, notably liberal in holding that all strikes are legal, were not equally liberal in holding that "Picketing always amounts to intimidation." (Commons and Andrews, Principles of labor legislation (1927) 108, 110.) However, less than two months before the cotton pickers' strike a California appellate court specifically denied that California law holds "there could be no such thing as peaceful picketing." In a concurring opinion, one judge stated even more broadly:

> That picketing, peaceable in fact, if not violative of a statute or ordinance, is not unlawful—and that the word intimidate—refers only to fear caused by threats, abuse or violence and not to the natural effect of picketing. * * * (Lisse v. Cooks, Waiters and Waitresses. 74 Cal. App. 518, 523–525)

Without discussing in detail the law on picketing, it is sufficient to stress that although peaceful picketing was lawful, it was left largely on the shoulders of local officers to determine in the light of "circumstances" and the "conduct of the pickets," the line between "persuasion" and "intimidation."

At the beginning of the strike, the sheriffs were unwilling to create large staffs of deputies; to do this would have been costly to the county, and responsibility for the acts of numbers of untrained deputies was something to be assumed only with reluctance:

> A uniform method of handling the cotton situation was worked out by San Joaquin Valley peace officers at Fresno last week end * * * It was agreed that no special deputies would be hired, but that officers would keep a close watch on the situation to prevent any violence. (Journal, Oct. 4)

Within ten days, however, first Kern, then Tulare and Kings counties had sworn in fresh deputies. As the strike opened in Kern County the sheriff's office sent out "flying details of men in fast cars ready to rush to any scene of trouble at a moment's notice." (Californian, Oct. 3)

Statements and demonstrations of force behind the law were frequently made by the officials and newspapers. Usually they were so phrased or conducted that they appeared to cast a shadow of illegality upon most of the normal activities of the strike. For example, it was reported: "Strike agitators are thwarted" when they "find the County well patrolled today by deputies from the Sheriff's Office." (Californian, Oct. 4) Similarly:

> CITES RIOT LAWS
>
> While he does not expect any serious trouble out of the Kings county cotton strike situation, District Attorney Clarence H. Wilson pointed out yesterday that there are definite laws under which county officers can act to handle any possible trouble. Rioting or inciting to riot are amply covered in the state laws as is also refusal to obey an order from a peace officer to disperse a riotous meeting. If agitators force workers to leave their jobs against their will, they are subject to punishment for a high misdemeanor.

Faced with the difficult problem of interpreting the law on picketing and public assemblages, the peace officers perforce made their own decisions. The sheriff of Kings County, for example, arrested a striker for failure to address his Mexican audience in English. The incident called forth the following editorial:

> Soap-box orators haranguing cotton pickers in Kings County must do it in one language—American. That is the new rule Sheriff W. V. Buckner has laid down. He invoked it yesterday at Corcoran. A Mexican speaker had mounted a truck there and was hitting it off a hundred miles an hour in the Spanish tongue. His hearers, for the most part were Mexicans. Drawn to the gathering to see and hear what was going on, and also to make sure that peace and quiet were respected by strikers, the sheriff listened for a few moments without understanding what the orator was talking about.
>
> Suspecting him of trying to incite the crowd the sheriff walked through the knot of people and ordered the speaker to say what he had to say in American or stop talking. Corcoran and Kings are American communities, he explained, and whatever was said and done should be carried out above board in the American language. The request was fair. Moreover, it was enforced. The orator obeyed the order reluctantly. Nor did he linger there. He moved on at the insistence of the law. (Editorial in Hanford Sentinel reprinted in Advance-Register, Oct. 18)

One sheriff explained:

> It isn't lawful to obstruct the highways whether to hold a church service or to picket. Picketing on the road like they did is obstructing traffic and you can't tell me that three hundred or four hundred pickets standing in the road don't intimidate thirty or forty workers, even if they don't say nothing. Mass picketing is illegal and I am not afraid to go before any court and prove it. (Interview.)

The following instance indicates the manner in which at various times picketing was interfered with by the officers:

> At Pixley in Tulare County two striking cotton pickers who were picketing a ranch when other ranchers continued to harvest were arrested on charges of disturbing the peace. They were accused of cursing workers who refused to strike. (Californian, Oct. 10)

The law against incitement to riot also was employed:

> Five strikers were arrested near Tulare on the eighteenth on charges of inciting riot; when according to information from the sheriff's office the men were calling to pickers on the Singh Ranch and attempting to get the pickers to quit working. (Advance-Register, Oct. 18)

As the strike wore on, the interpretation of lawful picketing became more stringent. A deputy said: "We allowed strikers to stop at a single ranch for a few minutes only and did not allow congestion of the roads. Men have a right to picket, but they can do lawful things in an unlawful manner." (Interview.) The practice at one time in Tulare County was to forbid even stopping:

> Picking was resumed in all sections of the county today as deputy sheriffs patrolled the roads and prevented parading strikers, from stopping in the vicinity of fields where pickers were at work, Sheriff R. L. Hill announced today * * * they are allowed to parade through the cotton districts in automobile caravans, but are not allowed to stop and hold meetings in front of the ranches. While banners urging continuation of the strike are permitted, the strikers are not allowed to shout threats at either the pickers in the fields or the ranchers. Hill said that each caravan sent out by the strikers was accompanied by officers, and that very effort was being made to prevent further violence. (Times-Delta, Oct. 17)

A few days later, after trespassing by pickets had become more conspicuous, the sheriff warned:

> An ultimatum to strikers to cease law violations was issued by Sheriff R. L. Hill * * * as he sent into the cotton belt 40 armed deputies who were instructed to resort to force if necessary to secure obedience of the sheriff's orders.
>
> Strikers will not be allowed to stop on roads, they will not be allowed to double back on roads, shouting into fields will be forbidden and none of the strikers will be allowed to get out of their automobiles.

> Persistent violations will result in the arrest of the driver and confiscation of the car. (Ibid. Oct. 24)

On the same day:

> Accompanied by 40 deputies, Sheriff Hill caught up with a caravan of strikers headed towards Earlimart from Corcoran. He halted the trucks, ordered all the occupants into the road, then arrested the drivers and confiscated the 10 vehicles. The arrested men and the machines were sent to the county jail under an escort of armed deputies. The strikers were left to make their way back to camp on foot. (Chronicle, Oct. 25)

The method by which trespassing pickets were handled upon one occasion in Kings County is described as follows:

> Sheriff Buckner and his deputies and a squad of 15 state traffic officers met the huge caravan of strike picketers, some 30 trucks and cars bearing almost 100 strikers. Sheriff Buckner, sensing trouble, had deputized some 15 citizens. The caravan stopped and began yelling at the pickers in the field, some 50 or 60 of the women later swarming into the fields in an effort to pull out the workers, most of whom ran for cover. When the first man was arrested, a near riot ensued. The strikers roared at officers, piled off the trucks and milled around the officers' cars, some of the officers being grabbed by strikers. One tear gas bomb was thrown into the yelling mob, and several deputies and state traffic officers leaped upon cars, held tear gas bombs high and shouted in both English and Spanish that if the riot didn't stop they would throw them. That halted the mob and the officers soon had them under control ordering the picketers back upon their trucks and into cars and placing 11 arrested leaders, including the three women, into their cars and sending them to jail in Hanford. (Journal, Oct. 24)

Only the day before the sheriff is said to have forbidden picket caravans to leave the striker's camp at Corcoran:

> Threat of trouble was seen when Sheriff Buckner of Kings County declared no cavalcade would be permitted to leave the strikers' camp at Corcoran while Caroline Decker, blond strike leader asserted, "No man will stop us." (Chronicle, October 23)

That strikers or their sympathizers at times did overstep the law with respect to trespass and personal violence has already been pointed out (see section on Union Attack). They also damaged physical property occasionally; for example, an independent farmer near Tipton said:

> The strikers burned cotton on my ranch. They cut fences and let cattle out, and stole sheep on other farms in the neighborhood. (Interview; also see below.)

The main fear of the growers, however, was clearly not damage to physical property, but loss of their pickers. Efforts were made to jail union leaders in order to limit the effectiveness of the strike, evidently on the principle subsequently expressed by a district attorney, and thoroughly in accord with the views of most growers, that:

> Tulare County can no longer permit the Communists and Radical agitators to move about our agricultural belt unmolested. (Chronicle, Oct. 29; also see below).

In Kern County it was reported following the Arvin riot that the sheriff "staged a house-cleaning in the farming community in an effort to capture the ringleaders." (Californian, Oct. 11.) Pat Chambers, the most conspicuous among the strike organizers until his arrest and the hearings before the Governor's Committee brought Caroline Decker into prominence, was arrested early during the cotton strike, and all efforts to bail him out or obtain release on habeas corpus were unsuccessful. The "leader of the strike was being held under $10,000 bond * * * on a charge of advocating criminal syndicalism. The complaint was signed by F. E. Peterson, Pixley rancher, and was based on alleged statements made by Chambers" preceding the shooting affair at Pixley. Chambers was arrested in front of the strike headquarters in Tulare. (Times-Delta, Oct. 12) His "criminal" record stated that he had been "arrested seven times in connection with his strike agitation activities, but never convicted." The Fresno Bee announced with evident satisfaction:

> Hanford officers said with Chambers and Gordon under arrest and Louis Bradley convicted on a Fresno county charge in connection with the grape pickers' strike, all three members of the strike agitation in San Joaquin county are in custody. (Bee, Oct. 13)

The Hanford Journal stated editorially:

> With Pat Chambers in jail in Visalia on charges of inciting rioting; with Louis Bradley, one of the principal leaders found guilty of rioting at Madera and facing two years in jail; and with Leroy Gordon, another leader in jail in Hanford, a considerable crimp has been put in the ranks of the radical cotton strike leaders.
>
> Chambers is a known communist, and Bradley, who "comraded" peach strikers at Tagus ranch about in approved Leningrad style, have been clever enough up to this point to evade the law. Arrested before, they have gained freedom shortly on bail, or obtained dismissal of charges against them by promptly using Union attorneys to handle their case. (Journal, Oct. 13)

The policy of arresting the leaders was termed by the Western Worker (Nov. 20) a "racket used by district attorneys to break strikes." And Chambers later filed suit against the district attorney, sheriff, and the rancher who signed the complaint:

> On his complaint Chambers stated that he was a leader in the cotton strike, and that the defendants conspired to break the strike by unlawful means, including the abuse of legal process for the purpose of aiding the ranchers. (Times-Delta, Nov. 9)

The suit was dismissed.

Arrest of strike leaders proved completely unavailing to break the strike. Although it was harassing to those conducting the strike, they used it as a rallying cry of "persecution" to deepen the antipathies of the strikers against officers of the law.

Efforts were also made by the officials to prevent an influx of new leaders which might increase the effectiveness of picketing activities:

> Steps to prevent an influx of transients called to this county to aid in maintaining picketing were taken by county authorities in conjunction with the aid of railroad detectives as a careful survey of railroad yards and jungles was started today. (Advance-Register, Oct. 19)

Sheriffs coordinated their activities and shared information concerning movements of strike "agitators":

> A report which Sheriff Emig of Santa Clara County said he had been unable to verify, that armed men were on their way from Communist Headquarters at San Jose to aid cotton strikers at Pixley, was transmitted to authorities in San Joaquin Valley by Emig. (Journal, Oct. 17)

Arrests of pickets in Kings and Tulare counties were frequent. Sixteen were arrested near Pixley on the day of the shooting. (Times, Oct. 11) Eleven others were arrested in Kings County on October 23. Smaller numbers of pickets were apprehended at frequent intervals in both counties. Only four strikers were jailed for picketing activity in Kern County.

George Creel, NRA Director, who spoke to the strikers at the Corcoran Camp on October 18 advised them that they were within their legal rights to picket. At this the growers and sheriffs were greatly incensed. As one prominent grower of Kern County stated:

> Creel told the Mexicans they had a right to picket. They thought the government wanted them to picket. (Interview.)

And a sheriff declared:

> Conditions are worse in the cotton fields this afternoon than they have been any day since the shooting * * * anything might happen any minute, and conditions tend to get worse instead of better. There are several groups of radical agitators in the county now and they apparently want trouble rather than any settlement of the dispute.
>
> We have been having lots of trouble since George Creel made a statement telling the strikers they had a right to picket. They took this to mean that they could do anything they pleased, and strikers in caravans have given officials considerable trouble. (Times-Delta, Oct. 19)

Some violence was in fact precipitated by strikers (see section on Union Attack). They are reported to have burned cotton in the fields in Kern county (Californian, Oct. 4, 7); to have attempted to burn some cotton at the Long gin near Corcoran; to have resisted officers trying to arrest a Mexican in the Corcoran camp (Times-Delta, Oct. 19); to have done some "night riding" (Times, Oct. 25); to have overturned cotton wagons in fields of Kings County (Times-Delta, Oct. 23); and to have fired shots into the home of one of the growers indicted for the Pixley affair (Chronicle, Oct. 20). Two other reports of strikers' violence early in the strike are as follows:

> J. D. Russell, Pond rancher, and Harry Torrey, driving along the highway, were reported stopped by 25 alleged strikers. The windows of the car were smashed and efforts made to drag the men from the car. Mr. Russell, however, accelerated the machine and the two escaped.
>
> It was reported that while 1,000 pounds of cotton were being loaded on the P. J. Richards ranch near McFarland a striker tossed a lighted match into the cotton and it was burned. J. D. Croder, brother-in-law of Richards, is reported to have struck the striker on the head with a pitchfork, but not soon enough to prevent a blaze. (Californian, Oct. 7)

On the whole, however, the strikers made an attempt to keep the peace and obey the law as their leaders advised, knowing their inability to resist attacks by growers and feeling they might better secure their ends by avoiding violence.

The first violent clash of groups of men occurred at Woodville when growers sought to disperse strikers and forbid picketing (see also section on Growers' Resistence).

> Seventy-five farmers held a meeting and afterward went over to a strikers' gathering at a local service station and broke up the meeting. The farmers told the striker who was speaking to be out of the county by 9. a. m. Sunday, which he agreed to do.
>
> The farmers told the strikers they didn't want to see a picket in the fields at 9 a. m. Sunday and that they would be around to see that such was the case.
>
> Farmers planned to hold a meeting at the Poplar gin Saturday night to complete their plans. (Advance-Register, Oct. 7.)

The strikers described the Woodville riot as follows:

> Earlier in the day, the president of the Woodville Local was attacked by a group of growers. That evening the strikers held a mass meeting at Woodville. Two truckloads of farmers drove up to the meeting, a deputy with a star on his shirt front stood on the farmers' truck. As the strikers' speaker attempted to speak, catcalls came from the growers' trucks, with the occasional urge—"let's go." While a young striker spoke the growers piled off their trucks and made a wedge-shaped attack on the meeting of the strikers. The strikers defended themselves with the parts of a small table and bench which were quickly dismembered, while the growers struck with pistol butts. One striker had seven stitches taken in his head, a farmer suffered a fractured skull, another striker had two front teeth pushed in, and there were several minor injuries. The growers then changed the purpose of their coming to the meeting and asked to address the meeting. They were granted that. Not being able to prove satisfactorily to the strikers that they could not pay the $1 per 100 demanded, they read a document which was later printed in all the newspapers, and informed the strikers that everyone wishing to pick cotton for 60¢ per hundred would be protected by the growers, all others must leave the state by 9 a. m. Monday morning.
>
> One grower present at the meeting, Stark, by name, turned to the strikers and said, facing Caroline Decker: "I will shoot to kill the first striker I see in the road, and it won't be the first man I've killed." (Brief History of the San Joaquin Valley Cotton Strike, submitted to Fact Finding Committee)

Groups of growers in the strike area vented their anger and sought to demoralize the strikers by arming themselves and threatening violence. Some had migrated earlier from the cotton belt and brought with them traditions of race domination over cotton workers by force. Immediately upon declaration of the strike, growers were publicly assured that they could protect workers in their fields by force and arms under the law against trespass. This they proceeded to do.

> It was reported that picking was proceeding as usual and that cotton growers were prepared to offer protection to their pickers under the state trespass

> law. Under this law a man has the right to resist unlawful invasion of his property with force if necessary. (Californian, Oct. 3)
>
> In some sections of the county, farmers are reported to have armed themselves with guns to prevent invasion of their fields and intimidation of their cotton pickers. (Californian, Oct. 5)
>
> Armed San Joaquin Valley ranchers today stood guard over their cotton fields, ready to resist with gunfire attempts of strikers to prevent harvest of their crops. (Advance-Register, Oct. 7)

The San Francisco Chronicle declared on October 13 that licenses to carry concealed weapons had been issued to 600 citizens in Kern County alone.

Well-armed as they were without a doubt, threats of forceful action by the growers carried added weight. Threats to "blow to hell every striker who so much as laid a hand on the fences of their properties" (Times-Delta, Oct. 13) appear to have been fairly frequent. Also, the growers employed their guns when forcing eviction of strikers from ranch camps and when protecting their pickers from picket caravans. Moreover, when the ranchers organized into vigilante associations, it only emphasized their promises. (See section on Growers' Resistance.)

The strikers, on the other hand, were almost wholly unarmed. There is little indication that the laborers ever carried guns or threatened use of force against the growers, despite rumors that the McFarland and Corcoran camps at one time were bristling with arms. The leaders continually advocated peaceful activity only and warned against the use of arms of any description.

This armament program of the growers led one sheriff to the opinion that "hell may break loose" at any time. (Tulare Times, Oct. 24) In fact it had already done so on two occasions when growers and strikers met: at Pixley, where two strikers were killed and eight growers were arrested on charges of murder; and near Arvin where one striker was shot to death and, strangely enough, nine strikers only were arrested for the death. Both clashes occurred on the afternoon of October 10.

Near Pixley, a small town about fifteen miles south of Tulare where a caravan of pickets had visited a ranch, sixteen of them were imprisoned on ranch property by armed growers collected for the purpose and held by them until sheriff's deputies could arrest the pickets and remove them to town. Soon strikers collected in Pixley to protest the arrests and held a mass meeting across the highway from their headquarters on a vacant lot near the Southern Pacific railroad tracks. While Pat Chambers addressed the group, aroused farmers arrived in town and partially surrounded the strikers, threatening them with guns. The strikers feared violence. They concluded their meeting and crossed the road en masse to enter their headquarters. As the first of them reached the entrance, a grower's gun was discharged, which then was seized by a striker and pointed into the ground. This striker was knocked down by a grower and shot to death while lying there. General firing took place as the strikers fled to cover. A second striker was killed, eight more were wounded, and holes were shot through windows, woodwork and flags at the union headquarters.

The growers then began to depart, unhindered by either state or local law officers who were at hand. As they departed, the officers decided to relieve them of their guns but no arrests were made until later when eight growers were arrested and jailed. A grand jury indictment held them on $15,000 bail, "furnished by friends," for trial on December 12.

> It is reported here that ginning companies and other large concerns interested in cotton are making arrangements to furnish the required bond for the accused men, all but one of whom are cotton growers. (Times-Delta, Nov. 2)

A San Francisco newspaper reporter who witnessed the attack, has described it as follows:

> The cotton of Tulare is stained with strikers' blood today.
>
> Two short-torn American flags droop over the doorways that framed the brutal shooting of unarmed strikers as they peacefully entered their headquarters at Pixley in Tulare county Tuesday.
>
> I saw eleven unarmed persons shot down in cold blood. One was a woman. Two were killed.
>
> It had been coming a long time. The farmers knew the strikers knew it. They had appealed to the police for protection in vain.

> W. D. Hammett, striker and former minister, had protested to the peace officers against the danger of allowing the farmers to carry their rifles and shotguns on the taut streets of Pixley.
>
> Mrs. Lillian Dunn—she stood with her baby clutched to her breast inside the strikers' headquarters as the farmers' shots ripped through the building all about her—corroborated this.
>
> The slaughter had been sudden, almost like an ambush.
>
> Pat Chambers, strike leader, had been on a truck haranguing the strikers. "This is no time for a backward step," he had said. "We must fight and show the farmers a solid front. We will match the farmers with their own violence. Let them start something and we will finish it."
>
> Idle words—at least so far.
>
> The meeting adjourned. The strikers were slowly walking across the street to their union headquarters.
>
> Suddenly a farmer fired into the crowd. Several strikers jumped on him.
>
> A few fusilades rang out from the other farmers.
>
> The strikers broke, ran into their red brick, two-storied headquarters building. All but a few. They lay in their own tracks where the farmers' bullets had dropped them. Some lay very still. Others weakly pulled themselves up on their elbows, tried to crawl to safety out of the line of fire.
>
> Tanks and barbed wire were all that were needed to complete the picture.
>
> The farmers barricaded themselves behind a row of parked automobiles—as if there was need for it. Not so much as a water pistol appeared in the hands of the besieged strikers.
>
> For several minutes the farmers kept up a sniping attack with their guns.
>
> The flags over the doorways danced a grotesque jig as shots ripped through their stars and stripes.
>
> Bullets whizzed over my head only a short distance outside the boundaries of the narrow no-man's land.
>
> It was a strange and feeble flag of peace that finally ended the battle—the white police car of W. W. Snell, in charge of the state highway patrol at Bakersfield. It drove into the highway from a side street and stopped right alongside of me.
>
> Surprised, the farmers stopped firing, staring blankly at the emblem of the law.
>
> Then they ran for their parked automobiles and drove past us. Inspector Snell remained seated in his car. I was standing outside.
>
> Their shotguns and rifles were poked menacingly out of the windows of their cars at us.
>
> The inspector, still seated in the machine, tooted his horn weakly. The long procession of bristling automobiles continued its deliberate, dignified retreat, never heeding the horse-like honking.
>
> By this time deputy sheriffs had come alongside the inspector's machine.
>
> "What shall we do now?" the inspector turned to one of the deputies.
>
> There was some stammering, some hemming and hawing, and finally, after the farmers' cars had passed, one of the deputies got an idea.
>
> "Let's go after them!" he suggested with very little enthusiasm.
>
> * * * the farmers were stopped by Deputy Sheriff Carl Inside, who searched the cars and removed six rifles, four shotguns, and other small arms, but did not detain the farmers.
>
> Other arms were found in abandoned cars around the besieged building.
>
> (San Francisco News, Oct. 11)

A striker eye-witness has given his version as follows:

> The farmers opened fire on us from behind automobiles without warning last night.
>
> Several hundred of us strikers were meeting on the main street here. We thought Justice of the Peace J. E. Swanson shouldn't have issued warrants and caused the arrest of 17 strikers held under armed guard.
>
> Pat Chambers got up and told us not to do anything violent. He said we'd get farther by peaceful means.
>
> A bunch of cotton growers drove into town in 10 automobiles. They drove through our meeting and scattered the crowd.
>
> We decided to go to the hall across the street—the strike headquarters.
>
> We were crossing the street when farmers stopped their automobiles. They got behind the cars and opened fire without warning.

> Some of the boys fought with them then. But there on the street were the dead and wounded. There was a lot of yelling and screaming. Then nearly everybody cleared out. I don't know whether anybody threw bricks or not. I know I did not.
>
> It all started when one of the farmers took a shot at someone in our crowd. I guess they were old enemies.
>
> There was a volley of shots. It was soon over. When the growers and the strikers saw the bodies and realized what happened, most of them ran out of there. Two were dead. (Billy Thomas in Advance-Register, Oct. 11)

W. D. Hammett, Pixley strike leader, who appeared before the jury during the trial of the indicted growers gave testimony as follows:

> As Pat Chambers started to talk on the railroad property across from headquarters in Pixley, a group of armed men drove up, Hammett said. When Chambers completed his speech, the strikers and their leader started back to the hall.
>
> They had been in the hall only a short time when some one shouted: Bill, they're coming in on us.
>
> Running to the sidewalk in front of the building, Hammett said he saw a group of armed men headed toward the headquarters.
>
> Hammett reached the highway just as the first man in the advancing group stepped on the highway in front of headquarters.
>
> I told him not to shoot into the hall among women and children there, Hammett said. He shoved a rifle toward me and I grabbed it by the barrel and pushed it toward the ground. Just then a Mexican fellow grabbed the rifle and I grabbed the pistol the next man had. We started scuffling and wrestled around there in the gutter while I tried to take the gun away and the man hung on to it.
>
> While we were scuffling, I heard a shot and then heard Delfino Davila shout: "Bill, you better run. They've got me." I let go the gun and ran into the building.
>
> I went through the back of the building and then through the fence and started north.
>
> Was the shooting going on while you were going away, District Attorney Walter Haight inquired.
>
> Yes, I heard it while I was getting away, Hammett replied, I could still hear the shots when I was two blocks away.
>
> You were running pretty fast, weren't you, Haight asked.
>
> Well, I wasn't walking, was Hammett's answer. (Times-Delta, Jan. 12, 1934.)

The Arvin riot took place the same afternoon as the Pixley shooting. Arvin is a small town in a cotton growing community about twenty miles southeast of Bakersfield, in Kern County. The initial impetus to the riot came on the morning of the 11th when more than a score of armed growers assembled to protect working pickers in a field 1¾ miles west of Arvin from a large caravan of pickets. From 10 o'clock on, the two sides defied each other. The strikers faced the growers across a dirt road and each group hurled epithets at the other. An under-sheriff described the scene:

> There was an imaginary line at the edge of the road and neither group dared cross it. There were 30 armed growers on the cotton field side and about 250 strikers in the road. All the time the growers were just hoping one would put his foot across the line and he would have been plugged full of holes. (Interview.)

Sometime after 3 o'clock a skirmish took place. Opinions vary as to the immediate cause. Intermittent fighting continued for nearly half an hour. Growers employed their gun butts and strikers used grape stakes and clubs. Finally shooting broke out for a brief minute or two and under-sheriff Carter threw a tear gas bomb. When the riot was over, one Mexican lay dying in the road and several others were wounded. A few growers had sustained cuts and bruises.

Testimony presented at the Coroner's inquest (In the matter of the inquest held on the body of Pedro Subia, deceased, Bakersfield, Oct. 14, 1933) indicated that only the growers were armed and the consensus of opinion was that all the shots, variously estimated at from 5 to 100, came from the north and northeast, the growers' side of the road. No one appeared to know who fired the death-dealing shot. One theory held it was fired by a striker and intended for undersheriff Carter but hit Subia instead. A second version described the assailant as a grower:

> Question: Can you repeat his words again?
>
> Answer: He [an armed man in overalls, wearing glasses and speaking to a deputy and growers] said, "I would not have shot him but he was contemplating shooting an officer." (Testimony of Eliza N. Margraeves before Coroner's jury.)

A description of the riot by the Bakersfield Californian (Oct. 11) depicts another view:

> Varied versions of the Gary Mitchell ranch battle were forthcoming but the most consistent was that told by guards and onlookers to the effect that strikers attempted to drag a strikebreaker from the field in which he was working.
>
> Mitchell laid aside the gun he carried and barehanded charged the strikers who lined the side of the field. Other growers on the scene, including Jewett, Thompson and Frick, in an instant had joined the fray.
>
> They were outnumbered 10 to 1 by the strikers and as grape stakes, gas pipe and fists swung the growers soon went down. Women and children scattered among the strikers kept the guards from using their guns, they said. The menacing weapons, however, held a large portion of the strikers at bay and are believed to have saved the lives of the growers.
>
> A riot call to Sheriff Cos Walser brought a carload of deputies headed by T. J. Carter, ex-marine, and F. Harlow Wright, also an overseas veteran, armed with tear gas guns and the army of strikers was forced to retreat.
>
> A sniper hidden in an evergreen tree beside the road down which the strikers were retreating is said to have been responsible for Subia's death. Witnesses said the bullet evidently was fired at the back of Deputy Carter as he advanced with a gas gun. Subia walked into the line of fire and crumpled to the ground as the bullet tore through his chest, severing an artery and causing death within a few minutes * * *
>
> Stunned by the spectre of death, the strikers soon retired to Arvin, where they milled about their headquarters in the Adobe Cafe and their camp in the residential district for hours.
>
> The tear gas produced by the Sheriff's office proved the most effective measure in quelling the rioters. The baptismal came as a surprise to the strikers.
>
> The main group of strikers had withdrawn down the highway and congregated 125 yards from the deputies. The range of Carter's riot gun is just 125 yards, and as he fired and the projectile barely dropped at their feet, the strikers jeered and hooted, not knowing it was a gas bomb. Suddenly it bursted and the stinging gas poured over them like a blanket. Choking, gasping and half-blinded, they took to their heels.

Nine strikers were arrested on murder charges, and brought to trial in November, but none were convicted.

In addition to these major clashes there were the usual sporadic rumors of violence. A Negro striker was reported shot in the neck while driving his car south of Pixley on the day of the encounter. Another striker was said to have been injured in McFarland on October 11 by a grower's gun. (Bee, Oct. 11, 12.)

> Another rancher, whose name could not be obtained, was reported to have driven strike agitators from his property using a gun. (Californian, Oct. 7.)

Pat Chambers, strike leader, charged that the violence and shootings were planned by the growers:

> The shooting itself was an organized attempt and was accompanied by disorders at Arvin and other points in the cotton fields. (Times-Delta, Oct. 13.)

It seems unlikely that the shootings themselves were more than spontaneous reactions to a common anger. Yet behind them, making them possible on the scale on which they occurred at Pixley lay the prior ogranization and arming of growers.

The position of local peace officers, caught between growers, strikers, and the metropolitan public of the State, was obviously difficult. Of course the growers were in the best position to bring pressure. They were stable, tax paying, voting, residents and well-organized for years. The sheriffs knew them as friends and neighbors. The strikers, on the other hand, were largely migratory, non-voting, poor, and hastily organized. The metropolitan press was far away.

The formal organization of pressure began early.

> For the first time since the strike commenced, E. K. Walls, president of the Tulare County Farm Bureau, and a committee of nine members met with Chairman Elliott of the board of supervisors at Visalia in a conference relative to the policing of the affected area.
>
> It was the consensus of opinion that Sheriff R. L. Hill be provided with special funds to employ extra deputies during such emergencies as the present. (Bee, Oct. 12.)

The power of the growers was well-understood by the authorities, who occasionally acknowledged it in interviews. An under-sheriff declared:

> We protect our farmers here in Kern County. They are our best people. They are always with us. They keep the country going. They put us in here and they can put us out again, so we serve them. But the Mexicans are trash. They have no standard of living. We herd them like pigs. (Interview.)

A district attorney explained:

> The growers really were more trouble and danger than the strikers were. We could control the strikers because they didn't amount to anything and couldn't even vote, but the growers were well known and had lots of influence and we were much more afraid we couldn't control them. I guess the growers said things just as likely to incite to violence as Pat Chambers did, but they couldn't be guilty of criminal syndicalism, because they weren't trying to overthrow the government.
>
> A grower came to me one day and asked me for a warrant, and I refused it and said he had no reason to arrest the striker. He insisted and I refused. Then he said if there was any bloodshed, it would be my fault. I was on the spot then, so I gave him the warrant but told him he had no right to sign it and if he did the striker would have the right to take action against him for illegal arrest. And I told him that if he was brought into court, I'd tell the jury the same thing as I told him. He went out with the warrant, but I never heard of it again. Why, some of the growers wanted us to arrest the strikers just because they were strikers and for no other reason. (Interview.)

This pressure from growers largely explains why tactics of the authorities so frequently operated to undermine the strike. One of the district attorneys pointed out the use of arrests for this purpose:

> Four other arrests were made in this county. That was when the strike leaders were arrested for vagrancy at Corcoran. The sheriff thought that would break the strike but they were better organized than we thought and it didn't do any good. I was against arresting them all the time because we didn't have any case against them. Their cases were later dismissed. (Interview.)

A similar occurrence in another county later was made the basis for an unsuccessful suit:

> Pat Chambers, strike leader and asserted communist, today filed suit against District Attorney Walter C. Haight, Sheriff R. L. Hill and F. M. Peterson, Pixley rancher, demanding $15,000 damages for what he termed malicious prosecution and his confinement in the Tulare County jail.
>
> On his complaint Chambers stated that he was a leader in the cotton strike and that the defendants conspired to break the strike by unlawful means, including the abuse of legal process for the purpose of aiding the ranchers. (Times-Delta, Nov. 9.)

The Western Worker termed the policy of arresting leaders "a racket used by district attorneys to break strikes" (Nov. 20).

The Hanford Journal reported that "113 persons have been arrested in connection with the strike" (Oct. 28). Of these only eight were growers who were arrested after the Pixley shooting; the remainder were strikers.

No part of the report of the Governor's Fact Finding Committee was more bitterly resented by growers than that section (see below) which found that the civil liberties of strikers had been violated.

The State Highway Patrol was used in the valley shortly after the Pixley and Arvin shootings.

> Cato, who has been in the district since the violent outbreak Tuesday night, offered to send 80 highway patrolmen into the community if the sheriff thinks it necessary. (Times-Delta, Oct. 12.)

The patrol quickly "took command of the tense situation in Kings County" at Corcoran camp and "relieved Sheriff Van Buckner." (Times-Delta, Oct. 24). The presence of the patrol of course relieved pressure for local deputies and shifted part of the cost of policing the strike from the counties to the State. When temporary withdrawal of the patrol was announced the sheriff of Tulare County was immediately affected.

> Hill announced this morning that he had received reports that the California Highway Patrol has withdrawn from strike duty. This will make it necessary to swear in more special deputies to cope with the situation, Hill said. The highway patrol has aided greatly in preserving order in the cotton belt, and patrolmen have been accompanying caravans of picketers every day since the Pixley shooting. (Times-Delta, Oct. 21)

Cato's program included an effort to persuade the farmers to halt picking until peace was restored:

> Chief Cato warned ranch owners not to attempt any picking today, fearing the strikers, grown suddenly ugly-tempered despite the efforts of Governor Rolph's fact-finding mediation board, might resort to further violence. (San Francisco Call-Bulletin, Oct. 24)

Also Cato used his influence, together with that of others, to dissuade the sheriff from entering Corcoran camp with 30 John Doe warrants to arrest leaders, although "some growers were white in the face because the sheriff wouldn't go in." The intensity of the situation, the influence of hereditary backgrounds, and the pressure of growers was described by a leading citizen:

> Southerners didn't think a Mexican or Nigger as anything but a slave. They said, "We will arm and go in there and clean them out." A grower who had come originally from Georgia said, "You ought to have guts enough in this community to go in and clean them out. The cotton industry in the San Joaquin Valley will never be worth anything unless you do." (Interview)

The patrol was subjected to some criticism for its work with strike caravans and at Pixley. At Corcoran camp, however, it clearly was a stabilizing influence, and restrained the more hot-headed growers from precipitating what could only have been a bloody and futile battle. But the terms in which the patrol won praise from local newspapers for its work in the valley foreshadowed the growth of hostility from organized labor toward use of the highway patrol in labor disputes.

> Whatever the final outcome of the cotton strike, it has already been shown that the State Highway Patrol constitutes one of the most effective police organizations in California.
> * * * an organization comparable to the famous Royal Northwest Mounted Police and the celebrated Pennsylvania State Troopers. (Times, Oct. 27)

In the closing days of the strike there were rumors that the National Guard would be called out. Sheriff Buckner is reported to have sent a "plea for troops to Governor Rolph from Corcoran declaring that the strike had gotten out of control and that unless troops were sent to Corcoran area bloodshed would result." (Journal, Oct. 24) Governor Rolph answered he would not call out any troops until absolutely necessary. (Times-Delta, Oct. 24) They were never considered indispensable.

RELIEF

The California Emergency Relief Administration, operating under Federal advice, rendered material assistance to the strikers in their dual role as needy unemployed. This was the first large labor conflict in the United States, perhaps the first of any size, in which a Federal agency gave food to hungry strikers, and it established a precedent of importance.

Many migratory families, living an always precarious existence, had come to the cotton area two or three weeks before picking season. This period served for many to exhaust their scanty reserves. Thus the advent of the strike found many of them penniless, and as it continued, the situation became grave. Even by the second week, many of the striking laborers had difficulty obtaining food and the threat of starvation of children in the dramatic Corcoran concentration camp attracted the attention of governmental officials and of the public.

The union attempted through its communist connections to collect both money and provisions at mass meetings staged in metropolitan communities. The Western Worker (Oct. 16) declared that the strikers

> must have *immediate relief!* Send funds and food! That's the ammunition they need! As soon as San Francisco heard of the strike, a lightning arrangement brought a big meeting to hear the strike leaders. $54.00 and lots of food was collected. YOUR CITY MUST DO LIKEWISE.

A. F. of L. locals and sympathetic persons also contributed. But the support secured in these ways was insufficient.

Local government relief agencies refused aid. The Tulare County Board of Supervisors on October 12 determined not to assist the strikers.

> The Board of Supervisors, meeting in a special session at the courthouse this morning, approved the action of Chairman Alfred J. Elliott of Tulare in refusing to promise to turn over to striking cotton pickers $5,000 to be used to feed and clothe the workers for the duration of the strike.
>
> In commenting on the board's action this morning, Elliott said that the county had no right to turn money over to the strikers' committee, and that the supervisors would in addition refuse to provide county aid for transients who had drifted in to take part in the strike.
>
> "We are going to carry on relief work just as we have in the past, but in the past we have never cared for indigents," Elliott said. "If the person applying for aid has resided in the county for the required length of time and is an indigent, he will be given relief, without regard as to whether he has been involved in the strike."
>
> "If we were getting federal money we would have to give aid to these indigents.[9] However, we are not getting federal money and we are not going to apply for it." (Times-Delta, Oct. 12)

The Kern County Board of Supervisors took similar action. Chairman Brite, when interviewed by a union delegation seeking food relief, replied: "We haven't the money." (Californian, Oct. 16) Union leaders severely criticized this attitude, which they called "starving us out."

Contrary to precedent the California Emergency Relief Administration stepped into the situation and treated the hungry strikers and their families like other destitute people "willing to work." Thus for the first time on a large scale a public relief agency waived the existence of a labor dispute and aided "strikers" just as it aided other "unemployed."

On October 12 Governor Rolph directed R. C. Branion, Director of the Relief Administration, to give aid:

> Stark hunger gripped the cotton belt tonight as Governor Rolph overrode NRA regulations to rush relief to the sufferers.
>
> Threatened with an epidemic of typhoid fever as a result of unsanitary conditions, thousands of destitute cotton strikers and their families, camped in squalid tent cities in Kings and Tulare Counties, are showing marked effects of malnutrition. More than 4,300 women and children, many of whom have not tasted food all day, are included in the population of the makeshift canvas villages, sprawled like gypsy encampments over the countryside.
>
> And in these wretched surroundings some of the women are expected to give birth to babies within 48 hours!
>
> Alarmed over conditions in the area, Governor Rolph last night ordered R. C. Branion, State Administrator of Federal relief funds, into the cotton belt to distribute food. . . .
>
> "Under national recovery regulations our hands are tied until the strikers agree to submit their difficulties to arbitration," Branion told him.
>
> "Arbitration hell!" declared the Governor. "We're not going to force these strikers into arbitration by starving them out. Not in my state!

---

[9] Receipt of Federal money from the California State Emergency Relief Administration, by local governmental relief organizations, was dependent upon the willingness of the local bodies to extend aid to all needy persons whether residents or not. Some California counties preferred to forego Federal assistance rather than accede to the requirement.

These people are hungry. Get down there—fly down there by plane and feed them as soon as you can."

Branion left a short time later to organize relief here in cooperation with agents of the State Department of Industrial Relations. (Chronicle, Oct. 13)

On October 15 assistance was ready. At first it was refused by the strikers:

> While demanding federal relief in the Kings County strike feud in a circular broadcast yesterday, strike leaders refused to accept the proffered relief of R. C. Branion, state emergency relief chief and a corps of assistants who took milk to the Corcoran camp Sunday for children of strikers. Branion and a corp of women relief workers were reported to have taken 260 quarts of milk for the children but only 18 quarts were accepted before strike leaders halted the procedure. Wood was also reported to have been offered by Branion and as definitely refused.
>
> Kings County officers who visited the camp could explain the refusal only on the grounds that the "history card" the state agency required strikers who accepted milk to sign were interpreted by the strike leaders as binding them to go to work at the 60-cent scale. Another version was that the strikers feared that if their record were thus obtained, many of them would be deported to Mexico. (Times-Delta, Oct. 14)

The questions objected to by the union were dropped and the mere signature of a family head and declaration of need sufficed for receipt of help. The strikers then gladly accepted the food distributed at emergency depots established at all important towns. The Fresno Bee stated on October 21:

> Unemployed cotton pickers and their families in most of the strike areas were reported to be receiving food from the federal unemployment relief administration * * *

The food was principally milk and groceries.

In the Corcoran camp alone, 2,595 persons in 525 families received food allotments based on $8.00 a week for families of 14 and $5.00 a week for smaller families." (News, Oct. 27)

The total expenditures by the California Emergency Relief administration for relief in the strike area was $10,709.26. divided as follows: Kern County, $5,233.48; Tulare County, $1,848.19; Kings County, $3,637.59.

As soon as the Governor's Fact Finding Committee submitted its suggestion of a 75 cent rate for picking, R. C. Branion telegraphed leading growers' representatives on October 25 urging acceptance of the rate determined by that public body, and promised to discontinue assistance to the strikers in the event the farmers yielded:

> Referring to your telegram of October 23 to George Creel, federal relief will be withheld from any able bodied individual striker who is given a bona fide offer of work at seventy-five cents per one hundred pounds of cotton picked, as approved by the fact-finding committee, and who refuses such employment. (Times-Delta, Oct. 25)

Despite the fact that a "fair" rate had now been approved by a Governor's Committee, a left-wing group protested the termination of relief to force acceptance of the terms. A telegram to George Creel stated:

> We also demand that relief which has been cut off from unemployed workers in strike areas in disgraceful attempt to force them to scab be immediately restored. We pledge full solidarity with strikers in heroic effort to win a living wage. Rudie Lambert, Chairman.

The difference between a strike *prior* to adjudication of fair wages by a public agency, and one *after*, and in opposition to its adjudication, was not recognized by these strike sympathizers.

The growers decided to accept the 75 cent rate, and on October 26:

> Sheriff Buckner was informed by Mr. Hughes that he had orders from his chief, Mr. Branion, that those who refused to go to work today would not be fed and authorized officers at Corcoran to notify the strikers to that effect. (Journal, Oct. 26)

Feeding strikers under rules of the federal relief administration was severely criticized by the growers, who felt that federal support greatly assisted the union to maintain the strike and to force a higher picking rate. In a telegram addressed to federal and state officials, the Citizens and Growers Committee of Kern County called their attention

> * * * to bountiful use of federal funds for welfare relief through federal-state agencies, which has made and is making it more pleasant and desirable for labor to accept charity than to work. Little if any investigations are made by welfare workers and we have evidence that practically anyone can obtain help whether needed or not and in amounts greater than necessary. This is keeping many workers from working. (Californian, Oct. 21)

The Chamber of Commerce of the same county took the same position:

> The directors of the Kern County Chamber of Commerce unanimously adopted a resolution opposing the promiscuous feeding, such as has been done during the past few weeks in the San Joaquin Valley through state agencies, of any able bodied person who was offered or able to secure work where there was plenty of it, and refused to accept it. (Letter of L. B. Nourse, Secretary.)

A prominent grower objected to relief for strikers on the basis that it led the Mexican strikers to believe that the federal government wanted them to strike and was supporting them in their conflict with the growers. None of the growers saw anything in common between extension by government of agricultural "relief" to growers seeking a better income and "relief" to laborers striking for better wages.

Sheriff Buckner of Kings County made a charge of misuse of federal funds to augment the strikers' ranks:

> * * * returning from the Corcoran strike area * * * said he had obtained positive proof that a woman representing herself as a welfare worker from Sacramento with authority to distribute federal and state funds to unemployed workers, had approached workers in the district and promised to allow each man $5 worth of groceries per week for himself and family if they would leave the job and join the strikers' camp near Corcoran. (Journal, Oct. 21)

The charge was refuted by C. W. Burr, representative of the Emergency Relief Administration:

> The position of the state emergency relief administration and the federal emergency relief administration in the distribution of food is purely one of relieving distress. No discrimination between strikers, people who may be working in the fields of growers is made. The only condition necessary to secure relief is a reasonable evidence of need.
>
> Any statement made by anyone to the effect that any penalty of any kind would result from people who are anxious to work or return to work securing food is purely propaganda. We deal with individuals and family heads and in no sense are we interested in organizations or groups.
>
> Any statement to the effect that people who may have returned to work would be barred from securing needed food or that they would be required to cease work by any representative of the administration is entirely false. Our position is to relieve distress. The issues of the strike are in no sense any responsibility of the emergency relief administration. (Californian, Oct. 21)

There is no doubt that the extension of relief to the strikers helped them to continue the strike. Public relief policy, however, was now starting to remove fear of starvation from the list of legitimate pressures in labor relations.

SETTLEMENT

The growers, angered at the disaffection of their formerly uncomplaining workers, conspired to "stand pat" as a unit. The pickers, enraged by the summary methods of eviction and threats meted out to them, determined to pick "not a pound for less than a dollar a hundred." The farmers believed they could break the strike. The strikers thought they could batter down the ranchers' resistance, supported by the growing threat of unfavorable weather as the season advanced. Each side was urged by its small group of leaders to hold fast to its original demands. The small growers were kept in line by the large ranchers and gin operators. On the other hand, the communists bolstered any sags in the spirit of their followers. The ill-feeling engendered by the Pixley and Arvin fatalities, the riots, the threats, and the gun-carrying all galvanized the stubbornness of the contending groups and set the mold of opinion more firmly.

Four principal attempts to settle the strike were made: first, by Frank MacDonald, State Labor Commissioner; second, by Edward H. Fitzgerald, Federal Conciliator; third, by Timothy Reardon of the State Department of Industrial Relations; and finally by the Fact Finding Committee appointed by the Governor and supported by the NRA in California. The Labor Commissioner's staff offered its services as mediator in the strike as early as October 6 through E. B. Daniels, deputy commissioner for Kern, Kings, Tulare and Inyo counties. Daniels addressed a communication to both farmers and strikers as follows:

> I have been requested by Frank C. MacDonald, state labor commissioner, to offer the services of the state department of industrial relations and the labor commissioner's office in the matter of mediating the dispute which has arisen between the San Joaquin Valley cotton growers and their picking labor. (Bee, Oct. 6.)

The flat rejection of this offer by representatives of the growers was condemned by the Labor Commissioner:

> I think their refusal to allow any officials, state or federal, to act as mediators is unjustifiable and tends to encourage communism and to precipitate such dangerous conditions as have developed in the Lodi district. (Bee, Oct. 8.)

The strikers accepted with some reservations. Daniels is reported to have received

> requests from the McFarland, Shafter and Wasco strikers to use his efforts to mediate the strike and that he had been informed a similar request had been sent by mail from the Arvin workers' group. (Bee, Oct. 10.)

Deputy labor commissioners made new proposals for mediation to the growers on October 9 at Corcoran, which again were declined as chairman Ellett of the Corcoran growers' committee declared:

> The growers of this district talked over the situation this morning and decided to sit tight. (Bee, Oct. 10.)

MacDonald himself entered the strike area at Governor Rolph's request to seek a settlement on October 11, and stated shortly:

> Developments since my arrival here cause me to feel confident of mediation. The serious complications and possibilities of tremendous financial loss, coupled with the sobering effects of the tragic occurrences during the past two days, have brought home a realization that violence will not settle the controversy and that mediation must be resorted to immediately. (Bee, Oct. 12.)

Even this endeavor was rebuffed by the growers when Frank J. Palomares, manager of the San Joaquin Valley Agricultural Labor Bureau, representing the growers, telegraphed the Governor on October 13:

> Leaders among the cotton farmer group are not favorable to the state department of labor conducting such a hearing as they do not have confidence in the impartiality of this department, and think they would be unsuitable for working out a solution of the problem. (Journal, Oct. 14.)

A more colorful statement appeared in the valley press:

> Why should we mediate with any of Governor Rolph's agents? one grower demanded. Every one of them is on the side of the strikers. They can't see our side of it at all. All they want is to get something for the strikers. We can't and won't buck that combination. (Advance-Register, Oct. 11.)

Thus ended efforts by the Labor Commissioner to mediate, but deputies remained in close touch with the strike throughout the conflict. MacDonald himself played an important role in the closing days of the strike when he helped to prevent armed eviction of the Corcoran campers and to persuade strikers to accept the report of the Governor's Committee.

The Commissioner drew criticism from both sides. By the Western Worker he was charged with "strike breaking" (Nov. 20). The Los Angeles Times characterized his manner of persuading the strikers to settle as

> an encouragement to disorder (which) seems difficult either to explain or excuse. * * * The spectacle of a state officer haranguing a group led by Reds and calling them "comrades" is not an edifying one. (Reprinted in Times-Delta, Oct. 31.)

Timothy Reardon, Director of the California Department of Industrial Relations, also tried to settle the strike, declaring after the Pixley and Arvin shootings that "Order must be restored and the strike must be settled immediately" (Bee, Oct. 12). Ten days later, after a brief visit to the strike area, he offered an ill-advised plan that he said would "settle the strike in twenty four hours."

> Pay cotton pickers 80 cents per 100 pounds and induce the federal government to make up the difference of 20 cents between that and the present rate, possibly out of funds now spent for relief among strikers' families. (Bee, Oct. 22.)

This plan would have been satisfactory to the growers but less certainly so to the strikers. Clearly the federal government could not accept a proposal to supplement wages directly. The precedent would have been impossible to follow. Generally it was accorded no more than brief attention by growers, strikers, or the public. But Reardon, like MacDonald, was attacked by those who took the agricultural employers' side:

> * * * it is understandable why farmers do not care to leave it to Rolph's men.
>
> For instance, men like Tim Reardon. Tim is a San Francisco political-leader. Need more be said?
>
> As an advocate and battler for labor he is doubtless a whiz, but as a calm, judicial arbiter looking at both sides dispassionately and making decisions broadly he is probably over-priced at a dime a dozen. (Pacific Rural Press, Oct. 21.)

Another settlement was advanced by the manager of the State Free Employment Service in Bakersfield. As early as October 10 he proposed a compromise at "75 cents for first picking." (Bee, Oct. 10.)

> I settled the strike in Kern by getting the growers to pay 75 cents. That is why they were picking here before the committee reported. All but three or four growers were willing to pay it. I did not send any pickers out at 60 cents. They did not want to go. (Interview.)

The efforts of Edward H. Fitzgerald, of the United States Conciliation Service opened the last phase of the strike settlement. Fitzgerald arrived in the San Joaquin Valley fresh from conciliation in the cotton pickers' strike of the Salt River Valley, Arizona. In the Arizona dispute, his work culminated in the return of the pickers to work at the rate against which they struck (60 cents for each 100 pounds of short staple and $1.00 for long staple) with provision for them to share in any further increase in the market price of cotton. (Advance-Register, Oct. 13)

The Federal Conciliator reached Visalia on Friday, October 13, and immediately urged a group of growers to accept a fact finding commission. The growers finally yielded but protested the personnel of the board suggested. Whereupon Fitzgerald intimated that another more suitable to them would be appointed. He then prepared to secure individual pickers, but not union leaders, to represent the strikers during negotiations. Immediately there was premature publicity that the strike had ended.

> "The San Joaquin Valley cotton strike is over. Pickers will be in the fields Monday."
>
> These were the words of the Federal Conciliator Edward Fitzgerald today following an all-night conference with sixty ranchers that ended in the early hours this morning.
>
> Fitzgerald announced the growers had agreed to the appointment of a committee to make a survey of the cost of production of cotton and the wages ranchers are able to pay for picking.
>
> He declared a fact-finding commission suggested by State NRA Administrator George Creel and James Rolph, Jr., and designed to include Archbishop Edward J. Hanna of San Francisco, O. K. McMurray, head of the law school of the University of California, and Tully C. Knoles of the College of the Pacific, had been suggested but had not met with the full support of the growers.
>
> Fitzgerald said a new commission probably would be suggested by Creel or Rolph today. The principal objection raised to Hanna, McMurray and Knoles, was by Edson Abel, attorney for the California Farm Bureau Federation, who pointed out none of those named had had previous experience in agriculture labor disputes.

> The agreement for a fact-finding committee followed a meeting in which the federal conciliator warned that grave consequences might result from delay in reaching a settlement.
>
> "This controversy must be settled peacefully or else somebody is going to get hurt," Fitzgerald declared. "The government has made up its mind to settle this dispute and there is to be no more quibbling. I know what the government will do if this situation is not immediately taken care of, but I will not state that course now * * *
>
> The [Mexican] consul agreed to cooperate with the movement for arbitration and said he would urge his countrymen to return to the cotton fields pending the negotiations.
>
> Fitzgerald accompanied [Consul] Bravo into the cotton fields today to select two representative strikers from each of the camps, who will meet with the arbitration board. (Bee, Oct. 14)

Fitzgerald concluded his trip into the area with publication and distribution to growers and strikers of an official notice in English and Spanish. The notice announced to all parties concerned that a fact finding board had been appointed and accepted by growers and strikers with the following commissioners:

> Archbishop Edward J. Hanna, San Francisco; Professor O. K. McMurray, Dean of the School of Jurisprudence, University of California; and Dr. Tully Knoles, President of the College of the Pacific. * * *
>
> It therefore becomes the duty of the striking cotton pickers to proceed with the picking of California's cotton crop subject to the decision of the Federal-State Arbitration Commission's findings and decisions.
>
> It is also the duty of the cotton growers to forthwith reemploy the cotton pickers who have been on strike.
>
> The Governments of the United States of America and the State of California have authorized their representatives to furnish food, clothing, and, if necessary, medical attention to cotton pickers and their families who are unable to earn sufficient money for these necessities for themselves and families.
>
> The Consul of the United States of Mexico has agreed to help to prepare and to present evidence and data to prove justification of the wage rate which the striking cotton pickers claim should be paid them.
>
> Because of the above stated arbitration arrangements and the acceptances of arbitration by the interested and affected parties, the cotton growers and the cotton pickers are requested to proceed with the picking of California's cotton crop beginning on Monday, October 16, 1933.

The notice carried statements approving the proposal from George Creel, Chairman, California Division of NRA; Governor James Rolph, Jr.; Enrique Bravo, Mexican Consul; Federal Conciliator Fitzgerald; F. C. MacDonald, State Labor Commissioner; San Joaquin Cotton Committee of the California Farm Bureau Federation; and R. C. Branion, Federal-State Emergency Relief Administration of California.

Following the issuance of the communication, Fitzgerald returned to his office in Los Angeles for the remainder of the conflict. The growers approved of his plan. The settlement of the Arizona strike had favored the farmers, he had conferred with the growers and attempted to secure a commission satisfactory to them, and he had refused to treat with the communist leaders, dealing instead with the Mexican Consul and individual strikers. Finally, he advised the return to work under the status quo until a report could be rendered by the commission. Consequently, the growers desired to secure his return to the Valley later when the attitude of the fact finding committee appeared unsatisfactory to them. The Citizens' and Growers' Committee of Kern County, in fact, telegraphed Washington:

> State efforts have been unavailing and growers have lost confidence in these officials and their work. Growers have expressed confidence in Edward Fitzgerald, federal conciliator in Los Angeles, and urge you to instruct him to enter this controversy with authority necessary to get results. (Californian, Oct. 21)

Governor Rolph and NRA Administrator Creel cooperated in selecting the fact finding commission and continually sought to settle the dispute as quickly as possible.

> After conferring for two hours with representatives of the strikers, Governor Rolph urged them to agree to arbitration or mediation if the growers likewise would agree. The strikers were told that only through such steps could the state assure relief in the way of food to destitute workers.
>
> After his conference with the strikers, the governor sent the following message to Frank J. Palomares of Fresno, representing the growers:
>
> "In the interests of California, I earnestly request that mediation or arbitration be immediately agreed upon between the cotton growers and the cotton pickers in the existing affected area.
>
> "I have the assurance of Mr. George Creel as representative of the federal government that he will cooperate with me to the fullest extent possible in attempting to bring an amicable adjustment of the pending controversy between the cotton growers and cotton pickers." (Journal, Oct. 13)

George Creel became active in the strike upon—

> receipt at San Francisco of a telegram from the national labor board asking him to represent it in the San Joaquin Valley cotton strike and to mediate * * *. [Immediately he] notified Governor Rolph the full power of President Roosevelt's labor mediation board is ready to be thrown into efforts to bring industrial peace.
>
> "Immediate suspension of hostilities is imperative," Creel said. He added that if Governor Rolph and state officials fail to take drastic peace measures, the Government will. (Bee, Oct. 12.)

Following acceptance by growers of the fact finding commission proposal, Creel announced, "the strike is over." (Advance-Register, Oct. 14.) When this did not prove to be the case, he went to the Valley to arrange for a settlement:

> "I am not here to settle the strike, but to set up a procedure by which it can be settled by the government commission on arbitration which is due here tomorrow. I want to be able to give the commission an outline of facts on which it can work to restore industrial peace in the cotton fields. We will want to know what the growers are able to pay, what is the limit of their capacity to pay; and whether that is sufficient for the workers. This strike is going to be settled in a way fair to all; but the federal government is going to insist on a settlement."
>
> Mr. Creel's plans are being formed as he moves along. First he was to interview Pat Chambers, strike leader in jail at Visalia. Then he proposed to proceed to Corcoran and look into conditions at the concentration strikers' camp there housing 3700 Mexican nationals. Afterwards he would return to Visalia for a conference with growers which is being arranged by President Ed Walls of the Tulare county farm bureau. This itinerary completed he intended to fly back to San Francisco. (Times-Delta, Oct. 18.)

By now neither the growers nor the strikers were as adamant against talking of an agreement as they had been and arrangements for a fact finding committee were advanced.

Some difficulty was experienced in securing the personnel of the commission. The committee originally proposed on October 14 to include Archbishop Hanna, President Knoles and Dean McMurray did not meet with the approval of the growers but was nevertheless in the official notice of Conciliator Fitzgerald. Soon it was announced that—

> * * * R. L. Adams, cotton expert, and professor of Farm Management at the University of California, has been substituted for Prof. O. K. McMurray, who was called east. (Times-Delta, Oct. 18.)

Professor Adams, in turn, was unable to serve and at the last moment Professor Ira B. Cross of the Department of Economics at the University was requested to take his place.

Neither growers nor union would bind themselves in advance to accept the recommendations of the commission. Both groups reserved the right to reject all or part of any forth-coming proposal as each saw fit. Neither of them realized the power behind the fact finding committee, which was not evident until later when pressure was brought to bear on both sides to accept its recommendations.

The growers' case, presented by Edson Abel, attorney for the Farm Bureau, began with an attack on the Governor's Committee.

> * * * on behalf of the growers it is my duty to state that they do not regard that their case will be considered with impartiality by the personnel

> on the committee. Many growers are not satisfied the problems of the farmer will be given fair consideration.
>
> The position of the growers may be stated in a very few words. In spite of the demands for higher wages being put up to the growers by the pickers, the price fixed by the Agricultural Labor Bureau of 60¢ per 100 pounds is all the price of cotton will stand. The price of cotton is a world price. It is fixed by competition between the various growing areas of the world and California must compete in that market. The growers must do their best to come within this world price. (Hearings.)

The growers' case rested principally upon a series of individual financial statements purporting to show that increase in the picking rate would cause losses. The Committee made some inquiries on its own account which raised doubts of the representative character of these estimates and of the propriety of their base from an accounting viewpoint.

In general, the growers accepted the conditions of the hearings with good grace. Several times growers protested against the presentation of the pickers' case by the communists, non-pickers, and agitators instead of workers. For example, H. C. Merritt, of the Tagus ranch, at first refused to be questioned by Pat Chambers, stating: "I didn't come here to be insulted by being asked questions by a dirty scum of a communist." (Hearings) He retracted his declaration, however, when the chairman pointed out that the union leaders had been chosen by the strikers as their representatives and accepted as such, and that it is customary for laborers to be represented by non-workers who can devote their time and ability without fear of losing their jobs, and for witnesses to submit to cross-questioning by representatives of the other side. Also the communists were accused of coaching their witnesses. Miss Decker retaliated by offering to place any picker in the room, chosen at random, on the stand.

The witnesses presenting the growers' case were either large growers or were connected with gins or finance companies. No "small growers" were represented. Seven of the twelve witnesses grew cotton and stated their cotton acreages, which ranged from 300 to 1200, with an average of 575. The average cotton grower in the three cotton counties in 1929 had only about 70 acres. Four of these seven men also were connected in an official capacity with banks, gins, finance companies or growers' labor agencies. Four of the other five witnesses were: a gin employee, a gin owner, a farm manager with no cotton plantings, a landowner renting out "25 to 30" farms, and a cotton farmer who did not state his acreage.

The growers centered their case on two points: first, the Mexican pickers can live on the 60 cent scale; and, second, the farmers cannot increase the rate of payment.

The growers sought to establish the sufficiency of the 60-cent rate by a statement of the estimated earnings of a Mexican family at that scale, and by comparing the 1933 scale in California with that paid in other sections of the United States, with the rate paid in 1932 for the same picking in California, and with that paid to labor engaged in other agricultural work. The California rate was said to be the highest in the United States with the exception of that prevalent in Arizona. The 1933 rate was stated to be a higher one, compared to the price of cotton, than in the two previous years. The 1932 scale was 40 cents based on 6 cent cotton, and in 1931 it was 50 cents. The 1933 rate, then, was a 50 percent and a 20 percent increase, respectively, over the two previous years.

> L. W. FRICK. The [San Joaquin Valley Agricultural Labor] Bureau has never established any wage scales. We supply labor when the farmers need it; make recommendations to farmers as to prices to be paid for getting employers help. Of the cotton acreage in the Valley there was about 90% present. A price of 60 cents was settled upon for the 1933 crop. Last year's price was 40 cents on the basis of 6 cent cotton and this year it is 50% higher with only a 35% increase in the price of cotton. (Hearings)
>
> A. L. WIRIN. Do you consider that a fair American rate?
>
> J. W. GUIBERSON. I can answer that by asking you whether it is fair for the American farmer to have been working for nothing for the past few years.

In general the information offered by the growers concerning the pickings and earnings of the laborers was of scant value, which was explained by Attorney Abel:

> Well, it is due to difference of viewpoint. The growers are only incidentally interested in the days of work of pickers. (Hearings.)

Caroline Decker opened the strikers' case by reading several typewritten statements, on a history of the strike, on the organization of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union, on a comparison of the Mexican pickers' standard of living with certain minimum cost of living studies, and on the demands of the union. These demands of the Union were:

> 1. That the Federal government, through its authorized agencies immediately cancel all cotton contracts between growers and finance companies, cotton gins, or other agencies which are now financing cotton growers in the San Joaquin Valley.
> 2. That in conjunction with the cancelation of above mentioned contracts the Federal government through the proper agencies, establish a minimum price for cotton to the growers of not less than 12½ cents a pound.
> 3. That a minimum scale of wages for all cotton pickers be established and set at not less than $1 a hundred pounds of cotton picked.
> 4. That the cotton growers recognize the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union, as representative of the agricultural workers in the State of California.
> 5. That there shall be no discrimination in rehiring because of race, color, creed, union, or strike activity.
> 6. That the inalienable right of the workers to organize, strike and picket be upheld by Federal, State, County and Local officials.
> 7. The immediate unconditional release of Pat Chambers, Chairman of the Strike Committee, and all arrested cotton strikers.
> 8. Conviction for first degree murder of growers identified in the shootings of Pixley and Arvin.

The strikers' case rested almost entirely on the ground that cotton pickers and their families cannot support themselves at the 60 cent a hundred rate. It was contended also that the farmer could pay more than this scale only if the "strangle hold of the gins and finance corporations" were released by action of the Federal government.

The union desired the cooperation of the small farmer:

> In all its activities, the union has called upon the poor and small farmer to support the strikers in their demands, pointing out to the farmers that they must not attempt to take their own miseries out on the hides of the workers, since the workers have nothing, but that they, the small farmers, must organize to combat the strangle hold of the gins and finance corporations. The majority of growers testifying today and yesterday are large growers, bankers and holders of large interests in finance corporations and gins. (The Unions Position on the Farmer, typewritten document read before the Fact Finding Commission. In 1933 efforts were made to organize small farmers in the San Joaquin Valley into the United Farmers' League, to protest farm mortgage sales, power rates, etc.)

The union therefore attacked the gin and finance companies as responsible for the desperate situation:

> We also contend that the cotton gin operators and finance companies have been exacting their pound of flesh from the cotton grower, and he, instead of fighting the injustice that has been inflicted upon him by these merciless financial interests, has proceeded to exact two pounds of flesh from the unfortunate cotton picker—the man and woman lowest down, the man and woman without defense, the man and woman whose condition has been ignored until this time, and is now only called to public attention because their lives have been threatened when they refuse to pick cotton at 60¢ a hundred pounds. (Arguments Submitted in Justification of the Demands by Striking California Cotton Pickers for Wage Increases; document read before Fact Finding Commission.)

The strikers' case was summarised as follows:

> We appear today to ask for justice for one of the most unfortunate and lowest paid groups of workers in America. * * *
>
> Striking cotton pickers have interviewed many of the growers who have frankly told them that 60¢ was too low; that they can afford to pay 75¢ per hundred pounds for picking cotton, but that they dare not do so because if they do they will be punished and possibly ruined by the cotton gin operators and the financial companies. * * *

> It should be borne in mind that with the tremendous increased cost of living, that such a miserable un-American, and, in our opinion, unlawful wage standard condemns the cotton picker, almost the moment he leaves the cotton fields, to apply to the state relief agencies for food to keep himself and family from starving, and thereby forces the citizens of the state to pay for the low wages that the cotton grower says is the most he can afford to pay. This they ask you to approve. * * *
>
> We call your further attention to the fact that the vast majority of the cotton pickers are Mexican citizens who were induced to come to pick California's cotton crop by the alluring untrue promises made by the financial interests that have grown rich through control of the cotton industry. * * *
>
> You are asked to put your approval on a condition of peonage in America, and a condition, we believe, of illegal domination of the cotton industry by its financial exploiters.
>
> We are sure that at this time when America's hope lies in the National Recovery Act that the American people will expect your honorable commission to tear the lid off and expose the viciousness that lies back of this condition, and to do justice to these poor unfortunate cotton pickers that ask for a wage that will barely enable them to live. (Hearings)

The union representatives pointed out also the seasonality of the pickers' employment, the low value of perquisites furnished by growers, the rising cost of living, and the disparity between cotton pickers' earnings and the State minimum wage for women (in industry) and to various standard family budgets.

Consul Enrique Bravo, though repudiated by the union leaders, supported the strikers' case with testimony of his own. He said in part:

> It is my desire to interpret the desires of the Mexican pickers. In 1917, during the war, Mexicans were brought here to work while others were at war. The Mexican laborer has been here for many years, long before cotton was planted in this valley. * * *
>
> The Mexican people with whom I have been in contact state that they are willing to work for 60 cents, but 60 cents for 60 pounds. * * * The children usually have to work to help in the support of their families. * * *
>
> My information from Mexican women pickers is that they cannot pick over 150 pounds a day and then she must have time out to fix dinner. This would be 90¢ per day; 5½ days would make $4.95 per week; 52 weeks, $237.40. This would be about $580 per year for both man and wife. * * *
>
> The Mexican has been an honest, just and loyal worker. He is liked by the grower. He is easy to handle. In case of war, they would then be willing to cooperate. They are obedient to the laws of this country. Due to the increased costs under the N. R. A., this year he needs higher wages. I wish to reach a just and fair amount of wages for these laborers which they need for the support of their families. (Hearings)

As the hearings drew to a close, Chairman Cross, the only member of the Governor's Committee able to be present throughout the hearing, attempted to get the two sides to discuss with each other plans for a settlement. The strike leaders agreed but the growers refused:

> Miss Decker. The feeling is only that the people cannot live on the 60 cent per hundred rate. The strikers are entitled to hold out for more than 60 cents. They have organized their picket lines and are trying to get the scabs out of the fields. If you wish and the growers wish, we can meet in a small group with you or them and then submit any proposals to our strike locals.
>
> Attorney Abel. But Miss Decker has no proposal.
>
> Decker. We have our proposal.
>
> Cross. Mr. Abel, will you meet with a small group?
>
> Abel. I will say right now that until the grower is provided with more money for his cotton, he cannot afford to pay more than 60 cents. When prices are higher, then they will pay more for picking, but only when conditions will permit. * * *
>
> Cross. Then there is no possibility of a compromise being effected?
>
> Abel. You have seen the cost records. If you can show how the farmers are going to pay $1.00, the farmers will be glad to have your method explained to them. The farmers are faced with a set of facts in this matter, not with theory. * * *

DECKER. May we take a definite answer to our proposal to our strike locals as to the position of the growers assuring us that they will meet with us in a smaller group or that they will do something about it, or some definite answer? * * *

GUIBERSON. The growers wish a proposal which comes honestly from the pickers.

CROSS. What do you mean "honestly."

GUIBERSON. I mean coming from the pickers.

CROSS. But we would have to work thru representatives. The strikers are organized as are the growers and use committees to carry out their ideas.

GUIBERSON. We would like to have a committee picked from real representative pickers and not from those who are out for what they can get.

CROSS. All labor is now represented by business agents who never do any of the work of the industry and in this case are not pickers.

DECKER. Of the officials of the Union in the Valley all but two are elected by the workers. The Union has been unanimously backed by the pickers * * *

CROSS. I was hoping that we might be able to arrive at some sort of an agreement between the parties that would lead to a settlement of this matter. * * * We have been notified that the strikers will strengthen their picket lines. We are wondering what the growers are going to do. Is this cotton belt of ours going to be an armed camp? The strikers are willing to listen to a proposal. Have you [growers] any suggestions to make to us. If the suggestion is made, we will probably deal through mediation.

GUIBERSON. In order to give Dr. Cross a chance to investigate conditions for a few days, I would suggest that in the meantime we declare an armistice. We have nothing against the pickers. They have a right to do all the things they have done but we do not wish to listen to tales we know nothing about. If we can get together, we shall be glad. * * * We only want a fair proposition. * * *

DECKER. I would like to ask Mr. Guiberson what he means by an armistice.

GUIBERSON. I mean for the pickers to withdraw from the picket lines and go back to their camps for a few days until this committee has a chance to study the facts.

DECKER. Will the growers suspend picking for that length of time?

GUIBERSON. We could not do that.

Dr. Cross then thanked the meeting for its conduct during the hearings, stated that the invitation to mediation would remain open, and adjourned the hearings.

Even before Chairman Cross left the strike area, the San Joaquin Cotton Committee of the California Farm Bureau Federation issued a statement attacking the personnel and conduct of the board, and attempting to prescribe the nature of its decision:

> The fact-finding committee resulted from the efforts of N. R. A. Administrator George Creel to settle the strike. The basis for the injection of the committee was that there should be ascertained what price farmers could afford to pay for cotton picking and what wage was necessary to enable cotton pickers to decently support themselves. If it became evident that there was a spread between the two, the national and state governments would find some way to take up the slack.
>
> On that basis the cotton growers were willing to present the facts of the case to the committee as it was originally constituted. The personnel of the committee was subsequently changed without the consent of the growers and at the subsequent hearing just concluded, the committee went outside of its functions as agreed upon and attempted to bring about a settlement before it found facts.
>
> At the hearing before the committee, it was established without dispute that the general run of cotton growers in the valley can not pay more than 60¢. * * *
>
> Despite this very obvious fact, some of the committee are putting as much pressure as can be developed on the growers to force an acceptance of a higher wage scale. In other words, the slack which it was understood the state and national governments were to absorb is now to be taken out of the cotton growers. The individuals responsible for this violation of the understanding have not even suggested the sources from which cotton growers are to obtain the money to pay this added cost. (Times-Delta, Oct. 21)

Dr. Cross replied to this published objection in part as follows:

> No attempt was made to arbitrate, i. e., to force the acceptance of an award, in the present controversy, but a sincere effort was made to assist the parties concerned to compose their differences. Manifestly such efforts could carry no compulsion, nor has any been attempted.
>
> The committee leaves the community regretting exceedingly that certain attacks have been made upon its personnel, integrity, and ability to render an impartial service.
>
> The findings of the committee have not been determined. Any statements by parties outside of the committee must necessarily rest upon conjecture and are untimely and unfair. The public may await with confidence the further deliberations of the committee and the publication of its report. (Times-Delta, Oct. 23)

While the committee conferred in San Francisco, renewed activities of both farmers and strikers resulted in a series of riots and near-riots in Kings County and elsewhere. A Tulare County paper reported:

> "The patience of the farmer is about exhausted, and if the present conditions continue we may see slaughter within the next three days," Sheriff R. L. Hill said this morning in commenting on the strike situation.
>
> Reports received from the cotton belt today tend to bear out Hill's statement. Picking was almost at a standstill as picketing strikers called the workers from the fields.
>
> At the B. A. Overland ranch in the southern part of the county 80 pickers deserted the field at the blasts from a bugle in the hands of picketeers, estimated at 300, who stood opposite a field where picking was in progress.
>
> Picking has been suspended on the Tagus ranch, reports indicate, while at the California nursery property a few white men are picking.
>
> That some of the ranchers plan to resort to force if picking is delayed much longer was revealed by the statement of a wife of a rancher in the Pixley area. She said her husband planned to start picking and if picketeers appeared, intended to seize the leader and hold him as hostage until the picking was completed. (Times-Delta, Oct. 23)

The committee deliberated promptly and made its report to Director Creel and Governor Rolph as follows:

> Your fact finding committee appointed to investigate strike conditions in cotton areas of the San Joaquin Valley, after a two day session at which both sides had full and ample opportunity under leadership of attorneys and other representatives to present their cases, begs leave to report as follows: It is judgment of committee that upon evidence growers presented, growers can pay for picking at rate of 75 cents per 100 pounds, and your committee begs leave therefore to advise this rate of payment be established. Without question, civil rights of strikers have been violated. We appeal to constituted authorities to see strikers are protected in rights conferred upon them by laws of state and by federal and state constitutions.
>
> (Signed) E. J. Hanna, *Chairman.*
> Ira B. Cross.
> Tully C. Knoles.

Creel immediately acquainted the growers and strikers with the action of the committee and added his own approval to that of Governor Rolph:

> As representative of National Labor Board and National Recovery Administration, I approve recommendation of committee and urge its acceptance by growers and workers as an equitable adjustment. Governor Rolph also states: "I feel recommendation of committee represents fair compromise and endorse it fully. I hereupon call on both sides to accept settlement sincerely and patriotically." (Telegram to chairman, Kings County N. R. A.)

State and federal officials added weight to their advised acceptance of the 75 cent scale by sending members of the State Highway Patrol to police the region, by using the influence of the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank to urge on the growers to accept, (Chronicle, Oct. 25) and by withdrawing food relief to encourage acceptance by the strikers.

The Committee's report was made public on Monday, October 23, but was not finally agreed to and the strike called off until Thursday. During this interval, as described earlier, picketing continued and in several instances resulted in rioting, growers became increasingly incensed and threatened to clean out the Corcoran camp by force, and state highway patrolmen were again used to augment local forces in preserving peace.

Representatives of the farmers immediately objected to the Committee's report. E. K. Walls, Chairman of the Tulare County Farm Bureau, and Edson Abel, Attorney, California Farm Bureau Federation, telegraphed President Roosevelt, "All state efforts have shown marked bias for strikers," and requested return of Federal Conciliator Fitzgerald. (Times-Delta, Oct. 23.)

Representatives of growers in five San Joaquin counties met at the Farm Bureau office in Visalia and sent the following telegram to Creel:

> Findings of the governor's fact finding committee with comments by Governor Rolph and yourself have been received by us. Cotton growers in this valley reiterate dissatisfaction in governor's committee and their findings, which are not supported by the facts submitted by either side. At the start of this season growers voluntarily increased picking rates from forty to sixty cents per hundred. Now you are asking a further increase in rates without any assurance that the crop can be picked at this or any other figure.
>
> What assurance can you give growers that federal-state welfare aid will not be continued for those who refuse to go to work and that intimidation of labor and threats of violence to workers and growers will not be continued? These points must be cleared up before the findings of the governor's committee can be recommended for the consideration of growers. E. K. Walls, president Tulare County farm bureau; H. V. Eastman, chairman regional cotton committee; H. E. Woodworth, chairman valley citizens and growers committee. (Times-Delta, Oct. 24.)

The Farm Bureau appears to have led the growers criticism of the commission:

> Groups of growers threatened retaliation because of the fast-finding report by a "tax strike." H. U. Eastman, chairman of the regional farm bureau, issued a statement asserting the findings of the committee had "no binding force, either legal or moral," and declaring that the committee had "made a joke of its duties" and was biased against employers of all kinds. (Chronicle, Oct. 23.)

Nevertheless, growers representatives held a valley-wide meeting at the office of the Agricultural Labor Bureau of the San Joaquin Valley in Fresno on Wednesday morning where, after discussion, they accepted the 75 cent scale, "in the interests of good American citizenship, law and order, and in order to forestall the spread of communism and radicalism and to protect the harvesting of other crops." (Times-Delta, Oct. 25.) Acceptance of the 75 cent rate was encouraged by such reports as the following in the Tulare Times for October 25:

> Governor James Rolph, Jr., last night strove to bring striking cotton pickers and growers to a settlement on a wage of 75 cents per hundredweight by announcing that strikers who refused to accept the wage would not receive federal aid, and growers failing to pay this wage will not be allowed loans from the Farm Loan Bank of Berkeley * * * (and) the assurance (by George Creel) that strikers who go back to work will be protected against intimidation and violence.

Following their acceptance, E. K. Walls of the Farm Bureau, and himself a former strike leader for the Iron Molders' Union in Massachusetts, explained the growers' position:

> My judgment is that growers immediately should resume picking operations on the stipulated 75 cent price—that every possible effort should be made to move the balance of the crop before rains set in. Growers should cooperate in getting every picker possible into the fields, with the assurance to us by Governor James Rolph, Jr., George Creel, and R. C. Branion that law and order will be maintained in the cotton area * * *.
>
> We are going to resume picking operations and we are going to expect federal and state agencies, as well as our county officers, to maintain order among farm employees.
>
> The 15 cent price raise for picking will cost the growers of the San Joaquin Valley an additional $450,000—nearly half a million dollars—and certainly many of our growers can ill afford to pay it. The least we can ask is that

> there shall be no further retardation of the cotton harvest. At 75 cents per hundred the pickers will realize $2,250,000. Many families of pickers are going to make more net money than will the growers, whose investment as well as months of labor are tied up in the crop.
>
> The Farm Bureau has consistently stood for maintenance of law and order and now, in view of the part it has played in the conciliatory moves, will unequivocally demand full and complete protection for harvest operations. (Times, Oct. 26.)

The strikers, who had been less opposed than the growers to conciliation, now offered greater resistance to final settlement, and delayed conclusion of the strike another day and a half. The final acceptance by the Union appears to have been influenced by the discontinuance of food relief by the California Emergency Relief Administration, cooling of the ardor of the strikers after three weeks of hostilities, and general assent by the rank and file of workers to the 75 cent rate. Threats of importation of new workers and more arrests of leaders likewise seem to have had their effect.

The delay of the Union leaders in advising termination of the strike has been ascribed to communist strike policy at the time of obtaining enough in a settlement to confirm the strikers' faith in communist leaders but to engender continued dissatisfaction toward employers by holding out unfulfilled demands. The manner of reaching this settlement supports this opinion. The central strike committee of thirty members, under leadership of Caroline Decker, decided, before acceptance by the growers, to counter the proposal of the fact finding committee with one of their own:

> 1. That 80 cents per 100 pounds of picked cotton be adopted as the wage for picking cotton in the entire strike area.
> 2. Recognition of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union.
> 3. No discrimination in rehiring because of race, color, creed, or union, or strike activities.
> 4. Immediate unconditional release of Pat Chambers and all the rest of the strikers.

The strike committee promised continued picketing activity in the event that this proposal met with refusal. These recommendations were presented to the membership of the strike locals on Tuesday evening and approved.

The following day State Labor Commissioner MacDonald notified the union that the growers had accepted the recommendation to pay 75 cents:

> I am authorized by the governor to advise you of the cotton growers' action. Inasmuch as your union was a party to the findings of the commission, it therefore becomes equally obligated and subject to the decision.
>
> You are therefore hereby officially requested to declare off and terminate the cotton pickers' strike and authorize your members to complete picking of the cotton at the rate of 75 cents per 100 pounds. (Times-Delta, Oct. 26.)

The central strike committee remained steadfast, arguing in substance that

> 1. The fact finding body was not considered by it as an arbitration board and the Union had never agreed to accept its proposal. Thus it was unjust to demand acceptance of the decision or try to force acceptance by terminating food relief.
> 2. The state and federal representatives had entirely ignored the Union demands for recognition and absence of prejudice in rehiring workers. These proposals deserved consideration.
> 3. The Fresno meeting of growers represented only 20 percent of the cotton acreage in the Valley and was controlled by gin and finance company operators.

MacDonald renewed his efforts to obtain Union assent on Thursday when he addressed the strikers gathered in the Corcoran camp at the time of the threatened invasion of the tent city by Sheriff Buckner. He pointed out that the difference between the proposed 75 cent scale and the demand for 80 cents amounted to only 10 cents a day in individual picking wages and that much of the crop was being picked by non-strikers. The central strike committee finally capitulated on Thursday night and on Friday morning a notice reading "The strike is over," was posted in each of the concentration camps.

Upon concluding the strike, Miss Decker stated:

> Today brings to a close the third week of the strike of 12,000 cotton pickers in the San Joaquin Valley. During this period every form of intimidation and terror has been employed by the growers and government officials to break our strike. The government, acting for the finance corporations and large gin interests, has used its armed forces in an attempt to force the strikers back to work, and today they are threatening to take by armed force the miserable shacks and tents the cotton pickers call home. Throughout this terror, the workers have remained a solidified unit through their own union, the Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union. The representatives of the government have made clear to us that the government does not wish to recognise the union. It is clear to the workers, that the government will not recognize any union which has a militant policy of struggle for the working class. We also understand that only the mass organization of the workers into the union will force the government and employers to recognize us even against their desire.
>
> We are, therefore, issuing this statement as a result of a majority vote in every strike local; and the statement becomes the basis upon which we officially call off the strike of the cotton pickers:
>
> 1. That seventy-five cents become the minimum wage for picking one hundred pounds of cotton in the San Joaquin Valley.
> 2. That we demand immediate withdrawal of armed forces from the strike area so that the strikers shall return to work in an organized manner. We call the government to task on this, in face of their assertions that they wish the strike ended in a "peaceful and orderly manner."
> 3. That cotton pickers shall be hired by the growers free of charge from the locals of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union in their respective territories.
> 4. No striker shall return to work until they are placed on union-contracted ranches by their union local.
> 5. An intensified continuation of the mass defense and fight to free our comrades who are rotting in jail because of their militancy in the interests of the strike. (Times-Delta, Oct. 27.)

The strike was over but the reverberations continued.

With scarcely an exception, the newspapers of the valley supported the position of the most unyielding growers. When growers at first rejected the report of the Governor's Committee, the Tulare Times published an editorial entitled "No compromise wanted":

> Any compromise whatever with the strike agitators means bankruptcy for the farmer and the end of cotton raising as a major industry in this section—the abandonment of approximately one-third of the farms before next year—when there would be a much larger crop of radical troublemakers with a brand new set of impossible "demands."
>
> If the "comrades" pay tribute to the communistic influences guiding the strike, and the farmer pays the "comrade," that means the farmer would be paying tribute to the communists. This is enough to make the blood of any loyal American boil. We want none of it. Neither do the farmers. Our slogan should be: "Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute." (Oct. 21.)

The Hanford Journal also supported the growers' case editorially as the hearings closed with the declaration: "The 60 cent picking scale is fair * * *" (Oct. 21.) The Journal announced the failure of the efforts of the fact finding board to bring a settlement in an editorial the following day:

> Growers and strikers who had hoped that the hearing of the federal-state fact finding board at Visalia would point the way to peaceful settlement of the cotton strike which has seethed in the San Joaquin Valley recently, bringing death and violence, will have to take another notch in the belt and get set for the real crisis.

The Visalia Times-Delta also joined in the growers' attack on the committee:

> Meanwhile, the report of the erudite committee sent down here by Governor Rolph, which gives the strikers a 25 per cent picking rate increase, ends with the statement: "Without question the civil rights of the strikers have been violated. * * *"

> By all that is fair and just, have the American farmers no rights over communists and aliens? Are their ranches to be trampled on, their employees beaten and carried bodily from their fields, their cotton scattered and destroyed and their harvest left to the elements? And all they get for their year's work is to hear a commission of highbrows prate of "strikers' violated civil rights," while a complacent government feeds the farmers' enemies as they are effecting his undoing. (Oct. 24.)

In the southern end of the cotton area, the Bakersfield Californian also attacked the findings with an editorial entitled "A Discredited Report":

> Before the ink was dry upon the report filed yesterday by the Governor's mediation committee in the cotton strike and at the very hour that the Governor and Regional Director of the federal government were signing their approval of the finding that "without question the civil rights of the strikers have been violated and we appeal to the constituted authorities to see that the strikers are protected in rights conferred upon them by the laws of the state and federal constitution," tragic events were moving swiftly in the northern cotton fields; families of wage-earners were kidnaped; night riders representing the so-called strikers are adding to the terrors in the disturbed region, and the sheriff and other officials of one county, Kings, have already been compelled to appeal to the state for relief in a situation which they declare has gone beyond the control of local authorities.
>
> The masses of unprejudiced people will not be disposed to quarrel with the finding that the grower can pay 75 cents per hundred for picking. From the viewpoint of the latter, that question is debatable, but any conclusion reached in that connection is of far less consequence than is the gratuitous statement that lawless interference with peaceable workers and concerted activity that threatens a great industry and menaces life, represent "civil rights that call for protection under the law and the constitution." The finding of the committee and its official endorsement are simply an invitation to rioting and lawlessness, and that is exactly what followed, and followed swiftly when word of the verdict reached the areas where the situation was already acute and which, since then, is at a stage that impels local authorities to declare that overt acts menace the social order of entire communities. (Oct. 24.)

Two days later the Californian added to its attack on the "civil rights" section of the committee's report a note of praise for the unselfish acceptance by the growers of the rate set by the board:

> The farmers of the Valley are to be congratulated for their prompt acceptance of the demand that the price of picking be increased 15 cents a hundred. Recognizing their obligation as citizens, and realizing that that demand, even though advanced without intelligent investigation and without regard to the capacity of the growers to meet it, created a situation that made acceptance a prerequisite to the resumption of peaceful conditions in the disputed area, they preferred to sacrifice their anticipated profits to such end.
>
> And now the Governor and the state administration, by firmly pursuing their promised policy of maintaining law and order, give assurance of resumption of work in the fields. Upon that depends the harvesting of a ten million dollar crop which was so vexatiously interfered with by those who were without understanding of the situation and who seemingly held the belief that the premier issue involved was the "violation of civil rights" by reckless leaders * * * (Oct. 27.)

Professor Cross in particular, who was the only member of the Committee not a clergyman, was subjected to much abuse by growers and their sympathizers. Their highly emotional state and lack of critical judgment are exemplified by the absurdities uttered by a gin foreman during an interview after the strike:

> Cross is the cause of all this trouble. He ran the thing wrong from the start. We knew we wouldn't get a square deal. Cross had no business listening to the communists in the first place. He had no business letting Chambers question the growers—the dirty scum. He was an I. W. W. of the worst sort when he was a student. He's a communist now. He ought to go back to the country where he belongs. The growers and finance companies gave him figures, and figures don't lie, but he believed Chambers instead. You tell him it won't be healthy for him if he comes down into the Valley—the respectable citizens will take care of him. (Interview.)

The local growers expressed no gratitude that the Committee's work had ended the strike and permitted the harvest. A single large grower did say after the strike that Knoles and Cross were "absolutely fair." (Interview.) Some small growers and less vocal large growers, however, appreciated the settlement. One small grower, for example, thought the committee "did the best that it could." Another said it was a "fair decision," and another stated:

> All the members of the committee were fine. The Doctor [Cross] was as fine as you could want and he knew all the time he was going to get in wrong for it. (Interview.)

Many of the farmers with small acreages also attacked the committee, as did one who said of Dr. Knoles:

> Dr. Knoles made a bad mistake when he lectured over the radio at the Commonwealth Club. They say he's a minister but I call him a liar. Anybody would know that what he said about raising cotton was a lie. (Interview.)

In general, the growers and their allies operating gins and finance companies have censured the board violently, though the small farmers have tended to be more favorable to the commission. The deep feeling with which the agricultural interests have expressed themselves would indicate that they will not forget their grievance in the near future.

Local law enforcement officials naturally attacked the report of the Fact Finding Committee on "civil rights," which was a reflection on them. Their criticisms (in interviews) were directed especially at Professor Cross.

> A sheriff: I know too much about that ——— ——— Cross. He's a communist pure and simple. He's on their pay roll. He's a Pat Chambers man. I can't see paying taxes to give salaries to men like him. Something ought to be done to put a stop to it. He wouldn't stay long at the University, if I had my way about it. Anyway, he, nor none of the others knew anything about cotton. They shouldn't have taken the job.
>
> A district attorney: The recommendation of 75 cents was all right. Most people believed all the time they ought to pay that. Then at the end some of the growers wanted to pay 75 cents but the gins wouldn't let them.
>
> But so far as Kings County is concerned at least this charge of the strikers not getting their constitutional rights is just not true. However, there isn't any feeling against the committee as individuals.
>
> A sheriff: The committee made an ass of itself. Anybody could have found the facts. All the farmers keep records. They know what every pound of cotton costs and what they can pay. Instead the committee let Sacramento politics run it.
>
> A district attorney: It seems to me they were entirely out of their jurisdiction to state that the civil rights of the strikers had been violated. The principal criticism of the committee has been on that score. They did not call in Hill, Snell, Cato or myself, who were most concerned. They condemned us without a hearing.
>
> I realize they had a difficult time. It is almost impossible to set a rate which is fair to all. Some can always afford to pay more and some can not afford to pay anything at all.

Labor and liberal groups in the valley supported the Committee but probably local public opinion preponderantly "resented the Fact-Finding Board, particularly its findings about the violations of civil rights. The people haven't forgotten about it yet, though it is a lot more quiet than it was." (Interview, Dec. 21.)

This strike and the method and results of the settlement stirred emotions in the southern San Joaquin Valley probably more than any other series of local events since the Musclеslew "massacre" of farmers by railroad agents fifty years before. (Cf. Frank Norris, *The Octopus*.) The entire population of the region, as is seldom true in urban industrial strikes, felt itself involved.

AFTERMATH

Upon termination of the strike the pickers soon resumed harvest. The delay had allowed most of the bolls to open, picking conditions were excellent, and many fields were picked but once. The delay also allowed many workers freed upon conclusion of the grape and other harvests to join the cotton pickers. Consequently the crop was gathered rapidly and daily earnings were high. However, the season of employment was brief and more pickers than usual shared in the work. The strikers, therefore, did not themselves receive the full benefit of the increase from 60 to 75 cents. But undoubtedly the example of the cotton strike held up wage rates in a succession of harvests which followed. Growers obtained a rapid and brief harvest because of the strike, but at an added cost of approximately $450,000. Losses because of deterioration in grade of cotton were negligible.

Friction engendered by the strike did not end with its termination. For a brief time growers near Corcoran and Pixley had some difficulty obtaining pickers because of resentment against their treatment during the strike. (Tulare Times, Oct. 20.) On their side "* * * a number of growers indicated the sentiment they would get along without hiring known strikers if possible." (Times, Oct. 28.) White and Negro strikers interviewed in November and as late as January testified to the difficulties of obtaining jobs.

> Negro union leader at Pixley: Some of our leaders have had a hard time to get jobs. Bill Hammett tried at Pixley and Tulare and then had to go 100 miles to Buttonwillow. The growers will never hire some of us again so we will have nothing to lose if we strike.
>
> White union leader at Pixley: Some of us had a hard time getting jobs, but if one farmer wouldn't hire us another one would.
>
> White strike leader, long resident at McFarland, interviewed while preparing to leave: No one here will ever give me a job again. Many other strike leaders have found out the same thing. We have had to leave the districts when we struck. The growers and gin operators are very bitter.

Ten days after settlement, the strike threatened to break out again around Pixley and Woodville:

> Resumption of the cotton strike in the Woodville and Pixley areas was expected today as cotton pickers demanded full recognition of their un on and increase of their pay to 80 cents a hundred pounds. * * *
>
> Strike leaders have caused trouble on several ranches in the cotton belt by insisting that the ranchers hire union members only. It is reported that strike leaders brought a crew of union pickers upon a ranch where picking was in progress and ordered the owner to discharge his non-union crew. (Times-Delta, Nov. 2.)

Four days later the threat of importation of Mexicans from Los Angeles into the Pixley neighborhood caused the threat of another minor disturbance:

> A new tenseness was injected into the cotton field situation south of here today when it was learned that 4,000 Los Angeles Mexicans were on their way into the valley to break a threatened strike in the Pixley district scheduled for tomorrow. * * *
>
> Spokesmen for the far-from-pacified pickers declared the growers were systematically letting out workers they have already taken back, and are fostering an infiltration of fresh Mexican labor from the South. (Chronicle, Nov. 6.)

The new strike did not materialize and few, if any, of the Los Angeles laborers arrived in the cotton belt.

> Some hostility between strikers and non-strikers survived the settlement.
>
> Ill feeling between strikers and strike breakers in the cotton fields almost developed into a gang fight at a Mexican dance at Armory Hall last night. City police intervened after two were injured and closed the dance to prevent further bloodshed. (Journal, Oct. 29.)
>
> The scabs are still scared and won't go near the union members. (Interview with local union leader, January, 1934.)

A committee of growers from five counties went to San Francisco on October 27 to confer on the cotton strike and lay plans against future strikes with Governor Rolph, Timothy Reardon of the State Department of Industrial Relations, U. S. Senator Hiram Johnson and NRA Director George Creel. One of the committee, Mr. Tom McManus, chairman of the Americanism Committee of the National American Legion (in 1939 executive of the Citizen's Association of Bakersfield.)

> * * * reported a cordial reception of the committee, particularly by Governor Rolph, Senator Johnson, and Director Reardon.

> "We reviewed the entire agricultural labor situation," he stated, "and succeeded in bringing forcibly to the governor's attention the question of whether the sinister and vicious influence of Communism is to be a controlling factor in agricultural labor conditions in California. * * *"
>
> It was the unanimous report of the committee that the conference with George Creel had not been on as cordial terms as with the others. (Californian, Oct. 28.)

Growers became highly sensitive to the criticisms of their actions from metropolitan centers. After President Knoles of the Governor's Committee addressed the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco,

> Kern County Farm Bureau called upon the Commonwealth Club to fix a date when a representative of the agricultural interests of the valley may appear and give the organization the true facts relative to the strike situation which existed in connection with the cotton harvest. (Californian, Nov. 4.)

For some months the conflict was debated back and forth before the Commonwealth Club and other forums.

The court trials of persons arrested during the strike served to keep the conflict before the local communities. The strikers were defended in the courts by Attorney A. L. Wirin of the American Civil Liberties Union. Communists sought to build up a "Defense Fund" to assist in supporting the strikers' case.

> The workers, back on the fields, with a 25% increase, have not forgotten those who sacrificed most to get the gains, and are now behind the bars. They are each donating five cents out of each day's wages towards the defense fund. (Western Worker, Nov. 13.)

The International Labor Defense established local defense committees to gain support for the jailed strikers.

> Defense committees to cooperate with the I. L. D. are responsible for the defense work in every local of the C. & A. W. I. U. Is your committee set up, and is it active? There are *Defense Stamps* to sell. They are to be pasted in the union membership books. They are 25¢ each. The Porterville, Tulare, Visalia, and Farmerville locals have done best so far. All money from the stamps goes for the defense of the cotton strike prisoners. Defense committees should see that leaflets and defense folders are widely distributed, and that prisoners are written to, and visited. (Bulletin No. 2, issued by International Labor Defense, Dec. 8, 1933.)

In Kern County, fourteen strikers and no farmers were arrested. Five of the strikers were released at the conclusion of the conflict and nine stood trial accused of the fatal shooting at Arvin. None were convicted for murder.

"Twenty-two or twenty-four strikers were arrested in Tulare County according to the sheriff. Several were released without trial. Of the seventeen Mexicans arrested on the Taylor ranch previous to the Pixley shooting, nine plead guilty and were given probation. Four were sent to the juvenile court and got the same. Three did not plead guilty and got ninety days." (Interview with district attorney.) The union attorney charged the judge with a "vindictive attitude," and declared:

> Tulare County has had its Scottsboro case, A. L. Wirin of the International Labor Defence and attorney for the convicted men said in statement issued following the announcement of the verdict.
>
> What the south does to its negroes, California has done to its exploited cotton pickers. (Times-Delta, Nov. 21.)

The last trial of strikers was that of Pat Chambers, accused of violating the Criminal Syndicalism Act and that section of the Act, in particular, "referring to a change in industrial control." (Defendant's Instruction Nov. 11, in re John Ernest Williams, alias Pat Chambers.) The ranchers advancing the charge quoted Chambers as saying:

> Fellow workers, we'll need every man to win this strike. This is no time for a backward move. We'll give Pixley more publicity than it has ever known. We'll make Pixley as bloody as Harlan, Kentucky. We'll take the law into our own hands. We don't want any more arrests. If anyone gets in our way, put him in the hospital to stay. (Times-Delta, Nov. 29.)

The Western Worker charged that the trial was held "before a court full of armed patrolmen and deputies, with machine guns mounted to prevent the workers from attending." (Nov. 27.) The union sought to dramatize the trial by the strategy employed at the I. W. W. trial in Centralia:

> A workers' jury selected by the strikers at a meeting in Hyde park yesterday afternoon filed into the courtroom as the selection of the jury started yesterday afternoon. The 12 persons selected by the strikers will listen to the entire case and will return their own verdict on the charges against Chambers after the testimony is completed. (Times-Delta, Nov. 22.)

The right of workers to organize as declared by section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act was advanced as one of the principal justifications of Chambers' conduct.

The jury disagreed six to six and a retrial was called for February 6, 1934. Judge Lamberson was generally held to have been fair to Chambers and a "judge above all things else." One defense instruction to the jury allowed by the judge questioned the application of the Criminal Syndicalism Act to conditions in 1933:

> "You are instructed that the Criminal Syndicalism Act was an emergency measure passed by the Legislature of California in 1919 on the grounds that it was necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace and safety." (Defendant's Instruction, Nov. 16.)

The trial of the eight growers held on murder charges growing out of the Pixley fatalities was held in January. Attempts were made to have laborers picket the trial, and the Western Worker charged that "Every attempt is being made to turn the trial into a whitewash." (Jan. 8, 1934) By this time, however, feelings were cooling on both sides. (Times-Delta, Jan. 12) The growers were acquitted, and soon thereafter Pat Chambers was released.

In Kings County the sheriff arrested eleven persons during the strike:

> One arrest was more or less accidental and was released. Two were released because they were just kids. Two others were dismissed by the judge because of lack of evidence, but that was wrong. The six others, three men and three women, were held for trial. They all ultimately plead guilty and were given two years probation. They have all turned against the strike, at least the women have and I think the men too. They were all Mexicans and they found the strike leaders didn't care anything about them and left them in jail though their bonds were only $500, while they raised $10,000 to get out Pat Chambers, the white leader. (Interview with district attorney)

In Fresno County

> Five or six were arrested on vagrancy charges, all plead guilty and were given floaters except one who got sixty days and then was given a floater. (Interview with deputy district attorney)

Federal immigration authorities arrested one union leader, Leroy Gordon, suspected of being illegally in the country.

The total of fifty-six arrests noted above from interviews with officials in four counties does not agree with the total of 101 arrests of strikers reported by the Western Worker (Nov. 20), or of 113 reported by the Hanford Journal.

> As the strike crisis appeared past, yesterday, it was learned that 113 persons have been arrested in connection with the strike, 40 in Tulare County, 28 in Kings County, 22 in Kern County, 17 in Fresno County and 5 in Madera County. (Oct. 28)

The discrepancy between the various figures may be explained partly by the number of arrests on charges such as vagrancy when strikers were held for perhaps only a few hours and never brought before a court. For example, the following arrests by a ranch superintendent deputy appear not to have entered the sheriff's enumeration at the close of the strike:

> Eleven men have been arrested in the Shafter-Wasco district in connection with alleged cotton strike agitations, according to the sheriff's office which is now patrolling the county's cotton areas to * * * inhibit any serious trouble in connection with labor. The arrests were made last night by Charles Ellwood, and deputy sheriff and superintendent of the Hoover ranch, according to undersheriff Charles Rankin. (Californian, Oct. 3)

The Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union sought to maintain its organization and membership in the San Joaquin Valley. Headquarters in

Tulare were continued for the remainder of the year, and the union sought to maintain contact with the migrants through ranch committees:

> Now that all of the comrades will be going into the fields to work, we must make certain that we lose contact with not a single union member. The best method in this respect is the setting up of ranch committees on every ranch. (Cecil McKiddy, Section Secretary, Instructions To Central Strike Committee members. Oct. 29, 1933)

Mass meetings, defense committees on behalf of arrested strikers and speaking tours by Pat Chambers and Caroline Decker also were employed to sustain the interest of the pickers.

Union leaders also sought to win the support of local small farmers by securing signatures to contracts to employ workers through the union, and by urging farmers to become members of communist sponsored groups. However, work among small farmers met with little success, and the pickers rapidly discontinued union activity after they returned to work and the strike no longer served as a focus for their attention. Contact with the locals also was weakened by migration from ranch to ranch in the cotton area and then into other sections of the state.

Occasional union meetings were still being held by the Bakersfield, Shafter, Wasco, Tulare, Corcoran, and a few other locals by the middle of November. Locals at Delano, McFarland, Pixley, Visalia, Dinuba, Hanford, Fresno, Kingsbury, and elsewhere had practically ceased to function by that time. By the middle of December only the Tulare headquarters were still open and only occasional meetings were being called in other sections of the Valley. No more than a skeleton organization remained.

Members of at least one local, at Wasco, deserted the communist leadership and requested acceptance by the American Federation of Labor. (Interview, editor of Kern County Labor Journal) Miss Decker charged the A. F. of L. with

> * * * trying to organize in the San Joaquin and Imperial Valleys and is paying organizers ten dollars a day. They are trying to lure leaders away by promising them pay, but they haven't been able to do it. (Speech on Nov. 27. There is no evidence this was true.)
>
> They are trying to bring in the red scare, to stir up race prejudice and use every method to disrupt.—Together with the A. F. of L. is the Mexican Consulate and its fake Mexican Union. They too are sending disruptive organizers into the fields in an effort to divide the workers and organize a Mexican Union. (Western Worker, Dec. 11)

Disintegration of union organization did not mean that union leaders did not still hold the allegiance of the workers. A few local leaders remained actively loyal, and there was general apprehension that, as one peace officer expressed it, "They could call a strike in five minutes if they wanted to." However, the union never resumed much activity, and finally disappeared when its parent, the Trade Union Unity League, was abolished by the Communist Party in favor of the tactics of working within other trade unions, instead of organizing their own.

ATTITUDES

The alignment of groups according to interests and attitudes lies back of the pressures which produce violations of civil liberties during the clash between employers and employees. In the southern San Joaquin Valley, the vocal elements of the community, save for the strikers themselves, generally sympathized with the growers. Valley newspapers encouraged this partisanship.

> The people of the valley must not forget, either, that failure to harvest the $90,000,000 cotton crop in the south San Joaquin Valley must inevitably result in hardship to citizens and government for the care of men and families deprived of an opportunity to earn at least a portion of their living in the cotton fields. (Times-Delta, Oct. 13)

The growers were called "our people," in contrast to the largely foreign migratory cotton pickers. The following excerpt from an editorial entitled, "Looks as Though Our Cotton Farmer is the Forgotten Man," indicates the prevalent feeling:

> The farmers are our people, and it would appear that it was about time the government and our good American friends [referring to labor agitators, officials of the National League for the Defence of Political Prisoners and university students with a communistic flair] gave at least a sidelong glance

> in their direction. They will remain with us after this unfortunate episode is a closed incident, while 90 percent of the strikers, about whom such a great ado is being made, will be moving on, many probably back to their own country where they belong. (Times-Delta, Oct. 19)

The Tulare Advance-Register requested absolute support by the citizenry of the growers:

> It behooves every business man, every citizen to support the farmers 100 percent in this crisis and see that he gets a square deal. Any compromise whatever with the strike agitators means bankruptcy for the farmer, the end of cotton raising as a major industry in this section, and the abandonment of approximately one-third of the farms before next year when there would be a much larger crop of radical trouble-makers with a brand new set of impossible demands. (Oct. 20)

The Hanford Journal declared:

> The Journal believes that the growers are absolutely right in standing pat and refusing to pay unreasonable demands for $1 a hundred for cotton picking. The Journal is glad to see they are presenting a solid front. The very rightness of their stand has contributed to their anger over the situation. They are within their rights also to evict strikers who are occupying their cabins, burning their wood, using their water, burning their electricity and refusing to work. The growers are justified also in guarding their ranches, in keeping out trespassers, particularly agitators who go into ranches and try to get pickers to quit. (Oct. 6)

This acceptance by the rural press of the growers' position was made the basis of a request by the defense attorney for change of venue in the Chambers trial for criminal syndicalism.

> He asserted that because of its large circulation in this community, the Times-Delta had influenced and molded public opinion to such an extent that it would be impossible to secure a fair and impartial trial here.
>
> Wirin made similar assertions concerning the Tulare Times, declaring that both it and the Times-Delta consistently supported the side of the ranchers in the controversy. That the ranchers realized this was evidenced by a resolution passed by the Tulare County farm bureau thanking the two newspapers for their stand on the strike, Wirin charged. (Times-Delta, Nov. 13.)

The San Francisco metropolitan press, particularly the Chronicle and News, presented strike news in a manner much more friendly to the strikers than the valley press, and were bitterly attacked for doing so. For example:

> Tulare County is getting a lot of undesirable notoriety from the cotton strike. The situation is bad enough without having the San Francisco Chronicle print the following in bold-faced type on its front page:
>
> "Meanwhile, a plan to 'starve the strikers out' was mapped at a meeting of Tulare County planters, supervisors, the District Attorney, the sheriff and the Visalia Chief of Police."
>
> Such a statement is absolutely untrue and viciously damaging. As a matter of fact, Tulare County officials have leaned backward in trying to keep hands off, and allow the parties to the difficulty to get together and settle their differences amicably. (Times-Delta, Oct. 12.)

On the other hand, the Los Angeles Times and its representative, Chapin Hall, who was antagonistic to the strikers, received the approval of the local editorial writers. (Times-Delta, Oct. 25.)

The Western Worker attacked even such newspapers as reported the news rather amply and accurately, declaring of one that its "hypocrisy and slimyness would fill an encyclopaedia." (Nov. 6.) A few groups in the valley expressed themselves publicly on the strike. The Bakersfield Post of the American Legion attacked the communistic leadership of the strike, while the Ku Klux Klan was reported to be planning to enter the conflict. (Chronicle, Oct. 27.) One newspaper, although denying the truth of the report, nevertheless advocated such action editorially:

> * * * it might not be such a bad idea at that. The strikers do not appear to have stood in much awe of the legally constituted authorities, who, with the exception of sheriff's and the district attorney's office from the fact-finding commission to the labor and food administrators, have petted, pam-

> pered and fed the reds and their charges, while harvest moon and torrid sun glowed on cotton fields' thwarted harvest. Perhaps white sheeted Knights might throw the fear of the devil into those whom neither state nor federal authority was able to throw the fear of God. The mystery of what is under a sheet is sometimes a powerful influence. (Times-Delta, Oct. 27.)

The fears of the community were played upon by comparing the actions of union agitators to those of gangsters like "George (Machine-gun) Kelly * * * fomenting disorder, illegal interference * * * with right of private contract and preventing people from working through intimidation." (Times-Delta, Oct. 7.)

The Hanford Chamber of Commerce stated in an open letter to the Corcoran Chamber:

> May I assure you that directors of the Hanford Chamber of Commerce are in thorough accord with the attitude of your farmers. It has become a situation of county-wide concern and you may be certain that sober minded citizens of this community will never approve any movement that makes it necessary for our farmers to be dictated to by communistic radicals. (Journal, Oct. 10.)

Organized labor in the valley was generally sympathetic to the strikers but was very hostile to its communist leadership. Labor papers published virtually no strike news, while the Labor News of Fresno even printed in the name of the "hosts of organized labor" a bitter attack on communists near the conclusion. This statement may have been in answer to a virtual demand 3 days earlier by Ralph Taylor, secretary of the Agricultural Council of California:

> California farmers expect the conservative, thoughtful heads of labor to put down the "left wing" of the labor movement which has been responsible for this campaign of lawlessness and destruction. (Times-Delta, Oct. 23)

Organized labor in San Francisco, however, gave more support to the strikers. It deprecated "the prevalent idea that the economics problem of the farmer can be settled by resort to Vigilante and Ku Klux Klan methods." (Labor Clarion, No. 3)

> *California's Disgrace*
>
> The strike in the agricultural districts of the state has grown to its present proportion not so much by reason of the fact of low wages and miserable working conditions, as because of brutal methods used to suppress it. Injustice and brutality are poor weapons for a rich and powerful state to countenance in the suppression of the weak and lowly element in its population on whom California's fabulously rich agricultural and horticultural industries rely.
>
> The agricultural workers, most of whom are illiterate foreigners induced to settle in the state by the growers under misleading promises, are just as much entitled to the protection of the state as are their oppressors.
>
> The plight of these agricultural workers who toil endlessly in the terrible heat of California's interior valleys must arouse the sympathy of every right-minded citizens. Composed largely of Mexicans * * * who were actually imported by the land owners without regard to economic conditions, they are shifted from pillar to post in a nomadic life which precludes the possibility of enjoying the benefits of American culture and comforts. Paid a mere pittance, when seasonal employment is ended they find their way to the cities, to become a charge on the charitably disposed urbanites, or to fill public institutions provided by a benevolent state for indigents. Thus the men responsible for their being in the country escape taxation for their support and the burden is placed upon those who had no part in bringing them into the state and who received no benefit from their labor. (Oct. 13)

Within the valley, the temperate attitude of some members of the clergy was conspicuous. Six ministers from Visalia and Tulare investigated the Pixley shootings, reported favorably on the conduct of the strikers, and later appealed to their communities to donate food and clothing to the strikers. (Times-Delta, Oct. 12, 14) Similar interest by religious leaders of the Fresno district council of the Methodist ministerial union brought reproof from a valley newspaper for extending an invitation to speak to Caroline Decker, "whose keenness of mind and brilliance of expression is undeniable * * *" (Times-Delta, Nov. 20)

Examples of the bitter resentment expressed in the San Joaquin Valley on four subjects will serve further to indicate the inflamed state of mind produced by the strike:

State and federal intervention; alleged but uninvestigated responsibility of gins, finance companies, and electric power interests for the difficulties of the cotton farmers; leadership of the strike by outside agitators; and the conduct of a handful of University of California students in the strike area, and the actions of Professor Ira. B. Cross as member of the Governor's Committee.

San Joaquin growers generally resented the actions of state and federal governments in the strike area, particularly the distribution of food to striking pickers, NRA Director Creel's assurance to the strikers that they had the legal right to picket, the conclusions of the state Fact-Finding Committee, and even the very state police intervention which at one time they earnestly requested. State activity, on the other hand, had a strong exponent in certain other quarters, especially the San Francisco Chronicle. Prompted by the death of three strikers, the Chronicle strongly advocated state control in the area in an editorial entitled, "Governor's Duty To End This Bloody War," which said:

> It is the State's duty to step in and end the lawlessness. The local authorities have not prevented it and by their close relation to local feeling are handicapped in preventing further lawlessness. Why does the Governor hesitate? (Oct. 12)

In a later editorial the same newspaper commented:

> The local authorities are not in a position to inforce the law evenly on both sides in such a strike as this. The votes that elected the District Attorney and Sheriff—Supervisors as well—are all on one side of the dispute. The farmers can hire and fire the county officers; the cotton pickers, who are itinerant laborers, have no votes. And the strike is the one big issue in these counties with all the residents on one side. (Oct. 13)

In direct opposition, the local papers insisted first upon protection of the crops:

> One can readily see the ultimate result of the new state and federal welfare policy. The workers will hold out against employment as long as the government supports them. The effect upon industry is also patent. It is stringhalted, if not destroyed. (Sentinel, reprinted in Times, Oct. 26)
>
> One thing seems certain: the strikers have been encouraged by the policy and attitude of the state and national governments. (Sentinel, reprinted in Times-Delta, Oct. 25)

As the strike drew to a close and it appeared that state pressure was needed to urge acceptance of the proposed terms upon the strikers, certain valley interests shifted their position, and requested state intervention. An editorial called "It's Up To Rolph" stated:

> The Polyanna, head-in-the-sand attitude of Governor Rolph and his order in connection with the cotton strike has become a public scandal.
>
> Governor Rolph is on trial in the San Joaquin Valley. His is the responsibility for anything that happens in the strike zone now.
>
> Local peace officers have done their part, citizens have done their part, growers have done their part. The rest is up to Rolph. (Journal, Oct. 27)

After the pressure had been successfully exerted to obtain acceptance by the strikers, the Governor received general commendation:

> Happily for California, the obstacle raised by misguided agencies and which unquestionably delayed the harvesting of the cotton crop for several critical days, and at one time even threatened to create chaos in a great agricultural area, have largely been removed. Governor Rolph, though belatedly, having assumed direct charge of the menacing situation and having pledged himself to pursue a policy of firmness and sanity which promised an end to the intolerable situation due to coddling of reckless and Communistic leadership. (Californian, Oct. 27)

Outside interference implied inability of the communities to govern themselves and was inimical to the interests of a substantial section of the resident voters. Therefore it was resented and opposed. A leading grower charged that the attitude of officials in protecting the rights of strikers led them to believe

> that the government wanted them to strike. Creel talked to them and said they might picket and Branion fed them. (Interview)

> Under-sheriff: We didn't want state help. We had things under control here. (Interview)
>
> Sheriff: If the state and federal governments had let us alone we could have handled it. Everything was going fine until Creel came down and told them they could raise all the hell they wanted to. (Interview)
>
> District attorney: The NRA seems to have been on the side of the strikers every place. It makes them think they have a right to strike whenever they want to. Then also the federal government came down here and definitely took the side of the strikers. They fed strikers who just wouldn't work, while they won't feed the poor unemployed who want to work. If it hadn't been for the federal and state food, the strike would have been broken a week sooner. Rolph was right on the side of the strikers, too. He's always been a labor union man. They made him Mayor of San Francisco and then Governor.
>
> Creel made us plenty of trouble, too. The sheriff just had the strikers well in hand when he came down. The strikers were quieted down to where they didn't picket much and when they did picket they obeyed the sheriff, and moved on when he told them to. But Creel came down and told them they could do whatever the sheriff said they should not do; they said Creel said they had the right to do it. (Interview)
>
> Sheriff: Creel came down here and he might just as well have told the Mexicans to go out and commit murder. He told them they could strike and picket and all the rest of that. Picketing is what caused all the trouble. That's what got the farmers sore.
>
> I could have handled it if it hadn't been for Creel and the state highway patrol. I could have stopped the picketing. It isn't lawful to obstruct the highways whether to hold a church service or to picket. But Creel spent an hour and a half in the Corcoran camp and told them they could do plenty. Then he went to see Pat Chambers for an hour. After that he spent only twenty minutes with the growers. Then he went and told our district attorney the strikers were within their rights to picket.
>
> Jimmie Rolph stole money, given by the Federal Government, to help the strike. It is the first time in the history of this country that they have done such a * * * thing. Branion came down here with a corps of assistants and gave food to everybody. That's all the Mexicans wanted. They would have stayed there all winter (Interview).

The gins, the finance companies and the electric light and power corporations were occasionally pointed to as the evil spirits behind the curtain. However, no investigation was made of the activities of these bodies. All three groups were accused of making exorbitant charges for the services they performed. An increase in ginning rates was the cause of protest by the farmers in at least one district:

> The West Side Land Owners' Association today was on record as protesting against the proposed ginning rate of 20 cents per 100 pounds of cotton this year, an increase of 100 percent over last year's rate. (Bee, Oct. 12)

The Visalia and Tulare ministers who made a public report following the Pixley affair suggested investigation of the companies:

> We discovered it to be a common opinion at Pixley that financial interests are largely to blame for this economic and industrial situation. The part played in this tragedy by finance corporations and their agents could wisely be investigated by proper state authorities. If they play no sinister part, that fact should be known. If they do play an evil part, they should be held responsible (Times-Delta, Oct. 12.)

A Valley newspaper editorially declared:

> Should Investigate Cotton Finance Company Angles To Pickers' Strike. There is a third party in the cotton strike imbroglio, a silent partner, who has been referred to frequently, but who has not been brought out into the open—the cotton finance corporation. The crux of the problem lies there, and the only agency that can get at it is the federal government through the NRA or the AAA. For the most part the strikers and the growers are powerless to help each other.
>
> A majority of the cotton growers are tenant farmers who seek financing from the inception of their operations. Banks cannot loan to them because they possess neither the personal nor property qualifications. There are

> scarcely any cotton loans in the local banks. The Federal Farm Loan Corporation does not advance money to farmers for cropping activities, and the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation, another government setup, has offices only in Los Angeles and San Francisco, with very sketchy contacts in the San Joaquin Valley. The cotton growers are, therefore, forced into the clutches of the Cotton Finance Companies, whose terms are onerous and whose supervision extends to every activity from seed to harvest, the farmer being budgeted as to his expenditures in each separate operation. If the finance company has allotted 60 cents per hundred pounds for picking, that is all the grower has to spend for that operation, without the consent of the company which is advancing the money.
>
> It is stated that these companies, not the grower, reap the premium which attached to valley cotton because of its superior quality. Because the contracts are based on eastern cotton prices at the time of contract, price advances are, therefore, also reaped by the finance companies. Of course, the companies assume considerable risk in their transactions, for which they are entitled to compensation above the amount which would be earned in a normal banking transaction. The deal is the same as those of the methods of automobile, radio and washing machine financing, in which interest rates in excess of 12 percent are not infrequently obtained.
>
> All hands to this unfortunate controversy would be farther along had they united earlier in a demand that the federal government survey this phase of the problem, and move for a correction which could solve the present situation. It may not be too late yet for government authority to arrange sufficient modification of contracts to permit growers to pay more than 60 cents per hundred for picking (Times-Delta, Oct. 21).

Several independent growers also attacked the gin, finance, and power companies and it was generally hinted that others would have done so were they not fearful that such action would mitigate against receiving future crop loans. M. B. Kearney testified before the Governor's Committee that:

> We will be glad to pay more to the poor slave who has to do the work. Under present conditions we cannot do it.
>
> I do not think that either the large or small farmer, the way things are manipulated, could pay. If the finance companies and the San Joaquin light and power company were put in their right places, we could pay so they could eat (Hearings).

The union also attacked the companies and sought to unite the small farmers in a joint attack upon them. The strikers' spokesman before the Fact-Finding Board argued:

> We again call your attention to the startling condition where free American citizen cotton growers frankly tell cotton pickers that they can afford to pay 75 cents a hundred pounds, and that they want to pay 75 cents a hundred pounds to cotton pickers, but that they dare not pay 75 cents because if they do, they will be punished and ruined by the cotton gin operators and the financial interests who dominate the cotton industry.
>
> We are informed that the cotton grower sends his cotton to the gin operators, who arbitrarily determine the quality and the price that is to be paid for the cotton. We are informed that independent California cotton growers have sent their cotton to cooperative gins where they get much higher prices for their cotton than is paid by the private monopoly gin operators of the district, who seem to control not only the cotton growers but also dominate the lives of the cotton pickers. This higher price is paid for cotton because the independent gin operators honestly measure the length of the cotton and inform the cotton growers that it is of better quality and longer length than do the operators of the private monopoly gins.
>
> We call your attention to the fact that this year, the same as in previous years, the cotton gin operators and finance companies, compel the growers to sell their cotton to them prior to its maturing, at a price that the cotton gin operators and financiers know would yield them a handsome profit because of the ascending market and the restrictions that the government was making possible by limiting output that would further stimulate prices, and also by the guarantee of the government of ten cents a pound to cotton growers.
>
> We also insist that it is the absolute duty of your commission and of the Federal Government to make an investigation of the methods and profits of the cotton gin operators and the finance companies, so that their racketeering methods will be exposed.

The readiness of peace officers and growers to blame the strike entirely on outside agitators, and their blindness to other causes, were marked.

> Sheriff: If the laws had teeth so we could catch about 20 rats the whole thing would be over (Interview).
>
> Clarence Morrill, Chief of California's Bureau of Criminal Investigation, today blamed the San Joaquin Valley labor trouble on Communism.
>
> The state—for that matter, the whole Pacific Coast—is a hotbed of Communism. I've been expecting this a long time.
>
> "There have been robberies of guns from state armories several times lately," he said, "They have been preparing a long time" (Californian, Oct. 11).

Local newspapers were unanimous in condemning the agitators. The Fresno Bee, for example, on October 6 printed an editorial:

> People Getting Weary of Communist Agitators. But our people are getting exceedingly weary of the activities of the professional Communist leaders mostly from New York, who are motivated by no honest desire to improve working conditions, but rather propose to feather their own nests while promoting the cause of social anarchy and red revolution.
>
> And they are getting very tired of the spectacle of these unprincipled agitators, most of them of alien origin, and strangers to California, actually forbidding those who want to work from working, on threat of physical violence.
>
> They do not work themselves except in stirring up strife and disorder.
>
> They look to their dupes to supply them with food, clothing, shelter and spending money.
>
> They loaf between working seasons; and then descend on the scene like vultures who have smelled carrion from afar.

The papers also took the growers' position that the pickers should be represented by pickers, not by professional organizers:

> But one thing is certain: The strikers cannot accept Communistic leadership and ideas and get anywhere in their dealing with patriotic Americans. If they will get rid of men whose chief purpose is to stir up trouble rather than to exact justice, they will have taken a long stride towards peace and prosperity (Times-Delta, Oct. 12).

Editorial columns accepted the view that the agitators ruled by force, and were not merely the instruments for expressing the pickers' desires:

> Consul Bravo is authority for the statement, that his nationals are ready to return to work at the 60 cents per hundred pounds which the growers have been paying. Sheriff Buckner of Kings County, in arresting a leader today, asserted that men in the concentration camp at Corcoran who are willing to work were being restrained through intimidation (Times-Delta, Oct. 13).

The Tulare Advance-Register whipped up the popular emotions with an attack on the "reds":

> Out With The Agitators. Every day of the so-called cotton "strike" it is becoming more apparent that the strife is due almost solely to a program for promoting unrest and dissatisfaction among the laboring classes by professional "outside" agitators.
>
> * * * the "strike" would vanish into thin air overnight if the outside agitators were rounded up en masse and escorted out of the country as they should be. And in the future, we should guard well against allowing them to get a new foothold for sowing the red seeds of radicalism among an otherwise happy and contented people (Oct. 16).

In addition to these editorial comments, various valley newspapers reprinted communistic literature said to be widely distributed by the union among the workers (E. g. Times, Oct. 22, and Times-Delta, Oct. 23).

To these charges against the agitators Miss Decker commented: "There was one thing that made this strike possible—it was the development of leadership from the ranks, coming from the bottom up." (Speech, Nov. 27.)

An attack on the University of California revealed the uncritical state of popular judgments in the valley at the close of the strike, and afforded an outlet for inflamed passions. It required to touch this off only the presence of one professor as member of the Governor's Committee, and the conduct of about seven students said to belong to the local affiliate of the National Students' League.

These seven students gave some publicity to their views, which were sympathetic to the strikers, and in addition participated in picketing excursions and resisted efforts of local officials who sought to curtail their activities. Two students testified before the Fact-Finding Committee, charging that the sheriff's officers dealt summarily with the pickets, did not allow them to stop their cars, threatened the use of tear-gas bombs, and acted in an unlawful manner (Hearings).

Their presence in the affected area as partisans led to a demand for an investigation of the University by the chairman of the Tulare County Board of Supervisors, heralded in the headlines of a local paper as follows:

> A. J. Elliott asks probe of U. C. radicals. Supervisor raps university students for entering local dispute. Found among pickets. Says taxpayers furnish money to educate young radicals (Times, Oct. 28).

The manager of the University of California News service, replied:

> I understand there is some bitterness down there toward the University because of the activities of these people, most of whom are not students here at all. It is not fair to judge the institution by them even if they are all students. Twelve thousand young men and women mind their own business and work as we believe they should. Half a dozen become involved in something like this strike and are observed where the workers are not: the University is judged by the half dozen and not by the twelve thousand (Times-Delta, Oct. 30).

The basic misunderstanding of the nature of a university which made it possible for valley opinion to propose laying violent hands on education is plain from the following:

> The chairman of the Board of Supervisors of Tulare County makes a timely suggestion. It is common knowledge in this county that students from the University of California actively participated as agitators in the so-called cotton strike, some of them becoming particularly obnoxious in their activities as pickets * * * But we are wondering whether the censure runs rightly to the students. It has long been a matter of concern that the colleges of the nation house many instructors whose preachment is a direct encouragement to Communism, who find in Russia's government policies that which commands their admiration.
>
> One does not have to guess as to the opinions of these instructors. We have heard them on the lecture platform; we have heard them outrage American audiences by declarations alleging that the country is on the road to Communism, that the signboard in the highway points directly to Moscow, that reverence for our own institutions has faded, and all in all, painting a picture calculated to impress the unthinking and the immature.
>
> With such preachments in the lecture halls of our universities, what else can we expect than that youth shall be attracted by Communistic leadership which seeks to destroy industry and finds its highest inspiration in misdirecting the activites of the thoughtless and uninformed. What ought to attract the attention of the public, particularly, is not that university students should have taken part in unseemly demonstrations on the highways of the state, but that institutions of learning should employ men to teach the youth of the land who can only see, in a most serious and menacing situation, that a Communistic leadership is being denied civil rights, and outrageously calling upon the authorities to protect it against the defensive attitude of those such leadership would destroy.
>
> Meantime, not only a good many farmers, but a good many citizens are reaching the conclusion that if our universities are to become the centers of Communistic teaching, society will be better served by such employment as will eliminate those who find inspiration in Moscow instead of in Washington (Californian, Oct. 30).

The lengths to which even university alumni could go in their failure correctly to judge the situation is indicated by the statement of a large grower:

> I am an old California man. I graduated there. I have followed the football teams and have supported the University in every way possible. There are a lot of old California men around here that feel the same way about it. The University is losing a lot of support. I can not talk freely with you.

> I cannot help but think that you are a Communist, too, and will use any information I might give you against the growers (Interview).

A sheriff also was caught in the hysteria:

> I don't want to support a University that teaches the students to be socialists, to wave the red flag and destroy America (Interview).

The Pacific Rural Press even demanded in an editorial that the College of Agriculture and Gianinni Foundation of the State University "must be for the farmer first and everyone else second * * *" (See Appendix.)

Following the cotton strike vigilante action flared up in Imperial Valley. Shortly, a state-wide organization of growers arose, sponsored by the Farm Bureau and the Agricultural Committee of the State Chamber of Commerce. This organization, now known as the Associated Farmers, represents predominantly the viewpoint of the larger growers as to labor policy.

At no time since 1933 has a strike of agricultural workers in California been accompanied by such complete documentation of its course and such clear delineation of the alignment of groups within the community. Nor has any other strike given such impetus to organization of agricultural employers. This organization now seems established on a permanent basis, and is making efforts to spread into the Pacific Northwest, and the Middle West. This study, therefore, has seized upon an opportunity which rarely is so fully available to contemporary historians. By use of documents and observations made in the field during and after the strike, it has portrayed the conditions out of which present alignments have developed, and the characteristics which were so clearly revealed at their genesis.

APPENDIX

(A number of significant documents are included here, partly because they would unduly have burdened the continuity of the textual account of the cotton strike, partly because most of them appeared after the strike ended. They are necessary, however, to adequate presentation of the attitudes which developed out of the agricultural strikes of 1933.)

1. SOME POINTS OF VIEW

Out With The Agitators. Every day of the so-called cotton "strike" it is becoming more apparent that the strife is due almost solely to a program of promoting unrest and dissatisfaction among the laboring classes by professional "outside" agitators.

The very fact that caravans are continually organized to "picket" fields in an effort to intimidate pickers at work is sufficient proof that the "strike" is in fact an artificial one, and would fall of its own weight if the agitators were rounded up and the laborers allowed to return to the fields or not, as they chose, free from fear of interference or threats.

All of which is ample evidence that the "strike" would vanish into thin air overnight if the outside agitators were rounded up en masse and escorted out of the country as they should be. And in the future we should guard well against allowing them to get a new foothold, or sowing the red seeds of radicalism among an otherwise happy and contented class of working people. (Advance-Register, Oct. 16, 1933)

* * * * * * *

The Farm Labor Strike Racket. Promotion of so-called agricultural workers' "union" in California within the past two months and consequent "strikes" launched in various localities give evidence of a new type of racket which is being vigorously promoted within our borders.

A variety of attempts similar to the local cotton "strike," all organized in the same manner and bearing the earmarks of the same group of racketeers directing them, have been launched at opportune times in various parts of the state.

Among these was an attempt to form such a "union" among Imperial Valley farm workers. Prompt action of officials in escorting the racketeers out of the district thwarted the "strike." Undaunted, the organizers moved to Ventura where they succeeded in getting a larger total of dues from "members" but failed to win out in the strike when authorities stepped in and prevented violence in picketing. No time was lost in jumping to Tulare where the Tagus strike was launched. More dues were collected from workers and with little official opposition a settlement was exacted.

Flushed with partial victory, and visions of a vast sum in dues from a growing membership, the organizers rushed plans for a grape picking strike in the Fresno and Lodi districts and polished up details of the cotton "strike" to be launched here, followed by an orange picking strike when the harvest in Eastern Tulare county opens.

The Fresno and Lodi strikes were "called" by the racketeers, but once more they found the forces of law and order too powerful. Repulsed, they returned again to Tulare where a more fertile field of memberships and dues was to be found in the cotton harvest, and the forthcoming orange crop. The results of this campaign are too well known to be repeated here.

It is sufficient to state that a membership of some 4,000 pickers is claimed, which with an initiation fee of 50 cents a head, would total several thousand dollars for the coffers of the racketeers, with additional sums to be paid from time to time in dues—should the "strike" succeed.

That is the story of the farm labor strike racket in California within the past few months. And it contains two clear-cut conclusions.

First, that the various strikes are one in purpose, promoted by a central group presumably principally interested in dues and in advancing the cause of Communism.

Second, that wherever the force of law and order have quickly exerted a restraining influence on attempts to coerce workers in fields, the strike racketeers have failed. Also, that in almost every case the worker—the "comrade"—has paid the bill. He is the real victim of the strike racketeer. (Advance-Register, Oct. 17, 1933)

* * * * * * *

Looks As Though Our Cotton Farmer Is The "Forgotten Man". The strike situation has not been helped any by the influx of labor agitators, officials of the National League for the Defense of Political Prisoners and university economic students with a Communistic flair. The wires to Washington have been burdened with protest in behalf of the strikers, most of whom are Mexican nationals, while not a single voice is raised in behalf of the cotton growing farmers who face ruin unless the pickers resume work before the crop is destroyed by inclement weather which may come now at any time.

The farmers are our people, and it would appear that it was about time the government and our good American friends gave at least a side-long glance in their direction. They will remain with us after this unfortunate episode is a closed incident, while 90 percent of the strikers, about whom such a great ado is being made, will be moving on, many probably back to their own country where they belong.

Americans are reputed to be fond of justice, and there are certainly two sides to this situation. If the farmers lose their crops, there will be no one to help them. If the pickers do not go back to work, the government has guaranteed that they will be given food, clothing and shelter.

On the eve of the appearance of a fact finding commission, which has been appointed by the federal and state governments to find a right solution of the difficulty, it is foolish, almost suicidal, to encourage the strikers to believe that they are being unfairly treated by the peace officers and courts, that the right to picket extends to the right to invade property and defy officers, and that no matter what they do, alien or citizen, they will be fed and cared for in idleness. (Times-Delta, Oct. 19, 1933)

An observer of the labor trouble at Lodi says that some of the state representatives who came to arbitrate "were as bad as the Communists."

Perhaps he was dramatizing his story by the customary and conventional hyperbole, but criticism of the state's efforts in agricultural labor disputes have come from other sections and it is understandable why farmers do not care to leave it to Rolph's men.

For instance, men like Tim Reardon. Tim is a S. F. political labor leader. Need more be said?

As an advocate and battler for labor he is doubtless a whiz, but as a calm, judicial arbiter, looking at both sides dispassionately and making decisions broadly, he is probably overpriced at a dime a dozen (Pacific Rural Press, Oct. 21, 1933).

* * * * * * *

Telegram to George Creel, NRA Administrator, San Francisco, Calif.: "The cotton strike in the San Joaquin Valley is directed by well known Communists with California headquarters in San Jose, California, with Russian Communist connections and these facts are well known by County, State, and Federal authorities. The strikers are composed of approximately ninety percent itinerants, Mexicans easily led and intimidated. Price being paid pickers sixty cents per hundred weight, cabins, light, fuel and water furnished free. Due to heavy yield and large bolls the average picker can pick three hundred pounds per day. This exceeds the average going wages paid American farm labor in other agricultural crops as well as cotton in this valley this season. With few exceptions Americans working and satisfied with this price. Believe your investigations will disclose price being paid in Texas for best picking ranges from forty to sixty cents and in lower California where price is being set by Mexican Government for its own nationals, forty nine cents American money and no accommodations furnished at either place. Communist leaders have organized large unsanitary concentration camps of these strikers and strikers are held in these camps practically prisoners through intimidation by leaders. Caravans of strikers are sent out from these camps for the express purpose of intimidating the community and satisfied pickers. Immediately adjoining the city limits of Corcoran one of these camps is estimated to contain three thousand seven hundred and eighty strikers and the population of the city of Corcoran is estimated at less than two thousand persons. The trustees of the city of Corcoran and all the civic organizations of the city of Corcoran have publicly passed resolutions that the camp is a menace to the health and safety of the city and have appealed to the local authorities and the governor of this State for removal of same but have obtained no relief. The food for these camps is being furnished from the Federal Emergency Relief Fund. Upon authority of sheriff of Kings County and backed by proof that is indisputable Federal relief workers have gone to the workers in the cotton in Kings County and tried to induce satisfied workers to quit work and accept Federal relief on scale of five dollars per week for man and wife. The farmers who have worked these crops through the year with heat ranging as high as one hundred and eighteen degrees and who at the present price of cotton and the picking scale of sixty cents per hundred have practically nothing left for their efforts are wondering if in combating the Communist influence they are going to have the Communists supported by the Federal Government in form of food and money. Federal Labor Commissioner Folin of Los Angeles has stated that if the intimidation of workers was stopped and he could be authorized by Washington he could furnish five thousand laborers out of the two hundred thousand now on Federal Relief in Los Angeles for picking the cotton at the scale of sixty cents. The local authorities seem powerless to combat this situation and the Governor of this State has been appealed to without relief. We respectfully refer you to Edward Fitzgerald Federal Conciliator Los Angeles who investigated these conditions and advised strikers to return to work at price of sixty cents pending further hearings but Communist leaders influenced strikers to ignore his advice. We also respectfully refer you to Federal Attorney Pierson Hall of Los Angeles familiar with conditions here and George Creel administrator NRA, San Francisco, who are thoroughly familiar with conditions here and know the menace existing to life and property in this valley. We are now appealing to you as a last resort to correct this situation." [From] L. D. Ellett, Chairman Corcoran Cotton Growers Committee, Corcoran, Calif., Oct. 21, 1933.

* * * * * * *

Growers Post-Strike Proposals to Governor Rolph. Growers say granting of the following requests is necessary to end bitter "labor difficulty":

1. All concentration camps to be closed immediately and occupants ordered to go to work or move out of the San Joaquin Valley.
2. Closing, permanently, of agitators' offices in every town in the valley.
3. Prevention of nightly meeting of Reds and agitators in valley.
4. Refusal of free food to able-bodied workers. Handling emergency relief administration funds by local organizations familiar with situation, instead of by state authorities.
5. Distinction to be made between industrial and agricultural labor commission. Welfare departments to be reorganized and to handle these two phases separately.
6. An official study of the personnel of these two departments with a view to eliminating undesirable officials and employes. (Bakersfield Californian, Oct. 28, 1933).

The Valley Tells Gov. Rolph. * * * The Chronicle of October 27 carries a great banner saying: "Ku Klux Klan's Blazing Crosses Warn Strikers." Just another pipe dream of a Chronicle reporter, comments a Visalia Times-Delta editorial.

And as you burrow into the fine type of the Chronicle article under the blazing head you discover that the cross was "figuratively set ablaze" by a secret order of Klan officials promising cooperation of citrus growers.

Meanwhile a big delegation of valley leaders call upon Governor Rolph. They tell him that they were promised protection from the radical agitators if the growers would pay 75 cents for cotton picking. It seems that George Creel, federal NRA representative, promised such protection, and asked who would furnish it, replied that Governor Rolph would. The Governor says it is up to the sheriffs. And the sheriffs say they are under bond and they have got to be careful about creating an army of Tom, Dick and Harry deputies to handle the situation.

Thus the hot plate is handed around the circle. Meanwhile many growers feel they were sold out. They cannot afford to pay 75 cents for cotton picking and it makes them wild to see agitators bellowing for more.

Growers want that promised protection and if they do not get it, they will probably provide some of their own. These are red-blooded Americans and not the big city type of human door-mats.

A number of demands were made of the governor. One was that the strikers be ousted from their camps if they do not go to work. Another was that federal relief be shut off from able bodied idlers. The distribution of food through federal plans has been a scandal. Let the regular welfare agencies do it, was demanded.

Also they want Governor Rolph to keep Labor Commissioner, Frank C. McDonald, out of the valley and the State Welfare Department.

Whether the governor was really listening, is always difficult to determine.

One member of the delegation, asked what was accomplished by visiting the Governor, replied: "We all got our pictures taken."

Frequently that is all such delegations get—their pictures in the paper. (Pacific Rural Press, Nov. 4, 1933).

The workers know that they won by defeating not only the finance companies and rich ranchers, the local sheriffs and their deputies, but the entire capitalistic government including the state police the U. S. State and Federal so-called Mediation Boards, and the treacherous Mexican Consul. (Western Worker, Nov. 6).

Box 406 Bakersfield, California,
November 10th, 1933.

Mr. R. C. Branion,
Federal State Welfare Administrator, San Francisco, California

Dear Sir: At a meeting of the Board of Directors of this Association, Wednesday, November 8th, the following resolution was passed unanimously:

"WHEREAS the distribution of welfare aid has a direct effect on the harvesting of agricultural crops, and

"WHEREAS in the recent labor disturbances in the cotton harvest in the San Joaquin Valley, one of the most disturbing influences in the settling of this trouble was the distribution of welfare aid to those voluntarily idle, and

"WHEREAS charity which encourages labor to remain idle is un-American and dangerous to our institutions of Government,

"THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Directors of the California Cotton Cooperative association request the Federal and State Welfare Agencies to define or revise their policies to the effect that aid will be refused able bodied workers who refuse to work when work is available".

Yours very truly,

California Cotton Cooperative Association, Ltd.
C. C. Sedden, *Secretary and General Manager.*

Those Philanthropists, the Ginners. Our recent suggestions that increased pay for cotton pickers should be taken out of the ginners instead of the growers leads to some interesting investigation and to even more interesting results.

For instance, it is found that ginners have a code pending in Washington which would increase ginning fees 100 per cent, and would put a special penalty of 5 cents additional on the ginning of all cotton over 1¼ inches staple.

It is the plea of the ginners to Washington that present ginning rates are not compensatory. That remains to be demonstrated! We do not observe ginners getting in line at the bank along with cotton growers.

And whaddeye mean ginning fees?

If you refer only to the running of the cotton through the gin, the price in the San Joaquin Valley has been 15 cents, and it is now proposed to increase it to 30 cents, with the Anderson-Clayton crowd, who handle about 50 per cent of the cotton of the state, seeking to reduce it to 25 cents.

"Yes, so you can squeeze the little gins out," retorted the critics of this big, powerful, nationwide crowd.

But, however that may be, the fees which gins charge are not limited to the mere running of cotton through the gin.

It is commonly reported that they make their big money out of the cotton seed, and that is not all.

The California gins sell bagging to the farmers and ties and insurance with storage space, and sell seed and credit.

They charge the farmer $3 a ton commission to sell his cottonseed to an oil mill, and if investigation does not prove that it is often a case of a gin merely turning the seed over to one of its subsidiary brother-in-laws, then we owe an apology for what we are thinking.

It is a known fact that the ginning companies own most of the cotton because they have financed its production for a rate of interest which surely nets them an additional profit.

So, it would seem as if growers might well look a bit deeper into this matter. They are certainly interested in what gins may do by way of a code and if a 100 per cent increase in ginning charges is made, the gins should be forced to show their books and demonstrate that they are losing money. (Pacific Rural Press, Nov. 11, 1933)

Council Backs Up Police Chief in Action Against Cotton Strike Leaders. "Union's" Demands Rejected. A list of demands made to the city council last night by a delegation from the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Union and the International Labor Defense were flatly rejected, and in addition Mayor Hahesy informed the delegation that businessmen and representative citizens of Tulare had decided at a meeting the night before to get the organization headquarters out of town. Mayor Hahesy said that Tulare was getting a name throughout the state as a "hot-bed" for harboring the headquarters of strike leaders, and that was the reason the businessmen had decided at their meeting to see that the headquarters left town. (Tulare Advance-Register, Jan. 4, 1934).

Red Flag "Unions". First it was the peach pickers' strike, then grapes, garment workers, lettuce, beans and cotton. Now it is a milkers' strike. Why? * * *

Fortunately, these questions are easily answered. The San Joaquin valley now knows them from experience and is not likely to be taken in a second time. * * *

They are primarily designed to gain membership for the Communists. Practically none have resulted in any benefit to the real worker, who is only a pawn and at the best a source of revenue to further the Bolshevik plots against American government.

The campaign is much like that of the I. W. W. a few years ago, except that it is more ruthless and aims principally at ultimate revolution and overthrow of the government. The traitorous attack is doomed to failure, but that does not mean that its leaders are to be excused. On the contrary they should be taught the folly of hoisting the red flag or any other over the Stars and Stripes on American soil. (Tulare Advance-Register, Jan. 8, 1934.)

Send Them Back to Russia. It is high time that the agitators were rounded up and sent back to Russia where they can actually practice what they preach. (Tulare Advance-Register, Jan. 11, 1934.)

Valley Expresses Self. Sentiment in Imperial Valley today approves action taken in Brawley and El Centro Tuesday night when vigilantes ordered leaders in agitation which has been ripe for the past two weeks to leave the county and took somewhat radical steps to see that they did leave. (Imperial Valley Press, quoted in Brawley News, Jan. 25, 1934.)

Not Mob Violence, But Valley Spirit. Mob rule is a thing to be avoided above all others, but it was not mob rule nor mob violence that removed from Imperial Valley Tuesday night the menace of active agitation among the valley's lettuce workers, content if left to themselves to continue peaceably in the fields. It was not mob violence—it was a studied, organized movement of citizens seeking the only way out of difficulties threatening the community's peace, when the hands of the law had been tied by the law itself.

The names of the men who took part in the move against strike agitators are not known, but the service they rendered their community is an outstanding one.

"Imperial Valley is not San Joaquin Valley. Stay out!" This in effect, was the message delivered to agitators—and they took it to heart. (Morning Farmer, quoted in Brawley News, Jan. 26, 1934.)

Vigilantes Organizing Over Valley. Visalia, Jan. 31 (UP). San Joaquin valley farmers are organizing quietly into vigilance committees, determined to prevent a recurrence of agricultural strikes which paralyzed harvests in the valley last summer, it was reported here today.

The farmers reportedly have hired trained investigators to check on the records of known Communist organizers and to watch their movements. It was understood the organization planned to stop at their inception any attempts to foment strikes during the coming harvest seasons. (Tulare Advance-Register, Jan. 31, 1934)

Free Speech and Criminal Speech. Free speech is not meant, nor does it give anyone the right to promote plans for destruction of life, property or the government * * * Free speech and criminal speech are two different things * * * The more drastic the action against those who make criminally traitorous utterances against the government, the safer will be the right of free speech in America. (Tulare Advance-Register, Feb. 2, 1934)

A Real Public Service. The Reverend Charles Woessner, who in resigning this week as pastor of the First Baptist Church of Tulare, will have the best wishes of many Tulareans in whatever future endeavor he undertakes. Besides serving the community through church activities, he performed a distinctly meritorious civic service in invading the headquarters of the Communist organization, masquerading as a labor union (sic) and exposing it for what it really was—a drive for "red" revolutionists. It was he who secured the incriminating literature published in this and other newspapers which first called attention of the entire state to the real agitators and motives behind local and other labor troubles. The community owes him a debt of gratitude for this service. (Advance-Register, Feb. 9, 1934)

Peace officers of five San Joaquin valley counties prepared today to organize into a solidly knit organization to prevent Communist-fostered farm labor troubles * * * uniform legislation against picketing and plans to combat (sic) * * * trouble making by Communists * * * (Advance-Register, Feb. 13, 1934)

Colleges of Agriculture Should Represent Agriculture. Are agricultural colleges supposed to represent agriculture and be advocates of that basic industry, or are they neutral fact-finding courts rendering decisions for or against agriculture as cold logic may decide? * * * In other words, for whom is the Giannini Foundation working?

The above questions are blunt, but not unfriendly.

They are asked with the understanding that many college professors believe they represent pure science and no person or class * * *

But these are new days, with imperative new needs, and the suggestion is offered pointedly and specifically:

That the College of Agriculture must be for the farmer first and every one else second and unless it is it cannot expect to hold the farmer's support in these tax-tight days.

We all know that agriculture is our biggest and most basic industry; that it creates most of the wealth which supports the college; that agriculture must prosper if the state is to be sound; so why shouldn't the College of Agriculture be the active, partisan friend and representative of agriculture?

This does not mean subserviently. A real friend is frank. Taking off the moth-eaten halo of the past and putting on serviceable work clothes is no cause for losing self-respect. (Pacific Rural Press, March 25, 1934)

(Apropos of the lynching of two kidnapper-murderers at San Jose):

The more fuss the Civil Liberties Union, Mooney Defense League, and other Communistic brotherhoods make over the San Jose lynching, the more we are inclined to believe that the jury of 15,000 citizens returned the right verdict. (Tulare Advance-Register, Jan. 3, 1934.)

II. TACTICS

(The following statement purports to be a communist manual of agricultural strike tactics. It was reprinted in the Tulare Advance-Register, April 4, 1934, under the headline "Details of red plot are exposed.")

Resolution on the manner of organizing strike struggles in the agricultural field. As drawn from the experiences of the 1933 strike movement, convention Mar. 17–18 District No. 13.

I. Introduction

This convention meets at a moment of our greatest opportunity for developing a struggle movement for higher wages and better conditions in practically every industry of our district. This movement, will, however, materialise only if our (Communist) Party organisations give the proper leadership to the Union and in the development of the struggles. This leadership must not be in the form of issuing direction and orders to other comrades. We too often have the experience that when we call some leading comrade to account for failure in his assigned field of work, the comrade excuses himself by saying "It is the fault of the membership, or the comrades of the lower organizations. I told them what to do, and they didn't do it." Leaders who at this stage of the game confine themselves to telling others what to do instead of devoting the bulk of their own time to leading by participating in the struggles directly, are foredoomed to failure, and should be immediately replaced. Also we must eliminate either this practice of leading comrades, or, if necessary, the leading comrades themselves who are simply administrators inside the organizations and do not directly enter into the practical work in the field of organizing workers. The 3rd category of comrades who, though well-intentioned, follow the practice of running from town to town, and from field to field, without accomplishing anything in any one place, must either be corrected in their manner of work, or eliminated from work, because their whole achievement is to run up expense, and discourage the local workers, who see in such activity much wind, but little practical achievement.

Danger of spontaneity. Because of these bad practices and because of our frequent negligence and lack of contact with large sections of the working-class, spontaneous strikes have developed by workers who tire of waiting for us to give them proper leadership, and who go out and strike, unprepared though they may be. The movement of organized strikes in comparison to the movement of spontaneous strikes must be continually increased if the strike movement of the workers is to result in substantial gains in hours, wages and conditions, and not result in futility and discouragement. It therefore is important for us to study our experiences of the previous year and understand wherein lie our shortcomings in order to accomplish more during this coming year.

School. As a first step in that direction, the school organized for March and April, 1934, is a good step forward. This school should not be lost in general theorizing, by the students and teachers, but should concretely examine our practice in strikes during the past year and test and amend our theory concerning these strikes in the light of that practice. With the experiences of this school, we must subsequently systematically organise schools throughout the district all the year round in order to train as rapidly as possible a large corps of efficient and experienced organizers who understand the objectives of the work and by what methods to carry it through.

II. Preparing to Strike

Surveying the territory. The most important thing in the leadership of a struggle is to know the territory, the condition of the industry, and the relation of forces. Probably the outstanding shortcoming of the leadership of the 1933 struggles was that too large a part of the leadership consisted of comrades who were not native to the situation that existed, and did not know the territorial conditions of the industry, or the relation of the contending forces. To learn these things, it is of minor value to study the statistics concerning a particular territory as reported by the government. Also, it is a wrong practice to issue lengthy questionnaires to the workers, or the lower functionaries, to have filled out in order to learn the territory. There is only one way to become a complete master of all knowledge concerning a particular locality, and that way is to have thorough discussions with all the workers, the poor farmers, and others who might be factors in a coming struggle. For this, the best comrades must not sit in the offices of the Union or (Communist) Party, but must go into the fields, and only a handful of comrades stay in the various centers for purposes of co-ordination. Official statistics and such information should be gathered but should always be regarded as secondary sources of authority. The chief source which guides us in our decisions along any lines at all must be the information that we gather from workers, poor growers and whatever we can learn from whatever contacts we may have with the richer growers or their agents.

Setting the demands. Having a thorough knowledge of the territory, the next thing to do is to set demands around which the struggle is to be fought. The most effective struggles are fought where the fewest demands are raised. However, for this, these few demands must really be important to every worker in the industry who would be so seriously affected by them that he or she is willing to get out and struggle and sacrifice for winning them. In order that such demands are really set, they should not be announced until a representative of the workers themselves decides upon them without being influenced by outside comrades against their own will. Unless the workers themselves are ready and willing to fight for these demands, it is useless and wasteful to enter the struggle.

Setting the time to strike. The next important thing is to choose the proper moment to strike. Here again it is of paramount importance that the workers determine at which moment to strike. They, best of all, know the conditions of the industry, and when the boss needs them most. The time to strike should be determined by exactly that (sic) when the boss needs the workers most.

The first apparatus. Organizers should not begin to organize in a territory by calling general mass meetings and general conferences of the workers. It is first important to go into the towns where workers are hired, or into the camps or on the ranches and there hold first informal meetings, and then formal meetings with the workers, until in at least a large number of places, especially those from which the strategic and big ranches draw their workers, are reasonably well organized, have at least a committee functioning, and are somewhat prepared for a greater step. Then the next step is to call a wage conference of delegates from those camps to agree on demands and to broaden our organizational forces. This conference should be as broad as possible, being certain that it is not so broad that it exposes itself to the police and the growers. The delegates to these conferences should be assigned to establish organizational connections where we have none yet in the strike area.

Leaflets. We want to call to the attention of the comrades, that up till now, we have said very little about distributing leaflets or issuing such agitational material. This is not an omission, but is because up to this point the issuance of leaflets frequently hinders the struggle rather than helps it. First, because it sets demands which the workers may not be prepared to fight for. Even if it puts these demands in a temporary optional way "Final decision to be made later" it has a tendency to make the workers feel that they can join the movement only conditionally upon their acceptance of these demands. For this reason, it is personal contact and mouth-to-mouth talk with the workers that will be decisive to the successes of our preliminary organization work. If leaflets have to be issued, that should only be done up to this stage under extremely important circumstances, and should not be relied upon as a major organizational weapon.

III. Setting Up Machinery—No Promise

The next important thing to consider is to set up a thorough and efficient machinery in order to mobilize every possible force for winning the strike. In this connection one thing is of especially outstanding importance. The organizers must make no promises to the workers. We must not promise them a strike nor success in a strike, nor induce them to go on strike on the basis that we will surely supply them with large amounts of relief, defense funds, money for picketing caravans, etc. On the contrary, it must be impressed on the workers that everything depends on what they themselves do. The whole strike is in their hands. If they are ready to strike for better conditions, we (Communists) will give them leadership, help them contact working class organizations in other parts for funds, food, etc., and we will help to coordinate their strike movement with workers in other parts of the state in the same industry. But even here, we should create this contact not by sending the outside organizers to other parts of the state, but rather sending delegations of the workers themselves to other parts to spread the strike movement. Our approach must be that we want to help workers organize, and we will give them the best of our experienced leadership, and support to help them win, but at every step, through democratic elections, through the speeches that we make, and the agitational material we issue, we must impress on the workers that the struggle is in their own hands, and that they must learn how to become experienced leaders, and not to depend only on the outside organizers.

The central strike committee. As a first measure to create this initiative from the workers themselves, it is important to set up the Central Organization Committee, which should be elected at the preliminary wage conferences. Unless we have already an organizational guarantee that we will absolutely be able to call a strike, this committee should not be called a Central Strike Committee, but a Central Organization Committee. The composition of this Central Organization Committee should be delegates from the various camps and ranches. The function of the Organization Committee should be to consider the one or two, or at the most, three major questions which most profoundly affect the strike at a particular moment. This committee should not become a theater, whereby every mass organization has its representatives make big speeches about the importance of building their own organization. At all times the committee must limit itself to only the main questions.

In organizing our leading committees in such a situation, we must be extremely careful to bring the rank and file into the leadership, and especially to bring them into those posts which are decisive for making decisions as to the course of their strike. For this purpose, the qualifications for leading comrades in a strike shall not be their abilities in the office or on committees, but rather, their abilities as workers in the field. In other words, their abilities to lead other workers in the actual course of the struggle. Union Card Delegates should be chosen on the same basis. The windy gas-hounds should be kept out of leadership, and instead, the practical devoted comrades who understand the importance of detailed organization work should be given every leading post, and the comrades who make the speeches should be put under the control of such leading committees. As near as possible, good speakers and good organizers should be the same person, but where that is not possible, we must be careful that our leading committees don't begin to consist of comrades who have the most wind.

The auxiliaries to the strike. Each helping organization to the strike must perform its own function. Thus, as a regular army cannot very well win battles without the aid of its supply trains, hospital corps, etc., so strikes cannot be fought without the aid of auxiliary organizations.

1. Among these are a relief organization to consist of strikers organized into committees to gather and distribute relief and cooperating with the W. I. R.

2. Similar defense committees cooperating with the I. L. D. The policy to guide the workers at trials should be carefully worked out. No worker should be allowed to go to trial without help from the defense committee. The strike organizers must not become panicky if there are not enough lawyers to handle the cases, but union representatives should be brought in and trained to become responsible to help for defense cases. This will especially be necessary where the number of arrests reaches large numbers. Bail, defense, prisoners relief, can only be carried through if the greatest initiative is developed among the workers themselves.

3. It is necessary to have a negotiations committee, whose function should be to reach the poor farmers immediately and try to split them away from the big grower and gain settlements to cooperate with the United Farmers League for this purpose, and to draw up a very simple agreement which the growers are asked to sign. This agreement shall not have much legal verbiage, but shall be so simple and be in so few words, that every farmer can understand its contents, and that no loophole be left for legal gymnastics.

4. A press committee must be organized. The purpose of the press committee should be:

a. To publish a bulletin as often as possible for the strikers themselves, giving them constant information on the progress of the strike, and keeping the workers informed as fully as possible. This bulletin should be very brief, but published in every language which the strikers themselves use.

b. The press committee must also arrange to issue constant releases to the capitalist press answering the slanders against the strike, and presenting the workers side of the struggle. This must be done even if the capitalist press does not print our bulletins because eventually our press releases will have the effect of weakening the lies spread against us.

5. A financial committ[illegible]t be established with possibly one expert so far as accounting is concerned, [illegible]hiefly consisting of workers themselves who shall control the receipt and dis[illegible]ursement of all funds, and who shall be responsible to the mass of the workers. The type of worker to be chosen for such a committee should be such that no worker will question the integrity of the handling of these finances.

Just prior to the strike vote, delegates to the conference should be instructed to hold elections in their respective localities for representatives to Central Strike Committees.

All committees must be responsible to the Central Strike Committee, but at every meeting of the Central Strike Committee it shall not be necessary that every committee shall report, but only those committees shall report whose questions are being handled at that particular Central Strike Committee meeting.

It is important to mobilize all the women, youth, and children in the struggle. In addition to the picket lines, the women can be organized especially in the relief apparatus, and to work with the children. The children should be organized to play games based on the strikes. Instead of "cops and robbers" they should play "workers against growers" and in the course of the play the lessons of the strikes and their simple but profound political significance can be taught to the children. The children should also be organized into picket lines and demonstrations in support of the strike, especially in the towns, to organize the sentiment of the rest of the people. As in most agricultural areas, the youth predominate in canneries. It should therefore be especially the job of the Y. C. L. and the youth sections of the Union to take hold of the job of organising the canneries and bringing them into solidarity with the workers, every effort must be to mobilise these backward workers in support of the strike. For this purpose, mass delegations of the strikers themselves should be sent to the packing house workers over the heads of whatever unions and existing machinery there might be, and appeal to the packing-house workers both on the basis of solidarity as well as for gaining improvements for themselves for united action against the growers. This should be done preliminary to the strike actually breaking out, as well as after the strike has broken out in the fields if the packing shed and cannery workers have not yet come out.

Technical preparation. Before, in the setting up of the machinery, it is of paramount importance that all technical equipment shall be prepared, including a mimeograph and typewriter, dues stamps, and dues books, and strike cards for all workers, so that the relief distirubtion should be controlled.

The union centers. During the time of the strike, it must be remembered that if the workers are really to retain with themselves any lasting lessons from the strike, the importance of the entire militant movement, and especially the district center of the C&AWIU, as well as the leadership of the T. U. U. L. must be constantly brought before them not merely in speeches but in practical actions. For example, when there are disputed points, our comrades should propose to consult and get advice from the C&AWIU or the T. U. U. L., and send in reports on all preparations and strike developments. The granting of charters to new locals should be made an occasion for impressive ceremony.

Defense squads. And finally, already before the strike, defense squads should be organized which should later be enlarged to become guerilla picketing squads, both for the purpose of defending the camps against attackers, and for the purpose of pulling those ranches, canneries or packing sheds, where access by a mass picketing line is more difficult. These defense squads should be chosen very carefully so that no stool-pigeons get into them, and the bravest workers put in to them, and the best manner of defense should be discussed and decided upon by the workers themselves.

The strike call. Now we are ready to issue the strike call. This strike call should be extremely simple. It should be first read and approved by the Central Organization or Strike Committee. It should be translated into every language the workers who are being appealed to, read, and above all, it must be very precise and to the point. When we are ready to issue the Central Strike call, we must assume that the call itself will not win the workers for the strike, because that agitation had already been prepared, but we must issue the call in order to most sharply and pointedly put the one, two, or at the most, three demands to be fought for, the date of the strike, and what to do the minute after the walkout occurs.

Conduct of the strike. The main weapon for conducting the strike is of course the picket line. The purpose of these is to keep scabs out, to pull out the more backward workers and to keep a solid organization for defense against vigilante attacks. Every picket line should be led by responsible and courageous leaders.

They should be of two general characters: guerilla picket line, and mass picket line. Both must be utilized together and to supplement one another. In other words, even while the mass picket lines are parading up and down the highway and calling upon the workers to strike, the guerilla picket lines must find other entrances to the ranches and help take the workers off. When the terror breaks loose on a large scale, it will be found that more and more we will have to rely on the guerilla picket lines. For this purpose, the guerilla picket lines must be efficient. They should not be too large, but consist of at the most from one to two carloads of workers, and they must be able to move very swiftly.

Headquarters. There should be an open headquarters wherever possible. The purpose of these headquarters shall only be for contact. In other words, we are not to keep mimeographs, typewriters or other such strike machinery in these headquarters. Not even all strike leaders should come to the headquarters, but many leading comrades should be held in reserve. There should also be reserve strike headquarters where comrades can gather in case the open headquarters are attacked. Sometimes it is wise not to have a separate Union headquarters, but to use the feeding kitchens or one of the shacks in the camps for contact purposes. All the issuance of leaflets, bulletins, and records should be kept at other places, known only to the special comrades assigned to that work and should be kept as secret as possible so that they are not attacked.

Leaders. The leading comrades should be divided into those who must become known generally because they are the open speakers, or members of the Negotiations Committee. But to supplement these, a whole series of leading comrades must not be known except by the workers through their mingling among the workers, or through their participation in the leading councils of the strike apparatus. Leaders must be chosen very carefully. They should not be the type of comrade who gets easily enthusiastic and who despairs just as easily. We should especially beware of such leaders who spread the theory that strikes can be won in 24 hours. While the enthusiasm of the masses is at its height it is the duty of the leaders to utilize that enthusiasm to its full extent, but themselves, to keep a sober realization of all factors involved, and to make decisions on such a realistic basis. At the first sign that a leader is getting discouraged and pessimistic, he should either be corrected or removed. Above all we must have leaders who do not easily get discouraged or pessimistic when difficulties arise.

The Communist Party & Y. C. L. How should the Communist Party and Y. C. L. be brought before the workers in the strike? We should distinguish the Party from the Union on a political basis. In other words, we must show the role of the Union so far as getting economic improvements is concerned, but utilize every incident in the strike to prove that the government is on the side of the bosses and that we must have also a Party that will bring the government on the side of the workers. We must explain to them that such a Party is the Communist Party and that the government by its nature is on the side of the growers, and we must establish a Workers and Farmers Government if we want the government to be on the side of the workers. Also, in our manner of recruiting, should the Party and the Union be distinguished. For the Union there should be mass recruiting from the platform, and through leaflets, but for the Party there should be recruiting person to person. The best workers should be chosen, but this should not mean one or two best workers, but in large strikes, hundreds of the best workers. "Western Workers," "Lucha Obreras," "Why Communism," and other such literature which will bring the workers close to the Communist movement should be systematically distributed.

The menace of disruption. Above all, we must watch for those comrades who continually prate against "Party interference." These comrades represent the capitalist influence in our ranks who try to split the Communist Party from its active leadership of the workers struggles. The workers themselves rarely demand the elimination of the Communist Party except where the Party comrades, through opportunist errors bring such a condition into being. We must not wait for the bosses to raise the Red Scare. On the contrary we must continually warn the workers both in the preparations for the strike, and during the strike itself that the manner of the bosses' breaking up the strike will be chiefly through trying to split the ranks of the workers, and then through terror. The workers will easily understand that they must fight against terror, but they will not easily recognize the tactics the bosses use to split their ranks. We must warn the workers in advance that the bosses will use such tactics as religious issues, race issues, political issues, issues of nationality. We must warn the workers that this strike in their union should be carried forward primarily on the basis of united action to win their demands, and no differences as to political or religious or national or racial distinctions should be allowed to enter into it at all, and that anyone who tries to split the ranks of the workers on the basis of these issues should be considered an enemy. The workers should all be asked at certain times to rise and solemnly pledge to such a platform. This will impress itself on the minds of the workers so that when the agitation of the growers comes out with their slimy talk to split the ranks, the workers will be prepared for it, and will drive them out. Only where our comrades under opportunist influence try to hide the Red issue, or cover up the fact that Communists are taking a leading part in the strike, only in such cases, does the Red issue in the hands of the bosses become effective. If we are the first to come to the workers to warn them against these issues, such methods will not be effective. During the entire strike, we must especially watch for any A. F. of L., Socialist Party, or other Social-Fascist or fascist influences entering the strike. We must warn the workers against those who pretend a "free interest in the strike" but who talk for the elimination of this or that militant leader. Especially for those like the Socialist Party who raise a few dollars for relief, and then try to use that as a wedge to go among the workers and split their ranks by telling them it is unfortunate they have "Communist leadership" and that "they stand a better chance of winning if they rid themselves of the Communist leadership." We must warn the workers of this even before the A. F. of L. and Socialist Party or other social fascist splitters come among these strikers, and make as the only test for leadership those who fight the hardest on picket lines, and other strike activity against the bosses, the growers, and their uniformed or plain-clothes agents. Finally, we must be prepared to answer quickly in our strike bulletins any maneuvers to introduce arbitration boards by investigations conducted by the Labor Commission; Federal Government, or liberal agencies.

V. The Settlement

It must be remembered that strikes are won and lost not only with the vanguard of the workers, but also with its most backward sections. In other words, we must not allow only the most militant workers to decide whether to accept a settlement, but all workers must share in the decision. The bosses will maneuver with offers of settlement against us. Their objective will be to split the ranks of the workers with such offers, and create indecision and wavering among them so as to make impossible unified action of the strike. We must meet every such maneuver chiefly by letting the workers themselves decide the questions in as democratic a fashion as possible, and by the leaders always keeping alert to see not only how the most militant sections of the strikers receive the offers of the growers, but also how the most backward sections receive these offers. It is most important to watch that we do not become influenced solely by the most militant sections, but while encouraging and strengthening the leadership of these most militant and best workers in the strike, we must also take into consideration at all times the moods of all sections of the strikers.

In the process, and after the settlement of the strike, an intense organizational drive must be begun to consolidate the gains of the strike organizationally and idealogically through popularizing the achievements through discussion and explaining the shortcomings so that workers will know how to fight better next time, and through drawing the best workers into the Communist Party, T. U. U. L. and other parts of the revolutionary movement.

STRIKE STRATEGY IN THE AGRICULTURAL FIELDS

Issued by the District Committee of The Cannery & Agricultural Workers Industrial Union

District Headquarters, 81 Post Street, San Jose, California

Since the coming of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union into the fields, thousands of workers have been organized and have taken part in struggles for better living and working conditions. Considerable experience in revolutionary struggle and in strike strategy has been developed. With greater and greater masses of workers constantly being drawn into struggle, the time has now come to take stock of the various methods and tactics used in preparing, calling and conducting strikes of field workers. This is necessary so that all class-conscious workers may benefit by the experience of the past.

In general, three methods of calling strikes have been used. These methods are: (1) The method of holding mass meetings, which may be called the public or open method. (2) The method of calling secret preliminary conferences of worker-delegates, or the "quiet" method. (3) The use of both the open and quiet methods. The advantages and disadvantages of these three methods were explained and discussed at the last District Committee meeting of the C&AWIU.

I. The Open Method

Many of the recent strikes has been called by the public or open method. That is, the Union by leaflet, advertisement or other means calls a public mass meeting of workers to consider the question of calling a strike. If the sentiment of the majority is in favor of striking, the strike call is issued, a strike committee elected from the floor and general instructions issued in regards to picketing, etc.

Some of the advantages of the open method are: This may be the only way to break into a new territory or a district in which the Union is very weak. This method often results in new and valuable recruits into the Union. The open method is perhaps the quickest way to call a strike, and sometimes upon the quickness by which a strike is called hinges the question of victory or defeat. This method has proved comparatively successful in a number of instances.

The disadvantages of the open method are: (1) The results of a public mass meeting with little or no preliminary work are too uncertain. It is hard to anticipate and be prepared for everything that may come up. (2) Secondly, a public meeting will expose those workers who take a forward or bold stand, and these workers will likely be fired from their jobs or perhaps be arrested by the police. The workers know what is likely to happen and many class-conscious workers will stand back rather than take a bold stand. (3) The open meeting gives the bosses warning to mobilize strike breakers and gives the police time to deputize thugs and gather new armed forces of suppression. (4) Such a method will increase the danger of bringing stool-pigeons into the general and central strike committees. (5) It is difficult at such a general assembly to make the necessary preliminary preparations or to draw the rank and file of the workers into a free discussion of the conditions and problems that are faced. (6) There is no assurance that at such a meeting there will be a wide, truly representative assembly of workers. (7) Calling a strike of workers when they are off the job increases the difficulty of getting the workers onto the picket lines.

II. The Quiet Or Delegated Conference Method

This method involves the calling of preliminary conferences of worker-delegates representing as many ranches as possible, especially the larger ranches. The workers can be summoned to the conference by Union men who are working on the ranches, or by unemployed Union men who can make contacts in the early morning while looking for work. Much can be done by both employed and unemployed during the noon hour to secure delegates.

This method of calling secret or "quiet" conferences of worker-delegates from the various ranches before the calling of the strike has a number of important advantages: (1) The main advantage is that the identity of the workers is kept from the bosses—there is no exposure of the leading, most active workers. (2) The bosses and the police are kept in the dark about the strike, and altho they may hear rumors of strike, they cannot be sure, and when the strike is called, it comes as a surprise to the bosses and police. (3) This quiet method of calling preliminary conferences enables full and detailed discussion by the workers of their conditions, wages, strike sentiment of fellow workers, when best to call the strike, the demands, and the ranches most important to bring out on strike. The conferences will bring out on which ranches the Union is strong and those on which the Union is weak. Certain comrades thus can be assigned in time to get work on or obtain delegates from the ranches in which the Union is weakly represented. Whenever possible Union men should be working on the ranches as much more effective work can be done from the "inside" than from the "outside." (4) These preliminary conferences make it possible to set up the entire strike apparatus prior to the calling of the strike, such as, the relief committee, the leaflet committee, the publicity committee, the central strike committee, etc. The entire conference may be turned into the General Strike Committee. (5) At the conference opportunity is had to explain the role and functioning of the Union, and new members can be signed into the Union. There is also opportunity to give detailed information to worker-delegates on the method of conducting a strike and particularly about the importance of establishing and maintaining a picket line.

The disadvantage of the conference method comes mainly when the Union is weak—when there are few Union men working in the ranches or when there are but few contacts established. Another disadvantage of the quiet method is that it sometimes turns out to be too quiet, that is, the workers themselves don't know a strike is being prepared and will be as much surprised as the bosses when the strike is called. To avoid this, care must be taken that during the preparatory work of the conferences, a general agitation for strike is carried on among the workers in the ranches. This will assure a readiness on the part of the workers to walk-out when they receive the strike call.

III. Combination "Open" and "Quiet" Method

The third method of preparing and calling a strike is a combination of the other two. Conferences of worker-delegates are held prior to the calling of the strike, but the open mass meeting held on the eve of the strike as well. This is a very common method, perhaps the most common.

The chief advantage over the quiet conference method is that it assures a more widespread knowledge of the strike among the masses of the workers.

The disadvantages are again those of exposing the leading comrades, of giving the bosses a chance to send in strike-breakers, and giving the police the opportunity to mobilize their armed thugs.

Thus we can see advantages and disadvantages in each of the three methods. In choosing their method, the comrades will have to be guided by the circumstances of the particular situation they face. As the Union grows and our experiences broaden, these methods will be improved and new and better ways found to increase the standard of living of the workers—and finally to bring about the establishment of the workers' own government which will once for all bring an end to exploitation and give all workers a decent standard of living.

No matter which method is used the following should receive special attention if successful strikes are to be led:

(1) **Preliminary preparations**: Of utmost importance is to have a well-functioning local and section apparatus. The section and various local committees should meet regularly. Full information should be possessed about the area in which the strike is to called—the number of workers, the important ranches, the various roads to the ranches, strategic points for establishing picket lines, etc. Contact should be secured with at least each large ranch.

(2) **Strike committees**: General and central strike committees should keep in touch with ranch committees at all times. The ranch committees must maintain contact with growers. Meetings of the various strike committees must be held at least daily in order to receive reports and to meet the changing developments with a change of tactics.

(3) **Relief**: Strikes are usually won or lost over the question of relief. Relief machinery should be prepared prior to the strike and in operation from the first day of the strike. A committee under the leadership of a competent person should be set up to handle relief. Liberals and sympathizers can often be brought into this work

(4) **Publicity**: Publicity in the form of mass meetings, news releases, leaflets, etc. should be conducted constantly during the strike. Liberals and sympathizers can also be utilized in the committee set up to handle the publicity. Assign some one to take pictures of the picket line, mass meetings and in particular to photo any attacks by the police.

(5) **Picket lines**: Picket lines must be established and maintained from the first day. It is particularly important that the picket line be formed early in the morning to prevent strike-breakers from being brought to work. Experience seems to show that it is better to mobilize the workers right on the picket line rather than mobilizing them somewhere else first and then going in mass to picket.

(6) **Educational work**: In order to keep alive the militant spirit on the picket line, the leading and politically advanced comrades or any comrades who address the workers must not only deliver agitational and political speeches, but it is even more vital that they instruct the workers as to the role of the Union and how it functions. Since a large portion of our membership consists of migratory workers, it is particularly important to stress the duty of these workers to act AS UNION MEN NO MATTER WHERE THEY ARE OR IN WHAT CROP THEY ARE WORKING. This must be done not only on the picket line, but in all the mass meetings as well.

(7) **Recruiting**: The question of recruiting and building the Union is of equal importance to winning the strike. A recruiting committee should be in possession of sufficient books and stamps to enable recruiting at all times,

whether on the picket line, at the mass meetings, or in committee meetings. The recruiting committee should be under the control and instructed by the dues secretary.

(8) **Defense**: The usual method of the bosses to break a strike is to arrest the leading comrades. This is done in order to behead the strike and intimidate the workers. To meet this danger two preparations should be made: (a) Defense squads should be formed from the first day of the strike. These squads should crowd around and protect speakers and act as the body-guard of the comrades. The defense squads should set the example by their militancy against police terror. (b) The best elements among the workers should be taught the duties of each functionary. Thus when something happens to the leading comrades there will be someone prepared to take their place.

(9) **Leading comrades**: It is necessary that leading comrades receive a minimum amount of rest and sleep during the strike so that they will be sufficiently alert mentally to meet the new developments from day to day and from hour to hour. Instances are known where strikes have been lost merely because all the leading comrades exhausted themselves in the first few days of the strikes. All comrades can get the needed amount of rest if there is organization of and division of work.

(10) **Developing leadership**: In every strike, in every struggle, the comrades will witness new workers cropping up into leadership, playing an active, militant role in the struggle. These workers must be drawn into the leading strike committees during the strike!

(11) **The District office**: Full information, from the beginning of the strike activity to the end, should be sent to the District Office of the Union. Only thru the constant cooperation of the various Sections of the Union thru the District center can we hope to build a strong, powerful Union.

Small Farmer, Worker Unite in Struggle. The strike of the California cotton pickers is of great significance because it is the first in the industry for a long period, and involves a great mass of the most exploited workers in the state. But the feature that should attract the widest attention from the agricultural workers and small farmers is the fact that it shows in actual practice how the workers and small farmers are united in struggle. The theories of the I. W. W. or such as the Socialist Labor Party, and similar sects, that all farmers belong to the exploiting class, are shattered completely by such living experiences.

For weeks in preparation for the strike, the United Farmers League, an organization of the small farmers in the district, co-operated with the workers because one of the chief strike demands is that the Finance Companies who have already contracted for the purchase of the cotton crop, shall raise the price to the farmers. The small farmer realizes that his position is similar to that of the worker. In face of the cost of living rising, he must turn over the crop for a price that was already set, which will not leave him anything for even an existence. Both he and the agricultural worker face the common exploiter—the Finance Companies, who reap the profits.

The small farmers immediately declared their willingness to accept the demands of the workers, for $1 per hundred and recognition of the union.

The action taken in the cotton fields should serve as an example for all similar situations. In this manner, struggles will serve as a means for uniting the two giant forces against capitalism.

In this manner the attempts of the large growers to organize the mass of small farmers into their terror squads against strikers will fail! (Western Worker, Oct. 9, 1933)

III. STATISTICS OF STRIKERS RECEIVING RELIEF

Analysis of 3,006 cases of cotton strikers (10,602 persons) which received relief from the California Emergency Relief Administration, 1933:

Of 2,426 cases for which data are available, 48.6 percent were Mexicans, 44.9 were American Whites, and 6.5 percent were Negroes. This certainly underrepresents Mexicans among the whole body of strikers.

Of 8,556 persons whose age was ascertained, 18.7 percent were under school age (1–5), 33.1 percent were of school age (6–17), and 48.2 percent were over school age. 35.6 percent were between the ages of 18 and 44 years, inclusive. Only 12.6 percent were 45 years of age or over. Only 4.7 percent were 55 or over.

Single persons comprised 31.1 percent of the 3,006 cases, but only 8.8 percent of all persons receiving relief.

Of the 2,070 families, 20.6 percent were comprised of 2 persons, 35.4 percent of 3 or 4 persons, 44 percent of 5 or more persons, and 13.3 percent of 8 or more.

EXHIBIT 8765[1]

CAMPBELL MCCULLOUGH'S REPORT—LABOR CONDITIONS IN IMPERIAL VALLEY

Relations between employer and employee in the Imperial Valley will be unsatisfactory and continue to produce strife at more or less regular intervals until some permanent form of adjustment of disputes is provided in the Valley itself, and which will have sufficient authority—voluntary or otherwise—to render decisions and have them obeyed.

Because of the nature of the crops, their swift rotation over the months of the year, the values involved, and type and volume of labor required to harvest them, the Imperial Valley with its 1800 square miles of area is an easy field for the professional agitators who have used the opportunities provided regularly from two to three times each season. Until the growers themselves realize that their own failure to make necessary changes and more or less permanent adjustments in working conditions providing the opportunity for the agitators trouble will continue. It is admitted that due to one cause or another the fabulously rich Imperial Valley has in three years passed suffered net loss amounting to more than $18,000,000. Undoubtedly some considerable part of this is due to labor difficulties. So much as preamble.

The labor in the Imperial Valley is probably 90% Mexican with Filipinos, Negroes, and a few Hindus making up the rest, the total population employed in the Valley being approximately 12,000. The labor is perhaps 25% floating and 75% classed as resident, many of the workers having families, and all living under conditions which would discourage white workers. Villages almost entirely of tents with the most primitive facilities house numbers of the workers. In camps outside Brawley, Imperial and El Centro are found many of the casuals. At Calipatria, Hopewell and El Centro are found good permanent camps, but because of the methods of cultivation, differences of groups, permanent construction on the ranches is not usual. At this writing, because of the economic and strike conditions there is probably a surplus of labor which cannot be absorbed amounting to 3500 or more, including many women and children.

Last October-November there was trouble between the workers and their employers over the pea crop. After some difficulty the strike was adjusted. There is little denial anywhere in the Valley that this strike was formed by Communist agitators who moved into the Imperial Valley from the San Joaquin Valley cotton strike. The same names, the same inflammatory literature, the same incendiary arguments appeared. Late in October the growers, totalling perhaps 70–75, met with committees of their employees and agreed upon hours and wages. For the field workers it was agreed that 22.5 cents per hour and a nine-hour day for steady work should be paid. Also it was agreed that a minimum working day of five hours should prevail. All these conditions would be discussed again in December. Apparently the features above listed were lived up to by the better type of grower.

Early in December agitators—the same ones admittedly—appeared in San Diego County and upset the tomato pickers. Through the efforts of representatives of the Los Angeles Regional Labor Board this difficulty was composed and an agreement signed by the Japanese employers and the Mexican and Filipino workers, and that pact is still in force. Three brothers named Hancock, the eldest being known as Stanley, had come to San Diego and Oceanside from the Imperial following the pea strike. Following the adjustment just mentioned they disappeared into the San Joaquin again.

Late in December when the lettuce crop began to mature the Hancocks appeared again. Some mimeograph circulars run off, the police of the Valley say, in a motor car which bore the mimeograph machine from place to place, began to appear. Because of the unrest a growers' committee met with a committee of the workers. There had been formed a Mexican workers' union with a membership of considerably less than a thousand, it is admitted, and it was from this union that the workers' committee was drawn. The agitators had convinced the workers that it would be possible to get 75% increase in wages, and consequently when the committee met with the growers about January 2nd, its first demand was for 35 cents per hour. There were some other demands, but the conference split on the first. The growers wished to postpone the discussion, but the workers' committee refused and a strike was called. However, on the 10th of January the regular workers began returning gradually to their employment until there are now 5,000 at work. From then on the trouble continued to increase, the flames adroitly fanned by Communist speakers and circulars. Many of these letters bore the name of Caroline Decker, characterized as a Communist leader who had been effective in the San Joaquin Valley, although it is believed that she was not then in the territory.

---

[1] See pt. 53, p. 19405.

Because of the unrest, the constant clashes and outbreaks between the Mexicans and Filipinos who cordially hate each other, the state highway police headquartered at Sacramento sent 25 additional men to reinforce the state highway police detachment headquartered at El Centro under command of Captain Frank Oswalt, whose brother Sterling Oswalt, is Chief of Police at El Centro. The Chief of Police at Brawley is Lon Cromer. There was no violent outbreak until the morning of January 12th at 10:30 in the morning. Reports from all quarters agree that at this hour Cromer of Brawley with a detachment of State Highway Patrolmen under Captain Oswalt and deputy sheriffs under Sheriff George Campbell proceeded to Azteca Hall in Brawley where he says he had reason to believe several known communists and agitators were addressing a mass meeting. When the door was opened by a woman the Chief brushed her aside and with his men tried to enter the hall and here met with resistance. It should be noted that the windows of the hall were covered outside by heavy wire screening and that the police surrounded the building

Something near a riot is said to have resulted and the police threw tear bombs into the hall. It is admitted that there were women and children in Azteca Hall; it is reported that the police battled to force the doors shut so that those inside should feel the effects of the gas, and it is admitted that a tear gas bomb was thrown from inside the hall and struck Chief Cromer on the head. Most people with whom this incident was discussed believe this bomb was one the police had used and which failing to break had been thrown back outside.

Those inside the hall promptly broke the windows for air. The police claim that the men that they were in search of escaped through the back of the hall. It must be noted that there was no question that "red" agitators were in the area; that conditions akin to riot and mob violence were apparent, and that it was necessary to prevent the incitement of large groups of people by the agitators. The use of tear gas bombs under the circumstances may or may not have been justified. When the crowd inside the hall were allowed to escape the police searched the hall. They found four hundred short lengths of cut wood which they claim were intended as riot clubs, some with nails driven through them. The Mexican workers assert that they were merely firewood. It is not stated that Communist literature was found in the hall although the clubs were confiscated. Several women and children were reported to have been made ill by the tear gas, though it is not true that there were deaths as the result of their experience in the hall. So far as can be learned there is no charge of inhuman conduct on the part of the police, the only severe criticism being because of the tear gas incident related above.

It is stated by many persons in both El Centro and Brawley that there is virtually military law in the lower part of Imperial Valley; that no mass meetings are allowed; not more than two of the workers are allowed to stand together in the streets in one group. The authorities say that these measures are necessary if peace is to be preserved.

The police and deputy sheriffs within a few days from January 15–17 arrested 75 persons whom they classed as agitators. They were held in jail till Wednesday night when Grover Johnson, an attorney of San Bernardino, obtained writs of habeas corpus calling on the sheriffs to produce the persons in court Thursday, January 18. On their production, however, Mr. Johnson did not appear. He had summoned an attorney from Phoenix named Lynch to assist him, but on Mr. Lynch's appearance he was arrested. Sheriff George Campbell stated that Lynch had a "criminal record in Arizona" and was a known agitator. The cases were all continued until Tuesday, January 23.

That there are communist agitators in the area need not be doubted; that they have incited trouble is unquestionably a fact, but that the bulk of the workers who at first struck at the beginning, of the lettuce harvest believe in communist promises and later finding these promises unfulfilled have returned to work is also a fact. The lettuce crop is moving; an average of 110 cars a day being shipped out of the Valley. Inquiry in several districts makes it reasonably sure that there are not less than 2500 people counting the ranchers; that probably as many more are engaged in preparing and cultivating the next crop of cantaloupes, and that squash and some other minor vegetables are also being cultivated. But there is also the large group of 3,000 or more for whom there is no employment, and that these people constitute a menace and unless something is done for them they will become not only a charge upon the area but a serious problem, for under present market conditions there can be no place for them.

On Thursday night, January 18th, the police succeeded in arresting Pat Chambers, known as a communist agitator recently released from custody in Tulare County where he had been held for inciting the San Joaquin riots, and Caroline Decker. They are now held in El Centro jail and will be arraigned Tuesday, January 23. With these arrests the police believe the back of the Red activities is broken.

The Los Angeles Regional Labor Board has had a representative in the area for several days making his headquarters in the State Labor Commissioner's office. Together these men have endeavored to compose the trouble, but report that their efforts have been discouraged by police officials. They quote Captain Oswalt above mentioned as having caused their appearance in El Centro police headquarters for questioning and then informing them that their conciliatory efforts were not needed.

"You men get out of here," he is reported to have said. "You are hurting our work. We don't want conciliation. We know how to handle these people and where we find trouble makers we will drive them out if we have to 'sap' them."

There is a face of the situation in the lower Imperial Valley that must to a considerable degree warp the unbiased judgment of those in control of the situation, and which will at least operate against unbiased treatment of the workers. It is the fact that most of the officials of the area are themselves growers. For example:

Captain Frank Oswalt is said to own and cultivate 400 acres of land in the vicinity of El Centro, and his brother Sterling Oswalt, Chief of Police of El Centro, also is reported as cultivating acreage.

Chief Cromer of Brawley also owns acreage and cultivates it.

Sheriff George Campbell of Imperial County is a grower and owner of acreage.

Undersheriff Rodney Clark operates a considerable acreage.

E. H. Harrigan, Agriculture Commissioner stationed at El Centro is a large grower, owning and operating four ranches.

A situation that produces dispute among workers is that of H. B. Griffin of Brawley who is not only a grower and land owner but is Police Judge and also Justice of the Peace sitting in civil cases. Mrs. Griffin is also the holder of two jobs—clerk of the Police Court and Clerk of the Justice Court. It is alleged that no worker can hope to get justice in either of the courts since Judge Griffin is reported to be of the opinion that $1.00 a day is enough for a Mexican field worker.

The one outstanding law-enforcement official of the county who is not involved in ranching operations in addition to his official duties is District Attorney Elmer Heald.

An earnest and composing influence in the troubles of the Valley since last October has been the Mexican consul, Joaquin Terrazas with official headquarters at Calexico, twelve miles south of El Centro. During the course of several hours' conversation with Consul Terrazas, while voicing no criticism of either authorities or growers, believed there was need of a conference between the growers and workers.

"How this is to be arranged I do not know", he said. "A workers' committee is necessary, but since the workers are not allowed to meet they cannot choose a committee. The problem is not easy of solution even when the conference is held. Living costs are increasing and because of the conditions under which the lettuce is cut it is difficult for the workers to get in more than a few hours, perhaps five hours at the most, on many days. Other days they may put in the full nine hours."

The efforts of Consul Terrazas in October resulted in the conference set forth above at which the wage scale of 22.5 cents was arrived at, this displacing the former scale of 15 cents per hour with a minimum of three hours.

The writer discussed with Consul Terrazas the question of what was to become of the 300 superfluous workers, many of whom had families. He was asked if there was possibility of repatriation. His reply was that these people could not finance repatriation since they were penniless. If such repatriation could be financed he believed that the necessary arrangements for their reception could be made with the Mexican government.

The same question was discussed with Commissioner of Agriculture Harrigan mentioned above.

"Let them get out," he stated. "There is no room for them here." When asked where penniless people were to go and how they were to go there he replied that a little starving would be good for them and the growers of Imperial County do not consider that this is their problem. They are not going to become a charge on this county either. Reminded that there were women and children among them he declined to admit that this made any difference. They should either get out or be sent out. Mr. Harrigan stated that he did not believe there was necessity for a meeting with the workers and the growers, as the growers had the situation in hand and were satisfied to "let things go along as they are."

Mr. Harrigan discussed the economic conditions of the Valley and the particular situation financially freely and no doubt accurately. He stated that there were probably 30,000 acres planted in lettuce; that of this perhaps 20,000 acres had reached useful maturity, and that replanting had increased this to 22,000 acres. A fair average yield would be 100 crates to the acre, which would give a total yield for the season of 2,200,000 crates or approximately 7,500 cars. He believed that no grower was making a profit upon shipments, such profit being impossible until a price of $1.50 per crate had been reached. Two weeks previously the price was 75 cents per crate, which entailed a heavy loss to the grower.

January 22nd there will be a meeting of growers under the supervision of the state at which an effort will be made to pro-rate the shipments for the purpose of maintaining the price. It is believed that a maximum of 110 cars a day should not be exceeded.

While such restrictions may react unfavorably for the workers it is expected that the cantaloupe crop if the weight is favorable and the market holds up as the result of improved business conditions throughout the country will restore the wage situation of the workers.

No small part of the difficulty with the workers had been due to living and working conditions which even for workers with an extraordinarily low standard are said to be aggravating. Mr. E. Buchhold attached to the County Health Department whose work is sanitary conditions upon the ranches admits that there is much to be desired. The sanitary conditions in the camps and on the ranches are such that a usual percentage of typhoid—far too high—is always present. There is no water supply for the field other than the irrigation water from the Colorado River, and this according to exterior conditions often has a heavy content of silt and other solid matter requiring careful and thorough filtering before it is potable.

Some workers' representatives with whom the writer talked complain that a number of ranches provide no good water for the workers, but that they are compelled to drink from the irrigation ditches. This is not so serious as it may seem since the regular water supply for the towns in the Valley is the irrigation water which passes through filtering basins and through a chlorinating process to make it potable. The ranches themselves have no such facilities. The state law requires employers to furnish employees with a "fresh and pure drinking water."

Mr. Buchhold described among other sanitary facilities the condition of certain latrines with imperfect screening on many ranches, tending to produce typhus conditions, and some of these being too close to the water supply. It is probable that any certain solution for this labor problem should include a careful survey of the sanitation in the workers' camps and on the ranches.

Some workers have complained of the maintenance of what are known as the "field boarding houses". These are just what the name implies. They are places on the ranches where food is furnished to workers at a price that is deducted from their wages. The complaint is that in many ranches the food is bad and that the charge is far too high. In fact, unquestionably these conditions contribute to the general unrest and dissatisfaction. No statement is made that the growers themselves operate these boarding places which are occasionally concessions.

Part of the workers' dissatisfaction has been due to what are known as "contract conditions". This means simply that a grower has a contract with an individual to supply a number of workers at the agreed rate of 22.5 per hour; and that the contractor has hired the workers at 12.5 per hour. In a number of cases the contractor has collected from the grower and has then absconded with the employees' wages. In other occasions where a foreman has contracted to operate the field commissary, making excess charges against the workers, and they want these abuses done away with.

A conference was held by the writer and others on the evening of January 18th at the Planters Hotel in Brawley with a group of seven growers, among them being Messrs. Jack, Moore, Sears, and Seibert, all among the largest operators of ranches in the County. Mr. Jack acted as spokesman for the group. The wage scale with its minimum hours he stated to be in effect. When it was said to him that there was a report that the growers had declined to meet a committee of the employees he stated unequivocally that this was not true; that the growers committee stood ready at any time to meet a committee of the workers, but that he and his associates would not meet, treat, nor even discuss the situation with agitators; that these agitators were interlopers seeking to make capital out of the ignorance of the workers and the economic situation of the growers. Mr. Jack confirmed the abuses by contractors and said the employers were also desirous of eliminating these and other conditions although many troubles lay beyond their control.

Mr. Jack confirmed the general statement that most of the growers were either actually bankrupt or on the verge of it, but the attitude of the entire group was hopeful that if the crops were successful and the market stood up this season it might do much toward covering their losses of the previous three years. The above refers especially to the large growers—many of them incorporated groups, but it has no reference whatever to the smaller growers, the little ranchers either own their own land or are renters from large land holders. Probably 75 percent of the smaller employers cannot hope for even a strong market to pull them out of their troubles; most of them having obligations in the bank in the Valley from which they will not be able to redeem themselves. There can be no valid criticism of the attitude of the larger growers.

District Attorney Elmer Heald is of the opinion that until there is some permanent form of adjustment for labor difficulties they will continue. There is no doubt that this statement is correct; there have been recurring seasonal disputes for a number of years; there must continue to be such disputes until a solution is found.

It is recommended as an experimental solution that:

1. An adjustment committee of three persons, for example, the Mexican consul, who is regarded with respect by all persons in the Valley; the District Attorney, who is an impartial official because he is not a grower, and one of the outstanding clergymen whose attitude is known to be impartial, both groups to agree to accept their decisions.

2. A close check of employment be kept by the State Industrial Welfare Commission and that on recommendation the growers issue in other points warnings to workers not to enter for Valley in the expectation of employment.

3. A combined survey of Imperial Valley labor conditions be made by the Los Angeles Regional Labor Board, the United States Department of Labor, and the California State Labor Commission, and that future adjustments be worked out from this survey.

Conferences with: Dist. Atty. Elmer Heald, Sheriff George Campbell, Agriculture Commissioner E. A. Harrigan, Mexican Consul Joaquin Terrazas, Committee of seven representing growers, J. H. Dicks, Secretary Vegetable Pickers' Assn., E. Buchhold, County Health Commission.

CAMPBELL MCCULLOUGH,
Secretary, Los Angeles Regional Labor Board.

EXHIBIT 8766[1]

REPORT TO THE NATIONAL LABOR BOARD BY SPECIAL COMMISSION RELEASE No. 3325

INTRODUCTORY

Under date of January 26th, Senator Robert F. Wagner, as Chairman of the National Labor Board, sent to each of the undersigned a telegram containing these words: "You are hereby designated as special commissioner to act * * * in agricultural disturbances in Imperial Valley and for purposes of making recommendation looking towards permanent adjustment of agricultural labor situation there. It is hoped that you will be able to undertake * * * the immediate commencement of the work".

Under instructions embodied in the telegrams, the Commission convened in Los Angeles on Monday, January 29. After planning the inquiry, we interviewed several persons in Los Angeles who were somewhat familiar with the Imperial County situation, and we reviewed the findings of Mr. Campbell McCullough who, as Secretary of the Los Angeles Regional Labor Board, had visited the Valley some time earlier.

The Commission reached Imperial County on Tuesday, January 30th, and remained there until the close of Wednesday, February 7th. In the course of our investigation we held several open hearings and then interviewed privately those who were hesitant about appearing publicly. The persons from whom information was obtained included City, County, State and Federal officials, growers and shippers, workers and their representatives (including both those in and out of jail, newspaper men, relief workers, professional men, and several unemployed individuals. The Commission personally inspected working conditions and also living conditions, both in cities and in the field camps.

As a result of our inquiry, we present at the end of this report certain definite suggestions for the serious consideration of the National Labor Board.

J. L. LEONARD,
WILL J. FRENCH,
SIMON J. LUBIN.

FEB. 11, 1934.

I. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

The outward events that caused the National Labor Board to intervene are as follows:

On October 12, 1933, there was revived the Union of Mexican Field Workers at Brawley. On November 1st. a committee from the Union met with three representatives of the growers. It was agreed that for lettuce harvesting the rate should be 22½ cents per hour, with a guarantee of five hours work for those called into the field. The workers understood there would be opportunity to review this rate about January 1st., if the market price of lettuce should sufficiently strengthen.

Alleging that the growers were not living up to the agreement, the Mexican Union called a one-day strike on November 13th. During December representatives of the Union and the growers met to consider charges that some grower were violating the agreement to pay for a minimum of five hours work or waiting time. The Mexican Consul stationed at Calexico acted as go-between. The growers claimed their respective companies were keeping the agreement, admitted that certain others were probably violating the agreement, but insisted that they had no control over the others.

At this point it was observed that so-called agitators were active among the workers.

On January 2, 1934, agents of the two groups met again. The workers asked for an increase to 35 cents an hour. The growers refused to grant the increase. The officers of the Mexican Union then believed it was necessary to do something to save their honor. There are two versions of their conduct: (1) that they decided to announce that the Union was "suspended" until January 15th, when they hoped they could meet the growers again, (2) that they turned the Union over to the "agitators" for fifteen days, with the request that the latter "see what they could do." Representatives of the "Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union", affiliated with the Trade Union Unity League (presumably allied with the Communist movement), then were successful in signing up members in their organization.

---

[1] See pt. 53, p 19495.

The growers shipped no lettuce on January 7th and 8th, claiming that Eastern markets were glutted.

A strike was declared by the C. and A. W. I. U. for January 8th. A mass meeting for all workers in the Valley was called for El Centro next day. As the Brawley contingent was forming, to proceed to El Centro by trucks and cars, it was broken up by peace officers, City, County, and State, and tear-gas bombs were used. On this day and later, many arrests were made. The Inquiry Commission has a list of 87 such arrests.

On January 12th, several hundred Mexicans gathered in Ayteca Hall in Brawley to hold a meeting. The Chief of Police of Brawley with policemen, sheriff's deputies, and State traffic officers, went to the Hall allegedly to capture five persons for whom he had warrants. Claiming that the audience would not permit him to perform his duty, he and his aides threw several gas-bombs into the over-crowded Hall. The police failed to capture any of the five persons for whom they held warrants, though they did make arrests five days later in the vicinity of the Hall.

On January 21st, a representative of the American Civil Liberties Union made formal request upon the Sheriff of Imperial County and the Chief of Police of Brawley for permission to hold a meeting at Ayteca Hall on the evening of January 23rd. The request was denied. On the morning of January 23rd, a Federal injunction was served on the Sheriff, the Chief, and others restraining them from interfering with the meeting in any manner. At 7:15 that evening, the person announced as chairman of the meeting was abducted from the Planters Hotel in Brawley by a large mob, and threatened, and then left in the desert about twenty miles from the point of abduction. Later, after he had found his way back to El Centro, he was escorted out of the County to San Diego by peace officers.

II. IMPERIAL COUNTY

Imperial County is one of the two southern Counties of California bordering upon Mexico. San Diego County lies to the west and fronts upon the Pacific Ocean, while Imperial County lies between the coast range on the west to the Colorado River on the east. Imperial Valley, mostly below sea level, occupies about one-fourth of the area of the county. Settled since 1900 and set up as a new county through its separation from San Diego County in 1907, it now boasts a population of 65,000 composed of white and colored groups. Of the total population there may be from 15,000 to 20,000 of Mexican extraction, several thousand Filipinos, and a good sprinkling of Japanese, Hindus and Negroes. Accurate estimates of the population and racial distribution of the county are impossible, because of the shifting character of many of the workers.

This inland empire, credited by the Imperial County Chambers of Commerce with being the largest irrigation area in the world and comprising some 525,000 irrigable acres, is watered by the muddy waters of the Colorado River, through an extensive irrigation system. The heavy sand and silt content of this water, together with its contaminated character in some of the irrigation canals, creates distinct problems of its own. The drainage of this valley is into the Salton Sea, a considerable body of water lying 240 feet below sea level.

The climate of the valley permits a twelve month growing season, and some crop is being harvested every month in the year. The products of the valley are grown for distant, rather than for local consumption. The dairy and cattle industry is extensive. Strawberries, carrots, cabbages, asparagus, and all manner of orchard and garden crops, are grown in super-abundance. The most important "money" crops, and those focussing attention upon the peculiar and particular labor problems of the valley, are lettuce, peas, and melons. A brief description of the seasons for the production of these crops throws special light upon the problems before us.

The planting time for lettuce begins about September 15th, and continues through the first week of November, while the thinning and cultivating operations are carried on from November 10th to Christmas Day. The lettuce harvest commences about December 5th, to 10th, and continues to the third week in

April. The peak load of the lettuce harvest is from the middle of January to the middle of March.

Pea planting begins the last week in August and extends to November 1st, and the fall crop is harvested until December frosts and freezes ruin the vines. Planting for the spring season follows the frosts and freezes and this crop is picked through February and March and sometimes into April. The peak of this season (1934 spring) will begin about the 10th to 15th of February and will continue for about 6 weeks.

The early variety of cantaloupe are planted from the middle to the last of November, and the planting continues through December and January. The late varieties of cantaloupe and also honeydews and honeyballs are planted in January through April. The melon harvest begins about the first of May, with the peak of the shipments from the middle to the last of June, through July and into August.

The dates for the planting and the harvesting of these three crops will vary somewhat from year to year, depending upon temperature conditions.

The work of preparing the soil, planting, cultivating and growing, is done by the residents of the valley, but for the peak seasons of the harvest much migratory and transitory labor is used. The migratory worker is of two general classifications, field workers and shed workers. The field workers harvest the crops in the field and the shed workers pack the harvest for the distant markets. Many of these migratory workers are attached to the payrolls of the great grower-shipper companies, which operate not only in the Imperial Valley, but also in the San Joaquin and other more northern valleys of California, in the Salt River Valley of Arizona and through the other areas of the west where they have interests. Many of these employees are moved by the companies to their various holdings as the crops mature. The transient labor will be made up of persons who move as individuals, groups or families, and who hope to find some opportunity for employment where so much labor is required. Many of this latter class are not skilled or inured to the types of labor required in the valley.

The work in the fields, since it deals with Crops that grow close to the ground and require hand work and hand harvesting is perhaps no more difficult than elsewhere in these United States, except that at times, and this is particularly true in the summer months, the heat in the fields reaches temperatures of 120 degrees and upwards. During the cantaloupe harvest only those accustomed to the heat can hope to stand up under the work. This is one of the reasons given for the employment of "color" among the field workers.

III. LAND ECONOMICS

The system of agriculture in the Imperial Valley is difficult to describe. The area is not devoted to farming in the sense that this term is used in the middle-west and in the east. It is a vast open area, between the towns and villages, owned and controlled for the most part by units known locally as shippers-growers, and devoted to commercial farming. To illustrate the elements of land control, we will refer to just a few of the major crops of the valley.

From the reports of the various State and Federal crop-reporting agencies, we find for the current season the following: 74 individuals and companies have planted 30,147 acres of lettuce, 13,932 acres of spring and fall peas, and 3,675 acres of carrots.

The situations in the melon crop (cantaloupe, honeydew, honeyball) for the season for 1933, presents the picture in a little different light. The grower-shipper acreage of the last season showed 53 such grower-shippers held 31,224 acres of melons, and "independents" 4,497 acres, a total of 35,721 acres. In view of even this brief exposition, a statement by one of the larger growers before us clarifies the situation. He says that in his opinion in excess of 90 percent of the crops in the County are grown or financed by the shipper-growers. At another time he stated that 75 percent of the commercial crops in the valley are grown by the shipper-growers [illegible] another 15 percent are financed by them.

With this system of land tenure and land operation there is then the requirement that all work upon these holdings must be done by paid labor. It is small wonder then that the past labor disturbances in the valley have centered around the small group that dominates the land situation, and we are tempted to include also the political and social situation.

We cannot deny that the shippers and growers, separately or in combination as shipper-growers, have been passing through a series of trying financial years.

The melon crop in 1930 comprised 52,637 acres, in 1931 it was 52,000 acres, in 1932 the acreage was held to 43,566, and for 1933 it was reduced to 35,721 acres indicated before. These reductions in acreage were not sufficient to stop the downward price movement for the melons and for the other crops. In spite of all economies, and with wages during 1933 as low as 12½¢ and 15¢ per hour, the shippers point out that they have lost an average of $3,500,000 per year for the last four years. Some of their associates are already bankrupt and sold out, others are in the bankruptcy courts now, and they maintain that still others are threatened by a like fate, unless there is a speedy turn for the better in the market price of their products. The considerable reduction in acreage, they point out, has lessened the demand for field labor, and has added to the unemployment in the valley, and at times the flood of transients looking for work has reached tremendous proportions. They cite the immediate case of more than 4,000 workers camped around the pea fields at the time we visited them (Feb. 6), with work available for only a small fraction of the number. They further insist, that having the mildest climate in this part of the country, the valley is a winter mecca for all who can find their way to this area. It is a fact that the only highway open all the year to the Pacific Coast runs through the heart of Imperial Valley.

As a further justification of the low wages paid, the growers presented us a number of confidential cost figures which indicate that they pay from 40 to 50 percent of their income for wages in field work, 12–22 percent for packing, that rents, including taxes, take 15–17 percent, and that the costs of fertilizer, seeds, selling, hauling, tractor work, etc., speedily devoured their dollars of income and made serious inroads through their surpluses of former years right down into their capital resources.

For the current season the price of lettuce has improved somewhat, aided no doubt by a pro-rating agreement made under the provisions of a recent California law. The growers contend that this will limit the harvest, but that the product sold at this improved price must pay for the lettuce grown that will not be harvested. The growers state that pro-rating will enable them to make their shipments in four to six days per week, and will tend to eliminate Sunday labor in the cutting and shipping divisions. How this will prove of any particular advantage to labor, working on an hourly or piece work rate, was not brought out.

From the foregoing it would appear that the shipper-grower is a victim of circumstances almost beyond his control, that he is caught between a low selling market on the one hand, and an insistent labor group on the other. The workers claim that they are receiving, due to irregular and uncertain employment, a starvation wage or less. How these conditions result in an aggravation of the labor and wage situation will be developed.

IV. THE LABOR SITUATION

1. The need for large numbers of workers to pick the crops, added to the prevailing business depression, has resulted in unusual complications in the economic problems of Imperial County. There are thousands of unemployed workers who have come from other States, or who have "followed the crops" from northern California down into southern California. In addition the presence of more than 15,000 Mexican men, women, and children, and about 3,000 Filipinos, to say naught of Japanese, Negroes, Hindus, and men of other nationalities, has augmented the difficulties to be faced.

2. The mild winter climate of the Imperial Valley attracts the migratory worker. He wants employment. If married, he brings his wife and family, and generally speaking, his lack of funds results in a call on Federal, State, or County agencies for the bare needs of existence. The growers estimated that there were between 4,000 and 5,000 unemployed in Imperial County during January, and to the group must be added thousands of women and children.

3. The complaints of workers presented to us related to low wages, failure to pay for minimum hours, contract labor, transportation charges to and from the fields, lack of good drinking water, living and sanitary conditions, and opposition on the part of employers to the organization of employees; we found justification for many of these complaints, but each requires comment.

4. The prevailing wage for lettuce harvesters, under a tentative agreement lived up to by the principal growers, is 22½ cents per hour, with a guarantee of at least five hours employment or pay when a man is sent out into the field. There are between seventy-five and eighty shipper-growers in Imperial County. Lacking

organization, each employer acts separately, except that several with larger acreages meet for discussions in a common interest. There are in the neighborhood of 225 growers who sell their crops to shippers. We believe that 22½ cents per hour rate is generally paid by the main growers, but evidence was presented showing that lower wages are paid by some employers and that a minimum five hour day is not always observed. Obviously there is extreme dissatisfaction on the part of those workers who receive less than the standard wage, or who have to wait in the field for the disappearance of frost before picking can start, without any pay or guarantee of time. No man can support himself, let alone others, under such an arrangement. If he is busy or paid for the five hours, his daily income is a fraction over one dollar. Of course, during the peak seasons, men work long hours, but such periods are limited by the crops.

5. Contract labor is not the problem it was at one time. A state law gives supervision over such contractors, but there are several ways of avoiding the statute. The tendency on the part of the contractors is to "chisel" any standard wage that may prevail in order to benefit financially.

6. Transportation cost to and from the fields is a factor in relation to dissatisfaction, but the testimony was to the effect that the larger growers pay for this service, and do not deduct the amount from earnings.

7. There is legitimate complaint about the water that is taken from irrigation ditches. It is muddy in appearance, liable to contamination from the people who temporarily reside on the banks of the streams, and is not purified by chemical treatment, as in the cities. This is not only a serious health problem for those who use the water, but there is a distinct menace to all the people of Imperial County. Typhoid fever is not unknown. The diseases that follow the use of impure water are prevalent. The different races that inhabit the valley bring with them varying customs, and some of them, to put it mildly, are not conclusive to the elimination of health hazards. The rectification of the water complaints is a duty that belongs to those public officials who are responsible for the protection of the health of all the people.

8. Living and sanitary conditions are a serious and irritating factor in the unrest we find in the Imperial Valley. We visited the quarters of the cities where live Mexicans, Negroes, and others. We inspected the camps of the pea-pickers, and know that they are similar to the camps that will serve as places of abode for workers in the field when melons are gathered. This report must state that we found filth, squalor, and entire absence of sanitation, and a crowding of human beings into totally inadequate tents or crude structures built of boards, weeds, and anything that was found at hand to give a pitiful semblance of a home at its worst. Words cannot describe some of the conditions we saw. During the warm weather when the temperature rises considerably above 100 degrees, the flies and insects become a pest, the children are fretful, the attitude of some of the parents can be imagined and innumerable inconveniences add to the general discomfort. In this environment there is bred a social sullenness that is to be deplored, but which can be understood by those who have viewed the scenes that violate all the recognized standards of living. Even in the section of cities that house Mexicans and people of other nationalities, we found shacks that are disgraceful, and a lack of sanitation in all its aspects, even though these folks are permanent residents, and, in some instances, taxpayers. Here again there is danger to the general public health in permitting such harmful conditions to prevail.

9. Fundamentally, at the base of much of the trouble in the Imperial Valley, is the natural desire of the workers to organize. Their efforts have been thwarted or rendered ineffective by a well defined opposition against them. An investigation of the labor difficulties of 1928, conducted by the State Department of Industrial Relations, showed that there was a Union of Workers of the Imperial Valley, comprised of Mexicans, and a Standard Picking Agreement between employers and employees was the outcome of the Department's efforts to promote peace, but the organization of workers did not prove permanent.

In 1933 the Mexicans formed the "Union de Trabajadores del Valle Imperial" (Union of Mexican Laborers of the Imperial Valley). After more or less satisfactory negotiations, a controversy in January 1934, resulted in the control of the Mexican Union by the "Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union", of State-wide proportions, led by men and women alleged to be "Communists", "reds", "radicals", and "outside agitators" to quote some of the more polite names we heard.

The growers and citizens generally say they have no objection to dealing with their own employees, organised or unorganised, but there is emphatic opposition to the leaders of C. and F. W. I. U. Despite the reverse of a welcome given to the "outside agitators", there is ample evidence that organization is going on among the workers in familiar under-cover ways, and that trouble is expected when the cantaloupe season starts. While the number of workers in the new union is unknown, we are firmly of the opinion that the best way to remove agitation and radicalism, is to eliminate those factors that give rise to dissatisfaction and complaint, especially when it must be conceded that there are grounds for some of the allegations. More than incidentally, there is a "Vegetable Packers' Association", a trade union of white men in the sheds, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, and operating under an unsigned wage-scale which the principal growers assure us they are observing. The extension of collective bargaining to the field workers, in our opinion, would give the best solution to a different situation. Certainly, such a method is preferable to the unrest now prevailing, which, if continued, may cause heavy financial losses, inability to pick crops at the height of the season, and, even more to be deplored, further clashing divisions among the residents of Imperial Valley.

10. The Mexicans were described to us to be "docile", "easily led", "contented", and, if left alone, "anxious to work without any assistance from outside agitators". We are not persuaded that these expressions accurately describe the picture. Intelligent Mexicans say their people are not satisfied, that living costs are mounting and the small average amount received in wages gives the group a bare subsistence. The "outside agitators" have fertile ground in which to plant and sow their views. The Mexicans have heard of the N. R. A., they believe that the Federal Government is going to protect them and improve their economic status, but they do not know that the N. R. A. does not apply to agricultural pursuits. It is well within the bounds of reason to say that Mexican field workers may not continue to be "docile". They led in the recent unsuccessful agitation to increase the basic wage from 22½ cents per hour to 35 cents. They have "agitators" of their own. The crop gathering of the Imperial Valley, is, at this time, very largely dependent upon Mexican workers. They constitute about one-fourth of the entire population. Among them are many who do not favor any peonage attitude toward their race.

11. The influx of Filipinos into the Imperial Valley is noteworthy. It is only within recent years that they have come down from the north to "follow the crops". They do not get along well with the Mexicans. The latter claim the Filipinos are usually single men, that they herd together, and it alleged they work for lower wages. Testimony from Filipinos was to the effect that their condition caused them to grasp at any opportunity to work, while, at the same time, they denied they were willing to labor for less than a standard wage that might be agreed upon. They are now actively organizing.

12. A suggestion for "subsistence acres" has met with a favorable response. The Associated Chambers of Commerce of the Valley have approved the idea. There are thousands of field workers who are fairly busy during crop picking seasons, but wait between such seasons give weeks or months of idleness, during which time there is no income, and any savings are not sufficient to tide over the leisure periods. If Mexican workers, for example, permanent residents of the valley and with families, were directed how to plant garden crops, improve a small holding around something more than a shack, look after a cow and chickens, and otherwise take an interest in their own well-being, the values returned to the individuals and to the community would be evident. There is plenty of good land at reasonable prices. There is no doubt about the surplus of trained agricultural labor, which, with a minimum of effort, could be made more self-reliant.

13. The thousands of men who enter the Imperial Valley glut the labor market in average years, and expecially when business is dull. There are years when they are needed for the peaks of crop picking. When economic conditions are good, many of the workers find something else to do. This leaves a normal supply of labor, or possibly a shortage. The growers are in no way responsible for these business cycles, but occasionally we were told of the necessity of having available men in sufficient numbers to pick a heavy crop or to meet various contingencies. Put another way, the word conveyed to us, at times, was that two or three men for each job was about right. From the standpoint of lettuce, peas, and cantaloupes, this may be sound doctrine. Viewed from the economic and social needs of unemployed men with their wives and children, we are of the opinion that a better way should be devised.

14. The men and women of alleged radical views who are busily engaged in organizing the workers are efficient in presenting their arguments in printed form. Sometimes they use the mimeograph or the multigraph. In either or

all ways their appeals are stirring when read by those who are hungry and homeless, or who feel they are in an unfortunate group without either recognition or place in our present economic plan. There is danger in this situation, especially when emphasis is directed toward the violation of the constitutional rights of free speech, free press, and free assemblage. Several of the employers with whom we talked expressed surprise when told that in Hyde Park in London and in Sydney Domain of Australia, as well as in other places, men and women mounted soap-boxes to discuss every subject under the sun, including Communism, without hindrance from the few policemen milling around among the thousands of listeners. This serves as a safety-valve in the community life.

15. It is not illegal to belong to the Communist Party, or to any other association that legitimately organizes in a peaceful manner. It is illegal to commit violence, to obstruct citizens in their reasonable activities, or to do many other things that are prohibited by law. The distinction between legal and illegal is often clouded in poor reasoning. The remedies are not to be found in piling violence upon violence.

V. VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

It is regrettable that men who have put heroic effort into the reclamation of desert wastes are threatened with the loss of their hard earned fortunes. It is deplorable that many workers are not able to earn sufficient to maintain even a primitive, or savage, standard of living, and consequently are forced upon charities. It is horrible that children are reared in an environment as pitiable as that which we saw in more than one locality. But worse than these is the harsh suppression of that which we in the United States claim as our birthright, the freedom to express our lawful opinions and legally to organize to better our lot and that of our fellow-men.

Merely to exist is not worth while. Value attaches to living when there are possible the will and the effort toward improvement. Under a democracy that will must be the people's will, to the realization of which, free expression is an absolute essential. Freedom to assemble and to speak our thoughts and convictions must not be interfered with, especially by those who, as peace officers, are sworn to uphold the law. Force is on their side, but it would be better were that force tempered by justice, legality, understanding, sympathy, and a sense of responsibility.

We uncovered sufficient evidence to convince us that in more than one instance the law was trampled underfoot by representative citizens of Imperial County and by public officials under oath to support the law.

In the first place, indiscriminate arrests are not likely to increase respect for authority.

During the recent disturbance, large numbers of men and women were "picked up" but not booked; 86 arrests (11 women, 75 men) were recorded between January 9th and 22nd: 48 of the 86 were charged with disturbing the peace; 28 with vagrancy; 4 for resisting arrest; 6 for trespassing. Against some of these 86 persons additional charges were filed for alleged violation of particular local and State laws. Bail ranged up to $1,800. The amount fixed was $500 for 31 persons, and $1,000 for 22.

We believe that wholly innocent persons, including several young women, were induced to plead guilty through intimidation and under the promise that suspended sentences would be given. It is not altogether fair that these must carry the stigma of a police record.

In most instances, the bail was so large as to make release from jail impossible. Several of the strike leaders were released on bail furnished by sympathizers outside of Imperial County.

Only by a prostitution of the State vagrancy law could some of the prisoners be arrested or held. This group includes two attorneys, one from the State of Arizona, and the other a resident of San Bernardino County, California.

In our opinion, regular peace officers, deputized officers and civilians displayed pistols altogether too freely, and the police unwarrantedly used tear gas bombs. We cannot understand why scores of officers (estimated by the newspapers at approximately 80) found it necessary to gas an audience of several hundred men, women, and children in a comparatively small one-story building while searching for three (or five) "agitators" for whom they held warrants (and who were not captured until six days later). The "Calexico Chronicle" of January 12th reported that "Under-sheriff Rodney Clarke and a posse found it necessary to draw revolvers while arresting women when a group of strikers milled around, seeking to prevent taking them into custody," and that "2,000 persons" in Brawley were dispersed by the police "who hurled tear gas bombs into the group and wielded hardwood clubs to break up the meeting." It is reliably reported that on the evening of January 23d, a visiting clergyman was detained and annoyed by a mob of citizens in front of El Centro's leading hotel, that many guns were pointed at him, and the testimony showed that several of the mob were inflamed by liquor.

The right of free speech and assemblage was denied. Even the Federal Court's injunction was jeered at, as is evidenced by this quotation from an editorial in the "Brawley News" of January 26th, credited to the "Morning Farmer." The reference is to the abduction of a representative of the American Civil Liberties Union who was scheduled to preside at a workers' meeting:

"* * * it was not mob rule or mob violence that removed from Imperial Valley Tuesday night the menace of active agitation among the valley's lettuce workers * * *. It was not mob violence, it was a studied, organized movement of citizens seeking the only way out of difficulties threatening the community's peace, when the hands of the law had been tied by the law itself * * * the legal technicalities entwining the courts so bind them in red tape that they offer far greater protection at times to forces working against peace than to those working for peace. The Federal Court injunction restraining officers from interfering with a meeting of strikers was an example * * *. The names of the men who took part in the move against the strike are not known, but the service they rendered their community is an outstanding one."

A feature article in the San Diego "Sun" of February 7th quotes a State peace officer in these words:

"If that (Federal) Court in San Diego grants a permanent injunction interfering with officers and keeping them from breaking up these agitators' meetings here in the valley, there will be bloodshed! I won't do anything, but there are some people here who will."

This attitude surely represents, if not technical, at least moral and virtual contempt of court, and of all law.

We were informed by a professional man that he had been intimidated because he expressed some sympathy for the field-workers, and a business man showing similar sympathy, that his note would be called if he "did not behave".

The actual abduction of the representative of the American Civil Liberties Union has not been denied. The general local sentiment seems to be expressed in this editorial comment that appeared in the "Brawley News" of January 25th:

"Sentiment in Imperial Valley today approves of the action taken in Brawley and El Centro Tuesday night when vigilantes ordered leaders in the agitation which has been rife for the past two weeks to leave the County, and took somewhat radical steps to see that they did leave."

We further submit, the following editorial comments, typical of many that appeared in Imperial County newspapers, do not reflect a liberal or legal attitude. We believe that the commission and approval of an abduction, especially in these days, is particularly reprehensible:

"It is to be hoped that the law enforcement officers will succeed in rounding up all those responsible for the vegetable workers' strike * * * the American Legion is to be commended for its readiness to 'go to the bat' if an extreme emergency arises." (Brawley News of January 11, 1934).

"Back of the officers stands a large group of citizens, the 'vigilantes' ready to assist in cleaning the valley of the undesirables at a moment's call." (Brawley News, January 18, 1934.)

A news item in the "Calexico Chronicle" of January 12th reported that "Brawley's American Legion reserve was mobilized to keep down the rising tide of strike sentiment." The same article further declared that Captain Frank Oswalt, a State Traffic policeman, "advised the Supervisors (of the county) that unless conditions became much worse, the special highway police, special deputies and Legion reserves in the County, are sufficient to keep down undue violence." In the same paper of January 18th, there appeared this item: "A committee of 30 citizens, who declined to reveal their identities, was formed to protect the interests of the grower and ranchers of the valley."

In view of the foregoing, we urge that the Federal and State Governments take every necessary step to protect all persons in their constitutional rights.

VI. COMMERCIAL ASPECTS

The ability of the growers to pay higher wages and to furnish better living conditions to their workers is a matter of vital consideration.

There can be no doubt that net incomes have been reduced materially during the past several years, and that equities have shrunk or disappeared altogether.

It is obvious that in many instances prevailing prices allow no margin for fair wages.

However, we are not ready to admit that unprofitable operations are explained wholly by "general conditions" or the "depression".

Imperial County has little or no industrial development. Its major crops are lettuce, peas and melons. These are luxury commodities in many of the consuming areas, because they are marketed in advance of the local supplies, and may be readily avoided by the consuming public. But on account of the elasticity of demand, they are susceptible to scientific marketing processes.

At times, these products must compete with similar products from other producing areas. At other times, the County has a virtual natural monopoly. Both these conditions, competition and monopoly, point to the necessity of thorough-going organization for their adequate handling. Nevertheless, we could find no evidences of the existence of any association of Imperial County growers, despite the fact that the entire farming area is controlled by a relatively small number of growers.

We submit that it would be highly advantageous for the growers to organize into a compact group and to employ thoroughly competent men to manage such an association.

An Imperial County growers' and shippers' association then might study and outline programs to cover these aspects of their problems:

1. Crops most suited to the physical environment,
2. Further crop diversification to regularize the labor of the valley,
3. Control of planting and output calculated to bring prices that would allow fair and just compensation to *all* factors involved,
4. Methods of marketing calculated to yield the best possible returns,
5. Fuel exploitation of present and potential markets by scientific methods,
6. Cooperation with competing areas,
7. Coordination and articulation of all services now available, including County, State and Federal agencies.

We believe that it would be well for an association, such as we suggest, to make a study of the advisability of establishing or developing certain industries in Imperial County, with the thought in view that the industrial workers families might supply a portion of the seasonal labor required by the planting, cultivating and harvesting of the short crops, thus minimizing the demand for outside, migratory workers.

The cost of running such an organization, properly manned, would be but a small fractional part of the claimed present losses the growers suffer.

VII. IMMEDIACY OF SITUATION

Openly, the police and growers insist that there was no strike, and that, anyway, all is now well in the Valley. We are informed editorially by the Brawley News of January 9th that "the Mexicans are well satisfied with the treatment accorded them by the growers and shippers." And on January 23rd. the same paper declared: "Vegetable workers as a whole are contented, anxious and willing to work, and in perfect understanding with their employers." However, we suspect that this is whistling in the grave-yard, for privately some of the growers informed us they were fearful that trouble might break out again at the time of harvesting the cantaloupe crop. This fear may be warranted by these circumstances.

1. We have been informed that as many as 30 men in prison have been discussing precisely what they are to do upon their release, and that the prison has become a virtual "normal school" for training in the technique of organizing and striking.

2. The Filipino group is actively organizing. The leaders assured us that this time effort will be made to join with all other groups of workers, regardless of race or color.

3. Only by the most tactful handling was the Vegetable Packers Association (affiliated with the American Federation of Labor), probably all United States citizens, prevented from passing a strong resolution of sympathy with the Mexican strikers.

4. Organization work is now going on among the Mexican workers, presumably under new leadership.

5. There is no evidence that the suppressive activities on the part of the police are retarding in the least the organization plans of the "Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union", allegedly Communistic.

6. With the pro-rating plan in effect, there is no doubt that there will continue to be a large surplus of workers in the Valley.

7. We could detect no existing movement for the purpose of improving the deplorable living conditions of the mass of the workers.

8. There is a lack of open and efficient leadership among the workers. Without such leadership there can be no stability.

The menace of further disturbance warrants immediate action looking toward the removal of those conditions, real or fancied, that create and encourage discontent.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Upon the basis of our inquiry, we submit the following recommendations for the Imperial Valley:

1. That Federal and State Governments exercise every power and authority to maintain in fact the rights of free speech, free press and free assembly, and that men, either citizens or aliens, shall not be harassed by permanent, temporary, amateur, or self-appointed officers of the law.

Specifically do we recommend that the apparent violation of the Federal injunction covering the meeting of American Civil Liberties Union in Brawley on January 23rd, 1934, be probed to the bottom by the United States Department of Justice.

2. That the Federal Government encourage the organization of workers, in order that collective bargaining may be effective in matters of wages and conditions, both working and living, and that the right to strike and peacefully to picket shall be maintained.

Specifically do we recommend that the United States Department of Labor send representatives who can speak Spanish to aid the Mexican and Filipino groups, and others, to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining.

3. That a "Labor Coordinator" be appointed by the Federal Government to equalize and balance the labor supply, and that, through this Coordinator, preference in employment be given to permanent residents.

4. That a permanent board or impartial administrator,be set up by the Federal Government, to act in matters of dispute regarding wages, long waits in the field, drinking water, contract labor, minimum and maximum hours, employment of women and children, transportation of workers, etc. We recommend this because we believe there are no codes for the protection of agricultural employees.

5. That State and County authorities be urged by the United States Public Health Service to improve living quarters (especially those adjacent to the larger centers of population), housing street improvements, sewage, water supply, and all other determining factors in the health and welfare of the entire community.

6. That the Federal Government cooperate with the State and County to establish subsistence farms or gardens, to enable the workers to tide over periods of unemployment characteristic of Imperial Valley.

7. That the California State Department of Education promote a program of social and economic education, using for that purpose such media as the schools, clubs, churches, fraternal organizations, chambers of commerce, the American Legion, the radio and the press.

8. That both State and Federal Governments encourage the growers and shippers to organize, that they may handle intelligently the various problems relating to the successful conduct of their business.

9. That steps be taken to repatriate aliens (a) who are undesirable and are subject to deportation, and (b) who desire of their own free will to return to their respective countries.

EXHIBIT 8767-A[1]

THE IMPERIAL VALLEY FARM LABOR SITUATION

Report of the Special Investigating Committee Appointed at the Request of The California State Board of Agriculture, The California Farm Bureau Federation, and The Agricultural Department of the California State Chamber of Commerce

Submitted to the Executive Committee Representing the Three Above Groups, Sacramento, California April 16, 1934

Committee: C. B. HUTCHISON (Berkeley), Dean, College of Agriculture, University of California; W. C. JACOBSEN (Sacramento), Administrative Assistant, State Department of Agriculture; JOHN PHILLIPS, Chairman (Banning), Member of State Assembly, 76th District.

THE IMPERIAL VALLEY FARM LABOR SITUATION

Report of the Investigating Committee sent to the Imperial Valley April, 1934, by the co-ordinating committee representing the California State Board of Agriculture, the California Farm Bureau Federation and the Agricultural Department of the California State Chamber of Commerce

SACRAMENTO, CALIF., *April 16, 1934.*

INTRODUCTION

During the past year several of the more important agricultural regions of California have been seriously affected by labor troubles. These disturbances have culminated in a series of strikes extending into widely scattered agricultural areas and affecting the harvesting of a number of the State's most important field, fruit and vegetable crops. The most recent disturbances have occurred in the pea and lettuce fields of Imperial Valley, the pea-growing areas of the Coastal region, the strawberry districts of Los Angeles, Sacramento and Santa Clara Counties and the dairy region contiguous to the City of Los Angeles.

Throughout the year the State press carried stories of unrest and disorder in the agricultural labor field. These press statements culminated in an extended and comprehensive article in the Pacific Rural Press for February 3rd under the heading "The Communist Menace to Agriculture" which implied that these labor troubles were part of a definite program of agitation deliberately designed to disrupt agriculture and charged that they were being fomented by agents of the Communist Party of America.

On February 11th the National Labor Board made public a report of a Commission sent to Imperial Valley by that Board to investigate conditions following the disturbances in the pea and lettuce fields. This report was not accepted as accurate by many people apparently equally conversant with the situation in the Valley. Following its release some public speakers expressed views on conditions in the Valley at marked variance with views of others and with reports coming from farm bureau centers and other organizations; in fact it seemed to many people that the only thing certain about the Imperial Valley situation was its uncertainty!

With these conflicting reports in mind and with a growing feeling that there might be some connection between these agricultural disturbances, even in widely separated locations, various agricultural groups and leaders called meetings in practically every agricultural county of the state. From these meetings developed two "coordinating committees," one in the North and one in the South, which in turn created an executive committee of nine members instructed to probe the problem and to find a solution. At a meeting in Fresno on March 28, the first action of this executive committee was to approve the proposal of the California Farm Bureau Federation and the Agricultural Department of the California

---

[1] See pt. 53, p. 19496.

State Chamber of Commerce, that an investigation of the agricultural labor situation in the Imperial Valley be made. Shortly afterwards the State Board of Agriculture allied itself with the movement and joined with the other two organizations in the proposal. Accordingly the executive committee appointed an investigating committee consisting of Assemblyman John Phillips of Banning, Chairman, Dean C. B. Hutchison, College of Agriculture, University of California, and W. C. Jacobsen, Administrative Assistant, State Department of Agriculture.

The Committee reached the Valley on Monday, April 2nd, accompanied by Professor R. L. Adams of the University of California and Mr. W. H. Wright, Administrative Assistant in the Los Angeles office of the State Department of Agriculture. The assistance of these two men and their familiarity with farm problems has enabled the Committee to cover much more ground than would have been possible without them.

Mr. Jacobsen left the Valley late Sunday, April 8, and Dean Hutchison left about noon on the 9th. Professor Adams, having secured the statistical data wanted, had left by Friday, the 6th, in order to compile his findings. The chairman of the Committee and Mr. Wright remained in the Valley until Thursday afternoon, the 12th. General Pelham D. Glassford, who had arrived in El Centro April 4, representing three federal departments, completed his investigations at the same time.

The Committee was able to make a thorough investigation of the situation. It was furnished with every facility for its investigations by all groups involved in the controversy. It is perhaps an indication of the manner in which the Committee was received that individuals and groups came before it to give information of the most divergent kind and to present to it verbal and documentary statements of the most confidential nature. In addition to interviewing organizations, groups and individuals resident in the Valley, safe-conduct was assured by citizens of the Valley to men and women from other localities whom these citizens classed as "agitators." These came before the Committee and stated their case with entire frankness. For all of this help and information the Committee is grateful.

IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM

The importance of this agricultural labor problem to California can be understood when one realizes that agriculture brought to the State in 1932 a gross income of more than $387,000,000 (1929—$732,000,000) and that 48 of the 58 counties of the State are classed as agricultural counties. Agriculture normally contributes more than one-third of the State's most basic industry. Anything therefore adversely affecting agriculture is at once reflected in other parts of the State's financial and economic structure. When it is remembered that California ships some thirty odd per cent of all the fruit and vegetable crops grown in the United States it is evident that no State could be so seriously affected by labor troubles. It has seemed to many people in recent months more than a coincidence that these troubles should follow almost as the season, the picking and marketing of California's perishable farm products.

AGRICULTURAL CONDITIONS OF IMPERIAL VALLEY

The agricultural portion of Imperial County is part of a broad, contiguous agricultural belt 80% of which lies in California and 20% in Mexico. Agriculture is the principal, in fact practically the only, industry of the Valley, and the prosperity of the locality can be but a reflection of conditions in its agriculture. Alfalfa, grains, sorghums, dairying, poultry, fattening of hogs, sheep, and cattle, together with other staple crops and livestock enterprises are well represented in the agriculture of the Valley. The principal source of revenue, however, is the growing of various vegetable crops for shipment to distant markets. There are a few orchards, groves, and vineyards but fruit-growing is at present a minor phase of the Valley's agriculture.

The agricultural soils of the Valley vary from fertile, easily tilled, highly productive types to others less fertile, difficult to handle, and of limited crop adaptation and productivity. The climate is very mild, so mild that tender plants can be successfully grown for 9 to 10 months of the year. The average mean temperature is high (about 72 degrees). Frosts usually occur at infrequent intervals in November, December, and January, but the remainder of the year is practically frost-free and with very high summer temperatures. The thermometer frequently stands at 100 degrees or over for days at a time, and may, on occasional days reach 117 to 120 degrees. The valley has limited rainfall, the annual total seldom reaching four inches and some years does not amount to one inch. As a result the Valley is entirely dependent upon irrigation and ample supplies of water are required to produce the various crops. To supply this need a vast network of canals and ditches conveys water from the Colorado River to the Valley and distributes it to the many fields.

Vegetable growing deserves special mention because the work of the Committee was primarily directed to problems arising in connection with this phase of the Valley's agriculture. Vegetable production is confined to the better class of soils but centers in a number of localities from Calexico at the extreme southern end of the county to Calipatria at the northern end. The extent of the vegetable industry may be gleaned from a comparison of the acreage in vegetables as reported by Mr. B. A. Harrigan, Agricultural Commissioner of the county, to the Committee with a total acreage in cultivation approximating 400,000 acres. According to the Federal-State crop reporting service, the total acreage in lettuce, carrots, cantaloupes, peas, melons, and similar truck crops in 1932 amounted to about 110,000 acres or 27% of the total cultivated area.

This vast vegetable acreage is operated in part by owners or lessees of relatively small farms who reside in the Valley and in part by corporations or companies who lease much of the land they farm, hire all labor, and operate with paid managers and superintendents. The major part of the total vegetable production of lettuce, cantaloupes, carrots, etc., is contributed by the large-scale corporate type of farming and but a minor part by operators who own or lease the holdings that they farm. The major portion of the pea and tomato output, however, appears to be produced on the smaller farms. In general, the corporate type of farming is of greatest importance from the standpoint of acreages farmed and value of outputs.

This difference in the prevailing types of agriculture creates dissimilar problems. Operators of relatively small farms do not appear to have problems that are identical with those of the so-called "grower-shippers." The latter group because of its influence largely determines the course of action pursued by the smaller growers. The problems, therefore, tend to be those incident to the concentration of an industry in relatively few hands, working with the better class of lands, operating on a relatively large scale, leasing much of the land that is thus farmed, planned and directed by non-resident managers, financed with considerable borrowed capital, conducted with paid resident farm managers, superintendents, and farm hands. The goal is one of profit-making, accompanied by a lack of permanency inherent in a combination of leased lands and salaried positions. The growing of vegetable crops, therefore, is largely of a speculative nature (insofar as marketing is concerned) and every effort is directed to producing crops as economically as possible and marketing them to the best of the operators' abilities in order to produce as wide a margin of profit as may be possible.

ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAGES AND RETURNS

Wages paid on an hour basis to field workers remained fairly constant throughout the Valley during 1929, 1930, and the spring and early summer months of 1931, but by August a downward trend occurred, reduction in the prevailing scale of wages being again recorded in April, August, and November, 1932 and in April, 1933. The period from April to June, 1933, registered the lowest scale (viz. 16⅔c per hour for irrigators and 15c for workers other than irrigators, as contrasted with 35c and 30c in 1929 and 1930). Beginning in July, 1933, the wage scale started to rise with increases taking place in July and November, 1933, and in January and April, 1934, finally resulting in the establishing of a rate by agreement between workers and employers equal to that in force during August to December, 1931 and January to March, 1932. Prices paid for harvesting on a piece basis during the years 1929 to date indicate a drop in the rate of picking spring peas in 1930 over that prevailing in 1929, a rate that held constant during 1930, 1931, and 1932, with a further drop in 1933 which has continued during the spring of 1934. The price paid for picking fall peas dropped in 1930 below that of 1929, with further drops in 1931 and 1932, the 1932 rate then holding fairly constant during 1933. The price for picking cantaloupes dropped in 1931 below that prevailing in 1929 and 1930, dropped again in 1932, continued through 1933, but rose on April 1, 1934, to a rate almost equaling that prevailing in 1929 and 1930. The price paid for harvesting carrots held steadily throughout 1929, 1930, and 1931, dropped in 1932, and again in 1933, but rose in the spring of 1934 to within 10% of the price paid during 1929–31.

Returns to growers for the year 1929 and up to and including the months of January to March inclusive 1934 indicate a gradual though irregular falling off in prices received by growers. This statement holds for carrots, lettuce, cantaloupes, and peas. During the 1932, 1933, and the spring season of 1934 returns for these crops were generally below production costs. Thus returns for spring peas were about equal to the cost of production in 1932 and 1933 and below cost in 1934; those of fall peas about equal in 1932 and below in 1933; those of cantaloupes slightly below the cost of production in 1932 and 1933 and seriously below in 1931. During the same period returns for lettuce were about equal to cost of production. Returns for carrots were well above cost of production in 1932. There followed a bad slump in 1933, during which year the returns for carrots just about paid the cost of packing and loading with nothing left to cover the cost of growing and harvesting. In general the growing of these vegetable crops in Imperial Valley has not been profitable since 1929. Prior to 1929 vegetable growing was generally profitable. During 1930, 1931, and 1932 returns and costs were in approximate balance (with occasional exception); while in 1933 costs tended to be higher than returns. Returns to growers ultimately determine the wage scale which can be justifiably paid and the statements set forth in this paragraph have an important bearing upon the wage scale situation.

Wages paid to field workers during periods when returns are equal to or above the cost of production establishes a base for comparing wages paid during seasons when the returns are less than the cost of production. These comparisons indicate that wages paid to field workers during 1933 and the spring season of 1934 were generally in excess of the wage scale justified on the basis of returns to growers. This condition was especially true in connection with the 1933 fall pea crop, the 1934 spring pea crop, the 1933 lettuce crop, the 1931 cantaloupe crop, and the 1933 and 1934 carrot crops. In this connection the fact should be emphasized that wage scales are set and payments made prior to the shipping of a crop so that the wages of any given season cannot be fixed on the basis of the crop returns of that season, since the probable selling price cannot be foretold with any degree of accuracy. Furthermore wages are determined by the general demand for labor such as is used in the vegetable fields and not by returns from any specific crop so that no individual grower or small group of growers can arbitrarily fix a wage scale to suit himself or themselves.

In general, reductions in wage scales in the Valley, as outlined in a previous paragraph, are reflections of decreased returns to growers and occurred following seasons of low prices. These reductions are apparently fully justified in view of the low returns to growers, though some question may arise as to the justifiable amount of drop, particularly during the months of April to June, 1933. Careful analysis of the wage scales prevailing during the period from 1929 to date indicates that during this period wages have, on the whole, been as high as growers could afford to pay and in some seasons have been higher than their returns justified.

GENERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS

In any attempt at a calm and unbiased analysis of the recent agricultural labor disturbances in the Imperial Valley, one cannot fail to recognize the role being played therein by various factors that characterize the present general economic situation of the nation. Among these factors none has contributed more to the present unrest in the Valley and in other regions of the State than general unemployment. For the first time in the history of the State, at least within many years, there exists a very definite surplus of labor available to produce and harvest the State's great array of specialty fruit and vegetable crops. During the past winter in addition to the agricultural laborers residing in the Imperial Valley much larger numbers than usual of the unemployed from other sections of California and from other States have come in hoping to find employment in the fields. This together with the sharp reduction in vegetable acreage and the curtailment and proration of shipments necessitated by market conditions has resulted in a supply of workers greatly in excess of the demand. For this the growers of the Valley can in no way be held responsible. They certainly cannot be expected to provide work for all who apply regardless of whether or not this labor is needed. If in an attempt of growers to spread the limited amount of work available among a larger number of workers than was actually required to perform the task of harvesting their crops, there resulted a deplorably low daily income to individual workers the fault would seem to be not with the wage scale paid by growers but to be inherent to the general unemployment situation. It must also be understood that daily earnings in field work of this type do not constitute a regular wage as in many other industries but rise from sometimes a dollar or less at the start of the season to five dollars or more at the peak of the season, and then decline with the waning of the crop. Thus the daily earnings of pea pickers, where there is no attempt to spread the work, average from $2.50 to $3.00 a day. Average daily earnings of cantaloupe pickers are considerably higher. Thus opinions based on individual checks, particularly at the beginning and end of a picking season may be misleading. It must also be noted that in Imperial Valley as in other agricultural areas where a similar class of labor is used, pickers often work in groups or families and the family or group income is the sum of individual earnings.

Careful inquiry by the Committee, including examination of the books of growers, has failed to disclose any evidence that wages now being paid field workers are unjustifiably low. It is common knowledge that agricultural wages in California are, and always have been, higher than those paid in any other area of the country except in the New England states where agriculture competes directly with industry for its labor. The Committee believes that this relatively favorable position of California agricultural workers is still being maintained. It cannot believe that these disturbances are essentially wage disputes.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

To understand the problem under consideration it is necessary to go back to October, 1933, and trace the chronology of events from that date to the present time.

On November 1 a committee representing what was then called "The Mexican Union" met with representatives of the growers. It was agreed between them, among other things, that 22½¢ an hour should be paid for harvesting lettuce. The question of the number of hours of work to be given to those who did not live on the ranches but who were taken there by the growers or by their own transportation methods, was a matter of some difficulty, and this November 1st agreement also established a minimum of five hours of work, for any worker taken to the field. There seems to have been a understanding, (since crop conditions, commodity prices and labor rates were so uncertain at that time) that this rate would be reviewed, if necessary, after the first of the year. It seems pertinent at this point in the report to make two definite statements:

> (a) Although the greatest criticism regarding conditions in the Valley is directed toward the small group of shipper-growers who are said to control directly seventy-five percent of the commercial crops in the Valley and indirectly an additional fifteen per cent, the investigations of this Committee, supported by figures taken from the books of growers, show that the so-called "large growers" have paid the highest wages, and that the lower wages, against which criticism might be directed, have been paid largely by the smaller farmers.
>
> (b) No evidence could be found to support the charges recently made that "Labor contractors hire a large proportion of lettuce pickers, receiving 22½¢ an hour for the labor, paying the workers 12½¢ an hour and pocketing the difference." Such evidences of any "contract system" as exists in the Valley today point (1) to a "cut" varying from 1¢ to 2½¢ (2) to the fact that this system applies to an exceedingly small portion of the labor, and (3) to the fact that it is chiefly confined to certain racial groups, among whom this is an established custom.

In the opinion of this Committee the laws of California already provide effective means for the control of this custom.

Before continuing the chronology of events subsequent to January first of the current year it is important to note that during the last few weeks of 1933 this "Mexican Union" experienced a marked change. About that time representatives of an organization known as the "Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union" entered the Valley and began to organize a local. They drew members from the "Mexican Union." This Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union is, on its own printed statements, the same Union which led the cotton strike in the San Joaquin Valley. It is also, on its own statement, led and controlled by members of the Communist Party. Its leaders in the Imperial Valley were the same men and women who led the movement elsewhere in Southern California. These men and women finally secured control of the "Mexican Union."

On January 2 representatives of the growers and of the workers met again. Reports of this meeting differ widely. There is no question, however, but that the workers insisted upon an increase in wages to 35¢ an hour and that the growers declined to discuss the matter further.

From that moment, it is evident that the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union became an active factor in the situation and that the original "Mexican Union" was completely subordinated to it and very shortly went out of existence.

It must be understood that at no time during the lettuce season were the shipments of lettuce hindered by the labor trouble in the Valley. This is not a matter of opinion but is evidenced by the records of the shippers and confirmed by the investigation made by representatives of the State Department of Industrial Relations. Technically, therefore, there was no "strike," a point which will be brought out further in this report.

On Sunday, January 7 and on Monday, January 8 the growers by agreement curtailed shipments of lettuce, the market having already been glutted with cars standing unsold in the East.

On Sunday, January 7 the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union circulated notices calling a strike. This date, therefore, becomes important, for these three points must be kept in mind:

(1) The growers, of their own accord, shipped little lettuce on that and the following day.

(2) The Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union circulated on that date its notices calling a strike.

(3) It was not until the following day that the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union presented its demands to the growers for increases in wages, for other concessions and for recognition of the Union. If there were no other evidence of the fact that a strike was predetermined and that the "demands" were only incidental to it, the evidence of this particular date would seem conclusive.

This same intention or desire to strike was apparent in the pea-picking disturbance which followed. There is no evidence to show that the leaders and organizers of the C. A. W. I. U. carried back to the members the growers' offer of $2 per day minimum, with 1¢ a pound for all peas picked over 200 pounds. There is evidence that the leaders of the Union reported that the growers would not accede to their demands and that the pickers should strike.

Between January 7 and January 12 there were minor disturbances in the city of Brawley and in other parts of the county. The lettuce was picked by those workers who continued in the fields, in spite of picketing and in spite of threats. Men who were not working were arrested on charges of disturbing the peace, carrying guns, vagrancy, intent to riot, and holding meetings without police permit. There was no marked conflict, however, until January 12 at which time the Chief of Police of the city of Brawley went to a hall used by the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union with the intention of serving a warrant upon two of the organizers of this Union. The hall was filled at that time, largely with Mexicans, and evidence secured from many people, including men and women who gave the Committee information in confidence, points to the fact that both organizers fled their arrest, and that their arrest was prevented by the Mexicans closing in around them. Evidence also confirms the statements that the Chief of Police was struck on the hip by some iron implement the nature of which is unknown, and also struck on the back of the head, presumably by an iron bar.

It was at this time that the Chief threw a gas bomb, which has caused much criticism. Many of those in the hall at the moment claimed that no warning was given to disperse, while others, nearer the Chief at the time, contended that he did order the crowd to disperse and gave them ample warning but that in the excitement of the moment, and because of the noise and confusion in the hall, it is possible that he may not have been heard. There are also two versions of the statement that the Chief was struck in the forehead by a gas bomb. Some witnesses state it was a "gas bomb" while others merely say that he was struck in the head by "something." This was in addition to the blows on the hip and on the back of the head. If indeed the object was a gas bomb it seems to the Committee likely that it was one first thrown by the police and picked up and returned by an occupant of the hall.

The entire incident developed so rapidly that accurate judgment of the order of the occurrences, or the reasons for them, is difficult to establish. It would appear that the Chief of Police, although acting entirely within his authority to serve the warrants, and undoubtedly meeting with opposition and excitement and the evasion of arrest by the persons named in the warrants, nevertheless may have acted more hastily than good judgment would recommend. There is no evidence to support the contention that more than five or six bombs in all were thrown.

It is evident, however, that the first bomb was thrown in an effort to apprehend one of the two organizers for whose arrest a warrant had been issued. There is no evidence to indicate that any injury was done by the use of gas bombs.

The subsequent stories that the "bombing" of this hall resulted in the death of a child are undoubtedly figments of imagination. The Committee made a thorough investigation of this accusation. Similar investigations have been made by others. The Committee consulted the doctor who attended the sick child as well as other persons and only one conclusion can be drawn, namely, that a child dying some 45 days after the bombing and whose presence in the hall at the moment is very doubtful, certainly must have died of "lobar pneumonia," as certified by the physician, and that any attempts to use this incident for propaganda constitute an example of the exaggeration and distortion which marks the Imperial Valley trouble.

Such incidents as the attempted parade of the unemployed on January 9 and individual arrests on various charges are omitted since they have no vital relation to this chronology.

It was at this point, in this chronological review, that the American Civil Liberties Union entered the picture, through representatives of its Los Angeles branch. On January 18, representatives of this organization went before the Federal Court in San Diego, and secured an injunction restraining city, county and State peace officers from interfering with meetings of the American Civil Liberties Union in the Imperial Valley. The intent of this obviously was to enable the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union to meet under the protection of the American Civil Liberties Union. This, therefore, becomes the second date of importance in this chronology, for with the granting of this injunction there evidently began to develop in the Imperial Valley a wide-spread feeling that the protection of constituted authorities had been removed from the residents of the Valley and given to those whose ultimate objective was to overthrow the Government, and whose immediate objective was to create trouble and prevent the harvesting of the Valley's crops. Too great emphasis cannot be laid upon this point for however strongly this Committee may support the constitutional rights of free speech and free assemblage, the fact remains that in the chronology of events now under review it was unquestionably this action which prompted the citizens of Imperial Valley to take steps designed to protect themselves and their property. The so-called "Anti-Communist League" was organized sixty days later, on March 21.

The "kidnapping" on January 23 of an attorney named A. L. Wirin representing the American Civil Liberties Union was an outcome of this changing mental attitude on the part of the citizens. Mr. Wirin was taken from an hotel in Brawley, driven several miles from the city, and left to find his way back as best he could. The object evidently was to keep him from attending a meeting called for the evening of that day and to suggest to him that he was "persona non grata" in the Imperial Valley. The Committee unreservedly condemns this incident, but is compelled to add that this event must be judged in the light of the entire situation, rather than as a separate incident, and also that the reports regarding it, which have appeared in many papers, and particularly in the literature published by the American Civil Liberties Union, have unquestionably been greatly exaggerated.

The features of the situation which the Committee has found most difficult to substantiate have been the reported treatment of various visitors to the Valley. An example of this is the reports of the treatment of Doctor Alexander Irvine while on a visit to the Valley on March 25. Certainly Dr. Irvine, whether invited or not had a right to visit Imperial Valley, if he so desired, provided he deported himself within the same bounds of propriety demanded of any other law-abiding citizen. The Committee had no reason to question Dr. Irvine's statement of his experiences and treatment in the Valley, as printed in church magazines and in periodicals published by the American Civil Liberties Union and elsewhere, but the Committee was unable to find in the Valley any confirmation of his reported treatment or any reason for it.

A second example of this sort of thing is the reports that a group of four men who came to El Centro (three of them from the metropolitan area of Los Angeles) to attend a meeting arranged by and held under the auspices of the American Civil Liberties Union were met by citizens of the Valley and told in no uncertain terms that their presence was not wanted and that they would be safer elsewhere; that they spoke at this meeting; that the time at which they left El Centro was of their own choosing, and that they were given safe conduct from the Valley by the authorities. The statement by one member of this group which has appeared in print that he himself counted 27 guns pointed at him, is not only without confirmation, but, if true, would seem to indicate a remarkable facility for mathematical accuracy under rather trying circumstances.

The point which the Committee desires to make in this connection is that the citizens of the Valley have passed through a period of great excitement during the past few months in which things have been done by individuals and by groups which undoubtedly would not have been done under less trying circumstances.

To understand the mental attitude of the citizens of the Valley, faced with this trying situation, it is important to note that these people have been accustomed for years to cope with natural and at times almost unsurmountable difficulties through sheer courage, hard work and their own indomitable will. Is it strange that they should find it difficult to understand the attitude and actions of other men and women lacking the same knowledge and experience of Valley conditions who came into the Valley, in the judgment of these citizens, to disturb the agricultural situation and to cause trouble and financial loss to an extent which might have had the most serious consequences? These men are accustomed to meet their problems firmly, and whether or not others agree with the methods they chose in meeting this particular one, nevertheless it must be admitted that they did meet it and that they met it with determination.

From January 23 to February 19 the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union, on one hand, attempted to organize, to secure members and to foment a strike. The citizens of the Valley attempted, on the other hand, to prevent them from meeting, and from intimidating workers, who were by that time picking the pea crop. It was on February 19 that the "camp of pea strikers" was broken up. The statement has been generally made that 48 hours before the camp was broken up the health officers of Imperial County gave this camp their endorsement, and the implication is that their opinion was changed by pressure from influential citizens of the county. No evidence supports this statement. Prior to the 16th or 17th this was a small camp of itinerants. Few, if any of them, were actually employed in picking peas. By the efforts of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (and it is quite apparent that threats supported these efforts) this camp increased to a size which made it a menace to health. Estimates of the number of persons in the camp vary from 800 to 2,000. It is likely that the actual number was less than 1,000. However, this camp was situated on a barren tract of desert land, near one of the irrigation ditches which supplied water for it, and contained only one toilet. It should be obvious to anyone that a camp which developed within 18 hours prior to the posting of the evacuation notice could not possibly have been "approved only two days before" by the health authorities. Incidentally this statement is specifically denied by Dr. W. F. Fox, County Health Officer and field agent of the U. S. Public Health Service, and Dr. M. M. Bucholz, Deputy Health Officer, both of whom state that the camp was condemned as soon as it became a menace. Fifteen hours notice was given for evacuation and the notice was read in both Spanish and English to all the campers.

The fact is brought out, and confirmed by those of opposing opinions, that when the camp was evacuated, it was visited not only by the Sheriff and his deputies but by the Health Officer and his deputies and nurses, and that every family was visited, and those families having sickness were permitted to remain. Such shelters as were burned were fired by the campers themselves, at the request of the health authorities. In other words, such camp materials and personal belongings as were removable were taken away by the campers while the brush huts and the discarded material were burned for sanitary reasons by the campers themselves. This statement seems to the Committee additional evidence of the exaggeration which has been a part of so many reports on the Imperial Valley situation.

Dates between February 19 and the arrival of the Committee on April 2 are marked largely by incidents having to do with the activities of representatives of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union and of the American Civil Liberties Union on one side, and of peace officers and the citizens of Imperial County on the other. It seems out of order for this Committee to comment on these in detail. Where an abridgement of constitutional rights has taken place there is proper redress under the law. Where an infraction of the law has taken place there is proper recourse to court trial and punishment.

THE PROBLEM

The Committee, therefore, had before it three questions:

1. What is the situation in the Imperial Valley?
2. Is there any immediate danger of a strike or of any serious trouble?
3. Is the situation localized in the Imperial Valley, or is it in any way related to labor disturbances in other agricultural areas of the State?

The Committee's answer to the first question is developed throughout its entire report.

The answer to the second question is important. Reference is made constantly in letters, in speeches, in literature, and in the press, to a "strike" in the Imperial Valley. Technically, the Committee does not find that there is a "strike" in the Imperial Valley, nor that there has been a "strike" in the Imperial Valley, nor that there is any "strike" imminent in the Imperial Valley.

If employees agree to work for a specified wage for their employers and are at work, and employers agree to pay this wage and are paying it, and there is adequate labor thus employed to do the work then there is no strike, no matter how many people not parties to the agreement may stand aside and cry for "higher wages." This appears to the Committee to be fundamental in collective bargaining. It involves the basic right of employer to agree with employee and of both sides to live up to that agreement and to demand and secure protection in carrying it out. This is the situation which now exists in the Imperial Valley at the beginning of the harvesting of the cantaloupe and melon crops. An organization known as the "Asociacion Mexicana del Valle Imperial," sponsored by the Mexican Consul, Sr. Joaquin Terrazas, which now has in its membership over 1,800 Mexicans (both native born and Mexican born), has a working agreement with the growers. There is no strike. Therefore there can be no "mediation" and no intervention by State or Federal authorities until the situation changes, if it should change. In view of the attempts of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union to intimidate workers during the lettuce and pea harvesting seasons the Committee cannot predict that similar attempts will not be made by this organization to cause disturbance during the cantaloupe harvest.

The answer to the third question is equally definite. The situation is not localized in the Imperial Valley. It is part of what appears to the Committee to be a definite program, carried out by the same organization, with the same affiliations and with the same leaders and organizers as have appeared in other agricultural areas of this State. It is a program primarily directed toward the perishable crops of California agriculture. It is a situation which must be met by agriculture as a whole.

THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS AFFILIATES IN CALIFORNIA'S AGRICULTURAL LABOR DISTURBANCES

The Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union is a subsidiary of the Trade Union Unity League. This is stated on its own membership application cards. The latter organization, in turn, is a subsidiary of the Red International of Labor Unions. This is stated on its literature, and there is no attempt at concealment. The R. I. L. U. is an integral part of the world revolutionary movement directed by the Communist International. The directing heads of this movement, and its leaders and organizers in its subsidiaries throughout the world, are members of the Communist Party. The program of the Communist Party, and of the Communist International, embodies the overthrow of the American form of government by force, the suppression of religion, and the establishment of a central control, or dictatorship, by the workers themselves. Evidence to support these statements and hence to connect the agricultural disturbances in California with the Communist Party, the Communist International or the world revolutionary movement, are so abundant, and are becoming so widely known, that it seems unnecessary to add them to this report. The Committee attaches the following documents of particular interest, secured during its investigation:

1. Call for Mass Meeting, issued by the San Diego section of the Communist Party U. S. A., and the Young Communist League of America, containing the statement that "The Communist Party is leading the lettuce pickers strike."
2. Membership application card in the C. and A. W. I. U. showing the connection of this organization with the Trade Union Unity League.
3. An original copy of a letter addressed to growers by the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union, from its San Diego office demanding a meeting in San Diego, and threatening a strike during the cantaloupe harvest if its demands were not met.
4. A circular, prepared by the C. and A. W. I. U. calling for a nation-wide boycott on all Imperial Valley products.

These four documents and others of a confidential nature constitute only a fraction of those in the possession of the Committee or examined by it. Their significance is evident. California agriculture must recognize the seriousness of the challenge, and strike threat, contained in the circular listed above as item No. 3, and the momentous significance inherent in the move arbitrarily to boycott nationally the products of one of the State's most important agricultural areas.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. EDUCATION: There should begin at once a campaign to inform the people of the State, and particularly those engaged in or dependent upon agriculture, of the true motives behind the so-called farm strikes which have been fomented in Imperial Valley, San Joaquin Valley, and elsewhere. Every citizen must understand the facts and have impressed upon him a warning that these disturbances are definitely associated with a great and far-reaching world revolutionary movement.

2. SELF ANALYSIS: Immediate consideration should be given to every factor which may give this disturbing element support in its campaign. California agriculture has been unusually free from labor troubles in the past. To maintain this status, agriculture must clean its own house so thoroughly, where it needs cleaning, that no condition can be seized upon and exaggerated by those schooled in the arts of exaggeration and propaganda.

3. STATISTICAL INFORMATION: Data collected during the course of this Committee's work in the Imperial Valley indicate that relationships can be established between crop returns, costs of production and proper compensation of labor. Provision should be made at once for further studies of this kind in order to obtain reliable information upon which to base equitable wage standards for use in connection with other California crops.

4. HOUSING: The State Division of Housing and Immigration has been changing living conditions for the better in all parts of California where the problem of the itinerant field worker exists. There is still room for further improvement. This work should be encouraged and more adequately supported in order that the Division's inspection and control of labor camps in Imperial Valley and other agricultural areas may be more effectively made. The Committee endorses the proposal that efforts be made, particularly in the San Joaquin and Coast Valleys, to develop subsistence homesteads for agricultural laborers in order that there may be available, insofar as possible, an adequate resident supply of agricultural labor to produce and harvest the State's crops. It is also probable that through cooperation growers might develop centrally located labor camps that would provide proper housing and living conditions at less expense then in camps located on individual ranches.

5. WATER: A supply of wholesome water for drinking and for bathing should be provided for workers. In Imperial Valley because of the nature of the water supply especial attention should be given to settling and filtering and special care taken to guard against contamination. The plans now being proposed by the Imperial County Health Officer appear to the Committee adequate to meet the situation.

6. FEDERAL HEALTH SERVICE: The Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service should be requested to renew co-operation with the State and County health authorities in the maintenance of high standards of health in Imperial Valley. This region is characterized by interstate and international movements of labor of considerable magnitude, especially during the winter months when there is a great influx of migratory laborers.

7. ASSISTANCE FROM ATTORNEY-GENERAL: The Attorney-General of California should be requested to assign at once a member of his staff to all trials and all legal work connected with agricultural labor disturbances. In addition to appearance at all trials when the defendant is in any way connected with these disturbances or with the Communist Party or its affiliates he should assemble and correlate information on statutory provisions governing:

- (a) rights and limitations of free speech and free assemblage,
- (b) limitations of authority of peace officers during strikes,
- (c) rules of evidence for trials involving prosecutions arising out of agricultural strike activities.

8. ASSISTANCE FROM STATE BAR ASSOCIATION: The State Bar Association should be requested to investigate the activities of attorneys employed to defend persons who advocate the overthrow of the present government and who disparage the efforts of the courts to mete our impartial justice. It should also be asked to recommend such changes in the laws as will meet the situations outlined in this report.

9. STATE HIGHWAY PATROL: Uniformed officers bearing the authority of the State government have been of material assistance to local peace officers in the recent agricultural labor disturbances in various districts. This agency should be requested to offer its assistance whenever needed. The Committee recommends that the State Highway Patrol be increased in numbers and charged with greater authority in enforcing the law against illegal acts accompanying agricultural labor disturbances.

10. CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION WORK: The State Bureau of Criminal Identification should be furnished immediately with more complete facilities for supplying information to peace officers throughout California relative to criminal activities in connection with strike agitation.

11. DEPORTATION OF ALIENS: Since deficiencies in federal statutes governing deportation of radical aliens and aliens illegally in the United States have been credited with failures to bring about the deportation of these persons, remedial legislation should be sought at once to correct any existing faults.

12. CONFERENCE WITH LABOR LEADERS: A conference between representatives of agriculture and labor leaders of the State should be arranged at an early date to coordinate the efforts of both groups in meeting this common problem.

Finally, the Committee recommends that a group of representatives of the agricultural interests of California wait upon the Governor to acquaint him fully with the agricultural labor situation in the State, to advise him of the broad and sinister motives and objectives of the recent labor disturbances and their serious threat to California's greatest industry and to urge upon him the necessity of using every means for the protection of the State.

C. B. HUTCHISON,
W. C. JACOBSEN,
JOHN PHILLIPS,
Chairman.

EXHIBIT 8767-B [1]

SUPPLEMENT TO THE REPORT ENTITLED "THE IMPERIAL VALLEY FARM LABOR SITUATION"

Published and Distributed by Associated Farmers of California, Inc., 1301 Hobart Building, San Francisco, Calif., 442 Chamber of Commerce Bldg., Los Angeles, Calif.

This supplement, submitted to the Executive Committee of the Associated Farmers of California, Inc., by same committee which made the original report on the situation in the Imperial Valley, refers specifically to certain "findings" and "recommendations" contained in a report made by a previously appointed "Federal Commission," and widely circulated in the so-called "Federal Report."

The State Committee, which investigated conditions in the Imperial Valley, was appointed at the request of the following organizations: The California State Board of Agriculture, The California Farm Bureau Federation, The Agricultural Department of the California State Chamber of Commerce.

The committee consisted of the following members: C. B. HUTCHISON, (Berkeley), Dean, College of Agriculture, University of California; W. C. JACOBSEN, (Sacramento) Administrative Assistant, State Department of Agriculture; JOHN PHILLIPS, Chairman, (Banning) Member of State Assembly, 76th District.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE REPORT ENTITLED "THE IMPERIAL VALLEY FARM LABOR SITUATION"

Supplemental Report of the Investigating Committee sent to the Imperial Valley April, 1934, by the co-ordinating committee representing the California State Board of Agriculture, the California Farm Bureau Federation and the Agricultural Department of the California State Chamber of Commerce.

"FINDINGS" AND "RECOMMENDATIONS" OF THE SO-CALLED "FEDERAL REPORT"

(NOTE: The Committee feels that it was sent into the Imperial Valley to make an investigation and a report independently of any other group or individual. This supplement to the Committee's report on the Imperial Valley Farm Labor situation is submitted in reply to specific questions asked by the Executive Committee of the Associated Farmers of California, Inc., regarding the findings and recommendations in the "Federal Commission" report.)

Under the heading "IMMEDIACY OF SITUATION" the "Federal Report" lists certain findings quoted below. The Committee's notations follow each of these. (NOTE: *The italicized sentences are from the so-called "Federal Report."* **The black faced sentences are the replies of the investigators of the State Farm Groups.**)

"*1. We have been informed that as many as 30 men in prison have been discussing precisely what they are to do upon their release, and that the prison has become a virtual 'normal school' for training in the technique of organizing and striking.*"

> **The Committee believes this was undoubtedly correct. However, this same "normal school" was being carried on outside the prison, in group meetings and in private homes, and under the direction of radical leaders.**

"*2. The Filipino group is actively organizing. The leaders assured us that this time effort will be made to join with all other groups of workers, regardless of race or color.*"

> **The Committee found no evidence of this in April.**

"*3. Only by the most tactful handling was the Vegetable Packers' Association (affiliated with the American Federation of Labor), probably all United States citizens, prevented from passing a strong resolution of sympathy with the Mexican strikers.*"

> **There is no evidence that the Vegetable Packers' Association ever expressed any sympathy with the Mexican group influenced and led by the**

---

[1] See pt. 53, p. 19496.

Communistic agitators. Such an expression would have been directly in opposition to the well known attitude of the American Federation of Labor. There is evidence that the above-named Association was sympathetic to the situation of the actual Mexican workers, whose right to work unmolested was being jeopardized. It is possible that some "Resolution" of this sort was contemplated. If so, then the wording of this paragraph of the Federal Report is misleading. One of the Committee's recommendations has to do with definite cooperation between labor and agriculture to meet the present situation. This cooperation has already been promised by both groups.

"4. Organization work is now going on among the Mexican workers, presumably under new leadership."

The Committee agrees. Organization work, both desirable and undesirable, is going on. Good organizations should be encouraged. The Mexicans, under their own leadership, have organized a union, sponsored by the Mexican Consul, which a large number of actual workers have joined. The Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union, led by Communist organizers and encouraged by the American Civil Liberties Union, is still in the Valley. Such undesirable organization work as this latter will continue steadily until the State and the Nation decide to strike at the basic movement which underlies such disturbances instead of dealing only with surface indications. Until then, radical organizers will be active, will change and be replaced, as the usefulness of one individual ceases or more apt pupils are discovered in the group.

"5. There is no evidence that the suppressive activities on the part of the police are retarding in the least the organization plans of the 'Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union,' allegedly Communistic."

This is an open question. The Committee holds the opposite view. Evidence developed since the Committee left the Valley supports its opinion.

"6. With the pro-rating plan in effect, there is no doubt that there will continue to be a large surplus of workers in the Valley."

The pro-rating plan is not entirely responsible. For some years the acreage has gradually been reducing. General economic conditions are more to blame than the pro-rating plan. There is a surplus of workers in the Valley, just as there is in other agricultural areas, and in all industries. The surplus during the winter months in Imperial Valley is not a wholly new problem.

"7. We could detect no existing movement for the purpose of improving deplorable living conditions of the mass of the workers."

It is possible that the limited time at the disposal of the "Federal Commission" prevented a more thorough investigation on this point. Conditions are improving and the Division of Housing and Immigration should be commended for its influence towards such improvements. There is still room for improvement, as this Committee suggested in its report. "Squatter" camps are not amenable to grower responsibility nor under the jurisdiction of State agencies. Agriculture must cooperate to correct these conditions.

"8. There is a lack of open and efficient leadership among the workers. Without such leadership there can be no stability."

The Committee questions this statement. The Mexican group, to which reference is undoubtedly made, has among its leaders men of as great, or greater, ability than are often found among Mexican laborers. The officers and directors of the Asociacion Mexicana del Valle Imperial are men of "efficient leadership." The Consul of Mexico, Sr. Joaquin Terrazas, is a man of very high character and attainments and is giving personal time and effort to working out a solution of the problem. His efforts apparently conform to similar efforts among the Mexican residents in the Los Angeles area. This point is of great importance.

"The menace of further disturbance warrants immediate action looking toward the removal of those conditions, real or fancied, that create and encourage discontent."

The Committee concurs in this statement and has already covered it in its own recommendations.

The Federal Commission also submitted nine Recommendations upon which the Committee comments as follows:

"1. That Federal and State Governments exercise every power and authority to maintain in fact the rights of free speech, free press, and free assembly, and that men, either citizens or aliens, shall not be harrassed by permanent, temporary, amateur, or self-appointed officers of the law.

Specifically do we recommend that the apparent violation of the Federal injunction covering the meeting of American Civil Liberties Union in Brawley on January 23, 1934, be probed to the bottom by the United States Department of Justice."

The Committee supports the rights of free speech and free assemblage, but it points out that it is time to make a distinction between free speech and unlicensed speech, and that any organization demanding the protection of the Constitution, must be able to show clean hands and no connection with a movement to overthrow this Constitution and subvert these rights.

"2. That the Federal Government encourage the organization of workers, in order that collective bargaining may be effective in matters of wages and conditions, both working and living, and that the right to strike and peacefully to picket shall be maintained.

Specifically do we recommend that the United States Department of Labor send to Imperial Valley representatives who can speak Spanish to aid the Mexican and Filipino groups, and others, to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining."

The Committee does not understand this recommendation. The organization of WORKERS has never been discouraged. Collective bargaining has been evident throughout the entire period. The Committee feels that possibly the Commission did not distinguish accurately between the "right to strike" on the part of the workers, and the "right to strike" on the part of those who were unemployed, and inspired by "agitation", a distinction which the Committee feels is basic and to which it has referred elsewhere. The Committee supports the right to strike, as between actual workers and their employers, and it supports the right to picket, but emphasizes the expression in the Commission's recommendation, "PEACEFUL picketing," which was not the method used by the C. and A. W. I. U. in the Imperial Valley.

"3. That a "Labor Coordinator" be appointed by the Federal Government to equalize and balance the labor supply, and that, through this Coordinator, preference in employment be given to permanent residents."

The Committee hesitates to comment on this recommendation as to the governmental agency to be in authority. It was a pleasure to meet and work with General Glassford, whose appointment evidently was based on it. However, the fact cannot be overlooked that the State of California is equipped through its own Department of Industrial Relations, augmented by or cooperating with an agency fully informed on agricultural conditions, such as the State Board of Agriculture, to handle such situations as exist in the Imperial Valley. The State Department of Industrial Relations has been constantly in touch with the situation in the Imperial Valley and some of its findings are referred to in the Committee's report. If the appointment of a Federal "Conciliator" was the result of the Federal Commission's report, this may have been due to a misconception of the need for such action, or of the real situation in the Valley.

As to the suggestion relative to preference being given permanent residents, the Committee can only point out that this has been the program of the Mexican Association and that it has been handicapped by the activities of the C. and A. W. I. U. whose policy is exactly the opposite, as brought out in the hearings before the Committee, on April 8.

"4. That a permanent board or impartial administrator be set up by the Federal Government, to act in matters of dispute regarding wages, long waits in the field, drinking water, contract labor, minimum and maximum hours, employment of women and children, transportation of workers, etc. We recommend this because we believe there are no codes for the protection of agricultural employees."

The Committee's comments on Recommendation 3 apply essentially also to Recommendation 4. "Collective bargaining" is the established means to this end, beyond that, the State machinery is already created.

"5. That State and County authorities be urged by the United States Public Health Service to improve living quarters (especially those adjacent to the larger centers of population), housing, street improvements, sewage, water supply, and all other determining factors in the health and welfare of the entire community."

The present laws cover this situation. National, State and County authorities are cooperating. It is a matter of evolution rather than sudden transformation. If money could be obtained, sufficient to build small houses, in centrally located camps, in the areas where such labor is used, then the work could progress much more rapidly. The Committee feels the recommendation might have been in this direction, rather than an implied criticism of present efforts.

"6. That the Federal government cooperate with the State and County to establish subsistence farms or gardens, to enable the workers to tide over periods of unemployment characteristic of the Imperial Valley."

The Committee agrees with this recommendation in theory and would like to see the experiment tried. It adds frankly, however, that it questions the practicability of the recommendation for Imperial Valley. The type of labor, its backgrounds, the climate of the Valley, especially during the four midsummer months, all make it feel that this is a theory of doubtful practice in that area. This idea might be adaptable to other agricultural areas of the State, and when proven practical there, might point to a social improvement of these people by some modification of this plan.

"7. That the California State Department of Education promote a program of social and economic education, using for that purpose, such media as the schools, clubs, churches, fraternal organizations, chambers of commerce, the American Legion, the radio, and the press."

Education is today the principal influence in the changing social conditions of the worker. Many of these men and women, coming from conditions in Mexico which in no way compare with conditions in the Imperial Valley, send their children to California schools, and secure for them the same opportunities available to American born children. This is the principle on which free education is based in America. This younger generation brings back to the homes the new ideas and new ideals. In all of these the California State Department of Education is a leader, and has a nation-wide reputation. The Committee is sure that all of the organizations named by the Commission will willingly help in such a process of education, and probably are already doing so.

"8. That both State and Federal Governments encourage the growers and shippers to organize, that they may handle intelligently the serious problems relating to the successful conduct of their business."

The Committee does not understand this recommendation. The Growers and Shippers are already organized, and have been for years. They must and do handle their problems cooperatively. In this Valley trouble, the Growers and Shippers have been represented through their organization, as the workers have been represented through their organizations.

"9. That steps be taken to repatriate aliens (a) who are undesirable and are subject to deportation, and (b) who desire of their own free will to return to their respective countries."

The Committee concurs enthusiastically with this suggestion. The deportation of alien agitators should be one of the most important factors in meeting the present revolutionary movement in California, as elsewhere. The repatriation of alien laborers of either class mentioned by the Commission would lessen the labor problem. Unfortunately, although at the present time actual deportation orders have been issued against many whose presence in this country is obviously to incite trouble, as is the case with several now under deportation orders in Southern California, it has been impossible to secure actual deportation. This is a serious matter and should have the attention of those in authority.

EXHIBIT 8768[1]

REPORT ON AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CAUSES THAT LED TO THE WHEATLAND HOP-FIELD RIOT OF AUGUST 3, 1913.

Made by State Commission of Immigration and Housing of California, and submitted to the Governor of California and to the special United States Industrial Commission appointed by President Wilson. Released on June 1, 1914.

THE HOP-PICKERS

The outbreak concerned the workers employed and camped upon the Durst hop ranch at Wheatland. There were about 2,800 men, women, and children camped on a low, unshaded hill. The estimates for women and children vary from 1,000 to 1,500. Many of the children were very small, some being infants-in-arms. Approximately half of the force were aliens, interpreters of seven languages having been used at one of the mass meetings. A field boss had made note of 27 nationalities in his picking gang of 235. These aliens were unskilled laborers; had unclean personal and camp habits, befouled the toilets and were careless in the presence of women and children.

The Americans were in main a casual-working, migratory labor class, with an indifferent standard of life and cleanliness. They were recruited in part from the improvident populations of near-by cities; in part from the poor of the country towns, and in part from the impoverished ranches and mining camps of the Sierra foothills. A small, but essentially important, fraction were American hoboes. There were many exceptions to these generalizations. Many families were of the better middle class and had been in the habit of using the hop and fruit seasons as their "country vacation". They were evidently deeply humiliated by their experience, and their indignant condemnation of the filth and sanitary neglect has been, for our investigation, the best standardization of this phase.

WAGE CONDITIONS

Ninety cents a hundred pounds was paid by Durst during the first week for hop picking, to which a so-called "bonus" of 10 cents was added if the picker stayed the three or four weeks season through. If the pickers quit before the last day of the season, this so-called "bonus" reverted to Durst. If there be a type hop-pickers' wage for 1913 in California, it was roughly $1.00 per 100 pounds of hops. Durst's so-called "bonus" was in reality a "hold-back" out of the normal hop picking wage for 1913. He had no more right to the 10 cents than he would have had to 50 cents out of the dollar. There is circumstantial evidence that this alleged bonus was intended at the opening of the season to be, and really acted as, a whip to force pickers to stay out the season in order to receive in the end their nominal wage for their weighed and recorded picking. It is suggestive that on the Monday after the Sunday's riot, Durst hastily instituted the wage rate of $1.00 per 100 pounds straight.

On the other hand, Durst found by Friday of the first week that he had 1,000 too many pickers. There is evidence that Durst planned, through State-wide advertising, to bring more pickers to his ranch than he could possibly keep in the field. Some of the pickers state in their affidavits that after they found only occasional opportunities to pick, they became disgusted with the work and the increasing filth of the camp and left. Taking the "bonus" for forfeitures of previous years as a standard, the "bonuses" accruing to Durst through the leaving of the discontented workers must have been $100. to $150. per day.

Durst's hop-drying ovens could not care for the picking of more than 1,500 pickers, so that one-half the campers hung around the camp or the office waiting for the field tickets. Durst made no effort to reduce the campers in number to correspond to the force needed. The Durst management, knowing exactly the unsanitary condition of the camp, and the threatened migration of part of the picking force because of it, had in its refusal to correct the abuses, laid itself open to the suspicion of intentional carelessness because of the gain accruing to Durst in the thus forfeited "bonuses" of the pickers leaving. There was in this period patently no danger of a dearth of labor on the Durst ranch, even though a part migrate.

---

[1] See pt. 53, p. 10496.

Durst has always demanded an unusual standard of cleanliness for his hops, and inspectors have very often forced pickers to go up to the kilns to pick their bags over. I am convinced that the average first picking on this ranch was, in cleanness of hops, up to the average of the district, so that this demand of the inspectors was a material handicap to the pickers. This strict inspection of hops, in conjunction with the unusual thinness of the hops on the vines, a result of the dry year, accounts in part for the prevailing low wage average of the week's picking prior to the outbreak. The following are average days' earnings for this period: $1.31; $1.30; $1.11; $.90; $1.80; $1.32; $1.90; $1.25; $.78; $.92; $1.32; $1.82; $1.18; $1.27; $1.41; $1.15.

SANITARY CONDITION OF THE CAMP

In answer to Durst's fanciful advertisements scattered throughout California, and even in Nevada, about 3,000 people arrived on the ranch within four days. They came by every conceivable means of transportation. A great number had no blankets and slept on piles of straw thrown onto the tent floors. These tents were rented from Durst at 75 cents per week, though some old tents were donated by him free of charge. Before these, and other accommodations were ready, many slept in the fields. One group of 45 men, women and children slept packed closely together on a single pile of straw. The moral conditions of these hop fields are notoriously lax, and this camp was no exception. At least one-half the campers were absolutely destitute and those who got an opportunity to work were forced to cash in their checks each evening to feed tent companions. There are many recorded instances of actual suffering and hunger.

Toilets.—Perhaps the most vicious sanitary abuse was that of toilets. There were very probably nine of these for the 2,800 people. There were certainly not less than eight, nor more than eleven. These toilets accommodated two persons, and were crude boxes placed over a hole of 2 feet in depth. About half the toilets had no boards with the customary holes cut in them, but had a single scantling nailed across. There was no toilet inspection or cleaning. They were used indiscriminately by Hindus, Japanese, Negroes, Whites, women and children. By the end of the second day the seats, scantlings and floors were covered by a semi-liquid mass of filth. The stench, under the great heat, became so nauseating that many instances of vomiting have been recorded. Lines of 15 to 20 women and children frequently formed awaiting their turns at the toilet, and since dysentery had become prevalent, I have heard of instances of women humiliating themselves before passing men. Children were seen about the camp in an unspeakably filthy condition, since it was not possible for them to use any toilet without befouling themselves. It must again be noted that these facts were known to the Durst management. Many of the campers soon refused to use the toilets and began using the fields in the near neighborhood of the tents. Some of these toilets were placed in immediate proximity to the wells.

There were no toilets in the fields and women were pointed out and called after as they went back among the vines. At the end of three days, the fields were in a filthy condition.

Garbage.—Despite the easily forecasted garbage problem that would of necessity arise in a camp of nearly 3,000 people, no real provision was made to take care of the garbage. Food and refuse were thrown out beside and behind the tents, and even in the paths. The toilets were used as garbage receptacles and the entrails of a sheep killed, according to report, by the Syrians, were thrown into one of the toilets. This toilet was found latter to be absolutely filled with maggots. A group of families killed a sheep about Thursday or Friday of this week, and on Monday a militia surgeon saw the entrails lying beside the tent in the sun as he went there to attend a sick child. This absolute want of garbage disposal without doubt accounts for a dangerous epidemic of dysentery which had run through the camp by Saturday of that week.

Water.—The wells, probably because the water supply had been diminished by two dry years, were absolutely insufficient for the camp. Two of the wells were often pumped dry by sun-up, and the campers were forced to either go to town for water, or to distant wells among the ranch buildings. An important part of the hop field was more than a mile away from the wells but despite the great heat of this week no water was transported to the pickers. Durst told your investigator that although he knew, as a rule, picking began on the ranch by Thursday or Friday, he never planned to have the water wagon go out to the fields until the following Monday. He gave no explanation as to the reason for this rule. The pickers during this week would be in the fields by dawn,—about 4 o'clock—and about 200 to 300 children were taken into the fields with the women. By noon, under the hot sun beating down on the still air held between the rows of vines, the children, many of whom were very small, were in a pitiable condition because of the lack of water. Numerous instances of sickness and partial prostration among children from 5 to 10 years of age were mentioned in testimony.

Durst had let a lemonade concession to his cousin, Jim Durst, who offered lemonade in the fields during this period at 5 cents a glass. This lemonade was proven upon the testimony of the druggist with whom Jim Durst traded to have been made entirely of citric acid.

A concession to sell stew had been sold and a stew-wagon went out about noon among the pickers and if stew was purchased a glass of water could be obtained with it.

There was absolutely no excuse given for the absence of water in the fields, and the failure of the ranch management to provide for this suggests, almost more than any other single incident, the absolute inability of the Durst management to realize any kind of social responsibility for the condition of the human beings employed on the ranch.

THE EMPLOYER

Ralph Durst, the manager and part-owner of the ranch, is an example of a certain type of California employer. The refusal of this type to meet the social responsibilities which come with the hiring of human beings for labor, not only works concrete and cruelly unnecessary misery to a class little able to combat personal indignity and degradation, but they add fuel to the fire of resentment and unrest which is beginning to burn in the uncared-for migratory laborer in California. That Durst could refuse his clear duty of real trusteeship of a camp on his own ranch which contained hundreds of women and children is a social fact of miserable import. The excuses I have heard, of unpreparedness, of alleged ignorance of conditions, are shamed by the proven human suffering and humiliation repeated each day from Wednesday to Sunday of that week. Even where the employer's innate sense of moral obligation fails to point out his duty, he should realize the insanity of failing to realize that a storm gathers. The riot on the Durst ranch is a California contribution to the literature of the social unrest in America.

THE I. W. W.

Of this entire labor force at the Durst ranch, it appears that some 100 had been I. W. W. "card men", or had had affiliations with this organization. There is evidence that there was in the camp a loosely caught together camp local of I. W. W. with about 30 active members. It is a deeply suggestive fact that these thirty men, through their energy, technique, and skill in organization, unified and dominated an unhomogenious mass of 2800 unskilled laborers within two days. Some 700 or 800 of the force were of the "hobo" class; in every sense potential I. W. W. strikers. At least 400 knew in a rough way the, for them curiously attractive philosophy of the I. W. W., and could also sing some of its songs.

Of the 100 old card men of the I. W. W., some of whom had been through the San Diego affair, some had been soap-boxers in Fresno; a dozen had been in the Free-speech fight in Spokane. They sized up on the hop-field as a ripe opportunity, as the principal defendant "Blackie" Ford puts it: "to start something". On Friday, two days after picking began, the practical agitators began working through the camp. Whether or not Ford came to Durst's ranch to foment trouble seems immaterial. There are five Fords in every camp of seasonal laborers in California. I have devoted myself in these weeks to these questions: "How big a per cent of California's migratory seasonal labor force know the technique of an I. W. W. strike?" "How many have imbibed that strike instinct and know when a condition is right to 'start something'?" I am convinced that the individuals of every fruit farm labor group are potential strikers. Where a group of hoboes sit around a fire under a railroad bridge, half of the group can sing I. W. W. songs without the book. This was not so three years ago. The protest mass-meeting of the Wheatland hop-pickers was singing the famous I. W. W. song "Mr. Block" when the sheriff's posse came up in its automobiles. The crowd had been harangued by an experienced I. W. W. orator—"Blackie" Ford. They had been told, according to evidence, to "knock the blocks of the scessor bills".

Ford had taken a sick baby from its mother's arms and, holding it before the eyes of the 1500 people, had cried out: "It's for the kids we are doing this". Not a quarter of the crowd was of a type normally venturesome enough to strike, and yet when the sheriff went after Ford, he was knocked down and kicked senseless by infuriated men. In the bloody riot which then ensued District Attorney Manwell, Deputy Sheriff Riordan, a negro Porto Rican and an English boy were shot and killed. Many were wounded. The posse literally fled and the camp remained practically unpoliced until the State milita arrived at dawn the next day. The question of what persons were guilty of the murder seems, in comparison with the deeper social economic responsibility, of insignificant importance. The posse was, I am convinced, over-nervous and, unfortunately, over-rigorous. This can be explained in part by the State-wide apprehension over the I. W. W.; in part by the normal California country posse's attitude towards a labor trouble. A deputy sheriff at the most critical moment fired a shot in the air, as he stated: "to sober the crowd". The crowd was armed, for every California crowd of 2000 casual laborers has a hundred gun-men. Evidence goes to show that even the gentler mountain folk in the crowd had been roused to a sense of personal injury. Durst's automobile had brought part of the posse. Numberless pickers cling to the belief that the posse was "Durst's police". When Deputy Sheriff Daken shot into the air, a fusillade took place, and when he had fired his last shell an infuriated crowd of men and women chased him to the ranch store, where he was forced to barricade himself. The crowd was dangerous and struck the first blow. The murderous temper which turned the crowd into a mob is incompatible with social existence, let alone social progress. The crowd at the moment of the shooting was a wild and lawless animal. But to your investigator the important subject to analyze is not the guilt or innocence of Ford or Suhr as the direct stimulators of the mob in action, but to name and standardize the early and equally important contributors to a psychological situation which resulted in an unlawful killing. If this is done, how can we omit either the filth of the hop ranch, the cheap gun talk of the ordinary deputy sheriff, or the unbridled, irresponsible speech of the soap box orator?

Without doubt the propaganda which the I. W. W. has actually adopted for the California seasonal laborer can be, in its fairly normal working out in law a criminal conspiracy, and under that Ford and Suhr have been found guilty of the Wheatland murder. But the important fact is that this propaganda will be carried out, whether unlawful or not. I have talked hours long with the I. W. W. leaders and they are absolutely conscious of their position in the eyes of the law. Their only comment is that they are glad, if it must be a conspiracy, that it is a criminal conspiracy. They have volunteered the beginning of a cure; it is to clean up the housing and wage problem of the seasonal worker. The shrewdest I. W. W. leader I found said: "We can't agitate in the country unless things are rotten enough to bring the crowd along".

They evidently were in Wheatland.

PROBLEM

The problem is the great problem of the growing, dangerous friction between the men who hire and those who work, and for whose study the great Federal Commission on Industrial Relations has been established.

The concrete problem in California is; What must be done to IN FACT remedy the evils of the existing industrial relations between casual, seasonal workers, and their employers, so as to forestall or prevent the insidious, violent work of the agitator who is not interested in improving living and wage conditions, but who rejoices in bad conditions which afford opportunities for stirring up discontent to fan the flames of the "Revolution" of his dreams? The seasonal workers are migratory, careless and disorganized, so that there is no effective units with which the employers can deal or through which the workers can present their demands. Besides, there is ill-will, and suspicion, and fault on both sides. It is also to be confidently expected that both sides will refuse to honestly take stock of their own deeds and intentions, and condemn the wrong they cannot help but disclose. Therefore, the remedy, of necessity means the intrusion of a third party.

THE REMEDY

It is obvious that the violent strike methods adopted by the I. W. W. type of agitator, which only incidentally, although effectively, tend to improve camp conditions, are not to be accepted as a solution of the problem. It is also obvious that the conviction of the agitators, such as Ford and Suhr, for murder is not a solution, but is only the punishment or revenge inflicted by organized society for a past deed. The Remedy lies in prevention.

The laws of the State already provide for the regulation of the sanitation of labor camps, and the Commission of Immigration and Housing has made definite preparations for the enforcement of these laws. The inspectors of this Commission are already at work in the field, and when the camps are opened up at the beginning of the summer season the Commission, acting in conjunction with the Board of Health, will condemn all unsanitary camps and will prosecute the employers to the full extent of the law, which imposes both a heavy fine and imprisonment.

It is the opinion of your investigator that the improvement of living conditions in the labor camps will have the immediate effect of making the recurrence of impassioned, violent strikes and riots not only improbable, but impossible, and, furthermore, such improvement will go far toward eradicating the hatred and bitterness in the minds of the employers and the roving, migratory laborers. This accomplished, the two conflicting parties will be in a position to meet on a saner, more constructive basis in solving the further industrial problems as to wages, etc.

As a preliminary to the active enforcement of the labor camp regulation laws the Commission of Immigration and Housing is preparing to start a State-wide campaign of warning and education among the large employers of migratory laborers and among the workers themselves. The employers must be shown that it is essential that living conditions among their employes be improved, not only in fulfillment of their obligations to society in general, but also in order to protect and promote their own welfare and interests. They must come to realize that their own laxity in allowing the existence of unsanitary and filthy conditions gives a much-desired foothold to the very agitators of the revolutionary I. W. W. doctrines whom they so dread: they must learn that unbearable, aggravating living conditions innoculate the minds of otherwise peaceful workers with the germs of bitterness and violence, as was so well exemplified at the Wheatland riot, giving the agitator a fruitful field wherein to sow the seeds of revolt, preach the doctrines of direct action and sabotage.

On the other hand, the migratory laborers must be shown that revolts accompanied by force in scattered and isolated localities, not only involve serious breaches of law and lead to crime, but that they accomplish no lasting constructive results in advancing their cause.

The Commission of Immigration and Housing, in intruding itself as the third party in the attempt to solve these problems, does not act as the friend or foe of either side in exclusion of the other. The Commission intends to furnish a clearing house to hear the complaints or grievances of both sides, and act as a mediator, or safety valve.

THE LIBRARY OF THE
JUL 1 1940
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS